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Exchange Stabilization Fund


History

Intervention Operations 1985-90
Intervention Operations 1993-2000
Credit Operations

The ESF began to conduct foreign exchange market intervention transactions in 1934 and 1935. Also, it entered into credit arrangements, starting in 1936. From 1936 to the present, the ESF has participated in over a hundred credit or loan arrangements with foreign governments or central banks. After World War II, the ESF conducted Treasury's monetary gold transactions and widened its participation in credit arrangements. Tables presenting all ESF credit arrangements since 1936 follow in the "Credit Operations" section below

Treasury policy during 1961-71 period focused on deterring capital outflows from the United States and giving major foreign central banks an incentive to hold dollar reserves rather than demand gold from the U.S. gold stock. The ESF resumed intervention operations in the foreign exchange market in March of 1961 (for the first time since the mid-1930s), but it soon became apparent that the resources of the ESF alone were too small to sustain transactions of the magnitude necessary. At the invitation of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve joined in foreign exchange operations in February 1962. The Federal Reserve entered into a network of swap agreements with other central banks in order to obtain foreign currencies for short-term periods for use in absorbing forward sales of dollars by foreign central banks hedging exchange risk on their dollar holdings. To provide foreign currency to repay the Fed's swap drawings, the Treasury during the 1960s issued non-marketable foreign currency-denominated medium-term securities (Roosa bonds) and sold the proceeds to the Fed. In August 1971, the United States ceased conducting gold transactions with foreign monetary authorities, and the need to moderate the drain on the US gold stock was eliminated.

In December 1974, ESF turned over, in a sale at par value, a gold balance of 2.02 million ounces (valued at $85 million) to the Treasury General Account. This gold had been acquired prior to August 1971 through gold transactions that the ESF engaged in with foreign monetary authorities and with the market for the purpose of stabilizing the value of the dollar relative to gold. In a public announcement of this sale of gold by the ESF to the Treasury General Account, the Treasury stated that the sale was made "in view of the likelihood that the Exchange Stabilization Fund [would] not be engaging in further transactions to stabilize the value of the dollar relative to gold." The ESF again had gold on its books for a short period in 1978 as a counterpart to an ESF credit to Portugal.

Later in the 1970s, the US monetary authorities built up foreign currency reserves substantially. For this purpose, the ESF entered in a $1 billion swap agreement with the Bundesbank in January 1978 (which has since been allowed to expire). In connection with the dollar support program announced in November 1978, the Treasury issued foreign currency-denominated securities (Carter bonds) in the Swiss and German capital markets to acquire additional foreign currencies needed for sale in the market through the ESF. The United States also drew its reserve position in the IMF.

In the mid-1980s, the major industrial nations embarked on a process of intensified policy coordination. The Group of Five's (G-5) Plaza Agreement in September 1985 served to reinforce exchange rate adjustments among the major currencies and occasioned substantial coordinated intervention sales of dollars. The G-5 "agreed that exchange rates should play a role in adjusting external imbalances … should better reflect fundamentals … and that … some further orderly appreciation of non-dollar currencies against the dollar is desirable." In the Louvre Accord of February 1987, the major industrial countries agreed that the exchange rate changes since the Plaza Agreement would "increasingly contribute to reducing external imbalances and … [had] brought their currencies within ranges broadly consistent with underlying economic fundamentals …[and agreed to cooperate closely to foster stability of exchange rates around current levels." They adopted specific measures and cooperative arrangements reflecting their view that their currencies were broadly consistent with underlying economic fundamentals. This framework for cooperation on exchange rates complemented the broader economic policy coordination efforts to promote growth and external adjustment. In December 1987, the Group of Seven (G-7) reaffirmed Louvre's basic objectives and policy directions and agreed to intensify their economic policy coordination efforts and to cooperate closely on exchange markets. There was continued active cooperation through late 1989, but such activities became less frequent thereafter.

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Intervention Operations 1985-90. There were numerous episodes of intervention during this period, some involving net purchases of foreign currencies by the US monetary authorities and some involving net sales of foreign currencies. These operations were generally carried out in conjunction with operations by a number of other countries' monetary authorities, including those of the major industrialized countries.

Table showing amounts of US intervention, 1985-90

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Intervention Operations 1993-2000. In the 1993-2000 period, there were fewer, but larger interventions.

There was intervention on 20 days during this period, always in conjunction with at least one other member of the G-7, but only two of these operations took place after August 1995. In the period April 1993 - November 1994, the ESF sold foreign currencies on a number of occasions. The dollar reached historical lows vs. the DM and the yen in March and April 1995 respectively. The US monetary authorities sold foreign currencies on four days from March through May. The May intervention was explicitly linked to the G-7's April 25 statement of "concern about recent developments in exchange markets … that recent movements have gone beyond the levels justified by underlying economic conditions in the major countries … [and] that orderly reversal of those movements is desirable …" There were further sales of foreign currencies in July and August. In June 1998, the ESF entered the market as a buyer of foreign currency for the first time in six years and purchased yen in the context of Japan’s plans to strengthen its economy. In September 2000, the ESF bought euros, in a coordinated intervention at the initiative of the ECB, on shared concern about the potential implications of euro movements for the world economy.

Table showing amounts of US intervention, 1993-2000

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Credit Operations.. In February 1995 the President decided to use the ESF to provide up to $20 billion in assistance to Mexico. Building on the North American Framework Agreement (NAFA) and the ESF's standing Exchange Stabilization Agreement (ESA) with Mexico under NAFA, the February agreements provided for support in the form of short-term swaps, medium-term swaps (up to 5 years), and securities guarantees (up to 10 years). The February agreements included an Oil Proceeds Facility Agreement that provided Treasury with a source of repayment through Mexican oil export proceeds if needed. Treasury also agreed with the Fed that any Fed claim on Mexico remaining outstanding beyond one year could be assigned to the ESF. In 1995, Mexico drew on the medium-term facility in an amount totaling $10.5 billion. Mexico fully repaid the drawings in advance, by January 1997. The ESA remains the ESF's only standing swap line.

In November 1998, the United States committed to use the ESF for up to $5 billion of a multilateral guarantee of a $13.2 billion Bank for International Settlements (BIS) credit facility for Brazil. Drawings by Brazil on the BIS totaled $8.65 billion, and the ESF's share of the guarantee of these drawings amounted to $3.3 billion. Brazil had fully repaid these drawings by April 2000.

The accompanying table shows ESF credit arrangements that entered into force from 1936 to 2002 and offers a brief description of each. In addition to the arrangements listed here, Treasury extended an overnight credit on September 30, 1967 and a $200 million line of credit in March 1968, both as part of multilateral operations to support the pound.

Tables showing credit arrangements since 1936


3. The ESF had a large number of swap lines after W.W.II, primarily with Latin American countries, but these were gradually eliminated and, by 1970, only a swap line with Mexico remained. In 1994, this swap line was brought under the North American Framework Agreement.

4. The Federal Reserve eliminated almost all of its swap lines after years of disuse and in connection with the advent of the European Central Bank on January 1, 2000 and now has swap lines only with Mexico and Canada under the 1994 North American Framework Agreement. (D2)

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