For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
May 6, 2004
Executive Summary
Report to the President from the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba
For the Entire Commission Report visit:
http://state.gov/p/wha/rt/cuba/
CHAPTER 1: HASTENING CUBA'S TRANSITION
As an essential part of America's commitment to stand with the
Cuban people against the tyranny of Fidel Castro's regime, President
George W. Bush mandated that the Commission for Assistance to a Free
Cuba identify additional means by which the United States can help the
Cuban people bring about an expeditious end to the Castro
dictatorship.
In the past, the United States has tended to initiate policies
towards Cuba that were implemented in isolation from each other. For
instance, economic sanctions were initially imposed with little, if
any, support to Cuban civil society, and were not coupled with
initiatives to break the regime's information blockade or proactively
engage the international community. In addition, well-meaning
humanitarian policies were authorized without thorough consideration of
the relationship they would have to the fundamental policy objective of
assisting the Cuban people regain their freedom and their right to
determine their way of life and their future.
The Commission sought a more proactive, integrated, and disciplined
approach to undermine the survival strategies of the Castro regime and
contribute to conditions that will help the Cuban people hasten the
dictatorship's end. The recommendations focus on actions available to
the United States Government, allowing us to establish a strong
foundation on which to build supportive international efforts. This
comprehensive framework is composed of six inter-related tasks
considered central to hastening change:
Empower Cuban Civil Society: The Castro dictatorship has been able
to maintain its repressive grip on the Cuban people by intimidating
civil society and preventing the emergence of a credible alternative to
its failed policies. As a result of Castro's 45-year strategy of
co-opting or crushing independent actors, Cuban civil society is weak
and divided, its development impeded by pervasive and continuous
repression. Through absolute control of the Cuban economy and the
manipulation of U.S. migration policy, the Castro regime has made it
all but impossible for human rights activists and reformers to operate
and has forced many into exile.
Now, the tide of public opinion has turned and Castro's loyalists
must constantly work to restrain the Cuban people from organizing and
expressing demands for change and freedom. Cubans are increasingly
losing their fear and vocalizing their desire to be architects of their
own destinies. By continuing to isolate the Castro regime while
supporting the democratic opposition and empowering an emerging civil
society, the United States can help the Cuban people in their efforts
to effect positive political and social change in their country. Cuban
civil society is not lacking spirit, desire, or determination; it is
hampered by a lack of materials and support needed to bring about these
changes.
Break the Cuban Dictatorship's Information Blockade: The Castro
regime controls all formal means of mass media and communication on the
island. The Cuban Communist Party exerts strict editorial control over
newspapers, television, and radio through the regime's pervasive
apparatus of repression, preventing the Cuban people from obtaining
accurate information on such issues as the regime's systematic
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the state of
the Cuban economy. Consistent with its fear of an uncontrolled
information flow to the Cuban people, the regime has set up
technological, administrative, and intelligence structures to impede
the ability of pro-democracy groups and the larger civil society, both
on and off the island, to effectively communicate their message to the
Cuban people. In concert with efforts to strengthen Cuban civil
society, and building on the excellent work already underway by U.S.
Government broadcasting entities, the means exist to increase the
availability to the Cuban people of reliable information on events in
Cuba and around the world and to assist in the effort to present a
democratic alternative to the failed policies of the Castro regime.
Deny Resources to the Cuban Dictatorship: The policies of the
Castro regime have debilitated the Cuban economy and impoverished the
Cuban people. Rather than address the deprivation confronting Cubans,
the regime cynically ignores its obligations and seeks to exploit
external engagement with the island and humanitarian assistance to the
Cuban people in order to maintain its grip on power. The economic
lifelines of the Castro regime are tourism; access to subsidized
Venezuelan oil; commodities; and revenues and other support generated
by those with family on the island, with the vast majority of such
support coming from the United States. Over the past decade, the
regime has built an apparatus designed to exploit humanitarian aspects
of U.S. policy, specifically to siphon off hundreds of millions of
dollars for itself. Remittances, gift parcels and travel-related
revenues from those in exile with family on the island, especially
those Cubans who have come to the United States since the early 1990s,
are avenues through which the regime has franchised out the subsistence
of a significant portion of the Cuban population. The dollars made
available to the regime through these means permit it to divert
resources to the maintenance and strengthening of its repressive
apparatus and away from meeting the basic needs of the Cuban people.
