CASE | DECISION | FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW | JUDGE
Decision No. CR643
Department of Health and Human Services
DEPARTMENTAL APPEALS BOARD
Civil Remedies Division

IN THE CASE OF  

SUBJECT: Parvin D. Syal, M. D.,

Petitioner,
DATE: Feb. 7, 2000
                                          
             - v -
The Inspector General. Docket No. C-99-424
DECISION
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I find that the Inspector General (I.G.) established a basis to exclude Petitioner, Parvin D. Syal, M.D., from participating in Medicare and other federally funded health care programs. The I.G. proved that Petitioner was convicted of a criminal offense relating to the delivery of an item or service under a federally funded health care program. However, I find that the exclusion the I.G. determined to impose against Petitioner, 15 years, is excessive and unreasonable in light of the evidence in this case. I find a 10-year exclusion to be reasonable.

 

ISSUES, FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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Background

Petitioner is a physician in Northridge, California. On March 31, 1999, the I.G. notified Petitioner that he was being excluded from participation in Medicare and other federally funded health care programs. The I.G. advised Petitioner that he was being excluded pursuant to section 1128(a)(1) of the Social Security Act (Act). This section of the Act mandates an exclusion of any individual who is convicted of a criminal offense related to the delivery of an item or service under Medicare or a State health care program. The I.G. averred that Petitioner had been convicted of a criminal offense related to the delivery of an item or service under California's Medicaid program (Medi-Cal).

The minimum exclusion which must be imposed pursuant to section 1128(a)(1) of the Act is five years. The I.G. determined to exclude Petitioner for a period of 15 years. The I.G. asserted that there existed aggravating factors in Petitioner's case which justified the 15-year period of exclusion.

Petitioner requested a hearing and the case was assigned to me for a hearing and a decision. I held a prehearing conference at which the parties advised me that the case could be heard and decided based on their written submissions. The I.G. submitted a brief, a reply brief, and eight proposed exhibits (I.G. Ex. 1 - I.G. Ex. 8). Petitioner submitted a brief and three proposed exhibits (P. Ex. 1 - P. Ex. 3). The parties have not objected to my receiving into evidence any of the proposed exhibits. I receive into evidence I.G. Ex. 1 - I.G. Ex. 8 and P. Ex. 1 - P. Ex. 3. Petitioner was given the opportunity to submit a reply brief. At the conclusion of the briefing schedule, my office contacted Petitioner's counsel because I had not received a reply brief from Petitioner and I wanted to determine whether one had been submitted. Petitioner's counsel asserted that he believed that he had submitted a reply brief on Petitioner's behalf. As Petitioner's counsel asserted that he had submitted a reply brief, I gave him the opportunity to submit the brief again. Petitioner's counsel has not done so. Thus, I am deciding this case on the evidence and argument of record.

Material Facts

The material facts that I recite in this part are drawn from the exhibits that I have received into evidence in this case.

A one-count misdemeanor charge was filed against Petitioner (and his sister, who will not be otherwise mentioned in this decision) on December 11, 1997. I.G. Ex. 5 at 3. It alleged that from September 1, 1993 to on or about December 31, 1995, Petitioner willfully, unlawfully and knowingly presented and caused to be presented a false and fraudulent claim for the payment of money for health care benefits. Id. The charge against Petitioner was made in connection with a broader felony indictment against two other individuals. The felony indictment alleges that the other individuals filed false and fraudulent claims for the payment of money for health care benefits and took unlawfully from the State of California funds of a value exceeding $150,000. Id. at 1 - 2.

The indictment against the other individuals, and the misdemeanor charge against Petitioner, were the product of an investigation that was conducted by the California Attorney General's Bureau of Medi-Cal Fraud. I.G. Ex. 4. That investigation concluded that Petitioner and the other indicted individuals engaged in a scheme to submit false and fraudulent claims to the California Medi-Cal program. Id. at 1 - 2. I take notice that Medi-Cal is the State of California's Medicaid program and is a federally funded health care program.

