AS he enters his tenth decade, Edward Teller continues questing after knowledge and innovation. Time recently cited his suggestion of sending a robot spacecraft to rendezvous with asteroid XF11, first thought to be on a collision path with Earth. The idea was to get information about the composition and strength of passing asteroids so as to understand how best to destroy or divert them. Teller for some time has been interested in outer space and has been concerned with the possibility of catastrophes caused by asteroids, comets, or other near-Earth objects. In fact, he and his colleagues have studied ways to deflect or destroy such objects with nuclear explosions. Prolific in his ideas and determined in his pursuit of scientific truth, Teller has promoted scientific studies far ahead of their time, studies that often have profoundly affected the direction of science and technology.![]() ![]() |
Doing Pure Science![]() ![]() |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]()
Developing Nuclear Weapons |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Developing the H-Bomb
In the fall of 1941, Enrico Fermi suggested that a fission bomb be used to heat a mass of deuterium to a temperature where the thermonuclear fusion of two deuterium atoms will proceed rapidly. I came up with a counter argument: that the needed temperature would be so high that most energy will appear as useless radiation rather than usable kinetic energy of the nuclei. Fermi agreed to my objection.
A few months later, I attempted to finalize my argument on the deuterium-plus-deuterium reaction. We did not succeed. Emil Konopinski, my collaborator, suggested (correctly) that tritium in a deuterium-plus-tritium reaction might react much faster than deuterium-plus-deuterium. I, in turn, proposed that the thermonuclear reaction might proceed before a lot of radiation is emitted and an equilibrium with radiation is established.
During this work, Oppenheimer invited us to participate in a discussion at Berkeley about the problems of explosives using nuclear energy. Oppenheimer mentioned the possibility of a hydrogen bomb to Arthur Compton (head of the whole Chicago project), arguing that the fission and fusion bomb problems required a new laboratory, which was established in March 1943.
In Los Alamos, difficulties connected with the fission bomb soon required the whole available effort. But working with a small group, I could give continued attention to the hydrogen bomb. It turned out that it is quite difficult to postpone radiation equilibrium and obtain sufficient time for thermonuclear reactions. But it still seemed quite promising to obtain a hydrogen bomb in this manner.
With the end of the Second World War, strong feelings developed against continuing the work. I returned to pure physics in Chicago for the next few years, which personally I found more attractive.
In 1949, I returned as a visitor to Los Alamos with the main purpose to continue the improvement of the fission bomb. But in the summer, the Soviets exploded a copy of our fission bomb. The question arose whether work on the hydrogen bomb should be given new emphasis. This possibility was strongly supported by Ernest Lawrence. On the other hand, the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) advised unanimously against such a project. In Los Alamos, Ulam and Everett made further calculations. They came up with results of improved quality, which, however, were negative on the feasibility of their approach to H-bombs.
By the end of 1950, I had the novel and positive answer. Because of the wartime work, we knew how to strongly compress the thermonuclear fuel, and, in the compressed fuel, radiation would be less important and would not inhibit the reaction. The Los Alamos administration discouraged new approaches, so for the time being I restricted myself to a few private discussions. One of these occurred between Ulam and myself in February 1951. Ulam suggested compression, for which I was fully prepared. I knew how to accomplish it, and I knew how it would help. I put all this down in a joint report, which Ulam signed but failed to support in subsequent discussions.
I took the opportunity of an SAB meeting (spring 1951) to present the plan for "an equilibrium hydrogen bomb," in which compressed fuel would be used. I gained the unanimous support of the SAB.
At that time, progress at Los Alamos had been assured, and I felt that it would be better for me to start work at an additional laboratory. This possibility materialized (with the essential help of Ernest Lawrence) in Livermore. In 1952, in the early days of Livermore, the first hydrogen bomb was successfully exploded. The detailed thermo-nuclear design was furnished by John Wheeler and collaborators.