Dollars and donated goods, although provided with good intentions by
U.S. persons, are effectively helping keep the regime afloat. U.S.
initiatives should maintain avenues by which Americans can engage the
Cuban people, and by which those with family on the island can
reasonably assist immediate relatives, while minimizing the regime's
manipulation and exploitation of the plight of the Cuban people.
Illuminate the Reality of Castro's Cuba: The current survival of
the regime is, in part, dependent upon its projection of a benign
international image. Cuba presents itself internationally as a prime
tourist destination, as a center for bio-technological innovation, and
as a successful socialist state that has improved the standard of
living of its people and that is a model for education, health care,
and race relations for the world. This image belies the true state of
Cuba's political, economic, and social conditions, its status as a
state sponsor of terrorism, and the increasingly erratic behavior of
its leadership.
Encourage International Diplomatic Efforts to Support Cuban Civil
Society and Challenge the Castro Regime: There is a growing
international consensus on the nature of the Castro regime and the need
for fundamental political and economic change on the island. This
consensus coalesced, in large part, after the regime's brutal
March-April 2003 crackdown on peaceful pro-democracy advocates, an act
properly characterized as the most severe repression of peaceful
political activists in the history of Cuba, and certainly the most
significant act of political repression in Latin America in a decade.
Infuriated by, and fearful of, the valiant effort by these same
activists to continue to reach out to the Cuban people and the
international community, the regime reacted; Castro's political attacks
against the European Union (EU) and other nations also reveal his
regime's continuing trepidation in the face of peaceful Cubans calling
for their fundamental rights. Many of those who once stood by Castro
have now begun to speak out publicly against the regime's abuses.
However, while this same international consensus has limits,
encouraging multilateral diplomatic efforts to challenge the regime in
international organizations and to strengthen policies of proactive
support for pro-democracy groups in Cuba should form a cornerstone of
our policy to hasten an end to the Castro regime. The International
Labor Organization and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
amongst other international organizations, are natural fora for
highlighting the conditions under which Cubans live and struggle to
survive.
Undermine the Regime's "Succession Strategy": The Castro
dictatorship is pursuing every means at its disposal to survive and
perpetuate itself through a "succession strategy" from Fidel Castro to
Raul Castro and beyond; its goal is that the unelected and undemocratic
communist elite now in power remain so indefinitely. The United States
rejects the continuation of a communist dictatorship in Cuba, and this
Commission recommends measures to focus pressure and attention on the
ruling elite so that succession by this elite or any one of its
individuals is seen as what it would be: an impediment to a democratic
and free Cuba.
SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Provide an additional $29 million (to augment the current Cuba
program budget of $7 million) to the State Department, USAID, and other
appropriate U.S. Government agencies to:
Work with willing third-country allies to support creation of an
international fund for the protection and development of civil society
in Cuba, to engage, train, and provide resources for volunteers of
different nationalities to travel to Cuba to provide assistance to
independent libraries, professional organizations, charity
organizations, journalists, educators, nurses, and medical doctors
working independently of the regime;
Fund programs to provide educational opportunities to family
members of the political opposition and, working with the
Organization of American States (OAS), to establish a university
scholarship program for the children of Cuban dissidents to study at
Latin American universities; and
Fund programs to support democracy-building efforts by youth,
women, and Afro-Cubans to train, develop, and organize these
disaffected and marginalized segments of Cuban society to take greater
action in support of democracy and human rights in Cuba.