Beginning in November, 1992, Petitioner was employed as the medical director of an entity known as Medcentrex. I.G. Ex. 4 at 7. Medcentrex was owned and operated by the two other individuals who were indicted in connection with the criminal charge that was filed against Petitioner. Medcentrex operated a clinic in the Los Angeles, California area. Petitioner agreed to allow Medcentrex to use his Medi-Cal provider numbers to bill Medicare and Medi-Cal. Id. at 8. Claims were submitted from Medcentrex using Petitioner's Medi-Cal provider numbers. In 1994, Medcentrex or Petitioner were paid $1,066,093.68 based on such claims. Through August 7, 1995, Medcentrex or Petitioner were paid $1,331,100.98 based on such claims. Id. at 4.

As part of the investigation, Petitioner's Medi-Cal claims were reviewed by independent physicians. The reviewers concluded that it was highly unlikely or impossible that an individual physician could have generated the volume and amount of claims made by or on behalf of Petitioner. I.G. Ex. 4 at 6 - 7. Petitioner's claims were described as being grossly unusual and the reviewers concluded that they probably indicated fraudulent billing by or on behalf of Petitioner. Id.

An analysis was done of a sample of the claims that were submitted for services in excess of $750 that were attributed to Petitioner's Medi-Cal provider numbers in 1994 and 1995 in order to ascertain the validity of the claims. I.G. Ex. 4 at 8 - 11. The sample was drawn from residents of two California counties, Kern and Tulare. Id. at 9. Approximately 10% of the members of the sample group were interviewed. Id. at 9 - 10. None of the individuals interviewed had been in the Los Angeles area on the dates for which services were claimed on their behalf. Id. at 10. It was determined that none of the services that had been billed were actually provided. Id.

The investigation established that, between January 23, 1993 and April 15, 1996, Petitioner was paid approximately $196,597.88 by Medcentrex. I.G. Ex. 4 at 10. Initially, Petitioner had agreed to accept a payment of $1,500 monthly from Medcentrex. Id. at 8. However, he renegotiated his compensation to three percent of the entity's gross income when he discovered that other employees of Medcentrex were driving expensive new cars. Id.

On March 31, 1998, Petitioner pled guilty to the misdemeanor charge that had been filed against him. I.G. Ex. 3; I.G. Ex. 6. Petitioner's sentence included an order to pay restitution. I.G. Ex. 6. However, the sentencing order does not make it clear what the restitution amount is. On the sentencing order next to a box that is labeled "Other" is a handwritten notation which reads:

100 REST FINE> DRR $227/ PROB COSTS

Id. Neither the I.G. nor Petitioner have offered any evidence to explain this statement.

Additionally, Petitioner agreed to forfeit or waive reimbursement for Medi-Cal or Medicare claims. I.G. Ex. 3. The amount of the forfeiture or waiver is $181,963.72. I.G. Ex. 7.

Petitioner agreed to provide testimony against the other individuals who were indicted. I.G. Ex. 3. Petitioner's cooperation with the California Bureau of Medi-Cal Fraud benefitted significantly that office in the prosecution of other individuals. I.G. Ex. 8.


Issues

The issues in this case are whether:

1. The I.G. is mandated to exclude Petitioner pursuant to section 1128(a)(1)
of the Act; and

2. A 15-year exclusion of Petitioner is unreasonable.

 

Findings of fact and conclusions of law

I make findings of fact and conclusions of law (Findings) to support my decision in this case. I set forth each Finding below as a separately numbered heading. I discuss each Finding in detail.

1. The I.G. is mandated to exclude Petitioner
pursuant to section 1128(a)(1) of the Act.

Section 1128(a)(1) of the Act mandates the I.G. to exclude any individual who is convicted of a criminal offense relating to the delivery of an item or service under Medicare or under another federally funded health care program such as Medi-Cal. This section of the Act affords no discretion to the I.G.

The facts of this case establish Petitioner to have been convicted of a program-related offense within the meaning of section 1128(a)(1). Petitioner pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge of defrauding Medi-Cal. A criminal offense that consists of theft or fraud against a federally funded health care program is, as a matter of law, a program-related crime within the meaning of section 1128(a)(1) of the Act. Greene v. Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. 835, 837 (E.D. Tenn. 1990). In establishing an offense to be program-related it is not necessary to prove that a specific item or service was involved or that care was actually delivered to a beneficiary. It will suffice to show that a federally funded health care program was a direct target of the offense. Id.

