1:45 P.M. (EST)

Real Audio of Briefing

MR. DENIG: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to the Foreign Press Center.

As you know, the situation with regard to weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and North Korea is of grave concern to both the United States and the international community. On Monday, Drs. Blix and El Baradei submitted their reports to the UN Security Council on the situation in Iraq, and last night, President Bush devoted considerable attention to weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation in his State of the Union Address.

So we're delighted to have a very timely briefing today with Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolf. He will have a brief opening statement, and then will take a question from New York and then questions from the audience here.

Assistant Secretary Wolf.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: Thank you all. Thank you for coming out on a wet day, a grim day maybe, and maybe it fits the subject.

Anyway, I'm not going to talk very -- I'm not going to speak very long, because I wanted to come and have a chance to answer your questions.

I think that the discussions on Monday and continuing today focus on some very straightforward issues. 1441 was a resolution with one goal, two tests.

First, the goal: disarmament. And the Council was very clear that after 11 years of waiting for Iraq to disarm, after a variety of resolutions that were more or less rigorous, 1441 was rigorous, and it was unequivocal. The task that the Council set for Iraq was to disarm, to disarm fully, to disarm immediately, to cooperate actively.

And there were two tests, as I said, for the disarmament goal.

The first test was a declaration that was due December 7th. The second test was full, active cooperation. And I think it's all summed up by what Dr. Blix said to the Council when he said -- let me come back to that.

First test, declaration; and I think there is nobody in the Council who would argue that it was 12,200 pages of old news. It was a rehash of documents previously submitted. It didn't answer the questions about Iraq's program -- programs -- before 1998, and it denied, despite clear and abundant evidence, denied having any programs that continued after 1998. They didn't pass that test. We described it as a material breach.

The second test was cooperation -- full, immediate, and active. And there, I'll simply stop with what Dr. Blix said: "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament that was demanded of it." While there was quasi-cooperation on process, there was little, if any, cooperation on substance. This is not about process. This is about substance. It's about achieving the one goal, disarmament, and achieving it now.

When President Bush talked to the UN September 12th, he said there were two tests out there. One is whether or not Iraq could finally be brought to comply with its obligations under Resolution 687 and a whole series of others, whether it would disarm. And the second test was a test of the UN and the international community. Could it hang together? Could it hold together in order to provide a determined view? I think those tests are still out there.

And with that, I'd be glad to answer your questions.

MR. DENIG: Okay. Let's take the first question, from New York.

QUESTION: Hi. Tom Kelly from the Press Association of the UK.

In the last few hours, both the President and, in London, Tony Blair have spoken of evidence of links between al-Qaida and Iraq, possibly with a view to Iraq supplying the terrorist group with weapons of mass destruction.

Do you have any specific evidence or more detailed evidence that you could share with us about this alleged link?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: I don't think there's anything that I would share today. I think the Secretary actually spoke to this earlier this morning, and he said we do have information that suggests that there have been these kinds of links over the years, and that there continue to be links between the Iraqi Government and al-Qaida.

It's abundantly clear that Iraq has had contact with terrorist groups. You will all remember that Abu Nidal died somehow by shooting three bullets into his brain. But I think this is an issue which we look, as we look more and more at what we are learning, and if we look back in time, the Secretary said, then we're able to connect, begin to connect the pieces; and for us, we see a link.

MR. DENIG: Okay. Up front here, Dimitri.

QUESTION: Dmitry Kirsanov of Russian News Agency Tass.

I remember Secretary Powell as saying, before last week, as saying before leaving to Switzerland, as saying that it is yet to decide for the United States how to -- how to lead a dialogue with North Korea, whether it would be strictly bilateral, whether it would be multilateral, whether it would be bilateral within some kind of multilateral mechanisms.

Have you already taken decision on this, and if yes, when and where you will start this dialogue?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: No, there's no decision. We have a number of ideas that we're consulting on with our allies, South Korea and Japan, as well as with members of the -- permanent five members -- of the Security Council; active discussions taking place in Vienna at the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The important point for us is that this is not an issue between the United States and North Korea. This is an issue where North Korea is in breach of its obligations to the international community, where the weapons program that it admitted to is -- also contravenes agreements that it had with South Korea, with us, with the international community; and it is important for North Korea to come back into compliance with its obligations.