Direct the immediate deployment of the C-130 COMMANDO SOLO
airborne platform and make available funds to acquire and refit a
dedicated airborne platform for the transmission of Radio and
Television Mart into Cuba, consistent with U. S. international
telecommunications obligations;
Support efforts by NGOs in selected third countries to highlight
human rights abuses in Cuba, as part of a broader effort to discourage
tourist travel and reinforce international attention on the plight of
the Cuban people, including political prisoners and civil society;
Eliminate abuses of educational travel by limiting it to
undergraduate or graduate degree granting institutions and for
full-semester study programs, or shorter duration only when the program
directly supports U.S. policy goals;
Direct U.S. law enforcement authorities to conduct "sting"
operations against "mule" networks and others who illegally carry
money and offer rewards to those who report on illegal remittances that
lead to enforcement actions;
Reduce the regime's manipulation of family visits to generate hard
currency -- while preserving efforts to promote legitimate family ties
and humanitarian relief for the Cuban people by:
Limiting family visits to Cuba to one (1) trip every three years
under a specific license; individuals would be eligible to apply for a
specific license three years after their last visit to Cuba; new
arrivals from Cuba would be eligible to apply for a specific license
three years after leaving Cuba;
Limiting the definition of "family" for the purposes of family
visits to immediate family (including grandparents, grandchildren,
parents, siblings, spouses, and children); and
Reducing the current authorized per diem amount (the authorized
amount allowed for food and lodging expenses for travel in Cuba) from
$164 per day to $50 per day (i.e., approximately eight times what a
Cuban national would expect to earn during a 14-day visit) for all
family visits to Cuba, based on the presumption that travelers will
stay with family in Cuba.
The process for implementation of Title III of the Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act should ensure that the
full range of policy options are made available to the President, and
that a detailed, rigorous, and complete country-by-country analysis of
policies and actions with respect to Cuba is provided to the President
for use in assessing whether the suspension is necessary to the
national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition
to democracy in Cuba;
To deter foreign investment in Cuba in confiscated properties,
claims to which are owned by U.S. nationals, aggressively pursue
Title IV visa sanctions against those foreign nationals trafficking in
(e.g., using or benefiting from) such property, including devoting
additional personnel and resources to application and enforcement;
Neutralize Cuban government front companies by establishing a
Cuban Asset Targeting Group, comprised of appropriate law
enforcement authorities, to investigate and identify new ways in which
hard currency is moved in and out of Cuba;
Provide an additional $5 million for U.S. Embassy public diplomacy
initiatives to:
Disseminate information abroad about U.S. foreign policy,
specifically regarding human rights and other developments in Cuba,
including Castro's record of harboring terrorists, committing espionage
against the United States and other countries, fomenting subversion of
democratically elected governments in Latin America, and the U.S.
Government's belief that Cuba has at least a limited developmental
offensive biological weapons research and development effort; and
Fund and promote international or third-country national
conferences to disseminate information abroad about U.S. policies
on transition planning efforts related to Cuba.
Increase direct efforts with willing third-country governments to
implement a robust, proactive policy to (1) support Cuban civil
society, including the opposition, and (2) develop policy frameworks
for assistance to a post-dictatorship Cuba;
Work with NGOs and other interested parties to assure that a Cuban
independent labor representative or labor representative in exile is
able to speak at ILO conferences;
Encourage efforts by NGOs to draw attention to exploitative labor
conditions in Cuba and assist Cuban workers in obtaining redress for
that wrong;
Fund NGO projects designed to help Cuban citizens obtain effective
access to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and provide
in-country training, through appropriate NGOs, to Cuban human rights
activists in collecting and preparing information in order to file
claims with the IACHR;
Target regime officials for visa denial if they (1) are or were
involved in torture or other serious human rights abuses or (2)
provided assistance to fugitives from U.S. justice; and
Establish a Transition Coordinator at the State Department to
facilitate expanded implementation of pro-democracy, civil-society
building, and public diplomacy projects for Cuba and to continue
regular planning for future transition assistance contingencies.