Petitioner appears to argue that, in fact, the I.G. had discretion to exclude him pursuant to section 1128(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Act. That section gives the I.G., acting as the delegate of the Secretary of this Department, the discretion to exclude an individual who is convicted of a criminal offense consisting of a misdemeanor relating to fraud, theft, embezzlement, breach of fiduciary responsibility, or other financial misconduct in connection with the delivery of a health care item or service. Petitioner suggests that the I.G. should have considered Petitioner's case under this section, inasmuch as he was convicted of a misdemeanor relating to fraud in connection with the delivery of a health care item or service.

Petitioner's argument is without merit. A similar argument was made by the excluded provider in Greene v. Sullivan and was rejected there. The identical argument has been made by excluded providers in many other cases and has been rejected many times. The Greene v. Sullivan case involved a somewhat different version of section 1128(b)(1) than is involved here (the Act was subsequently revised and amended). However, the principle which was the basis for the decision in that case continues to be valid. Section 1128(a)(1) of the Act specifically encompasses cases which relate to federally funded health care programs. The specific language of that section, which mandates exclusion of any individual who is convicted of such an offense, takes precedence over the more general language of section 1128(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Act. When the two sections of the Act are read in pari materia it is evident that section 1128(b)(1)(A)(i) applies only to misdemeanor cases of fraud or other financial crimes that relate to health care items or services that are not delivered in connection with federally funded health care programs.

Furthermore, I note that section 1128(b)(1)(A)(i) in any event applies only to a conviction for an offense which occurred after the date of enactment of the revisions and amendments to the Act (August 21, 1996). The offense of which Petitioner was convicted occurred prior to August 21, 1996. It occurred between September 1, 1993 to on or about December 31, 1995.

2. The I.G. must exclude Petitioner for a period of at least five years.

The Act imposes a minimum exclusion period of at least five years for any individual who is excluded pursuant to the mandatory exclusion provision of section 1128(a). Act, section 1128(c)(3)(B). Thus, the minimum exclusion period that must be imposed against Petitioner is five years.

3. The I.G. is authorized to impose an exclusion for more than five
years, pursuant to section 1128(a)(1) of the Act, in a case where there
are aggravating factors that are not offset by mitigating factors.

The Secretary has published regulations which govern the length of exclusions that are imposed pursuant to section 1128 of the Act. 42 C.F.R. Part 1001. The regulation which establishes criteria to govern the length of exclusions that are imposed pursuant to section 1128(a)(1) is 42 C.F.R. § 1001.102. This regulation identifies "aggravating" factors which may be used, if present in a case, as a basis to lengthen an exclusion beyond the five year minimum period and "mitigating" factors which may be used, if present in a case, to offset any aggravating factors that are established.

The regulation makes clear that only those factors that it identifies as either aggravating or mitigating may be considered to determine whether an exclusion of more than five years is reasonable in a case involving section 1128(a)(1) of the Act. The aggravating and mitigating factors thus operate as rules of evidence in such a case. Evidence which does not relate to an identified aggravating or mitigating factor is irrelevant to determining the length of an exclusion and may not be considered.

The regulation does not, however, prescribe the weight which is to be given to any aggravating or mitigating factor. The regulation contains no formula prescribing any exclusion length beyond the five-year minimum period based on the presence of aggravating factors or the absence of mitigating factors. Rather, the regulation merely identifies the factors which may be used to lengthen an exclusion beyond the minimum period.

The factors which are identified in 42 C.F.R. § 1001.102 may not be applied arbitrarily to lengthen an exclusion beyond the five-year minimum. The regulation establishes the criteria which may be considered in determining whether or not to lengthen an exclusion. But, in the absence of any statement in the regulation as to how much weight must be given to an aggravating or mitigating factor, one must look to the purpose of the Act in order to determine what is the reasonable length of an exclusion where aggravating or mitigating factors are present.

Section 1128 of the Act is a remedial statute. Its purpose is not to punish the excluded individual but to protect federally funded health care programs and the beneficiaries and recipients of program funds from an individual whose conduct establishes him or her not to be trustworthy. In assessing the length of any exclusion that is imposed under section 1128, the ultimate issue that must be addressed is: how long of an exclusion is reasonably necessary to protect programs, beneficiaries, and recipients, from an untrustworthy individual?