We are prepared to talk about that. We've made clear that we would talk. We've made clear we won't attack. We've made clear that we don't have hostile intent. We're consulting with others, and we're looking for a peaceful way to solve a problem which is multilateral in nature.

QUESTION: Excuse me. Can I have a quick follow-up? Are you ready to somehow codify your intent of not attacking North Korea?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: I think other senior officials have said that's probably not the most difficult of the issues. The key issue is will the North return to compliance with its obligations.

We're very clear and very public about our intent or lack of intent.

QUESTION: Michael Backfisch, German Business Daily Handelslatt.

The Secretary of State will go to the United Nations Security Council next week, and the President said he'll reveal some hard evidence. Of course, you can't give us a preview, but can you elaborate a little bit? What is your greatest concern? Evidently, the Secretary won't present an Adlai Stevenson type photo of a smoking gun, but what are your major concerns?

And Senator Biden was talking about circumstantial evidence the administration has in regard to Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. What does that mean?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: I think the case was clearly made on Monday for those who cared to listen. As I said, no one, but no one, thinks the declaration met the tests set in Resolution 1441, and no one who listened to Dr. Blix say, "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament that was demanded of it," should have any doubts.  There are indications that VX was weaponized. We must assume chemical bombs are unaccounted for. We found mustard gas precursors. There are strong indications that Iraq has produced more anthrax than it declared. Iraq's ballistic missile programs might very well represent prima facie cases of proscribed systems. That propellants and missile engines were illegally procured -- that's the case for non-cooperation right there.

I think what the Secretary will do will provide additional perspective. What he will do is reinforce a number of points that are already on the United Nations Security Council's public record, and points which are well-known to a number of member governments represented on the Security Council. That is, that through their own national means, they're aware of these illegal programs. They are aware of procurement. They are aware of the mobile labs that have not been declared. They are aware of the facts, but we will provide a kind of reinforcement of what Drs. Blix and El Baradei described. We will dip into the intelligence that we have to help amplify the kinds of concerns that the inspectors have catalogued and the kinds of concerns that were on the record from even 1998 and previously.

QUESTION: But obviously, the Secretary won't just give a second reading on 1441, so what does reinforcement mean?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: Tune in Wednesday.

QUESTION: You can't say anything? I mean, is it chemical --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: I told you, he's going to look at the case that they presented. He is going to provide additional reinforcement for --

QUESTION: Additional evidence?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: Yes.

QUESTION: Thank you. I'm Arin Basu with Radio Free Asia. If we could go back to North Korea for a minute, please.

Could you update us where North Korea's nuclear program is right now? They're out of the NPT. We know there's new stuff, fuel rods.

Do you have any sense of whether they're processing any of these chemicals? Is there activity going on with their nuclear program that is recent and that we should be concerned about, or do we really not know what they're doing?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: Well, I don't think I can get into all the details. We should be concerned by their admission that they have a program to enrich uranium; and we should be concerned by clear evidence that is available to all of us that they probably have enough fissile material from their plutonium program to construct one or two bombs; and we should be concerned that they have a nuclear weapons program; and we should be concerned that they have announced that they are in the process, but they have not yet withdrawn from the NPT, because under the NPT, one requires 90 days notice; and we should be concerned that they threw the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors out of the country, took the seals off the various nuclear facilities, disassembled the cameras; and we should be concerned by the kind of activities that may be taking place now under the veil of secrecy.

We should be concerned about all of this, not panicked, but concerned, and the concern should be that a country which sticks its thumb in the eye of the international community, a country which is developing nuclear weapons despite its commitment on nuclear weapons, which can threaten the security and stability of Northeast Asia, those are the things that we should be concerned about.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: I can't.

MR. DENIG: (Inaudible.)

QUESTION: Joon Lee from Joongang Daily in Seoul, Korea.

Let me just follow the NPT situation of North Korea you just mentioned, that when they earlier this month when they announced that the NPT (inaudible) insisted that they are out of the NPT as of right now; so because that in 1991, North Korea, they just suspended NPT through (inaudible) cancellations. So they just -- we don't have to wait for 90 days for the exact release of the treaty.

So how do you think about -- how the United States Government regard this, their insistence?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: Well, there's a fairly theological point, and we actually think that one requires a new 90-day notification pursuant to the specific provisions of the Nonproliferation Treaty, Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and that it needs to be done in a certain way.

