The United States continues to support democracy for Haiti and will remain the Caribbean nation's leading provider of economic aid, says Roger Noriega, the U.S. State Department's assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs.

In March 3 testimony at a U.S. congressional hearing on Haiti, Noriega outlined the events leading to the resignation of former Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and his departure from the country.

Noriega reiterated earlier denials by U.S. officials that the United States forced Aristide to leave office, as has been charged by some members of the U.S. Congress, and others. While the United States was convinced that Aristide was a "key obstacle" to resolving Haiti's political impasse, "we sought to work with him until the very end," said Noriega.

The State Department official, speaking to the House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Western Hempishere Affairs, said the first U.S. goal for Haiti is to stabilize the country's security situation and provide emergency humanitarian aid to needy Haitians. Noriega said that such aid was never suspended or cut off, "as some have claimed." Between 1995 and 2003, the United States provided over $850 million in assistance to Haiti, he observed.

Noriega said other U.S. goals in Haiti are to promote the formation of an independent government that enjoys broad popular support "and work with that government to restore the rule of law and other key democratic institutions in Haiti, while encouraging steps to improve the difficult economic condition of the Haitian people."

He said the United States will not work alone in this endeavor. Under terms of a United Nations resolution passed February 29, Noriega said, U.S. forces in Haiti are participating in a Multilateral Interim Force to contribute to a secure and stable environment in the Caribbean nation.

As that force ends its mission, Noriega said, the United States will support a U.N. stabilization force, as called for by the U.N. Security Council, and will work with the U.N. and the Organization of American States to help the Haitian people rebuild their institutions, starting with the Haitian national police.

Noriega said there "must be a break from the past" if Haiti is to move forward.

"That break will not come in the form of a new autocrat or demagogue, but by unleashing the incredible potential of the Haitian people in positive and productive directions," said Noriega. He added that "nowhere is there written that the Haitian people must be poor or ruled by tyrants. They deserve leaders worthy of their trust and respect, who favor the common good over personal gain."

Noriega said the United States and the international community will support Haiti, but the "long-term job of building Haitian democracy is up to the Haitians themselves. They, above all people in our hemisphere, deserve some success."

Meanwhile, another State Department official, Arthur Dewey, also testified to the subcommittee on U.S. policy toward Haiti as it pertains to migration and refugee affairs.

Dewey said he was "thankful" that the number of Haitians seeking to flee their country during the present crisis was not "of the order of those who departed during previous migrations" from Haiti.

"Had there been a mass migration, we would almost certainly have seen people drowned or otherwise lost at sea," said Dewey, who is assistant secretary of state for population, refugees, and migration.

The United States, he emphasized, continues to encourage Haitians not to take to sea in an attempt to escape their homeland.

Dewey said that during the previous week, the U.S. Coast Guard rescued some 900 migrants at sea. Once aboard U.S. vessels, the migrants were given medical attention and food, and cared for while awaiting repatriation in coordination with the Haitian Coast Guard.

Any Haitian migrant rescued at sea who expresses a fear or concern about being sent home is interviewed by a protection officer from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to determine if the migrant requires protection against repatriation, said Dewey. He said those migrants who expressed such a fear are promptly transferred to a separate vessel for protection screening.

Dewey said his bureau at the State Department is now making emergency funds available to the U.S. embassy in Port-au-Prince to cover food, transportation, and similar expenses to help migrants return to their homes in Haiti.

(begin Noriega testimony)

STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
ROGER F. NORIEGA
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS
March 3, 2004

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear and to speak before this Subcommittee today on the topic of Haiti.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members:

A chapter in the history of Haiti has just come to a close and the Haitian people are preparing to write a new one. The resignation of President Aristide on February 29 marked the end of a process that in its early days held out a bright promise to free Haiti from the violence, authoritarianism, and confrontation that has plagued that country since its independence two hundred years ago. Sadly, that hope remains unrealized. While responsibility for this failure resides largely with Aristide himself, the task before the United States, working with the international community, is to help the people of Haiti break the cycle of political misrule that has caused so much misery.

As we move ahead, it is important that we understand where the problems lie. The Haitian people are not to blame for the country's poverty and lack of development. Rather, the absence of good governance, even the WILL to govern fairly and effectively lies at the heart of the problem. Aristide's legacy of frustrated hope was caused as much by what HE DID NOT DO as by the steps he took. At the end, even his supporters in the international community realized that his rule had undermined democracy and economic development in Haiti rather than strengthened it.

