For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
May 10, 2002
Message to the Senate of the United States
TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:
I submit herewith, for Senate advice and consent to ratification,
the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United States of
America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application
of Safeguards in the United States of America, with annexes, signed at
Vienna June 12, 1998 (the "Additional Protocol"). Adhering to the
Additional Protocol will bolster U.S. efforts to strengthen nuclear
safeguards and promote the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, which
is a cornerstone of U.S. foreign and national security policy.
At the end of the Persian Gulf War, the world learned the extent of
Iraq's clandestine pursuit of an advanced program to develop nuclear
weapons. In order to increase the capability of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (the "Agency") to detect such programs, the
international community negotiated a Model Additional Protocol (the
"Model Protocol") to strengthen the Agency's nuclear safeguards
system. The Model Protocol is to be used to amend the existing
bilateral safeguards agreements of states with the Agency.
The Model Protocol is a milestone in U.S. efforts to strengthen the
safeguards system of the Agency and thereby to reduce the threat posed
by clandestine efforts to develop a nuclear weapon capability. By
accepting the Model Protocol, states assume new obligations that will
provide far greater transparency for their nuclear activities.
Specifically, the Model Protocol strengthens safeguards by requiring
states to provide broader declarations to the Agency about their
nuclear programs and nuclear-related activities and by expanding the
access rights of the Agency.
The United States signed the Additional Protocol at Vienna on June
12, 1998. The Additional Protocol is a bilateral treaty that would
supplement and amend the Agency verification arrangements under the
existing Agreement Between the United States of America and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in
the United States of America of November 18, 1977 (the "Voluntary
Offer"), which entered into force on December 9, 1980. The Additional
Protocol will enter into force when the United States notifies the
Agency that the U.S. statutory and constitutional requirements for
entry into force have been met.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the "NPT")
requires non-nuclear-weapon states parties to accept Agency safeguards
on their nuclear activities. The United States, as a nuclear-weapon
state party to the NPT, is not obligated to accept Agency safeguards on
its nuclear activities. Nonetheless, it has been the announced policy
of the United States since 1967 to permit the application of Agency
safeguards to its nuclear facilities -- excluding only those of direct
national security significance. The Additional Protocol similarly
allows the United States to exclude its application in instances where
the United States decides that its application would result in access
by the Agency to activities with direct
national security significance to the United States or access to
locations or information associated with such activities. I am,
therefore, confident that the Additional Protocol, given our right to
invoke the national security exclusion and to manage access in
accordance with established principles for implementing these
provisions, can be implemented in a fashion that is fully consistent
with U.S. national security.
By submitting itself to the same safeguards on all of its civil
nuclear activities that non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT
are subject to, the United States intends to demonstrate that
adherence to the Model Protocol does not place other countries at a
commercial disadvantage. The U.S. signature of the Additional Protocol
was an important factor in the decisions of many non-nuclear-weapon
states to accept the Model Protocol and provided significant impetus
toward their early acceptance. I am satisfied that the provisions of
the Additional Protocol, given our right to manage access in accordance
with Article 7 and established implementation principles, will allow
the United States to prevent the dissemination of
proliferation-sensitive information and protect proprietary or
commercially sensitive information.
I also transmit, for the information of the Senate, the report of
the Department of State concerning the Additional Protocol, including
an article-by-article analysis, a subsidiary arrangement, and a letter
the United States has sent to the Agency concerning the Additional
Protocol. Additionally, the recommended legislation necessary to
implement the Additional Protocol will be submitted separately to the
Congress.
I believe that the Additional Protocol is in the best interests of
the United States. Our acceptance of this agreement will sustain our
longstanding record of voluntary acceptance of nuclear safeguards and
greatly strengthen our ability to promote universal adoption of the
Model Protocol, a central goal of my nuclear nonproliferation policy.
Widespread acceptance of the Protocol will contribute significantly to
our nonproliferation objectives as well as strengthen U.S., allied, and
international security. I, therefore, urge the Senate to give early
and favorable consideration to the Additional Protocol, and to give
advice and consent to its ratification.
GEORGE W. BUSH
THE WHITE HOUSE,
May 9, 2002.
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