Real Audio of Briefing

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Good afternoon. What I'd like to do is just provide a very brief overview and then take questions.

       In addition to the publication that was just referred to, "What Does Disarmament Look Like," I'd also call your attention to two other events. One is the publication by Dr. Condi Rice of the op-ed piece in the New York Times today and the speech by Dr. Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of Defense, before the Council of Foreign Relations in New York earlier this afternoon.

       In Dr. Wolfowitz's speech, he lays out what I consider to be a very powerful argument, an argument that is further developed in this publication and referred to in Dr. Rice's op-ed piece. The argument is as follows:

       We know from recent experiences -- the case of South Africa, the case of Ukraine and Kazakhstan -- we know from these experiences what cooperative disarmament looks like. And as we look at those experiences and we contrast them with what is occurring in Iraq, we know that what is happening in Iraq is the opposite of cooperative disarmament. And given that the fundamental premise for inspections was that inspections would work only if Iraq had made the strategic decision to cooperate and disarm, we have to draw the appropriate conclusions.

       But before I get into the conclusions, let me just lay out the argument for you.

       In the three experiences that I've just mentioned, we find a number of common elements.

       The first common element is that when a government decides to disarm cooperatively, there is a high-level political decision and commitment to that disarmament. We saw that in all three of these cases. In the case of South Africa, a state that had produced nuclear weapons -- had actually not only developed but had built seven nuclear weapons -- there was a decision by the president to disarm. In the case of Kazakhstan and Ukraine, there were similarly high-level decisions to disarm themselves of the nuclear weapons that they inherited as a consequence of the unraveling of the Soviet Union.

       The second common element is that in all three cases, you find national programs of implementation and you find that the governments identify organizations and even individuals who are responsible for carrying out the disarmament.

       And the third element is full cooperation and transparency, whether it's with the IAEA or with other groups. Again, in the case of South Africa, you had a presidential decision, you had the commitment to work with an international authority, and you had a government that bent over backwards to provide full cooperation and transparency. And in that case, the government made available to the international inspectors all of the documentation associated with the weapons program and the dismantlement, access to all of the associated facilities and access to all of the individuals who worked on that program.

       Now, when you contrast the situation that I've just described with what is going on in Iraq, you find the exact opposite. Instead of a political commitment to disarm at the highest level, you have a commitment to defeat the inspectors.

       And, in fact, it's Saddam Hussein's own son who leads the organization -- the SSO, or Special Security Organization -- that is designed to counter the inspectors. Instead of an organization to carry out disarmament, you have a number of organizations that are designed to defeat the inspections. And instead of full cooperation and transparency, you find repeated examples of concealment and of deception, including what was supposed to be the final and full and accurate disclosure that was an obligation placed on Iraq by the Security Council in Resolution 1441.

       What you find in the 12,000 pages of documentation is very little other than obfuscation and deception. You find no explanation of what international inspectors had identified upon their exit in 1998 in terms of gaps and inconsistencies. Gaps and inconsistencies should be translated into real concerns about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. What happened to the one and a half tons of VX? What happened to the 30,000 chemical munitions that were unaccounted for? What happened to the 8,000 liters of anthrax, which, oh, by the way, U.N. inspectors say could have actually been two to four times that amount? What's happened to all of these weapons of mass destruction that could literally kill millions of people?

       Well, the 8 December declaration doesn't tell us. When it addresses some of the missing items, such as some of the growth media for growing biological agents for weapons, it takes an almost mocking response: We've lost it. Well, I don't believe that you lose weapons of mass destruction.

       There has been no plausible explanation, not only for what U.N. inspectors had identified prior to 1998, but the document doesn't deal with the other issues of concern that have been raised since then, issues such as mobile laboratories for the development and production of biological agents, or explanations for why Iraq would try to import uranium from Africa, or explanations for Iraq's development of ballistic missiles and UAVs with ranges greater than 150 kilometers -- that is the limit that was allowed for Iraq under the early resolution.

       In addition to the absence of documentation, you also have a determined effort to conceal, the continuation of what we believe are the weapons of mass destruction program in Iraq. You have Iraq sending home with scientists documentation on the program. You have Iraq committing resources to moving things around. You have Iraq committing massive resources to shadowing the inspectors, to penetrating the security of the inspections.