The I.G. may not arbitrarily exclude an individual for any period of more than five years simply because aggravating factors exist in a given case. The I.G. must weigh the evidence that pertains to aggravating and mitigating factors in order to establish the degree of untrustworthiness that is manifested by the excluded individual. An exclusion that is not based on what the evidence which relates to aggravating and mitigating factors shows about the trustworthiness of the excluded individual may be arbitrary and unreasonably punitive.

4. An excluded individual has a right to a de novo hearing.

Any individual who is excluded pursuant to section 1128 of the Act has a right to a hearing before an administrative law judge. Such a hearing is conducted pursuant to section 205(b) of the Act. That section has been interpreted on numerous occasions to require a de novo hearing and an independent decision by an administrative law judge.

That is not to suggest that an administrative law judge is free to ignore entirely the determination that is made by the I.G. The I.G. has expertise in making exclusion determinations and her determinations deserve to be respected. The I.G.'s exclusion determination should be sustained as reasonable if that determination falls within a reasonable range of possible exclusions. However, the administrative law judge must evaluate independently the evidence relating to the aggravating and mitigating factors that are set forth in the regulations. If the administrative law judge concludes, based on his or her independent and de novo evaluation of the evidence, that the exclusion imposed by the I.G. departs significantly from that which the administrative law judge decides is reasonable, then the administrative law judge may modify the length of the exclusion to assure that the exclusion falls within a reasonable range of exclusions.

5. The I.G. established the presence of three aggravating factors.

The I.G. proved the presence of three aggravating factors in this case. These are as follows:

1. The acts resulting in Petitioner's conviction, or similar acts, resulted in financial loss to a government program of $1,500 or more. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.102(b)(1). The financial impact on Medi-Cal of Petitioner's conduct. plainly exceeded $1,500. Beneficiaries residing in Kern and Tulare Counties in California were interviewed during the investigation of Petitioner's involvement with Medcentrex. These interviews were of individuals for whom charges in excess of $750 per claim had been made using Petitioner's various Medi-Cal provider numbers. I.G. Ex. 4 at 9. A total of 33 individuals were interviewed. Id. at 9 - 10. The investigation established that none of the services that had been billed on behalf of these individuals actually had been provided. Id. at 10.

2. The acts resulting in Petitioner's conviction, or similar acts, were committed over a period of one year or more. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.102(b)(2). Petitioner was charged with, and pled guilty to, criminal activity that spanned a period from September 1, 1993 to on or about December 31, 1995, a period of more than two years. I.G. Ex. 3; I.G. Ex. 5 at 3.

3. Petitioner was overpaid $1,500 or more by federally funded health care programs as the result of improper billings. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.102(b)(7). The record does not establish precisely how much Medi-Cal or other federally funded health care programs overpaid Petitioner as a consequence of fraudulent claims. There is ample evidence, however, from which I infer that Petitioner's activities produced overpayments that exceeded $1,500. It is clear, in the cases of the 33 residents of Kern and Tulare Counties who were interviewed during the investigation of Petitioner's case, that claims were submitted on behalf of each of these individuals exceeding $750 for services that had not been provided. Moreover, independent analysis of the Medi-Cal claims that were submitted by or on behalf of Petitioner established that it was highly unlikely or impossible that Petitioner could have provided all of the services for which claims were submitted. I.G. Ex. 4 at 6 - 7.


6. Petitioner proved the presence of a mitigating factor.

In the notice of exclusion which the I.G. sent to Petitioner, the I.G. advised Petitioner that it had taken into account "the following mitigating factor" in determining the length of Petitioner's exclusion.

The individual's or entity's cooperation with Federal or State officials resulted
in others being convicted or excluded from Medicare or any of the State health
care programs. State documents indicate that you have agreed to cooperate
and testify against others involved in the scheme to defraud the programs.

I.G. Ex. 1 at 2. The I.G.'s determination did not explain how the I.G. used this apparent mitigating factor in weighing the length of the exclusion that the I.G. determined to impose. See Id.

However, the I.G., citing 42 C.F.R. § 1001.102(c)(3), now asserts that Petitioner's cooperation does not establish the presence of a mitigating factor. According to the I.G., Petitioner's cooperation is not mitigating because it did not result in either: 1) others being convicted or excluded from program participation; or 2) additional cases being investigated. I.G.'s Brief in Support of Exclusion at 12. The I.G. avers also that Petitioner's cooperation was not voluntary, but was instead part of a negotiated plea agreement. Id.