An important application of the hydrogen bomb came through a plan for placing such explosives in rockets carried by submarines. This development made it impossible for the Soviets to attack the United States and prevent retaliation. Indeed, rocket-delivered explosives are hard to shoot down, and the submarines that carry them are hard to locate. The proposal I made succeeded because of the excellent work of John Foster at Livermore, who designed a small and efficient primary fission bomb, and Carl Haussmann, who designed a small and efficient secondary hydrogen bomb. The resulting nuclear explosives were more than ten times as powerful as those used during the Second World War, but the use of thermonuclear reactions made them flexible enough to become practical explosives carried by submarines.
-- Edward Teller, June 1998
Building an Institution![]() ![]()
Champion of Safe Reactors |
Nuclear Power as Servant |
![]() |
Legacy of X-Ray Lasers![]() |
Strategic Defense Initiative: The Next Stop
It is widely believed that the rapid development of weapons of mass destruction is the main danger humanity confronts. An extreme consequence of this belief is that new scientific knowledge is considered dangerous and must be limited.
I strongly believe that the main danger lies in human intentions and not in the ability to bring about mass destruction. An important example is the history of the wars of Genghis Khan-in particular, the destruction of Persia by the Mongols. More than half the population of the defeated country was killed, and Persia, the present-day Iran, has never recovered its great historic importance.
I believe that the most important part of the present danger is due to the situation that the world has become smaller and more interactive, and catastrophes may occur with unprecedented rapidity.
The United States, which is losing the remnants of its isolation, is a particularly important component in this change. The technical cause of this change lies primarily in the development and worldwide proliferation of missiles. They may carry weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear explosives or poisons (chemical or biological), but even if they carry no more than high explosives, they are already a terrible and sudden danger to stability.
My attempts to do something about this situation go back to the visit of Ronald Reagan, freshly elected governor of California, to the Livermore Laboratory. Reagan listened with an active interest to receive novel information of our attempts (in 1967) at missile defense. He asked a few relevant questions and then left without stating clearly whether and to what extent he agreed.
That answer came in 1983 when Reagan gave a remarkable after-dinner speech to a mixed audience of which I was a part. With a delay of sixteen years, he unambiguously stated that missile defense was possible, necessary, and urgent. In that regard, he gave the Livermore initiative his full support. But how to do it? Reagan suggested that defense, if ever possible, should not utilize nuclear explosives.
In this new situation, my good friend, Lowell Wood, took the strong initiative of advocating first x-ray lasers and later "Brilliant Pebbles." The latter (and final) proposal consisted in destroying the attacking missile by a direct collision with a small guided defensive object. The defensive object should actually be a satellite already in orbit. Lowell and others in our Laboratory continued to develop this concept. Having helped and supported this effort, I am convinced that it is realistic particularly with the continuing great advancement in computing capability. An important part of the development was and remains the specification that the aggressive missile should be destroyed soon after it has been launched. This necessitates continuing surveillance of our globe by satellites and an international understanding that unannounced missiles or missiles in unannounced orbits should be promptly destroyed. This, in turn, would make safety from rapid attack a worldwide benefit.
Such an effect has been strongly supported by Presidents Reagan and Bush. Unfortunately, efforts toward missile defense continue at present mostly in connection with defending our armed forces on their missions abroad. The American people (together with all other people in the world) should have such a defense that, indeed, necessitates defensive measures against dangerous launches even before it is obvious who will be attacked. We give priority to the defense of our armed forces, whose needs as an organization must obviously be satisfied. Unfortunately, the need to defend our homeland may, in political practice, be deemphasized by denying the possibility or, at any rate, the urgency of such a defense.
What has been stated here does not describe my only technical activity nor the only strongly needed technical-military development. It appears to me that it stands out as a matter that has been in the public eye for a couple of decades and where there seems to be a necessity for change in emphasis in the immediate future.
-- Edward Teller, May 1998
![]() |
Good Luck Wish![]() ![]() |
![]() ![]() ![]() |