I&BS Subcommittee Hearing:
Maritime Security Operations of the
Department of Homeland Security

Opening Statement, May 5, 2005

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I’d like to thank our witnesses for appearing here today.

In my estimation, there is not one part of our nation’s critical infrastructure that is as vital to our economy, and at the same time so vulnerable, as our nation’s ports.

A successful attack on a U.S. port could not only cause immediate loss of life, but also severe economic damage.

My district is very close to the Port of LA - Long Beach. The lockout of the longshoremen that occurred in the fall of 2002 shut down that port and 28 other ports on the West Coast for 11 days.  It cost the U.S. economy over $1 billion per day. 

The port system in this country was built with maximum openness to ensure efficient moving of cargo, but there was virtually no security.  We have a long way to go and we need to get there fast.

With that in mind, Ranking Member Turner, myself, and several other members of the Committee will introduce a comprehensive port security bill next week.  The ideas presented in the bill range from the low-tech to high-tech, from U.S. ports to those overseas. 

Of course, the Coast Guard is our lead agency in port and maritime security, and I have many questions for them today too.  Our bill authorizes many Coast Guard programs, including port security grants, a long-range vessel tracking system, faster implementation of the Deepwater Program, the Automated Identification System, and upping the end strength to 50,000 people.

I am very proud of this legislation.  I know that if it becomes law, it will greatly increase the security of our ports, and by extension, the security of the entire country. 

Each of the agencies represented here has an important role to play in securing our ports, and our national waters.

A lot of our ports are still lacking the most basic security measures, such as the installation of fencing and personnel access restrictions at the ports themselves.

Next, we must secure cargo within the shipping system.  We must improve the Container Security Initiative, a program designed to identify and inspect high-risk cargo while it is still at a foreign port. 

This program might be a good idea, but it will be ineffective unless we provide the resources, especially personnel, to do the job right.

We also intend to strengthen the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism by requiring full inspections of the security practices of the participants.  Currently, there are 3100 companies benefiting from CTPAT.  Only 248 of those have gone through real on-site, hands-on verification inspections to insure their security is as good as it says it is on paper.  This is unacceptable.

Another area of concern is that we still have not completed the Maritime Intelligence Plan or the National Maritime Transportation Security Plan required by the Maritime Transportation Security Act.

I would like to know who is responsible within the agency for development of these plans. One aspect of the Maritime Transportation Security Plan that I find extremely important is a plan to re-establish cargo flows in the event of an attack or other disaster at a USport.

Re-routing cargo will be an extremely difficult task, and it is important that DHS develops a robust contingency plan in advance.  We cannot afford to be caught flat-footed.  A “shut everything down” response similar to what happened to aviation and our borders after 9-11 would be economically devastating.

Besides port security, another purpose of the hearing is to examine the various maritime assets of the agencies here before us.  We want to make sure that these agencies are complimenting each other are not duplicating efforts.  I would also like to talk about what kind of coordination you have with local law enforcement agencies. 

We have a lot of ground to cover here.  I thank you all for being here and I look forward to hearing from all of you on these issues.

Thank you,   Mr. Chairman.