Let's be very clear. U.S. policy in Haiti and throughout the Western Hemisphere -- indeed the world -- is to support democracy and the strengthening of democratic institutions. On September 11, 2001, the United States joined the 33 other members of the Organization of American States -- including Haiti -- in signing the Inter-American Democratic Charter. The creation of the Democratic Charter owed much to the hemispheric concern against the undermining of democratic institutions by elected governments. It acknowledges that the essential elements of representative democracy go well beyond merely holding elections, and that governments have the obligation to promote and defend democratic principles and institutions.

The commitment to strengthening democracy has been the cornerstone of our policy in Haiti since the restoration of Aristide to power -- by the international community led by the United States -- in 1994. This process was set back by the highly flawed parliamentary elections of June 1995, badly run local elections in April 1997, and fraudulent parliamentary elections once again in May 2000. This series of bogus electoral exercises and the Haitian government's unwillingness to govern fairly opened the door to many subsequent acts of political violence and intimidation by Aristide against his opponents. Our approach in encouraging respect for constitutional processes and good governance in Haiti focused on working with our hemispheric partners through the OAS and with other friends of Haiti. In June 2001, the OAS General Assembly approved Resolution 1831 calling on the Government of Haiti to take steps to create an environment conducive to free and fair elections as a means of resolving the political crisis created by the tainted elections of 2000.

On December 17, 2001, the government of Haiti lashed out at its opponents with a series of brutal attacks by pro-Aristide thugs on persons and property. This led to OAS Resolution 806, which called for the creation of an OAS Special Mission to Strengthen Democracy in Haiti and for the Aristide regime to take vigorous steps to restore a climate of security.

When the Government of Haiti failed to comply with the terms of Resolution 806, the OAS responded with another resolution -- 822 -- in September 2002. In this resolution, the Government of Haiti again committed itself to take a series of actions to promote a climate of security and confidence leading to free and fair elections in 2003. I was Chairman of the OAS Permanent Council when Resolution 822 was approved and the U.S. delegation did the heavy lifting in negotiating the document. Resolution 822 took the key step of calling for the normalization of economic cooperation between the GOH and the international financial institutions -- as a means of providing Haiti with further incentive to develop its institutions and promote sustainable development.

In the face of the Haitian government's non-compliance with the terms of these resolutions, the Caribbean Community -- CARICOM -- and the OAS sent a high-level delegation, which included President Bush's Special Envoy for Western Hemisphere Affairs, to Haiti in March 2003. In September 2003, the United States facilitated the OAS effort to send another special envoy to Haiti, Ambassador Terence Todman, to help broker a breakthrough in the political stalemate. While all this was taking place, the United States donated $3.5M to the OAS Special Mission in Haiti to support its work.

These impressive efforts came to naught. Rather than taking steps to build political consensus, reign in the rampant corruption that robbed Haitians of their already meager resources, or promote an atmosphere of security, Aristide continued to recruit and arm gangs of thugs to be unleashed against his opponents. In the process, he undermined what little legitimate law enforcement capacity remained in the already corrupted and weakened Haitian National Police. U.S. law enforcement assistance was essentially limited to support of the Haitian Coast Guard, a rare and largely autonomous police unit that continued to have professional and competent leadership.

Further undermining the rule of law and the effectiveness of his government, Aristide turned a blind eye to the rampant corruption and drug trafficking of those within his circle of power.

It is no wonder, therefore, that when one of the largest pro-Aristide gangs turned against him and rose in open rebellion in the city of Gonaïves last month, the Government of Haiti had no effective, let alone legitimate means with which to respond. The rapid collapse of Government authority throughout Haiti bore testimony not to the strength of the thugs and gangs who sought to bring him down, but to Aristide's own failures. By gutting respect for the rule of law and reverting to authoritarian practices, he undermined his own legitimacy and demeaned the word "democracy."

Under these circumstances, Aristide agreed to what he had steadfastly rejected before, a plan that would open the door to consensus government and a way forward to resolve Haiti's political crisis. This was, of course, the CARICOM Prior Action Plan, with its own Plan of Action and endorsement by the United States, France and Canada. For Aristide, this change of heart came too late to save his government. Nor did his eleventh-hour appeal for foreign military intervention garner support in the international community. No country, the United States included, was inclined to send forces to sustain the failed political status quo in Haiti. In what may eventually be considered his finest hour, Aristide decided to resign, initiating a constitutional process that transferred power to the President of the Supreme Court.

There are several key points that I wish to make regarding U.S. policy toward Haiti -- as we move forward with our international partners to help the Haitian people:

1. The United States has been and will continue to be a firm supporter of democracy in Haiti. That is a cornerstone of our policy.

2. Aristide's departure was never a U.S. demand. We continuously worked with our international partners to break through the political impasse and allow democracy to have a chance. Even France, while calling on February 25 for Aristide's ouster, remained supportive of our efforts to find a negotiated solution. While we were convinced that Aristide was a key obstacle in these efforts, we sought to work with him up until the very end. These efforts were conducted at the highest levels of the United States Government, with Secretary Powell in the forefront.