CHAPTER 2: MEETING BASIC HUMAN NEEDS IN HEALTH, EDUCATION,
HOUSING, AND HUMAN SERVICES
Cuba's transition from the Castro regime to a democratic society
with a free economy will be a challenging process. The task of meeting
the basic human needs of the Cuban population involves the removal of
the manifestations of Castro's communism; the introduction of the
values and practices of democracy and free enterprise; and the building
of institutions and services that will improve the health, nutrition,
education, housing, and social services available to the Cuban people.
The fundamental goal of any assistance to a free Cuba must be to
empower the Cuban people by improving their economic and social
well-being, ensuring that adequate health and social services are
maintained, reconstructing a democratic civic culture through education
and institution-building, dealing with the human cost of the
totalitarian police state, and supporting the Cuban people as they cope
with these issues and work to transform themselves.
The international community, especially organizations in the
Western Hemisphere, can play a leading role in assisting the Cuban
transition process. The U.S. Government can work through the
Organization of American States and regional agencies, and with the
United Nations and its agencies, and other organizations and individual
countries.
Improving Cubans' condition will require dramatic reforms to ensure
that democratic values and a civic culture return, that important
democratic institutions -- including private and faith-based
organizations -- are able to flourish, and that helping agents such as
schools, clinics, and community centers can respond to real needs and
be accountable to the citizenry.
Some of the effort to meet basic human needs will involve
immediate, short-term assistance to ensure that critical health,
nutrition, and social services issues are addressed; that schools are
kept open and provided with new instructional materials and staff; that
any housing emergencies are addressed; that comprehensive needs
assessments and data collection are begun; and that food and medical
aid is distributed as needed.
As a new Cuban government initiates the process of establishing the
rule of law, safeguarding human rights, and creating a new climate of
opportunity, a variety of programs and services are identified that
U.S. public and private sources could provide to the Cuban people over
the medium- and long-tem. It is expected that such assistance would
come not only from U.S. Government agencies and contractors, but also
from philanthropic foundations, non-profit expert organizations, and
businesses investing in Cuba's future. Cuban-American and other U.S.
citizens and organizations would be involved in these efforts.
Both short- and long-term issues will involve the work of many
players and will need to be coordinated. The Cuban people are educated
to a good basic standard and, despite the repression of the Castro
regime, they have shown themselves to be remarkably resilient, savvy,
and entrepreneurial. They will need the resources (including short-
and long-term loans), technical assistance, and general support to
enable them to improve health standards, manage the change to a market
economy, and maintain and improve their infrastructure and basic
services.
SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS:
The U.S. Government, if requested by the transition government,
should be prepared:
To conduct a hands-on needs assessment to provide objective data
and observations on the state of health care, nutrition,
education, housing, and social services;
For the immediate immunization of all children under five who have
not been already immunized under the existing health system for the
major childhood diseases;
To distribute food aid as needed and as feasible, and consider a
food aid monetization program for merchants to maintain the price
of food at a reasonable level;
To work with Cuban churches and their external supporting church
institutions to use local religious networks and structures to assist
with humanitarian relief;
Prepare to keep all schools open during an emergency phase of the
transition in order to keep children and teenagers off the streets and
learning during this unstable period;
To institute large-scale public works projects using local Cuban
labor to provide immediate jobs and help with aid efforts; and
To provide support to Cuban small farmers to supplement food aid
and to encourage self-reliance. Use the humanitarian aid program
to encourage the democratic transition by empowering Cuban churches,
free libraries, civic centers, the media, and small businesses to
assist in the effort.
CHAPTER 3: ESTABLISHING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, RESPECT FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, RULE OF LAW, AND NATIONAL JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION
The United States is committed to assist a post-Castro transition
government in the promotion and consolidation of representative
democratic processes and institutions that will respect the human
rights and personal freedoms of all Cuban citizens.
