For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
September 4, 2003
Fact Sheet
Proliferation Security Initiative
Statement of Interdiction Principles
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a response to the
growing challenge posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials
worldwide. The PSI builds on efforts by the international community to
prevent proliferation of such items, including existing treaties and
regimes. It is consistent with and a step in the implementation of the
United Nations Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992,
which states that the proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to
international peace and security, and underlines the need for member
states of the U.N. to prevent proliferation. The PSI is also
consistent with recent statements of the G8 and the European Union,
establishing that more coherent and concerted efforts are needed to
prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related
materials. PSI participants are deeply concerned about this threat and
of the danger that these items could fall into the hands of terrorists,
and are committed to working together to stop the flow of these items
to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.
The PSI seeks to involve in some capacity all states that have a
stake in nonproliferation and the ability and willingness to take steps
to stop the flow of such items at sea, in the air, or on land. The PSI
also seeks cooperation from any state whose vessels, flags, ports,
territorial waters, airspace, or land might be used for proliferation
purposes by states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The
increasingly aggressive efforts by proliferators to stand outside or to
circumvent existing nonproliferation norms, and to profit from such
trade, requires new and stronger actions by the international
community. We look forward to working with all concerned states on
measures they are able and willing to take in support of the PSI, as
outlined in the following set of "Interdiction Principles."
Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative:
PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction
principles to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through
which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and
related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of
proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and
relevant international law and frameworks, including the United Nations
Security Council. They call on all states concerned with this threat
to international peace and security to join in similarly committing
to:
1) Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with
other states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their
delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and
non-state actors of proliferation concern. "States or non-state actors
of proliferation concern" generally refers to those countries or
entities that the PSI participants involved establish should be subject
to interdiction activities because they are engaged in proliferation
through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or
nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers
(either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery
systems, or related materials.
2) Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant
information concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting the
confidential character of classified information provided by other
states as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources and
efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize
coordination among participants in interdiction efforts.
3) Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal
authorities where necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to
strengthen when necessary relevant international laws and frameworks in
appropriate ways to support these commitments.
4) Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts
regarding cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials,
to the extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent
with their obligations under international law and frameworks, to
include:
a) Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes
to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not
to allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so.
b) At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown
by another state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying
their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas
beyond the territorial seas of any other state, that is reasonably
suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-state
actors of proliferation concerns, and to seize such cargoes that are
identified.
c) To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate
circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by
other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such
vessels that may be identified by such states.
d) To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their
internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared)
vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or
from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to seize
such cargoes that are identified; and (2) enforce conditions on vessels
entering or leaving their ports, internal waters, or territorial seas
that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as
requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure
of such cargoes prior to entry.
e) At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause
shown by another state, to (a) require aircraft that are reasonably
suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state
actors of proliferation concern and that are transiting their airspace
to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified;
and/or (b) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes
transit rights through their airspace in advance of such flights.
f) If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as
transshipment points for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or
non-state actors of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels,
aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying
such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.
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