Title: NSF/Tokyo Report: Science in the Cold War: The Legacy of the International Geophysical Year Date: April 23, 1998 The National Science Foundation's offices in Tokyo and in Paris periodically report on developments abroad that are related to the Foundation's mission. These documents present facts for the use of NSF program managers and policy makers; they are not statements of NSF policy. Special Scientific Report #98-07 (April 7, 1998) * * * * * The following was prepared by Dr. Fae L. Korsmo, Program Director for Arctic Social Sciences in the Office of Polar Programs at the National Science Foundation. Dr. Korsmo visited Japan from March 15-23, 1998 in order to participate in, and present the following paper at, the International Conference on Science, Technology, and Society held in Makuhari. Dr. Korsmo may be reached via email at: fkorsmo@nsf.gov. * * * * * Science in the Cold War: The Legacy of the International Geophysical Year >From the upper atmosphere to the ocean depths, the knowledge generated during the International Geophysical Year (IGY, 1957-58) led to important discoveries in the earth sciences. At the height of the Cold War, the science programs of IGY engaged several thousand scientists from 67 countries, including the United States and the former Soviet Union, in one of the largest data collection and analysis efforts ever to be undertaken (Sullivan, 1961; Wilson, 1961; Odishaw, 1968; Bullis, 1973; Doel, 1997). Many scientists who participated in IGY thought of the earth in terms of system and process, while political leaders saw the utility of IGY research for national security advantages. IGY was shaped by the Cold War, yet its comprehensive earth science programs involved multiple actors from East and West, North and South, in both planning and implementation. The Soviet and U.S. space programs emerged from the IGY, as did the Antarctic Treaty and other arrangements for international scientific cooperation. U.S. military and national security institutions played a vital role in shaping the research agenda, mobilizing the resources, and using the results of IGY programs. At the same time, the scientific organizers of IGY seized the opportunity to extend our knowledge of the physical properties of the earth, including its upper atmosphere and ionosphere, as well as the solar system. What can we learn from this mixture of cooperation and conflict, secrecy and sharing, Cold War tensions and universalist quests for knowledge? IGY constitutes a transition between the mobilized science of World War II and what might be called the entrepreneurial, pluralistic science of the waning days of the Cold War. These brief remarks focus on the U.S. perspective, but I hope to elicit discussion and further study to enrich our knowledge of IGY as an international undertaking. Indeed, most popular accounts of IGY as a positive scientific achievement emanate from the U.S. and Western perspectives, while in-depth comparative work has yet to be done. In the U.S. context, we know that despite expressions of unease regarding military involvement, the interests of scientists and national security coexisted in alignment and mutual support. Origins and Objectives of IGY Published sources on the IGY trace its establishment to a conversation held in the home of James A. Van Allen in a suburb of Washington, D.C., April 5, 1950 (Sullivan, 1961, 20; Bullis, 1973, 6; Odishaw, 1968, 42; McDougall, 1985, 118). Van Allen had invited a small group of scientists concerned with atmospheric research, among them Lloyd Berkner, J. Wallace Joyce, S. Fred Singer, and E. H. Vestine, to meet with renowned geophysicist Sydney Chapman. It was Berkner who suggested that a third polar year be held in 1957-58 to take advantage of the period of maximum solar activities and several eclipses. During the same month Berkner shared the results of a report he had completed for the U.S. State Department arguing for an enhanced role for scientific expertise in U.S. foreign policy (Needell, 1993, 402, note 14). Specifically, the report recommended the establishment of a science office in the State Department, the placement of scientific attachés at embassies, and the creation of a National Academy of Sciences committee to act as an advisory board to the State Department (Needell, 1992, 301; Carnegie Commission, 1992, 32-33). At the same time, Berkner was planning a trip to Europe to attend a meeting of the International Scientific Radio Union and the Mixed Commission on the Ionosphere. Van Allen and his guests suggested that Berkner present the idea of the third international polar year on his European travels. He did so, and by January 1951 the above-named organizations in addition to the International Union on Geodesy and Geophysics, the International Astronomical Union, and the parent International Council of Scientific Unions, had endorsed the plan. In 1952 ICSU established a committee on the polar year (Bullis, 1973, 6). Several scientific organizations, such as the World Meteorological Organization