       If Iraq didn't have weapons of mass destruction -- and everyone says, well, where's the smoking gun, where's the smoking gun? Well, if Iraq didn't have a gun, why would they be going through these efforts? Why wouldn't they, in fact, approach disarmament like the other cases of cooperative disarmament that I've mentioned? Why wouldn't you have a high level commitment to disarm, or the establishment of organizations that are designed to facilitate disarmament in a cooperative way with the international authorities? Instead, you have Iraq calling the inspectors spies. In a totalitarian state, if inspectors are labeled as spies, one can predict the amount of cooperation that would be forthcoming by Iraqi citizens. This is -- this is a state in which you have people killed for talking to the U.N. inspectors. This is a very serious matter. This is an issue that is of central interest to the president and to our national security strategy. What this is about is weapons of mass destruction.

       Let me stop there and take any questions you might have.

       MODERATOR: Let me remind you to use the microphone, please, and identify yourself and your news organization. Let's start up here. This gentleman right here.

       Q Yeah, hi. Peter Spiegel (sp) with the Financial Times. You mentioned at the end of your remarks there, as did Dr. Wolfowitz, the deception efforts, the moving the papers and what not.

       But there are two things that he mentioned specifically that you touched on. One was the threat to the scientists' families, to kill them and their families. And the other one he mentioned is the active effort to infiltrate the inspection process. If I'm reading his remarks correctly, he said that this is an active thing since UNMOVIC is here, the last month and a half or so, as opposed to a historic thing.

       Can you put a little bit more meat on that bone in terms of what evidence you have of that actively going on currently?

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I think you do need to take into account things that Ambassador Butler has said in the past, or that inspectors from both IAEA as well as from UNSCOM have said. And that's part of the open record.

       In terms of recent evidence, we do know that there have been threats made by officials in the Iraqi government concerning scientists and scientists being interviewed without minders, or scientists who might be willing to go out of the country. We have evidence of Iraq moving documents around in order to defeat the purpose of the inspections. And you're well aware, I'm sure, of the inspection at the home of a private individual, a scientist in the nuclear program. These are, you know, very important, it seems to me, documents. These are documents that need to be placed in the broader context of the Iraqi weapons program, but I think also in the broader context of what Iraq is doing to defeat the inspectors.

       I can't get into, you know, a level of detail that would compromise any intelligence, but I think -- you know, I think what Dr. Wolfowitz has said, and I think I've just reflected that, demonstrates very clearly the level of effort.

       Q May I follow up on the issue of infiltration?

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Sure.

       Q Just to follow up on the issue of infiltration, whether that -- if that was supposed to be current or that is historic with UNSCOM.

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: It's -- again, the record for UNSCOM is public. In terms of UNMOVIC and the current activities of the IAEA, the same methods are being applied, both technical as well as, you know, much more direct penetration.

       Q Thank you. My name is Kristen Sabier (ph). I work for the Canadian Television. According to many polls, even people in United States are asking for more evidence; they want to see these weapons of mass destruction. How will you satisfy their curiosity?

       And my second question is, how would you explain that inspectors, after two months of research, didn't find anything?

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I think it's certainly understandable that the American public, and more broadly, the international community wants to understand the basis for the conclusion that weapons of mass destruction continue to exist in Iraq. This is, or could become, an issue of war. And clearly, we need to make that case. I think that Dr. Wolfowitz began to make the case about our evidence of Iraqi programs today. This is a case that we have been making for some time.

       The problem is that there is an expectation that there will be a smoking gun, that you have to come up with weapons of mass destruction; you have to find a chemical weapon. Well, the inspectors found 12, okay? One can say, well, those are empty. You can't say that these 12 weren't in excellent condition, because we know from inspectors that they are in excellent condition, okay? These aren't shells that were forgotten by UNSCOM and left desert and buried under sand. These are 12 shells that are in -- you know, and ammunitioned people. Now, they're empty, but if you look at Iraqi operational doctrine, they would be stored empty, okay, because you wouldn't store them with the agent. Now, there are only 12, and Iraq came up with four more, leaving 29,984 unaccounted for.

       But the point that I think needs to be made is not the 12 shells, or the four, or even the 30,000; the important point is that the burden of proof is on Iraq.

       We have a baseline established by the United Nations, and we have -- you know, that says to Iraq, "You must disclose all information about your programs. Here's what we know about your programs in terms of gaps and inconsistencies." Iraq still doesn't do that. It still doesn't account for this in a full, complete or accurate manner. Instead, it defeats the inspectors. It puts its resources into, you know, defeating the purpose and the objective of the inspectors.

