|
By RADM J. H. Finney
From Fathom Magazine
November/December 1992
Three years ago, a destroyer (DD) collided with a merchant
ship during independent steaming in restricted waters. The DD's
officer of the deck (OOD) mistakenly identified the other ship as
a parallel contact he was overtaking. Casualties included one
officer dead, 16 people injured, and damaged estimated at $20
million. (For a complete report of this mishap, read 'Metal to
Metal in the Straits' in the June/July 1990 Fathom.)
You would think such a mishap would have a lasting influence
on sailors' actions. In reality, however, the influence spanned
only two and a half years.
In June, another DD transiting the same restricted waters also
collided with a merchant ship. Like the other OOD, this one
mistakenly identified the merchant ship as a parallel contact he
was overtaking. There were no deaths or injuries, but the DD's
damage estimate was $17 million.
Consider these many other similarities between the two
mishaps:
The captain and the executive officer were off the bridge.
The OOD didn't follow the CO's night orders. The orders
required him to call the captain when he had his first doubts
or there were surface contacts with CPAs less than 1,000
yards. He focused on one problem and lost the big picture.
He didn't organize his bridge watch to pilot the ship and
avoid shipping. He didn't fully use the capabilities of the
CIC watch team. Once the ship was in extremis, he didn't
initiate proper shiphandling maneuvers to avoid collision.
(Note: He ordered 'left 5 degrees rudder' but didn't alter
speed.) He didn't use the bridge-to-bridge radio telephone.
The combat information center watch officer (CICWO) assumed
the bridge watch knew about the danger of collision. He
didn't require watch personnel to develop maneuvering-board
solutions on all surface contacts with close CPAs, as
required by the captain's standing orders.
Communications broke down between the bridge and the CIC.
The navigator didn't take visual fixes and compare them as
required in the ship's doctrine for coastal navigation. He
didn't follow the type commander's piloting checklist for
entering restricted waters. Because of the ship's speed (25
knots in the second mishap) and an undermanned navigation
detail, he couldn't sight and log all charted aids to
navigation.
At least two watch personnel who required binoculars had a
pair that didn't work (first mishap) or didn't have any
(second mishap).
Lookouts lacked formal training.
The captain put inexperienced officers in key watch
positions, depriving himself of people most qualified to
avoid collision. These novices and their inexperienced watch
teams didn't have the ability to recognize impending danger
until it was too late.
The question that comes to my mind is, 'Why do we keep
making the same dumb mistakes?' I have examined countless mishap
reports during my tour here, and the lessons learned always
follow a common thread.
For example, crews get complacent, or the let 'channel
fever' take control of their judgement while returning from long
deployments. When 'get-home-itis' clouds their thinking, they
take shortcuts that usually result in injuries and damaged goods.
Adding to this problem are supervisors who fail in their
responsibility to keep sailors trained to do their jobs
correctly.
On the other hand, COs fail to pay attention to the
professional development of their watch officers. They often
don't know which watch officers have acquired the leadership
qualities to make the right decisions in challenging underway
situations. In some cases, they don't set the example for those
they lead.
I'm convinced there's a way to eliminate a lot of the
mishaps that occur. People just have to learn to treat
independent steaming the same way they do major fleet operations
(such as 'Tradewinds' and 'Ocean Venture'). How often do you
hear about a collision at sea during one of the latter? The
reason mishaps don't occur then is because the participants pay
closer attention to what they're doing. There's more
supervision. The participants also spend more time planning and
organizing for a successful mission.
They certainly don't steam through restricted waters at
night doing 25 knots, watching 10 surface contacts with CPAs
within 5,000 yards and knowing shoals are within 3 nautical
miles. However, that's what the OOD did in the June mishap I
described earlier. Of course, he paid the penalty.
The episode ended abruptly when the DD ran into one of the
contacts ' without anyone ever sounding the collision alarm. The
DD was left with a merchant ship's anchor stuck in its starboard
side and a ragged tear from frame 28 to frame 127. The tear
extended to a height of 4 feet above the waterline. Damage was
so extensive it cost the ship 56 operating days.
The tragedy of the most recent incident was that the ship's
crew had access to the lessons learned from the earlier mishap.
They had used the information when they started the cruise but
ignored it during the return transit.
There were no new lessons learned from either mishap. No
one could blame the failures on just one watch stander. Instead,
the failures were the responsibility of everyone in the commands,
which simply didn't organize for success. Luckily, the damage-
control efforts in both mishaps were exceptional, or the results
could have been much more costly. To avoid these problems, plan,
brief, execute, debrief, then do better the next time. |