and the International Association of Terrestrial Magnetism and Electricity, suggested the program be expanded beyond the poles to include other regions, and the ICSU general assembly approved Chapman's suggestion to change the title of the program to the International Geophysical Year. What would the program accomplish? What would be the U.S. role? Berkner's post-war work for the military's Joint Research and Development Board, the Department of Defense, and the State Department indicated his belief that scientific competence was integral to a successful U.S. foreign policy (Needell, 1987, 264-65). Examination of the minutes and correspondence of the U.S. National and Executive Committees for IGY show that other scientists joined Berkner in seeing little contradiction between the international scientific exchange of data and the close collaboration with the Department of Defense and military branches. At the most basic level of cooperation, the equipment, transportation, and research platforms provided by the military allowed scientists working on IGY projects to reach new frontiers, e.g., Antarctica and the upper atmosphere. At a deeper level, the U.S. organizing scientists may have hoped that the involvement of peers from other countries with diverse polit! ical systems and ideologies would lead to a triumph of science over politics.1 Such a confluence of motivations (utilitarian and policy-related as well as the interest in basic scientific research) behind the huge effort at worldwide synoptic observation and measurement was indeed characteristic of Cold War science in the United States. (Doel and Needell, 1997, 59-60). The late 1940s and early 1950s saw many developments in atmospheric and rocket-related research (Devorkin, 1992), and the IGY program plans capitalized on these developments. Initially the program called for research in meteorology, latitude and longitude, geomagnetism, gravity measurements, ionospheric physics, aurora and airglow, solar activity, cosmic rays, glaciology, oceanography, and rocket exploration of the upper atmosphere.2. The emphasis on synchronous global measurements to understand changes in sea levels, causes of magnetic storms and ionospheric disturbances, the origins of cosmic rays, and other processes required a large number of participants covering a vast geographic space. The IGY programs extended nineteenth-century exploration to the upper atmosphere and the ocean floor, using satellites and submarines to capture complex interrelationships between the atmosphere, earth, oceans, and ice (Pyne, 1979, 179). Joseph Kaplan, Chairman of the U.S. National Commit! tee for IGY, noted that it would be "possible for the first time to triangulate the whole earth."3 The earth itself would become both field and laboratory, with scientists and volunteers staffing the observation posts and operating the instruments. The U.S. military interests ranged from preventing exclusive claims to the Antarctic (especially on the part of the Soviet Union) to improving military communications and electronic warfare. Walter A. McDougall argues that the IGY provided the United States with a nonmilitary justification for satellite surveillance of Soviet bases (i.e., in the interest of global science, and under the legal cover of freedom of space) (McDougall, 1985, 117-18). From the very origins of the IGY, the military participated. A few scientists expressed disapproval of the military's dominance.4 For the most part, however, the military had supported geophysical research both during and immediately after the war, and participants in the U.S. National and Executive Committees were already accustomed to a working relationship. Plans for IGY, then, encompassed both international scientific objectives and specific U.S. foreign policy and national security concerns. Yet the implementation of the IGY program for the United States could not proceed along the wartime model of mobilized research. Instead, the fund raisers for the IGY had to balance an open, civilian process of congressional appropriations to the newly constituted National Science Foundation with a closed, secret intelligence gathering effort by military and security agencies. Combined with the objectives of worldwide data collection, the effort to prepare for and carry out IGY research entailed the persuasion of multiple audiences and participants within the United States, not to mention overseas, including private foundations, congressional and White House staff, federal agencies, universities, laboratories, amateurs, and the educated public. Selling Science On the eve of the official commencement of IGY, the U.S. National Committee met in Washington, D.C. to consider, among other items, a proposal (most likely raised by the Soviet delegate) to the Comité Special de l'Année Géophysique Internationale (CSAGI) to hold a rocket satellite conference in the United States no later than October 1, 1957. Merle Tuve hesitated, noting that the "IGY as such does not have any rocket information....Our military