       We are going to continue to lay out our case. But you have to remember that inspections work only if there is cooperation on the part of the government. We're not getting that cooperation. To send 100 inspectors, 200 total, I think, a hundred and a small number of actual inspectors, out in a state the size of California is not -- is not something that one can -- you know, one can expect to go out and find things, okay, in a hunt-and-peck sort of approach. That's not an expectation that we've ever had. And we've made very clear from the beginning that the inspections don't work unless there is a political decision to cooperate. A strategic choice has to be made to disarm. And there is no evidence of them disarming. Quite the contrary. All evidence indicates that they have made the decision to retain their weapons of mass destruction. And remember, 1441 was the last -- described as the last opportunity.

       MODERATOR: The gentleman -- (off mike).

       Q (Off mike) -- from Al-Jazeera Television. Thanks for the opportunity to talk about this. I have a couple of questions.

       The Bush administration seems to be saying that the Iraqis do have weapons of mass destruction and therefore, Mr. Wolfowitz even today sort of said, that the inspectors may not necessarily be able to undercover all of those weapons. Some of the Europeans, on the other hand, the French and the Germans, seem to have more confidence in the process of inspections. In terms of information, are you and your European allies like the Germans and the French reading from a different book?

       And the other question that I have: In terms of the materials, which you have made a determination and the inspectors indeed have made a determination that they are amiss, how do you actually make sure that they will be found even after there has been regime change in Iraq? And if you think that the Iraqis are holding them, other than the ultimatum given by President Bush yesterday to Iraqi officers not to use them in case they get orders from the Iraqi leadership to use them, how do you make sure that you don't put American soldiers in harm's way?

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Right. Well, those are very, very important questions. Let me try to take them one at a time.

       It's not just the United States that says Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. Again, let me point out to you that in their final report, UNSCOM identified -- and they're laid out, I think, quite well in this publication that you have access to -- all of the weapons of mass destruction and associated programmatic elements that were left unaccounted for. Well, they remain unaccounted for.

       In terms of are we reading from a different book -- the United States versus some of our European allies -- I think not. I think the -- you know, the British, for example, have published their white paper with a set of very similar conclusions and a very similar set of observations with regard to the gaps and inconsistencies that are out there.

       Will inspections work? Well, again, I think the whole premise of what the Security Council did -- and that includes, you know, of course, a number of our friends and allies in Europe -- the whole premise was that it only works if Iraq cooperates. Now, you know, maybe some of those governments are making the calculation that this cooperation will happen in the future -- okay? -- certainly hasn't happened to date. And I think, you know, Mr. Blix has demonstrated, you know, through his own statements a certain degree of frustration with the lack of real cooperation, not opening doors, but real cooperation. And you know, he's pointed out, for example, the problems with -- you know, with interviews and the failure of Iraq to cooperate on interviews, the failure of Iraq to cooperate when it comes to surveillance, aerial surveillance -- a whole number of complaints.

       So I think that, you know, maybe there is a sense that Saddam will make this choice. I still, you know, continue to hope that he does. But I think clearly the president has made clear that the time is running out.

       In terms of putting American soldiers -- and it's not just American; it would be forces in the region from all of the countries -- at risk, well, they are at risk. There's no question about that. You know, Iraq has the capability of using chemical weapons or biological weapons, on the battlefield or beyond the battlefield, strategically within the region. These are, you know, facts that we need to deal with and capabilities that we need to prepare to counter.

       And American forces, and coalition forces, need to have the passive defenses and the active defenses and the counter-force capabilities that are tailored to an environment in which chemical and biological weapons might be used. If -- you know, if conflict occurs, then we need to be prepared for that; we want to deter that. And part of deterring the use of chemical and biological weapons is being able to defeat it, to continue to operate and prevail in the battlefield environment.

       I mean, if you look at the previous Gulf War, Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, and there is no question that they did, okay? They had chemical weapons deployed, they had biological weapons ready to be fired from missiles and other delivery means. We know this; this is a matter of public record. I don't think anybody would challenge that. They didn't use those weapons. And one thing that at least some Iraqis told us after the war was that one reason they didn't use the chemical weapons -- one reason -- was that they believed that we were better prepared to operate in that environment than they were. So it did serve as a deterrent. There were other aspects, I think, to why Iraq was deterred from using that, that capability, but that was one of them. We need to be prepared.

       Q Michael Backfisch, German business daily Handelsblatt. You say Iraq did not provide the necessary information about its weapons and its material, that there is an information gap. What, in your opinion, is the biggest information gap? And when were these weapons discovered, and by whom -- these weapons or the material. And last question, would all that justify war?