But, rather than get hung up on whether it's now or 90 days from now, and we happen to think it's 90 days from the date of their announcement, the more important question is what they've been doing for a dozen or more years. That is, they have clandestinely been producing fissile material, designing a nuclear weapon, developing multiple capabilities to acquire additional fissile material.

And that is the issue that confronts the international community. It's the issue that we're working with Korea, Japan, the permanent five members of the Security Council, the European Union, Australia, and others. That's an issue that's before all of us, and that's what we're concerned about.

QUESTION: Stefano Marchi from the Italian daily newspaper, Il Tempo. I would have two questions, if I may.

The first question is, to which extent will the evidence to be provided by Secretary Powell to the Security Council next week be circumstantiated, and will partly, at least partly, such evidence be made public?

The second question is, last night, President Bush reiterated that it is up to Saddam Hussein's regime to disclose the prohibited weapons. Does it mean that, after the provision of evidence to the Security Council, the United States will give Saddam Hussein a further, maybe final opportunity, but a fair and real opportunity, to provide evidence, to disclose and destroy those weapons?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: I think your first question was: will our evidence be substantiated.

The evidence already on the table is quite clear, and it's not even ours. It's others' conclusions. It's the UN's conclusions.

We will put out, we will amplify, we will reinforce that. We will use information that is available to us, and it will be public. The Secretary is not going to speak in a closed room. The Secretary will speak not only to the Security Council, but to anybody who chooses to listen, and I suspect there will be a rather wide audience, and the case will be what the case is.

It's not some special Hollywood, you know, contrivance. It will be factual, it will be sober, and it will be straightforward. It will amplify, it will reinforce the kinds of points which, on their own -- the points that were put out on Monday -- on their own are clear indications of non-cooperation, clear indications, in the British words and the Australian words, and our words, too, of further "material breach."

In other words, the story is out there, and we will amplify it.

Now, to your second question. I guess you're asking, are we going to provide a final, final opportunity, or, if you think back to 1991, and I was there when we wrote Resolution 687, that was a one-time, "Do it, it's your obligation. Do you agree?" "Yes." Did they violate it? Yes.

So that was a final opportunity, and there were 15 more resolutions. So I guess I could say, but I don't want to bore everybody; are you suggesting we should have a final, final, final, final, final, 16 times final plus one more, opportunity?

Saddam Hussein has shown his colors. If he wants to -- he doesn't need -- he doesn't need more time. As the Secretary said this morning, today he can drive those mobile vans to UN Headquarters in Baghdad. Today, he can take the documents out of the private residences where they've been hidden, and he can deliver them to the UN. Today, he can account for the VX. Today, he can account for the mustard gas shells. Today, he can disclose the details of his illegal unmanned aerial vehicle program. Today, he can talk about illegal programs. Today, he can talk about his nuclear efforts. Today, he can make people available for private interviews. Today, he can encourage them to go out of the country. If they have nothing to hide, why shouldn't they? He can do it all today. He does not need a final opportunity.

In Iraq, you don't need a vote of Parliament. In Iraq, you don't need search warrants. In Iraq, you don't need to pay much attention to public opinion. But Saddam Hussein has not yet apparently made the genuine acceptance, not even today, of the fact that disarmament, that was demanded of him. He's not accepted that.

If he makes the decision, he knows where to find the UN. He has their phones tapped, I'm sure, so he must know the phone number. He should pick up the phone and tell them, "I'm coming to deliver the arms."

QUESTION: (Inaudible) that the February the 5th meeting will be somehow a convicting sentence for Iraq, or will the United States provide such an evidence for the purpose of the United Nations inspections?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: The Secretary, the President -- the President, the Secretary, others who speak for the administration, have been very clear. We're engaged in a process of consultation. We will talk to the members of the Security Council, our friends and allies, about where we are and where we go.

Right now, inspections are continuing. There were inspections today. There were inspections yesterday. There will be inspections tomorrow. The United States is providing very -- quite broad, as broad as we can, support to the UN. But the purpose of inspections was not to go looking under rocks. It was not, as the Secretary said the other day, to feel around in the darkness.

The purpose of inspections, dating from 1991, and certainly the purpose of inspections in Resolution 1441, were to verify a decision by Iraq to disarm peacefully. If they make that choice, the inspections can work. If they don't make that choice, then the inspections won't work.

So we're in a process of consultation, and the consultations between the President and other heads of government, the Secretary and other ministers, when those consultations are complete, then we'll have a better idea of the next steps that we want to take.

