From: COMNAVSAFECEN NORFOLK VA [COMNAVSAFECENNORFOLKVA@nrfkdms.nadsusea.navy.mil] Posted At: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 5:28 PM Conversation: 112018Z MAY 04 PROWLER SAFETYGRAM FOR THE SECOND HALF OF APRIL, 2004 c=US;a=DMS;o=WA1;ou1=AVPV1;ou2=NASWIDMS;ou3=COMVAQWINGPAC(uc);dda:msxcx5 00=c:US,o:U.S. Government,ou:DoD,ou:Navy,ou:Organizations(uc),l:Washington,l:WHIDBEY ISLAND,ou:COMVAQWINGPAC WHIDBEY ISLAND WA(uc) Posted To: NRFK_SAFE_Code 70 Subject: 112018Z MAY 04 PROWLER SAFETYGRAM FOR THE SECOND HALF OF APRIL, 2004 c=US;a=DMS;o=WA1;ou1=AVPV1;ou2=NASWIDMS;ou3=COMVAQWINGPAC(uc);dda:msxcx5 00=c:US,o:U.S. Government,ou:DoD,ou:Navy,ou:Organizations(uc),l:Washington,l:WHIDBEY ISLAND,ou:COMVAQWINGPAC WHIDB Importance: Low TO ALVAQRONS AL ALVAQRONS(uc) CC COMNAVAIRLANT NORFOLK VA COMNAVREG NW SEATTLE WA(uc) MAWTS 1(uc) NAVPGSCOL MONTEREY CA(uc) COMNAVSAFECEN NORFOLK VA(uc) COMNAVAIRSYSCOM PATUXENT RIVER MD(uc) NAVSTKAIRWARCEN FALLON NV(uc) COMMARFORLANT(uc) COMMARFORPAC(uc) COMNAVAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA COMVAQWINGPAC WHIDBEY ISLAND WA(uc) NATEC DET WHIDBEY ISLAND WA(uc) AIMD WHIDBEY ISLAND WA(uc) DCMA NG ST. AUGUSTINE(uc) NAVAIRDEPOT JACKSONVILLE FL(uc) FASOTRAGRUPAC DET WHIDBEY ISLAND WA(uc) NAVAIRWARCENWPNDIV PT MUGU CA(uc) ELATKWEPSCOL WHIDBEY ISLAND WA(uc) AIRTEVRON NINE CHINA LAKE CA(uc) NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND WA(uc) MAG TWELVE MAG FOURTEEN UNCLAS MSGID/GENADMIN/CVWP N5// POC/M. HALL/LCDR/SAFETY OFFICER/LOC:COMVAQWINGPAC/TEL:DSN 820-4152 /EMAIL:MICHAEL.J.HALL4@NAVY.MIL// RMKS/1. THIS WEEK'S SAFETYGRAM COMES TO US COURTESY OF THE VAQ-137 "ROOKS". 2. GIVEN THE RECENT EMPHASIS PLACED ON RISK MANAGEMENT BY THE ENTIRE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE SAFETY DEPARTMENT THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE TO COMPARE AND CONTRAST TWO DIFFERENT SCENARIOS IN THE LIGHT OF PROFESSIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT: JUST PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT, A HARD-WORKING JUNIOR SAILOR TAKES A WELL-DESERVED BREAK TO VISIT WITH FAMILY AND FRIENDS. AS SO OFTEN HAPPENS, HE DELAYS HIS RETURN DRIVE UNTIL IT IS NECESSARY TO DRIVE STRAIGHT THROUGH THE NIGHT TO NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND. DURING THE DRIVE, OUR INTREPID SAILOR UNDERSTANDABLY BEGINS TO FIGHT SLEEP AND FATIGUE. HE FIGHTS THIS OFF AT FIRST WITH SEVERAL SHOTS OF ESPRESSO. AS THE HOURS WEAR ON, IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT COFFEE ALONE WILL NOT DO THE TRICK. DETERMINED TO MAKE IT TO THE SQUADRON PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF HIS LEAVE, HE BUYS SEVERAL ENERGY DRINKS AND "ENERGY" PILLS AT A ROADSIDE SERVICE STATION. THESE SEEM TO WORK JUST FINE AND HE ARRIVES AT THE SQUADRON FEELING GOOD AND READY TO WORK. HE IMMEDIATELY STARTS HAULING GEAR FOR THE SQUADRON PACKOUT EVOLUTION; HOWEVER, SHORTLY AFTER BEGINNING WORK, HE NOTICES THAT HIS HEART IS BEATING STRANGELY. AFTER TRYING TO CONTINUE WORKING FOR ANOTHER HOUR, HE DECIDES TO ASK HIS CHIEF FOR A LITTLE REST TIME. BACK AT THE BARRACKS, HIS HEARTBEAT CONTINUES TO RISE AND HIS RESPIRATION BECOMES LABORED. ON THE ADVICE OF A FRIEND, AN AMBULANCE IS CALLED, AND OUR SAILOR FINDS HIMSELF IN THE HOSPITAL UNDER OBSERVATION AND DIAGNOSED AS BEING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF AMPHETAMINES. 