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, it's not just the United States that has said there's an information gap. You'll have to, you know, check the record for what Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei have said about it. And, you know, that was their clear message in the council following the Iraqi declaration of December 8th. There are major gaps; gaps in the baseline, which was your second question. The baseline was established in large part by UNSCOM -- again, part of the public record; it's the final UNSCOM report in which they said that there were, you know, significant inconsistencies and issues that have not been resolved. That's where the 30,000 chemical munitions come from. That's where the 1.5 tons of VX comes from.

       You know, there's a whole list of -- you know, of problems, gaps with the declaration. Most of those are in the declaration -- in the publication that has been released today. But again, there -- it's a matter of -- it's a matter of public record.

       Does it justify war? Well, I mean, we certainly hope that we don't have to go to war. But we have made the decision that Iraq -- the president has made the decision that Iraq will be disarmed one way or another. And if it's not disarmed cooperatively through the inspection process, then we will disarm it in, you know, in another way. We cannot let Iraq continue to possess weapons of mass destruction and continue to develop additional weapons of mass destruction.

       Imagine if Iraq had nuclear weapons today. Imagine how the situation would be -- would be different. If they had nuclear weapons today, I would argue that they would be much more prone, going back to the other gentleman's question, to use chemical and biological weapons. And that's something that Iraq has done before in terms of using chemical weapons on the battlefield, using chemical weapons against defenseless civilians, killing people by the thousands. Is that a situation that's tolerable? No. And we're not going to allow that to happen. And the international community has said that they are not going to let that happen.

       The alternative to not disarming Iraq is something that's even more unpalatable than the current situation. I think the threshold for use goes way down.

       MODERATOR: The gentleman over there.

       Q Yes. My name is Patrick Gardiner (sp) from Tokyo Shimbun. And the question I have is more specifically about a part in this report that we received. On page one, there are three common elements of successful cooperative disarmament. And I'm wondering, are these three common elements the standard used to decide whether Iraq is cooperatively disarming or not?

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, it's certainly one standard. I mean, what we've done is we've looked at previous cases of cooperative disarmament. And on the basis of what we have seen in those three cases we have identified these three common elements. And it's for that reason that when we contrast that with Iraqi behavior we see that what is going is anything but cooperative. It is the creation of the anti-inspector force and the devotion of tremendous resources not to disarm, but to defeat the purpose of the inspectors.

       Q Yoski Atanabi (ph), Kyodo News, Japan's news wire. Secretary Powell, in an interview last night with PBS, he suggested that the U.S. government is willing to show some evidence after 27th. Could you elaborate on that?

       And there is a widespread impression that -- among international society that the U.S. government has a smoking gun, but somehow, it's not willing to share it with the rest of the world, with some reason. Is that impression wrong? Thank you.

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, the impression, whether it's right or not, I don't know. I'm not close to, you know, to public opinion on this issue. I wouldn't be surprised if there is this image out there that, you know, what will happen will be -- you know, the U.N. inspectors will come across, you know, weapons of mass destruction, and there's the evidence, there's the end of the case. But even when they do that, people discount what they have found, okay? Even when they find delivery means for chemical weapons, people say, "Eh, there are only 12." Or, you know, "They're empty."

       Look, what's important, I think, is that we provide evidence that is convincing that Iraq has not made the decision to disarm; that's the key test here. Because it's only with that decision -- and go back, check the record. For months we have been saying that unless there's cooperation, inspections don't work. To think that -- you know, again, in a large state like this with a handful of inspectors, a little bit more than 100, against a government that is deliberately trying to defeat the inspections, either by penetrating the inspectors either technically or in some other way, or moving around, you know, the documentation and other things, to conclude that, you know, you're going to actually be able to find biological weapons when, in fact, we know they're moving them around in these, you know, in these mobile -- I mean, why would you, why would Iraq have mobile laboratories?

       Well, they're mobile because they're designed to move around. Imagine trying to find four or seven or 10, you know, trucks in California with 100 inspectors, and be able to identify which trucks. I mean, it doesn't work. Inspections don't work -- and we have been saying this from the beginning, they don't work unless there's cooperation, and there is a large body of evidence that they're not cooperating.

       Again, the burden of proof is on Iraq, and has been. That's what the international inspectorate force has said over and over: Iraq must cooperate for this to work. That's the message, not "where's the smoking gun?"

       Q Sir, my question is that, I mean, if you have concrete evidence through your intelligence means, and are you willing to disclose that after the 27th?