Only when the Castro regime's authoritarian institutions and
practices are abandoned, its instruments of repression dismantled, and
a popularly based democratic process initiated, will Cubans be able to
begin governing themselves through the exercise of their own free
will. Such a liberation from Fidel Castro's brutal communist
dictatorship will inspire a new political order based on national
reconciliation, the rule of law, personal choice, and equal justice and
opportunity for all.
Leaders of a transition government will likely move urgently to
address a number of immediate priorities. Political prisoners will be
freed because they have been unjustly incarcerated for exercising their
fundamental freedoms. The large segment of the population that has
been subjugated and silenced by government intimidation and violence
will fear no more. The many forms of violence that have characterized
the Castro regime's behavior at home and abroad will be abandoned. The
Cuban people will have reason once again to be proud as they take
collective responsibility for restoring their country to a respected,
peaceful, and constructive role in the international community.
Other immediate priorities a transition government will face
include: professionalizing military and civilian police and security
services; considering whether to end obligatory military service;
voiding constitutional provisions that are inimical to democracy;
revising criminal codes and sentencing guidelines; deciding what laws
and regulations should be rescinded; cleansing the judiciary of corrupt
and political judges; initiating a national debate about the provisions
of a new constitution and procedures for drafting and ratifying it;
opening prisons for the first time to outside inspection; guaranteeing
human rights and freedom of speech; and ending all forms of
discrimination.
Among the most daunting challenges a transition government
immediately will face are those that will pit popular demands for
prosecutions of former Castro regime officials against the imperative
of establishing a government firmly founded on the rule of law and due
process. On balance, the prospects for a rapid and peaceful transition
to democracy could depend more on this key variable than any other.
Middle- and longer-term priorities will include building all of the
institutions, processes, relationships, and values that will nourish
democratic governance. The U.S. Government should be prepared to work
with the Cuban people and their chosen representatives, should they
ask, to lend assistance in drafting laws and regulations, preparing a
new constitution, and establishing a system of checks and balances and
the spectrum of national and local level democratic institutions
(executive, legislative, and judicial) responsive to the public will.
U.S. public and private assistance could also help in the critical
longer-term task of promoting a culture of lawfulness in which citizens
believe in their new system, accept its legal and constitutional
principles and understand their obligations in that context, and
involve themselves in an emerging civil society. In building
professional, apolitical law enforcement institutions, international
assistance could be beneficial.
As the transition to a multi-party democracy progresses -- with the
help and encouragement of the United States -- Cubans will be able for
the first time in decades to enjoy the freedoms that prevail in the
rest of the Western Hemisphere. The experiences of some of those
neighbors -- and of former communist countries -- that have progressed
from dictatorship to democracy could influence the choices Cubans make
in constructing their own free society. A free and democratic Cuba
will be welcomed back as a full participant in the inter-American
system.
The assistance and encouragement of democracies in the region, and
elsewhere, could prove to be crucial in helping to assure that the
transition to constitutional democracy is rapid and peaceful. Assuming
a free Cuban government agreed, the U.S. Government would also be
prepared to assist as Cubans form diverse and representative political
parties, interest groups, labor unions, and other free political
institutions, as well as civic, professional, and commercial
associations. A national legislature, such other regional and local
governments as the Cuban people desire, courts and other legal and
judicial infrastructure, as well as new and accountable executive
branch agencies could receive U.S. assistance, if desired. Eliminating
and preventing official corruption will be a continuing priority.
A peaceful transition to democracy will require the presence of
effective, professional Cuban security institutions that are committed
fully to supporting the democratic transition. As an immediate
priority, and assuming the new Cuban government desires it, the United
States would be prepared to assist a free Cuba develop a truly
professional civilian police force.
SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Introduce exchange programs to inform Cuban leaders and
administrators about democratic policy and decision-making and
transparent governance;
The U.S. Government should be prepared to provide technical
assistance and capacity building to strengthen legislative
institutions, processes, and procedures;
The U.S. Government should be prepared to provide technical
assistance on decentralization through the development of provincial
and municipal governments;
If requested by a transition government, the U.S. Government
should provide technical assistance to promote and develop
democratic political party structures and processes and introduce
concepts and mechanisms for citizen oversight of parties as well as of
local government;
Offer expertise and assistance, if requested by a transition
government, to help develop and strengthen a democratic electoral
system including on the drafting and reform of election laws and
training election officials in voter registration, maintenance of
voting lists and balloting procedures, and proactive measures against
fraud and abuse; and
Work with the OAS to support electoral observation missions to
help Cuban transition government authorities bring accountability
to their electoral process.
CHAPTER 4: ESTABLISHING THE CORE INSTITUTIONS OF A FREE ECONOMY
The Cuban economic system is broken; it will not be easily fixed.
It will take time to build national institutions, as well as develop in
individuals the attitudes, expertise, and skills capable of managing
Cuba's reconstruction. Lessons learned from other transition countries
demonstrate that it is extremely important to identify and prioritize
needs, and to manage expectations correctly.
After decades of repression and material deprivation, Cubans will
also be able to assert their new political freedoms to establish an
entirely new economic order. Liberated from the rigidities and
corruption of Castro's communist system, they will be free to create a
private sector capable of providing jobs and opportunity, generating
wealth, and spurring diversified growth. Long denied rights available
to peoples in nearly every other country of the world, Cubans can be
expected to place a high immediate priority on restoring rights to
private ownership and the formation of competitive free enterprise.
The reconstruction effort in a free Cuba will be costly. In this
regard, the burden of reconstruction need not fall completely on the
shoulders of the United States and must be done in close consultation
with the Cuban people. There is a significant role to be played by the
international donor community, the international financial institutions
(IFIs), including the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the
United Nations development agencies, all of which can provide programs
and assistance to a free Cuba. We should seek engagement by the
international community and the IFIs to better ensure a smooth
transition when the time comes.
Economic change in Cuba will not occur in a vacuum. Two
generations have grown up under Castro's repressive system. There are
Cubans (i.e., the communist elite) who will have vested interests in
maintaining the status quo. They will present a difficult but not
unprecedented problem.
It is crucial that the Cuban people be full partners in the reform
process, that whatever proposals we make to a free Cuban people are
realistic, and that any promises made are promises kept.
SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS:
The U.S. Government, applying its experiences with other
non-market economy transitions, should be prepared to encourage a
free Cuba to decontrol prices, including energy prices, in the near
term;
The U.S. Government should provide examples to a free Cuba from
Eastern Europe concerning its experiences in transitioning from a
centralized economy, including experiences with the restructuring of
enterprises controlled by militaries;
The U.S. Government and the IFIs should be prepared to offer
assistance to a free Cuba to help it design an effective privatization
program as well as prepare enterprises for privatization, including
industries and enterprises operated or managed by the Cuban Armed
Forces;
The U.S. Government should be in a position to work with a free
Cuba to establish a U.S.-Cuba Joint Committee on Trade and
Investment (JCTI). The JCTI would focus on post-embargo relations
affecting trade and investment. It would also serve as a precursor and
first step toward the possible negotiation of a U.S.-Cuba Free Trade
Agreement;
The U.S. Government should encourage a free Cuba to rejoin the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and OAS, and join the
IDB as quickly as possible;
The U.S. Government and the IFIs should be prepared to assist a
free Cuba in developing a new investment regime that fosters
foreign investment and investor confidence, consistent with appropriate
free market mechanisms; and
The U.S. Government should encourage a free Cuba to settle
outstanding claims issues as expeditiously as possible, bearing in mind
that a long, complicated process is not in Cuba's best economic
interest.
