U.S. Policy and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI)

Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the invitation to discuss the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and the State Department’s continued efforts in this critical region. The Initiative represents a significant investment by the American people in a region that produces the vast majority of the drugs arriving in the United States.

If this initiative were targeted just at saving some of the 21,000 lives lost to these drugs last year, it would be the right thing to do. But there is more to this bipartisan, multi-year initiative than even that noble aim. It is also a bulwark against the threat of terrorism in Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama. In short, it is a regional hemispheric and national security program, with direct implications, for homeland security and for our well being here in the continental United States. One need only look as far as Haiti to see that drug money, and the instability that follows it, can be institutionally corrosive, to the point of breakdown. In Colombia, and elsewhere in the hemisphere, the link between drug money and terrorism is incontrovertible.

All of this reinforces the wisdom of Congress in empowering the State Department, and the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) in particular, to protect Americans and our allies in this hemisphere by strengthening the rule of law, building law enforcement and justice sector capacity, cultivating non-drug sources of income, and stopping heroin and cocaine from being produced and shipped to our shores.

In the future, as in the past, strong congressional support will be critical to fully achieving the endgame. The endgame is a hemisphere in which drug-funded terrorism, corruption of struggling democracies by drug traffickers along with drug violence and drug abuse from the streets of Bogotá to the streets of Baltimore, are reduced dramatically. We are making real progress toward that end state, and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative is a major part of that palpable progress.

Let me pause here to say something unexpected. Management of these programs is also essential. Congress provides the money, but we at INL must provide the proper management for these program dollars. I have a special duty, as custodian of these dollars; to make sure they go where they are intended. Accordingly, I have ordered a top-to-bottom program review of the entire stable of INL programming, put penalties in government contracts, moved from cost-plus to performance contracts, insisted that bonus justifications match awards, imposed new performance measures, moved to multiple contracts where possible, sat with senior executives of these contracts, and begun reviewing past financial practices. All of this is good government and basic oversight. It will make sure that dollars in the ACI account go where they are intended -- to stop drug production and drug-funded terrorism before those menaces arrive on U.S. soil, in our towns, in our counties, in our schools.

The investment we have made is bearing fruit – drug production is down, traffickers are being arrested and extradited, legitimate jobs created, and the rule of law expanded. Our security, development, and institutional assistance to the judicial and law enforcement sectors are having a positive impact. The job is only half done, but the results are coming in and we are approaching what may well be a tipping point.

Background

The strategic centerpiece of the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) is INL programming in Colombia, the source of 90 percent of all the cocaine reaching the United States. Colombia also provides upwards to 70 percent of the heroin reaching our streets, and it also is a leading supplier of cocaine to Brazil, Europe, and points East. Besides being a producer of raw materials for cocaine and heroin, Colombia is a major manufacturer of refined drugs. And it is the world headquarters for major criminal and narco-terrorist organizations. What we do in Colombia affects us in United States, but also affects regional security and the growth of economic opportunities for those who wish to live in democracies free from drugs and terror.

ACI Program Successes

Over the past two years, long awaited ACI funds have hit the ground, and they are making a difference. With INL support, the Colombian Government has eradicated both coca and heroin poppy at a pace that should begin to seriously deter future growing, even as it wipes out larger and larger percentages of the crops that currently become cocaine and heroin. The physical risks associated with this program have been great, but the strategy is proving both successful and justified. The Colombians and we have lost assets as well as personnel to the enemy. Three hostages, who are still in Colombia, though not INL employees, are a continuing reminder that we are dealing with a dangerous group of terrorists who do not respect the rules or principles of civil society.

In 2003, INL and the Colombians, working closely together, sprayed 127,000 hectares of the coca crop at 91.5 percent effectiveness, for a net of 116,000 hectares of coca eradicated. At the same time, alternative programs in Colombia resulted in the manual eradication of an additional 8,441 hectares. Similarly, we sprayed 2,821 hectares in the opium regions while 1,009 hectares were manually eradicated.

In 2002 our efforts reduced coca cultivation by 15 percent and poppy cultivation by 25 percent. With final 2003 estimates still pending, we can nevertheless see the beginning of the long-predicted trend. Our efforts have brought us close to the tipping point where sustained suppression of illegal crops and alternative employment incentives together will convince growers that further cultivation is a futile proposition.

Predictably, it is also true that the work is getting more dangerous. In 2003, INL aircraft took more than 380 hits, and we lost 4 planes. So far this year, we have taken 29 hits on our assets. We are fully reviewing our air wing operations to make the most effective use of our resources and to plan for the future. Security of our air fleet is our highest priority. We have increased intelligence coordination and protective measures to make sure each spray mission is as safe as humanly possible under the difficult circumstances. If it is not safe to launch a mission, the mission does not fly. Protecting the lives of the brave pilots who fly this program is our highest priority. Getting results of their outlay of bravery is the second, but sustaining the mission is first.