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, we have been providing the U.N. inspectors with a great deal of support, and Dr. Wolfowitz outlined that in his speech today. I think we will be providing more information. But again, it's going to be information that demonstrates the whole argument, and an important part of the whole argument is that Iraq is not cooperating.

       MODERATOR: Last question. This gentleman in the blue shirt.

       Q Thank you. The point that I -- the issue that I wanted to raise is that when and if there is regime change in Iraq, how do you actually make sure that these weapons you say the Iraqis have are destroyed, they're found and destroyed so that, let's say, 10, 15 years down the road, should that government turn against the United States, that doesn't become an issue again?

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Right.

       Q And the other point is -- concerns the mobilization of -- deployment of U.S. forces in the region. How long can these forces be deployed, even if there isn't a war, without them becoming a political liability for the administration?

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Right, well let me -- let me answer your first question. I won't be able to answer the second; I'm just not -- I'm just not the right person to do that.

       And I should have answered that first question before; it's an important question. If we are forced to disarm Iraq, you know, with force, how will we be able to ensure that we have identified and eliminated all of their weapons of mass destruction? This is, of course, something that we are looking at and we are preparing for.

       A key would be, of course, what follows Saddam Hussein in terms of political leadership, because if you have political leadership -- a political leadership that is dedicated to disarming the country, again cooperatively, that's going to solve a lot of the problems, because at that point, you have, instead of people discouraged or threatened to -- you know, from talking to inspectors, you have individuals who are actually encouraged to talk to the inspectors or whomever might be responsible for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. You have documentation turned over. You have a cooperative partner in actually eliminating the weapons and the infrastructure for developing more weapons. It's a challenge, but it's one that we have taken on, in terms of thinking about it and preparing for it, if necessary.

       Okay.

       MODERATOR: Okay. One more question. Dmitri?

       Q Actually, I'd like to --

       MODERATOR: (Off mike.)

       Q I'm sorry. Dmitri Kirsanov, Russian News Agency Tass. Actually, my question is not related to the Iraqi subject. That's why I waited for the very end. And thanks for the opportunity.

       Nevertheless, a couple of days ago Ambassador Vershbow -- U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Vershbow was summoned here, among other American ambassadors to the European countries. And in a couple of public appearances he said that the United States administration welcomes the recent agreement between Iranian and Russian government to transport spent nuclear fuel from the nuclear power plant in Bushehr back to Russia. At -- but at the same time, said Ambassador Vershbow, this is not enough to address the concerns that the Washington -- that Washington has.

       I wonder what specifically -- I mean, specifically -- you want the Russian and Iranian government else to do.

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, the United States has never, as you know, supported Russian assistance to construct the Bushehr power reactor. We believe that will assist Iran with its nuclear weapons program. Individuals are trained. You have a whole number of indirect ways in which that assistance will be provided to what is a nuclear weapons program.

       The Russian government has said that they are moving forward; but at the same time, they have pledged that there will be very stringent nonproliferation controls on Bushehr.

       One condition, of course, is the provision in take-back of fuel for the life of the reactor. Certainly that is a better situation than the alternative, in which one has Iran producing the fuel for the reactor, because once you get into fuel-cycle technologies and the development of fuel, you have even more direct access to fissile material for nuclear weapons.

       So we are working with the Russian government to develop a set of nonproliferation controls, or we are encouraging them to do that. The take-back of fuel is one of those. We very much also would like to see the assistance stop with a single reactor, and we have made that position very clear, not to move on to a second or third reactor at Bushehr or even additional reactors beyond that, as they are envisioned at least in a tentative sense in the overall economic plan that I'm sure you're familiar with.

       MODERATOR: Did you have one more quick one on Iraq?

       Q I have a question about North Korea, a very different topic.

       SR. ADMIN OFFICIAL: Not a question on Iraq? (Laughs.)

       Q (Laughs.)

       SR. ADMIN, OFFICIAL: Go ahead.

       Q My question also pertains to what's in the report, and you gave the examples of the programs that were used in South Africa and Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Can the verifying procedures used in those three countries also be used in verifying whether North Korea is ending its nuclear weapons program?

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Sure, if North Korea were willing to make the political decision and to open up in terms of transparency and cooperation. The problem, of course, is that North Korea has not been willing to work with the IAEA in a way that would verify, you know, past reprocessing as well as other aspects of its nuclear weapons program. You know, this will again depend on, you know, a high-level political commitment on the part of North Korea, but the IAEA would play an important role.

       MODERATOR: Thank you very much.

       SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: You're certainly welcome.

       Thank you.