The mitigating factor which is at issue here is set forth at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.102(c)(3). The regulation states that a mitigating factor is present under the following circumstances:


(3) The [excluded] individual's or entity's cooperation with Federal or State officials resulted in -

(i) Others being convicted or excluded from Medicare, Medicaid and all other Federal health care programs,

(ii) Additional cases being investigated or reports being issued by the appropriate law enforcement agency identifying program vulnerabilities or weaknesses, or

(iii) The imposition against anyone of a civil money penalty or assessment under part 1003 of this chapter.


The evidence concerning Petitioner's agreement to cooperate and the extent of his cooperation is contained in his plea agreement and in a letter from an attorney who is a Supervising Attorney General in the California Bureau of Medi-Cal Fraud (California Attorney General). I.G. Ex. 3; I.G. Ex. 8. The plea agreement recites that Petitioner will cooperate fully in the criminal prosecutions of two of the other individuals who were indicted in the case which led to a misdemeanor charge being filed against Petitioner. I.G. Ex. 3. It recites further that Petitioner understands that he must provide honest testimony against the other defendants and that false testimony may result in sanctions and additional criminal charges being imposed against Petitioner. Id. The letter from the California Attorney General recites that charges against Petitioner were filed at the misdemeanor level in view of Petitioner's minor role in the criminal scheme and in light of his cooperation "in a significant way" with the investigation. The letter adds that Petitioner's cooperation "benefitted this office in the prosecution of others."

Petitioner's cooperation meets the criteria for a mitigating factor that are set forth at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.102(c)(3)(ii). The evidence is not vitiated by the fact that Petitioner gave his cooperation in consideration for acceptance of his plea.

The letter from the California Attorney General establishes that Petitioner's cooperation resulted in additional cases being investigated within the meaning of 42 C.F.R. § 1001.102(c)(3)(ii). As is plain from the letter, Petitioner's cooperation benefitted the California Attorney General in the prosecution of other individuals. I.G. Ex. 8.

It seems that the I.G. may be advocating a narrow reading of the language of 42 C.F.R. § 1001.102(c)(3)(ii). The I.G. appears to be arguing that a mitigating factor can exist under this section only in the instance where an individual's cooperation results in investigation of a case involving an individual or individuals who are not named in the indictment in which the cooperating individual is charged or in a case which involves different facts from those which are the basis for the indictment in which the cooperating individual is charged. If that is the I.G.'s interpretation, I find it to be an unreasonably narrow reading of the regulation. Read literally, the regulation allows for a mitigating factor in any instance where an excluded individual cooperates in a case other than his or her own case. The regulation would not preclude giving credit to an individual who cooperates in an investigation of other individuals named in the same criminal complaint as is the excluded individual. Nor would the regulation preclude giving credit to an individual who cooperates in an investigation of another individual which involves the same facts or criminal scheme of which the excluded individual was charged and convicted.

There is nothing in 42 C.F.R. § 1001.102(c)(3) which states or suggests that, in order to qualify as a mitigating factor, an individual's cooperation must be unrelated to or not tied to a plea agreement. The regulation plainly allows for a mitigating factor even where cooperation is an express condition of a plea.

7. An exclusion of 15 years is unreasonable in light of
evidence relating to aggravating and mitigating factors.

I find to be unreasonable the 15-year exclusion that the I.G. imposed against Petitioner. It is unreasonably harsh in light of what the evidence pertaining to aggravating factors says about Petitioner's involvement in the criminal scheme that resulted in his conviction. Moreover, it gives Petitioner no credit for the cooperation that he provided to the California Attorney General.

At the outset of this discussion, I note that the exclusion in this case is among the longer exclusions that I have seen in the more than 11 years that I have heard and decided cases concerning exclusions imposed by the I.G. That is not to suggest that a 15-year exclusion may not be merited by the evidence. But, an exclusion of 15 years suggests that the excluded individual is far more untrustworthy than are most of the individuals who have been excluded by the I.G.