This year, as of February 29, 2004, we have sprayed over 29,000 hectares of coca and 691 hectares of poppy. This exceeds by 84 percent the amount of coca eradicated during the same timeframe in 2003. Our eradication goal for this has been initially set and is ambitious in the area of both coca and opium poppy. We have worked out a spray program in full coordination with the Colombian police and armed forces. Depending on the 2003 final spray results, we will review our spray targets for this year and adjust accordingly – because killing coca and deterring future cultivation is the twin aim. And we aim to succeed.

After 2004, we expect to enter a maintenance phase of spraying smaller, more isolated coca fields, instead of the larger fields we have sprayed since our program began. The endgame will then involve a ramp down to maintenance levels as the comprehensive effort to stabilize, eradicate coca, empower people, and restore the rule of law is achieved.

Please make no mistake: In Colombia, ACI funds have been vital to strengthen democracy and security. We have helped fund the establishment of police in 158 municipalities, many of which had not seen any government security presence in years. For the first time in history there is now a police presence in all 1098 of Colombia’s municipalities. This is an enormous step forward. To demonstrate the hunger for security, San Mateo is a municipality that last had a real Colombian National Police presence in June 1999, when the FARC killed the seven San Mateo police. In April of 2003, though, our program installed a new 46-man police department, and San Mateo school children formed a human corridor and cheered as the police passed by. San Mateo declared the day a holiday, and fireworks were set off throughout the day. There is both hope and appreciation afoot – and the U.S. Congress, through leadership and support for the ACI, can take considerable credit for that development.

The results are there: In 2003, Colombia’s murder rate dropped by 20 percent, to its lowest figure since 1986. Colombia’s illegal armed groups committed 73 massacres in 2003, as compared to 115 in 2002. The number of victims affected by those massacres dropped 38 percent from 680 in 2002 to 418 in 2003. Also in 2003, 2,043 cases of kidnapping were registered – 32 percent fewer than in 2002. Finally, 846 terrorist incidents were reported in 2003, a 49 percent drop over the 1,645 reported in 2002.

On the interdiction side we continue to work closely with Colombia’s armed forces and the police. Colombian forces seized 70 metric tons of cocaine base and cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) in 2003. In addition, 126 metric tons of cannabis were seized.

The Air Bridge Denial program, which began last August, is starting to become effective. Since August 2003, 10 planes suspected of drug trafficking were forced down and 8 were destroyed. In 2003, the program also resulted in 6.9 metric tons of drugs seized regionally. And as of March 1, 2004, the Colombian Air Force and its regional partners have already seized 1 metric ton of illicit drugs. But the key here is not the number of planes destroyed. Our goal is to effectively deter the use of Colombian airspace by traffickers while protecting civil aviation.

I emphasize the need to continue to work regionally. Success in Colombia can have a ripple effect for better or worse. To be sure, the ripple effect is positive, our programs in countries bordering Colombia have also kept drug cultivation there at record low levels, increased the effectiveness and coverage of drug interdiction programs, strengthened the judiciary’s ability to prosecute, and expanded economic opportunities for the poor.

ACI’s administration of justice programs are designed to enhance the rule of law – to shift to a more effective criminal system, protect witnesses, increase asset seizure, and protect citizens’ human rights. ACI support established 34 justice and peace houses to increase access to justice for the urban and rural poor. These casas de justicia (justice houses) have handled over 1.8 million cases, easing the burden on the over-taxed, inefficient judicial system. ACI funding for administration of justice also created 19 oral trial courtrooms and trained over 6,000 lawyers, judges and public defenders in new oral legal procedures designed to reduce impunity and quicken the judicial process.

In Peru and Bolivia, we have held the line on drug production so that there has not been the “balloon effect”. Drug cultivation in both countries has declined 70 percent over the past five years. In Ecuador, our program along the northern border to boost security and enhance economic development has prevented any significant cultivation of drug crops in that country. Interdictions are up throughout the area. In 2003, Peru’s efforts resulted in the destruction of close to 3,762 kilograms of cocaine base, 3,250 kilograms of coca paste, and 134 metric tons of coca leaf. We hope that a new drug interdiction coordination center, which we are working to establish with the Government of Peru, will assist in that effort. In Bolivia, interdiction seizures in 2003 are up to three times as high as those for 2002 – with 152 metric tons of leaf and 12.9 metric tons of cocaine captured.

In Bolivia, by the end of 2003, at least 25,000 Bolivian farm families received alternative development assistance conditioned on creation of coca-free areas. As a result, the wholesale value of legitimate and legal agriculture leaving the Chapare exceeded $25 million. This represents a 25 percent increase over 2002 levels. In Peru we have also funded a key program, the "Culture of Lawfulness" – a school-based program that teaches ethics to thousands of children in junior high school. If we can mold these young people, we can help foster a civic belief that drugs and corruption are wrong. Again, this is a measure of progress. Cultural education and trust in a stable, drug-free future will take time.