have a lot of rocket information." Hugh Odishaw, on the other hand, spoke in favor of the conference to obtain information on the Soviet satellite program.5 In the end, both the National Committee and CSAGI supported the conference, and while the participants were gathered in Washington, D.C. in early October, 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik (Sullivan, 1961, 67-76). Students of the Cold War credit the Sputnik launching with catalyzing the space, arms, and intelligence race.6 Prior to Sputnik, the U.S. military had reduced the number of planned satellites. Sputnik presented an opportunity to argue for budgetary increases in scientific research and education. Even before Sputnik, however, the U.S. National Committee and Berkner, a leading figure within the international committee, realized the need to capitalize on Cold War tensions to sell IGY and to continue the interest in IGY's scientific programs well after IGY officially ended December 1958. This marketing effort involved private corporations (including General Electric and IBM), television stations, teacher education institutes, curriculum developers, motion picture companies, and other media.7 The U.S. National Committee strove to represent IGY as a civilian and international scientific program and resisted the Pentagon's portrayal of the earth satellite program as a military operation.8 Posters, films, teaching kits, exhibits, and brochures exclaimed the wonders of the earth and the benefits of science to humanity. The linkages between research and education, public and private support, nationalist pride and international knowledge received explicit articulation during the IGY. These linkages continued to characterize the U.S. space program, and today both NASA and NSF have well developed educational and public relations components. Science Policy and International Relations The National Science Foundation began its support of IGY with a grant of $5,000 in early 1953. By 1956, the budget request to Congress for IGY activities had expanded to $40 million (Bullis, 1973, 14). IGY organizers went to work for NSF and helped to establish geophysics as a broad area of institutional support (England, 1982, 307-10). IGY also brought scientists into power through institutions such as the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) (Wang, 1995, 330). Berkner, ever alert to opportunities in international science, used the IGY to lobby for reinstatement of the science attaché program in the State Department.9 Not only was the program revived, but later the State Department established a Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (1973-74). Another legacy of IGY was to lead the way for large, multidisciplinary earth science endeavors such as the International Council of Scientific Union's International Geosphere-Biosphere Program (1986) (Doel, 1997, 410). In the area of earth sciences, environmental sciences and global change, the international legacy of IGY is ever present but unexplored. As we move toward the fiftieth anniversary, it is time to explore the lessons of IGY and their application to fundamental questions of international relations in the post-Cold War era. What effects did IGY have on recently decolonized states and remaining colonial outposts? What perceptions of IGY colored science in other parts of the world, including areas of Communist rule? How has the marketing aspect of science, so evident during IGY, influenced science education and public understanding of science across national boundaries? Finally, has IGY proved a useful example of how international agreements can be made to work smooth! ly, as Tuzo Wilson states (Wilson, 1961, 326)? I hope this invitation to review the legacies of the IGY in a comparative, international framework inspires you to reach into your files, your memories, and your address books to reflect on the nature of Cold War science in your home countries and the lessons we might bring to bear on current efforts to address global environmental problems. References Bullis, Harold. The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical Year. Prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973. Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government. Science and Technology in U.S. International Affairs. New York, January 1992. Devorkin, David H. Science with a Vengeance: How the Military Created the U.S. Space Sciences After World War II. New York, Berlin, Heidleberg: Springer-Verlag, 1992. Doel, Ronald E. "The Earth Sciences and Geophysics." In John Krige and Dominique Pestre, eds. Science in the Twentieth Century. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997, 391-416. Doel, Ronald E. and Allan A. Needell. "Science, Scientists, and the CIA: Balancing International Ideals, National Needs, and Professional Opportunities." In Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Christopher Andrew, eds. Eternal Vigilance? 