QUESTION: Scott Gordon, the Asahi Shimbun.

I just wanted to ask, concerning yesterday's State of the Union Address, President Bush made it clear once again that if things didn't improve, he would lead a coalition, a coalition to disarm Saddam, right?

So my question is, who are the players in this coalition, and who, other than the US, will lend major troop support and whatnot?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: I think we have said before that when the time comes, it will be clear. If you look at movements towards the Middle East, you can already begin to see some of the outlines.

But I guess this is the time to make an important qualification, or just to keep the context. The President didn't say we are going to lead a war, and you didn't say that, but I just want to make clear, there has been no decision to go to war.

The President's hope, the Secretary of State's hope, all of our hope remains that Iraq, even while time is running out, will make the decision to disarm. And it still has time to do it, but time is running out.

If he doesn't make that decision, if it is necessary to use arms, I think you will see that we have more than considerable support, and certainly more support than would be necessary to accomplish the goal of disarming Iraq.

QUESTION: I'm Malcolm Brown from Feature Story News. I have a sort of more general, two-part question, really.

I wonder how you see the future of nonproliferation efforts as they regard nuclear weapons? Do you see it as some kind of inexorable process that the United States can at best slow down, or do you think it can be avoided?

And secondly, what do you say to those who level the charge that the United States has itself weakened the nonproliferation regime with its apparent aversion to treaties, development of new low-yield weapons and so on.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: I'm not sure about whether we've actually done the latter.

QUESTION: The posture review?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: Our posture reviews go on every year. The -- our -- we are concerned that there are a number of efforts by countries within the NPT to clandestinely acquire nuclear capabilities. We need to use a variety of tools to forestall that.

I have said before that I actually am concerned that, while this is a core issue for the United States, a focusing issue of our national security policy, as the President said yesterday, as we've said in our various national security statements over time, it's only one of many issues that seems to be out there for a lot of countries; and indeed, while we get into big wrangles with some of our friends and allies about this architecture, about treaties and whatnot, that the actual willingness to engage and, in essence, to confront the issue, either by tightening export controls, more rigorous enforcement of national laws, more rigorous enforcement of multilateral conventions, more rigorous approach to the proliferation wannabes, that's sometimes missing.

And I think, if we are to be successful in countering proliferation, whether it's nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile, then we're going to need to have a little more passion in the discussion. We're going to need to have a little more than words about architecture. And I think if we do, I think if we are committed, I think if we match our words with our actions, and I think if we stand resolutely when there are challenges like Iraq, or like North Korea, then I think the message that a united world will send will be very powerful, and that's key.

QUESTION: Jill Culberson (phonetic), ABC TV, Australia. Back to Iraq.

Unless there is a significant and immediate about face from Iraq, do you believe that matters will come to a head on or about February 14th, if not before? How quickly will that snowball?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: I don't think I want to pick a date. We've got an office -- no, we don't have an office pool, because no decision has been made. What we're going to do is consult. Consultation is underway now. The Secretary has spoken to Foreign Minister Downer several times in the last week about a variety of issues, and we will continue to consult. I would -- and I think -- I don't remember whether the President has or hasn't spoken, I think he has spoken to Prime Minister Howard, and I'm sure he will continue to speak about these issues.

We're consulting. Next Wednesday, the Secretary of State will go to New York. He will present a case that is designed to reinforce the record of non-cooperation that was laid out to the Council on Monday. When the consultations are done, we'll decide where and how we proceed forward.

But we're working through this. We're working through it methodically. But I think it would be fair to say there's not a lot of time left for the peaceful solution that we all want.

QUESTION: Chris Cockel from the China Post of Taiwan. A question about China, if I may.

I believe you met with China's chief arms control negotiator, Liu Jieyi, here in Washington towards the end of last year. From that meeting, can you give us a sense of how discussions between Washington and Beijing are going? Are you satisfied with the results so far, and what more are you asking of the Chinese at this time?

And one quick attachment to that, if I may. When do you plan to meet with the Chinese again?

Thank you.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: Well, Under Secretary Bolton, as you know, was just in Beijing last week, had discussions with Vice Foreign Minister Wang, and I think Liu Jieyi actually participated in those discussions, so it's not like I'm the only one or that's the only conversation that takes place.