In Panama, we are meanwhile funding programs to tighten port security and enhance that country’s ability to investigate and prosecute financial crimes via their Financial Intelligence and Analysis units. Our increased cooperation recently reaped rich results with the expulsion of key Colombian traffickers to the United States. These are a few examples of key programs that are working in the region.

ACI Program Challenges

We expect our efforts in Colombia to have significant results in the next two years, allowing Colombia to move toward full rule of law and increasingly balanced economic development. As I noted above, we are working regionally to prevent spillover effects to neighboring countries. However, we face some serious challenges in this effort.

The first is a lack of sustained activity in terms of forced eradication programs in Bolivia and Peru. As a result, in the Yungas region of Bolivia, cultivation increased 26 percent last year to 23,550 hectares.

Despite great success in the Chapare region, where cultivation dropped 15 percent from June 2002 to June 2003, the Yungas cultivation resulted in an overall increase for the country of 17 percent to 28,450 hectares. The Yungas area poses formidable political and logistical challenges to a large eradication program, but we must nevertheless, support efforts to tackle the problems in concert with the government of President Mesa.

In Peru, forced eradication programs are essentially limited to areas near labs, national parks, and new cultivation. While efforts to include a new voluntary program did help lead to a decrease in cultivation by 15 percent last year, it is very clearly forced eradication which will more quickly hurt the industry.

Growing local demand for drugs in the region is another incipient problem. These countries are painfully aware that drug consumption is on the rise, and they have launched new programs in response with U.S. support. Brazil, by some estimates, is the world’s second largest consuming nation for cocaine. Brazil has initiated programs that address its growing domestic demand as well as more aggressive programs to protect its borders from use by drug traffickers. We are engaged with the government of Brazil in discussions on the major challenges it faces, and are vigorously supporting Brazil’s new demand reduction emphasis.

In FY 2005, our counternarcotics programs in Colombia will need to build upon the historic successes of the last few years. The relationship between drugs and terrorism in Colombia is well understood. As President Uribe grapples with dismantling narco-terrorist groups, we will keep our focus on the drug industry that is funding the terrorists.

Road Ahead

On balance, we will need to continue to work regionally in this Hemisphere, engaging with the key producing and transit countries in the ACI. So long as drugs continue to flow from the area, further efforts are needed to destroy the industry in all its forms. The traffic undermines democracy and the rule of law and, as noted, is also feeding increased demand for drugs in the region.

Given poverty rates in the region, farmers will continue to be tempted to cultivate drug crops unless they have alternative ways for feeding their families. We will therefore work collaboratively toward viable, economic options for Andean farmers and others now caught in the coercive web of the violent and illegal drug trade.

I am encouraged to see Andean-based efforts to regionalize counterdrug activity. With increased international cooperation and strengthening of the law enforcement agencies among our friends abroad, Congressional-supported INL programs will bring us closer to protecting our Andean neighbors, as well as enhancing our own national security. We will continue to methodically reduce the international flow of drugs and cripple the trafficking industry whose profits feed violence, violate the basic rule of law, stir hopelessness, and incite terrorism.

Our FY 2005 planning continues the pursuit of vigorous eradication and interdiction efforts to disrupt and destroy the production and transport of drugs destined for U.S. and other markets. Our request includes sustained funding for programs that will build strong government institutions capable of detecting, arresting and prosecuting processors and traffickers as well as the terrorists that thrive with them. We intend to turn over responsibilities to host nations, including counternarcotics training, equipment acquisition and operation and maintenance.

That said, I want to return to Colombia – the centerpiece of our ACI activities. We are approaching a predicted, but long-awaited tipping point. We have local, regional, hemispheric, and bipartisan U.S. leadership that finally sees the potential for – and is willing to press for – lasting change. Congress is an enormous part of this emerging picture. Our success is also a result of the vision, commitment, and energy of Colombian President Uribe. I underscore his importance to our efforts and the need for sustained support during the remaining years of his presidency. We are here because of all those who helped conceive and push forward U.S. support to ACI – and also because of our strong partnership with President Uribe, whose policy goals are in exact alignment with our own.

Concluding Remarks

Drugs and crime undermine democracy, rule of law, and the stability required for economic development. The drug trade continues to kill our young people, and the bulk of the drugs arriving in the United States still come from the Andean region. The drug trade also funds terrorists in this Hemisphere and other regions. These are the stark realities.

Set against them is our methodical ACI program, in its many parts. And that program is producing results. Projects in Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, Venezuela, and Panama are integrated. I am making sure that our assets are being used in the most effective manner and that performance criteria for projects are strengthened in order to better measure results. We have reached a tipping point in Colombia – for the first time we may be close to delivering a lasting blow to narco-terrorists. Sustained support for President Uribe is essential. I appreciate this Committee’s strong commitment to our efforts and look forward to exchanging views on how to carry this effort into the future. In all of this, there is a real mission. And in the mission, there is the real potential for lasting results that will change our world – for the better.

Thank you.

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