For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
November 15, 2002
Message to the Senate of the United States
I transmit herewith, for Senate advice and consent to ratification,
with a declaration, the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for
Nuclear Damage done at Vienna on September 12, 1997. This Convention
was adopted by a Diplomatic Conference convened by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and was opened for signature at Vienna on
September 29, 1997, during the IAEA General Conference. Then-Secretary
of Energy Federico Pea signed the Convention for the United States on
that date, subject to ratification. Also transmitted for the
information of the Senate is the report of the Department of State
concerning the Convention.
The Convention establishes a legal framework for defining,
adjudicating, and compensating civil liability for nuclear damage that
results from an incident in the territory of a Party, or in certain
circumstances in international waters, and creates a contingent
international supplementary compensation fund. This fund would be
activated in the event of an incident with damage so extensive that it
exhausts the compensation funds that the Party where the incident
occurs is obligated under the Convention to make available.
The international supplementary fund would be made up largely of
contributions from Parties that operate nuclear power plants. The
improved legal certainty and uniformity provided under the Convention
combined with the availability of additional resources provided by the
international supplementary fund create a balanced package appealing
both to countries that operate nuclear power plants and those that do
not. The Convention thus creates for the first time the potential for
a nuclear civil liability convention with global application.
Prompt U.S. ratification of the Convention is important for two
reasons. First, U.S. suppliers of nuclear technology now face
potentially unlimited third-party civil liability arising from their
activities in foreign markets because the United States is not
currently party to any international nuclear civil liability
convention. In addition to limiting commercial opportunities, lack of
liability protection afforded by treaty obligations has limited the
scope of participation by major U.S. companies in the provision of
safety assistance to Soviet-designed nuclear power plants, increasing
the risk of future accidents in these plants. Once widely applied, the
Convention will create for suppliers of U.S. nuclear equipment and
technology substantially the same legal environment in foreign markets
that they now experience domestically under the Price-Anderson Act. It
will level the playing field on which they meet foreign competitors and
eliminate the liability concerns that have inhibited them from
providing the fullest range of safety assistance.
Second, under existing nuclear liability conventions many potential
victims outside the United States generally have no assurance that they
will be adequately or promptly compensated in the event they are harmed
by a civil nuclear incident, especially if that incident occurs outside
their borders or damages their environment. The Convention, once
widely accepted, will provide that assurance.
United States leadership is essential in order to bring the
Convention into force soon. With the United States as an initial
Party, other countries will find the Convention attractive and the
number of Parties is likely to grow quickly. Without U.S. leadership,
the Convention could take many years to enter into force. The creation
of a global civil liability regime will play a critical role in
allowing nuclear power to achieve its full potential in the diverse and
environmentally responsible world energy structure we need to build in
the coming decades.
The Convention is consistent with the primary existing U.S. statute
governing nuclear civil liability, the Price-Anderson Act of 1957.
Adoption of the Convention would require virtually no substantive
changes in that Act. Moreover, under legislation that is being
submitted separately to implement the Convention, the U.S. contingent
liability to contribute to the international supplementary fund would
be completely covered, either by funds generated under the
Price-Anderson Act in the event of an accident covered by both that Act
and the Convention, or by funds contributed to a retrospective pool by
U.S. suppliers of nuclear equipment and technology in the event of an
accident covered by the Convention but falling outside the
Price-Anderson system. In either case, U.S. taxpayers would not have
to bear the burden of the U.S. contribution to the international
supplementary fund.
The Convention allows nations that are party to existing nuclear
liability conventions to join the new global regime easily, without
giving up their participation in those conventions. It also permits
nations that do not belong to an existing convention to join the new
regime easily and rapidly. The United States in particular benefits
from a grandfather clause that allows it to join the Convention without
being required to change certain aspects of the Price-Anderson system
that would otherwise be inconsistent with its requirements.
The Convention, without relying on taxpayer funds, will increase
the compensation available to potential victims of a civil nuclear
incident, strengthen the position of U.S. exporters of nuclear
equipment and technology, and permit us to provide safety assistance to
the world's least-safe reactors more effectively.
I urge the Senate to act expeditiously in giving its advice and
consent to ratification of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation
for Nuclear Damage, with a declaration as set forth in the accompanying
report of the Department of State.
GEORGE W. BUSH
THE WHITE HOUSE,
November 14, 2002.
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