3. OUR SECOND SCENARIO SEEMS AT FIRST TO BE QUITE DIFFERENT. THE SQUADRON IS HEADING ACROSS THE COUNTRY FOR A DETACHMENT TO THE SHIP WITH THE REST OF THE CARRIER AIR WING. SEVERAL CREWS FERRIED AIRCRAFT TO THE EAST COAST EARLY IN AN ATTEMPT TO CONDUCT FCLPS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE DETACHMENT. ONE BAND OF ADVENTURERS DECIDES TO FLY TO NAS WILLOW GROVE NEAR PHILADELPHIA, PA AS AN INTERMEDIATE STOP. THE FIRST TWO LEGS OF THE DAY ARE REASONABLY UNEVENTFUL; HOWEVER, THE CREW FINDS IT NECESSARY TO PICK THEIR WAY THROUGH LINES OF THUNDERSTORMS AT EACH DESTINATION. AFTER WAITING FOR A LOCAL THUNDERSTORM TO CLEAR THE AREA PRIOR TO MANNING UP FOR THE FINAL LEG, THE CREW LAUNCHES INTO AN ANGRY SKY FOR THE SHORT FLIGHT TO PHILADELPHIA. PROACTIVELY CHECKING WEATHER RIGHT FROM THE START OF THE FLIGHT, THE CREW LEARNS THAT NAS WILLOW GROVE IS CURRENTLY UNDER A 100 FOOT CEILING WITH HEAVY RAIN SHOWERS. FURTHERMORE, AS THE CREW CHECKED IN WITH APPROACH CONTROL, THEY ARE SURPRISED TO HEAR THAT THE DUTY RUNWAY IS CURRENTLY WITHOUT A PRECISION APPROACH RADAR. THE BACKSEAT CREWMEMBERS DOGGEDLY COORDINATE WITH BASE OPERATIONS AND, AS THE GROUND CREW SWINGS THE APPROACH RADAR, APPROACH CONTROL PROVIDES VECTORS AROUND THE EMBEDDED CELLS AND LIGHTNING. EVENTUALLY THE PRECISION APPROACH CONTROLLERS GUIDE THE AIRCRAFT TO A PERFECT BREAKOUT ON CENTERLINE AT 100 FEET AND ONE-QUARTER MILE FROM THE RUNWAY THRESHOLD. THE CREW ELECTS TO TAKE A TRAP, WHICH TURNS OUT TO BE WISE AS THE STANDING WATER ON THE RUNWAY IS ALMOST AN INCH DEEP. SOUNDS QUITE A BIT LIKE A SUCCESS STORY, DOES IT NOT? IT MIGHT BE SALIENT TO NOTE THAT JUST 80 MILES TO THE SOUTH ANDREWS AFB HAS NO CEILING AND UNRESTRICTED VISIBILITY. 4. AT FIRST BLUSH, MUCH ABOUT THESE SCENARIOS SEEMS TO BE DIFFERENT. ONE STORY CONCERNS A JUNIOR ENLISTED SAILOR AND HIS CAR; THE OTHER FEATURES FOUR AVIATION OFFICERS AND A NAVAL AIRCRAFT VALUED AT OVER SIXTY MILLION DOLLARS. THE FIRST SCENARIO WAS NOT A RESULT OF CAREFUL PLANNING AND CONTEMPLATION. IT WAS, RATHER, A DECISION MADE IN THE MOMENT TO DELAY UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT A RETURN DRIVE TO THE NAVAL AIR STATION. THE SECOND SCENARIO, ON THE OTHER HAND, INVOLVED MULTIPLE FLIGHT LEGS ACROSS THE COUNTRY. THIS DEMANDED CAREFUL NAVIGATION AND FUEL PLANNING BY THE AIRCREW AT EACH STAGE OF THE JOURNEY. THESE FACTS NOT WITH STANDING, ARE THESE SCENARIOS SO DIFFERENT IN THE END ANALYSIS? THE SAILOR DECIDED TO PROLONG THE TIME OF HIS DEPARTURE UNTIL HE HAD (IN HIS MIND) NO OPTION BUT TO CONTINUE DRIVING WHILE TIRED. THE AIRCREW INVOLVED IN THE SECOND JOURNEY ELECTED TO PLACE THEMSELVES AND THE AIRCRAFT INTO A SITUATION WHERE, AGAIN, FEW CHOICES OR OPTIONS EXISTED. IN AVIATION, WE CALL THIS "PUTTING OURSELVES INTO A BOX" WHEN WE LIMIT OUR OPTIONS FOR SAFELY COMPLETING THE FLIGHT OR MISSION. BOTH SCENARIOS INVOLVED DECISIONS ABOUT RISK, AND BOTH DECISIONS WERE, MOST LIKELY, NOT THE BEST THAT COULD HAVE BEEN MADE GIVEN THE HAZARDS INVOLVED. 5. RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT DEMAND PROFESSIONAL DECISION-MAKING AND SAFETY AWARENESS BOTH ON THE GROUND AND IN THE AIR. WOULD IT TRULY HAVE BEEN SO UNACCEPTABLE FOR THE SAILOR TO CALL HIS DIVISION OFFICER TO EXPLAIN HIS SITUATION INSTEAD OF RISKING HIS LIFE AND OTHERS BY TRYING TO "TOUGH" IT OUT IN THE DRIVER'S SEAT. WHAT WOULD THE REPERCUSSIONS HAVE BEEN IF THE CREW HAD DECIDED TO LAND THE AIRCRAFT AT A FIELD WITH BETTER WEATHER BEFORE CONTINUING TO THEIR FINAL DESTINATION THE NEXT DAY? THOUGHTFUL RISK MANAGEMENT DECISIONS REQUIRE MATURITY AND PATIENCE, BOTH QUALITIES NAVAL AVIATION CANNOT AFFORD TO BE WITHOUT. 6. FROM WING SAFETY: THANKS TO THE ROOKS FOR AN EXCELLENT SAFETYGRAM.//