Here, the evidence pertaining to Petitioner's lack of trustworthiness does not establish Petitioner to be so exceptionally untrustworthy as to merit an exclusion of the extreme length that the I.G. determined to impose. The evidence does not establish that Petitioner was a major player in a massive scheme to defraud Medi-Cal. The I.G. failed to meet her burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner was as culpable as the I.G. determined Petitioner to be. Indeed, the equivocal nature of the evidence against Petitioner is underscored by the fact that Petitioner was convicted only of a single misdemeanor offense. The California Attorney General has characterized Petitioner's involvement in the scheme for which he was convicted as being "minor." I.G. Ex. 8.

What is apparent from the evidence pertaining to aggravating factors is that Petitioner certainly allowed the other indicted individuals to make free use of his Medi-Cal provider numbers to commit extensive fraud against Medi-Cal. Millions of dollars of fraudulent claims were made using Petitioner's Medi-Cal provider numbers. At the very least, Petitioner willingly looked the other way while this fraud was being committed. And, Petitioner profited from the fraud for a period of more than two years.

But, it is unclear from the evidence which relates to the aggravating factors the extent to which Petitioner personally planned, executed, or participated in the fraud. The evidence lends itself to inferences which include: 1) that Petitioner knowingly participated in and abetted the scheme; and 2) that Petitioner simply was indifferent to how others misused his Medi-Cal provider numbers and accepted some of the fruits of that misuse.

The I.G. essentially alleges that the first inference is correct. The I.G. attributes to Petitioner all of the fraud committed at the Medcentrex clinic during the period when Petitioner was employed as the Medcentrex medical director.

However, although there are various possible explanations of the extent of Petitioner's involvement, the preponderance of the evidence does not support the I.G.'s conclusion. The evidence shows that: Petitioner allowed others to file claims using his Medi-Cal provider numbers; and, Petitioner profited by receiving a percentage of the revenues earned based on these claims. It does not explain, however, whether Petitioner personally directed the filing of false claims or whether Petitioner was even aware of the extent of the fraud that was being committed in his name. The most that can be said about Petitioner's involvement was that he was recklessly indifferent to fraud at the Medcentrex clinic.

The I.G. has offered no evidence which establishes that Petitioner was actively involved in the criminal activities at Medcentrex. There is, for example, no evidence that Petitioner personally generated false claims or false documentation of claims. Nor is there evidence to show that he helped to plan and to execute the scheme to defraud Medi-Cal. The I.G. has not produced any evidence to show that Petitioner was aware of the extent of the false claims that were being made in his name.

That is not to minimize the extent of Petitioner's culpability. Petitioner was a participant for more than two years in a criminal scheme. He allowed his Medi-Cal provider numbers to be misused to generate wholesale false claims. And, he profited from this criminal activity. But, there is a difference between reckless indifference to what was going on and active involvement in a criminal scheme. For this reason, I conclude that the evidence as to aggravating factors shows Petitioner to be untrustworthy, but not so untrustworthy as the I.G. asserts Petitioner to be.

Moreover, the I.G. has not given Petitioner credit for his cooperation with the California Attorney General. This cooperation plainly has been valuable. I.G. Ex. 8.

8. An exclusion of 10 years is reasonable.

The weight of the evidence establishes that Petitioner is not so untrustworthy as the I.G. asserts him to be. For that reason I find that a 15-year exclusion is unreasonable. It exceeds the reasonable range of exclusions that might be imposed against Petitioner given what the evidence establishes about his conduct.

The weight of the evidence does show Petitioner to be untrustworthy. He may not have been an active participant in the scheme perpetrated against Medi-Cal by the other indicted individuals. However, he certainly was indifferent for a period of more than two years to the consequences of his allowing his Medi-Cal provider numbers to be misused by others. Petitioner had to have some awareness of the volume of claims being generated based on his provider numbers. He negotiated an agreement to be paid three percent of the income of Medcentrex for his role as clinic director. Petitioner easily could have extrapolated from his pay, had he desired to do so, and learned the amount of the fraud that was being committed in his name. Moreover, Petitioner had to be aware during the period of his employment at Medcentrex that the pay he was receiving was grossly disproportionate to the actual business that the clinic was doing.

For these reasons I find Petitioner to be highly untrustworthy, although not so untrustworthy as the I.G. alleges him to be. I find that an exclusion of 10 years is reasonable in light of the level of untrustworthiness that is manifested by Petitioner.

 

JUDGE
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Steven T. Kessel
Administrative Law Judge



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