50 Years of the CIA. London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997, 59-81. England, J. Merton. A Patron for Pure Science: The National Science Foundation's Formative Years, 1945-1957. Washington, DC: National Science Foundation, 1982. McDougall, Walter A. The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. Needell, Allan A. "Lloyd Berkner, Merle Tuve, and the Federal Role in Radio Astronomy." Osiris, 2d series, vol. 3 (1987), 261-88. Needell, Allan A. "From Military Research to Big Science: Lloyd Berkner and Science-Statesmanship in the Postwar Era." In Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds. Big Science: The Growth of Large-Scale Research. Stanford University Pres, 1992, 290-311. Needell, Allan A. "Truth Is Our Weapon: Project TROY, Political Warfare, and Government-Academic Relations in the National Security State." Diplomatic History 17 (1993), 399-420. Odishaw, Hugh. "The International Geophysical Year," In Syun-Ichi Akasofu, et al, eds. Sydney Chapman, Eighty. Fairbanks: University of Alaska, 1968, 42-43. Pielke, Roger A. and Michael H. Glantz. "Serving Science and Society: Lessons from Large-Scale Atmospheric Science Programs." Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 76, 12 (December 1995), 2445-58. Pyne, Steve. "From the Grand Canyon to the Marianas Trench: The Earth Sciences After Darwin." In Nathan Reingold, ed. The Sciences in the American Context: New Perspectives. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1979, 165-92. Sullivan, Walter. Assault on the Unknown. New York, Toronto, London: McGraw-Hill, 1961 Wilson, J. Tuzo. IGY: The Year of the New Moons. New York: Alfred. Knopf, 1961. Unpublished Manuscripts National Academy of Sciences, Archives of the International Geophysical Year (IGY), Washington, DC. 1 The correspondence and minutes of the U.S. National Committee and Executive Committee for the IGY repeatedly reveal the members' concerns with establishing research ties with colleagues in Latin America, Asia, and Europe. J Tuzo Wilson reports that IGY was a success because the scientists agreed on a plan of action, left each nation-state to carry out its own part of the research task assigned to it, and delegated to a central committee the problems of coordination (Wilson, 1961, 326). 2 See Joseph Kaplan's draft report, "The Scientific Program of the International Geophysical Year," Drawer 1, File "Organization USNC," National Academy of Sciences, IGY Archives, Washington, DC. 3Ibid., 10. 4 For example, Donald B. Lawrence, Professor of Botany, University of Minnesota, wrote to Wallace Atwood, Director of the National Academy of Sciences, "It makes me very unhappy to see the military agencies taking such a prominent part in the sponsorship of the International Geophysical Year." Letter from Lawrence to Kaplan, copy to Atwood, 6 May 1953, Drawer 1, File "Program Proposals for IGY (1952-1953)," National Academy of Sciences, IGY Archives. 5 "National Academy of Sciences, Special Meeting of the U.S. National Committee for the IGY, Thursday, June 27, 1957," pages 23-25, Drawer 2, File "USNC - Minutes, 12th Meeting," National Academy of Sciences, IGY Archives. 6 The launch of Sputnik stimulated the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and justified huge increases in federal research and development spending. Kevles notes that between 1957 and 1967 federal research and development expenditures nearly quadrupled, reaching almost $15 billion. Daniel J. Kevles, "Principles and Politics in Federal R&D Policy, 1945-1990," preface to the 1990 edition of Science-the Endless Frontier, by Vannevar Bush (Washington, D.C., National Science Foundation, 1990), xviii. 7 The problems of "marketing science" in the United States in the context of the end of the Cold War, federal budget deficits, and pressing policy problems, are taken up in Pielke and Glantz (1995). Prior to Sputnik, the marketing problems were of great concern to the U.S. organizers of IGY. 8 "Minutes, Eighteenth Meeting, USNC-IGY Executive Committee," 5-6 December 1956, Drawer 2, File "USNC Executive Committee Draft Minutes 1956," National Academy of Sciences, IGY Archives. 9 Berkner wrote to members of Congress that "While such international sponsored activities as the IGY are progressing with extraordinary success, I feel that the representation of American science abroad is open to serious question. The program of the U.S. scientific attaches initiated in 1952 was most successful, but its recent abandonment has left very serious gaps in our international relations. This opinion is strongly reinforced by a recent trip to the Far East including Japan, Hong Kong, Thailand, India, Malaya, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand in which I had the opportunity to discuss the matter with many representatives of our foreign missions, as well as the scientists of these countries in my official capacity as President of the International Council of Scientific Unions." Letter from Berkner to Senator Paul H. Douglas, 10 May 1957, Drawer 1, File "Congress (Senate) 1954-1960," National Academy of Sciences, IGY Archives. 7