3. The United States has been and will almost certainly remain Haiti's leading provider of economic aid. This aid was never suspended or cut off, as some have claimed. Between 1995 and 2003, the United States provided over $850 million in assistance to Haiti.

4. Our leadership at the OAS in negotiating Resolution 822 in September 2002 helped to open the door to normalized relations between Haiti and the IFIs and since then IDB loans have begun to flow. We will continue to support IFI loans to Haiti based on their technical merits.

Looking forward, our goal is first to stabilize the security situation and provide emergency humanitarian assistance to Haitians, promote the formation of an independent government that enjoys broad popular support, and work with that government to restore the rule of law and other key democratic institutions in Haiti, while encouraging steps to improve the difficult economic condition of the Haitian people. The United States is not alone in this process. Under the terms of a U.N. Resolution approved unanimously by the Security Council on February 29, U.S. forces are already in Haiti, participating in a Multilateral Interim Force to contribute to a secure and stable environment. The key elements of the CARICOM prior action plan are, as we speak, being carried out to name a new Prime Minister who will in turn form a consensus government to lead Haiti forward. As the Multinational Interim Force ends its mission, we will support the U.N. stabilization force called for by the Security Council and will work with the U.N. and OAS to help the Haitian people rebuild their institutions, starting with the Haitian National Police.

President Bush has called for a "break from the past" in Haiti. Indeed there MUST be a break from the past if Haiti is to move forward. That break will not come in the form of a new autocrat or demagogue but by unleashing the incredible potential of the Haitian people in positive and productive directions. Nowhere is there written that the Haitian people must be poor or ruled by tyrants. They deserve leaders worthy of their trust and respect, who favor the common good over personal gain. The rule of law must be upheld. Those responsible for crimes and abuses must be punished. Gangs and thugs cannot be allowed to hold sway. Support from the United States and the international community can help -- and they will have it -- but the long-term job of building Haitian democracy is up to the Haitians themselves. They, above all people in our Hemisphere, deserve some success.

(end Noriega testimony)

(begin Dewey testimony)

TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR E. DEWEY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES AND MIGRATION (PRM)
BEFORE THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE SUBCOMMITTEE
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MARCH 3, 2004

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I appreciate this opportunity to discuss recent developments in Haiti as they pertain to migration and refugee affairs.

I am thankful, first, that the number of Haitians taking to the sea in overcrowded, unseaworthy vessels was not of the order of those who departed during previous migrations. Had there been a mass migration by sea, we would almost certainly have seen people drowned or otherwise lost at sea. We continue to encourage Haitians not to take to sea.

During the course of the last week, the U. S. Coast Guard rescued some 900 migrants at sea. Once aboard cutters they were given medical attention and food, and cared for while awaiting repatriation in coordination with the Haitian Coast Guard.

If at any time during the course of interdiction and repatriation efforts a migrant in any way expresses or indicates a fear or concern regarding return to Haiti, that migrant is interviewed by a trained Department of Homeland Security protection officer to determine whether the migrant requires protection against repatriation. During last week's repatriations, migrants who expressed a fear of return were promptly transferred to a separate vessel for protection screening.

Among those interdicted, only several expressed fear of returning home. They were promptly transferred to a separate vessel. They were not immediately returned to Haiti with the other migrants. After thorough screening, these migrants were found not to have a credible fear of persecution, and were repatriated.

The U. S. Coast Guard effected these repatriations with superb assistance from the Haitian Coast Guard and from U.S. Embassy staff in Port-Au-Prince who were on scene for as much of the repatriation process as possible. My own bureau, the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, is now making emergency funds available to the Embassy to cover food, transportation and similar expenses to assist repatriated migrants return to their homes.

We are working closely with the Department of Homeland Security, including the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Department of Defense in this endeavor, as we have worked closely together throughout the recent events in Haiti.

In addition to these efforts, we contacted the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) well before the onset of the crisis to discuss, among other issues, what could be done to assist Caribbean countries like Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas in the event of a large outflow from Haiti.

With our full support, UNHCR dispatched a team of specialists to the Caribbean to draw up a comprehensive regional response to any crisis that might emerge. They have provided guidance to Caribbean governments throughout the crisis. Consideration of an international appeal for assistance is now on hold pending new developments.

Our goal in this endeavor has been to mobilize the international community through UNHCR to ensure that the United States -- and the United States taxpayer - do not bear sole responsibility for responding to the crisis, and that we can count on our international partners to shoulder responsibility as well.

Application of international burden sharing to rebuilding Haiti will also minimize motivations in the future for Haitians to attempt to flee their homeland.

(end Dewey testimony)