CHAPTER 5: MODERNIZING INFRASTRUCTURE
As a result of years of inadequate investment and neglect of
repairs and maintenance, Cuba's infrastructure has significantly
deteriorated. Examples of the abysmal state of Cuba's infrastructure
are not difficult to identify. The only investment realized in Cuba's
transportation infrastructure over the last two decades has been to
support the narrow interests of the tourism industry at the expense of
the general population. Ports, roads, and bridges suffer from a lack
of investment, as do many of the supporting components of a healthy
transportation and distribution system.
To assist a transition government in Cuba and meet humanitarian as
well as reconstruction challenges significant infrastructure
investments will be needed in transportation systems, energy,
telecommunications, water resources, and sanitation. Since
infrastructure, by definition, implies facilities and equipment that
are unlikely to be built or acquired in a
90-day timeframe, this Commission identified short-term actions,
such as operational changes and signing of new cooperative agreements,
that can facilitate the most rapid assistance to the Cuban people in a
time of transition. It also identified the areas which would need, in
the proper context, on-site technical evaluation to establish needs and
priorities for longer-term infrastructure reconstruction.
In the short-term, the U.S. Government can assist a free Cuba and
its citizens by facilitating the acquisition of new and/or used
equipment, opening avenues of cooperation between public/private U.S.
transport entities and their Cuban counterparts, conducting technical
needs assessments, and providing technical assistance to develop an
infrastructure development plan that will identify emergency
requirements as well as medium- and long-term needs.
To address long-term infrastructure needs, elements of the U.S.
Government can support a free Cuba in seeking donor assistance from the
international community and organizations such as the World Bank and
the Inter-American Development Bank to help finance feasibility
studies, improve the operation and financial viability of public
utilities, upgrade and replace plants and equipment, undertake the
privatization of utilities, encourage competition in services, and
develop regulatory mechanisms for natural monopolies.
SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Transportation:
Highways: Subject to the desires of a free Cuban government, the
U.S. Government could provide advisors to a Transportation Ministry to
assist Cuban officials with design, construction, and maintenance
issues associated with primary and secondary roads and bridges.
Aviation: The U.S. Government should be prepared to provide
technical assistance to conduct airport assessments in Cuba to
facilitate granting them permission to serve as the last point of
departure for the United States.
Maritime: The U.S. Government should be prepared to assist a free
Cuba in identifying priority needs for port equipment and investments
in port and intermodal infrastructure.
Railways: In a transition context, the U.S. Government should be
prepared to assist a free Cuba to ascertain the status of railroad
bridges, culverts, track, and other critical rail-related
infrastructure assets, including rolling stock.
Energy:
Work with officials of a free Cuban government to perform a
comprehensive assessment of energy sector needs, priorities, and
acquisition planning.
Potable Water:
If requested by a transition government, assess existing plants to
ensure that the population is receiving water that is clean and safe
and offer technical assistance to develop a coordinated program of
capital rehabilitation of the distribution system and distribution to
end users of home water disinfection chemicals (i.e., sodium hypo
chlorite as used in many developing nations).
CHAPTER 6: IDENTIFYING & ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION
Cuba has many natural assets and challenges. The natural
environment has suffered degradation as a result of the neglectful
policies of Cuba's Soviet-style economic system. Cuba faces degraded
soil, old and decaying water and sanitation infrastructure, wildlife
habitat destruction, and salt water intrusion into its fresh water
supplies. Thanks to the regime's insistence on crushing organizations
it cannot control, Cuba also lacks an independent non-governmental
organization (NGO) sector capable of providing accountability and
advocating on behalf of the environment and natural resources and to
serve as a mechanism to raise public awareness and bring new ideas and
issues to the attention of policy makers for action. Among Cuba's
assets are a rich biodiversity, mineral reserves, relatively low levels
of industrialization, elements of an environmental framework law, an
educated population, and highly trained experts and scientists. These
assets could serve as a foundation for sustainable development in a
free Cuba.