I think, in the various discussions that the Director General and I have had about nonproliferation, we have gained a better understanding of our -- of concerns, I of his, and his, I trust of ours, and China has made some noteworthy steps in terms of putting forward new export controls for missiles, chemical and biological weapons. They've revamped the process of licensing, and all of that on paper, all of that on paper is quite good.

But we've made the point to China, and we continue to be concerned that enforcement action, implementation of the laws and the regulations, is the only test. We welcome the assurances that the Government of China shares our concerns about proliferation. We are consulting closely with China on issues of mutual concern, like North Korea and Iraq. We welcome the cooperation that we've had in places like the Security Council. There are big parts of the record which are quite good.

But on the question of proliferation from China, it would not -- I would not -- I would be less than candid if I didn't say that we are still concerned that entities within China appear able to export sensitive technologies to proliferant countries, and that those -- and it's not clear to us that, in the marketplace within China, that the entities understand clearly that the Government of China is determined to rigorously enforce the new laws and procedures that they've put in place.

QUESTION: Hi. Wei Jing from Phoenix TV of Hong Kong. Two separate questions.

One is the missile export. If these states are trying to get some international support or get a missile export regulation, a new kind of treaty or something, especially after the Korean missile boat was caught, that's one thing.

And then separately, are the hidden weapons that you say Iraq has, are you confident that even and if US troops went in, if -- if the inspectors cannot find them with cooperation from Iraqis, can the American soldiers locate them quickly without them using them first?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: Well, two questions. The international community, I forget how many countries, four or five months ago, signed the International Code of Conduct, which was designed to create a kind of new body of international thinking against the spread of ballistic missiles. And we support that. We supported that effort strongly.

We also work actively within the Missile Technology Control Regime to control the spread, the sale of the kinds of technologies that would facilitate countries' ability to build ballistic missile programs, and we have laws in the United States that would require -- which require us to sanction foreign firms which do export things that are listed by the Missile Technology Control Regime.

I think there's a bit of a -- changing slides -- I think there's a bit of a misimpression about what the inspectors, UN inspectors' task is. It is not the 108 inspectors with their eight helicopters and 40 or 50 vehicles -- it's not their job to go dig the stuff up, to go find it. Their job is to verify the peaceful disarmament of Iraq. But it's Iraq's decision to -- but that only works if Iraq makes the first decision.

And while it's a hypothetical, and clearly no decision has been made, I think there is confidence that if the other path -- if Iraq forces the international community to go down the other path, which is forceful disarmament, then there'll be more than 108 people available for the task.

MR. DENIG: One last quick question, if you would.

QUESTION: Nori Sawaki, Tokyo Shimbun. Back to North Korea. When you say that you are demanding North Korea scrap their nuclear weapons program, what exactly do you mean? Are you demanding the freezing of the nuclear facilities as they did in 1994, but this time with much wider scope, which is to include uranium as well as plutonium? Or are you demanding the physical destruction of the facilities?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: We're not -- it's not a U.S. demand. Their obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty, their obligations under the North-South Denuclearization Agreement, their obligations under several other bilateral or multilateral agreements was not to acquire the capabilities to build a nuclear weapon. So it's not our demand, but their obligation is to acknowledge and dismantle in a verifiable way their HEU program, to freeze and then reconcile their accounts at Yongbyon with the IAEA and to put back in place the kinds of safeguards on whatever remains such that the world community can have confidence. Right now we have no confidence at all.

QUESTION: But that means you won't do the destruction of the facilities because in 1994 you did not -- or not within the Framework Agreement North Korea did not destroy.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: The object of the 1994 agreement would have been to -- was to put spent fuel in -- to can it and put it under safeguards and eventually -- and to get it, in due course, out of the country. That still needs to be done. It contains fissile material. They have no need for it.

It would be to -- it would be to fully, fully justify their correctness and completeness declaration with the IAEA; couldn't do that if they had hidden nuclear weapons, research, development, production capabilities; can't do it with the highly enriched uranium capability. So all of those things would be subject to dismantlement. All of it needs to be verifiable.

Our bottom line, like the international community's bottom line, is that North Korea must be a state without nuclear weapons -- that the Korean Peninsula needs to be denuclearized.

QUESTION: (Inaudible).

ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: The freeze, the freeze -- the question was eliminate versus freeze, and I'm just saying freeze was only a way station on the way towards the denuclearization of North Korea.

Thank you very much.

MR. DENIG: I'm sorry we've run out of time. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
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