The poor environmental protection policies that have been in effect
are evident in the quality of land, water, air, and natural habitats
that exist on the island today.
Land and Soils: The Cuban government has permitted deforestation
and over-cultivation of the land, compaction of soils due to the use of
heavy farm machinery, and strip mining. These practices have resulted
in salinity in soils and heavy erosion of the land.
Water: Agricultural runoff from heavily treated fields has
contributed to the degradation of surface water streams, in addition to
the untreated wastewater from cities, sugar mills and other
food-processing plants, and nickel mining operations. Irrigation
practices have resulted in low groundwater levels, causing significant
salt-water intrusion into fresh water and salinity in coastal soils.
Low river flows due to dam construction have in turn caused lower
re-charge of aquifers and further salinity in the streams.
Habitat/Biodiversity: Wildlife habitat has been affected by water
quality in freshwater streams, which is in turn affected by runoff from
agricultural practices, erosion due to deforestation, and sedimentation
of freshwater streams. The introduction of non-native species has also
had a significant impact on the overall viability of the ecological
system. The relatively recent phenomenon of major hotel and tourism
infrastructure construction projects, particularly in highly fragile
ecosystems like the Sabana-Camaguey Peninsula, has already had
deleterious effects, which will worsen if uncontrolled development
continues.
Air: Air emissions from industry and transportation cause
significant health problems. Stationary sources of emissions (electric
power plants, petroleum refineries, cement plants, nickel plants, and
other old industries) emit large amounts of sulfur dioxide and
particulate matter. While it is true that Cuba's poverty means that it
has a comparatively low density of vehicles per capita, Cuban vehicles
are old and lack basic pollution controls and maintenance.
U.S. cooperation and technical assistance can help a free Cuba
address the immediate and long-term needs it will face in a post-Castro
era. As an immediate step, the U.S. Government can help a transition
government conduct a rapid assessment of immediate equipment needs to
ensure that drinking water systems are operational and chemicals needed
to treat the water are made available. For medium- and long-term
actions, a wide range of cooperation and assistance possibilities
exist. However, it is important to select a few key areas where there
can be a short-term success as well as work on medium- and long-term
capacity building efforts. Generating and providing quality
environmental information to the public will be a cornerstone for
engaging a free Cuban people in environmental and natural resources
management.
SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS:
The U.S. Government should be prepared to offer to a free Cuba
strengthen its legal framework and improve its development and
implementation of its environmental laws;
The U.S. Government should be prepared to assist a free Cuba in
developing and conducting assessments of the impacts of point and
non-point sources of pollution;
U.S. Government agencies could provide a free Cuba with
significant capacity building expertise, including the development
of monitoring programs, review and assessment of water quality data
(drinking water, effluent discharge, ambient water quality), long-term
development of laws and regulations, development of pre-treatment
programs (control of industrial discharges into public waste water
systems), etc.;
The U.S. Government can assist transition government coral reef
managers with a number of tools, including mapping of benthic habitats
of coral reef ecosystems and assessing the associated reef fish and
their essential fish habitat;
In the area of solid wastes, if requested by a transition
government, U.S. Government experts could provide technical
assistance in the areas of contaminant-specific Environmental
Technologies, treatment & control of solid wastes, medical waste
tracking, municipal solid waste source reduction, soil washing
(chemical and metals removal), management of watersheds and freshwater
ecology, and erosion control and water management associated with solid
waste landfill situations;
The U.S. Government could provide assistance, if requested, in
addressing all facets of soil erosion, sedimentation, soil compaction,
and related conservation practices; and
The U.S. Government should be prepared to look for public-private
partnerships and partnerships with cities -- with the objective of
identifying U.S. expertise that could help a free Cuba reduce
pollution, such as landfill methane recovery or industrial energy
efficiency, and develop policies for "responsible investment."
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