


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
NUMBER 14



*Foreign
Policy
and the
1996
Presidential
Election*

*Interviews
with
Brent Scowcroft
and
Zbigniew Brzezinski*

October 1996



U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA

Foreign Policy and the 1996 Presidential Election

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA

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On November 5, 1996, millions of Americans will go to polling places throughout the country to vote for their choice for the next President of the United States. The time for Election Day, which is always the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November, was designated by the U.S. Congress in 1845.

Selecting the nation's leader is one of the most important and complex processes in representative government in the United States, and Americans will consider many factors — domestic and international — as they decide who should be President for the next four years.

What concerns are important to voters and what criteria do they use in choosing the President? This issue of *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda* takes a look at those questions and attempts to put into context the relationship between foreign policy and U.S. presidential campaigns. It offers an historical perspective of the impact of foreign policy in earlier elections as well as assessments of the role it is playing in the current campaign.

In the Focus Section an historian, tracing presidential elections since 1952, describes the durability of bipartisanship in U.S. foreign policy. In separate interviews two foreign policy experts, who served as National Security Advisers to former Democratic and Republican Presidents, discuss key foreign policy concerns of their respective parties. Other articles explain the role of foreign policy advisers in the campaign, convention platforms as a means to define political parties' positions on foreign policy, and recent public opinion polls and how they reflect voters' concerns. Also included are foreign policy statements by the Democratic, Republican and Reform Party nominees for President.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A

*An Electronic Journal of the
U. S. Information Agency*

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE 1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

CONTENTS

● FOCUS

FOREIGN POLICY AND ELECTIONS: THE DURABILITY OF BIPARTISANSHIP 5

*By Professor Robert Schulzinger
Department of History, University of Colorado in Boulder*

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND TRADE: KEY THEMES FOR THE DEMOCRATS 8

*An interview with Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski
Counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies*

LEADERSHIP AND CONSISTENCY: KEY THEMES FOR THE REPUBLICANS 11

*An interview with General Brent Scowcroft
President of The Forum for International Policy and The Scowcroft Group*

● COMMENTARY

THE FOREIGN POLICY FACTOR IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 14

*By Stephen Hess
Senior Fellow in Governmental Studies, Brookings Institution*

● THE PROCESS AND THE PLAYERS

WHAT THE POLLS SAY: ISSUES OF CONCERN TO AMERICAN VOTERS 17

By Alvin Richman

THE ROLE OF FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS IN DOLE, CLINTON CAMPAIGNS 22

By Wendy S. Ross

PLATFORMS: HOW THE PARTIES DEFINE THEIR POLICY POSITIONS 25

By Ralph Dannheisser

● IN THEIR OWN WORDS: THE CANDIDATES' VIEWS ON FOREIGN POLICY

DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE BILL CLINTON 29

Forging a foreign policy that advances U.S. values

REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE BOB DOLE 33

A pledge to pursue terrorists "to the ends of the earth"

REFORM PARTY PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE ROSS PEROT 36

In pursuit of "intelligent, free international trade"

© **DEPARTMENTS**

ELSEWHERE ON THE DIPLOMATIC SCENE **39**

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

ACTION ON CAPITOL HILL **40**

*Chemical Weapons Convention, defense authorization, U.S. action in Iraq,
U.N. command of U.S. troops, Iran/Libya sanctions*

© **A GUIDE TO ADDITIONAL READING**

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE 1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: KEY INTERNET SITES **42**

Internet links to resources on foreign policy and the campaign

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE 1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: BIBLIOGRAPHY **43**

Spotlighting other views on the subject

ARTICLE ALERT: OTHER POLITICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES **44**

Abstracts of current articles

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

A G E N D A

USIA's electronic journals, published and transmitted worldwide at two-week intervals, examine major issues facing the United States and the international community. The journals — Economic Perspectives, Global Issues, Issues of Democracy, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, and U.S. Society and Values — provide analysis, commentary, and background information in their thematic areas. French and Spanish language versions appear one week after the English. The opinions expressed in the journals do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Government. Articles may be reproduced and translated outside the United States unless copyright restrictions are cited on the articles.

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FOREIGN POLICY AND ELECTIONS: THE DURABILITY OF BIPARTISANSHIP

By Robert D. Schulzinger

“Bipartisanship in foreign policy runs deep in the American political culture,” contends the author. Tracing U.S. presidential elections since 1952, he describes how successful contenders for the presidency “have followed the contours” of their predecessors in dealing with other nations. During the Cold War both Democratic and Republican administrations “advocated containment of the Soviet Union and avoidance of world war, and after 1989 they kept the United States deeply involved in world affairs,” he writes. Schulzinger is a Professor of History at the University of Colorado in Boulder. He was Staff Consultant to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and now serves as a member of the U.S. State Department Advisory Committee on Historical Publications. His books include American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, Present Tense: The United States since 1945, Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy, and The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Six of the eleven U.S. presidential elections since the Second World War have resulted in a change of political party in the White House. Three times Republicans turned out Democrats (1952, 1968 and 1980), and three times Democrats replaced Republicans (1960, 1976 and 1992). During each of these campaigns, the winning candidate promised a foreign policy vastly different from the one practiced by the current president of the other party. Once inaugurated, however, the successful challenger followed the contours of his predecessor’s relations with other countries. Bipartisanship in foreign policy runs deep in the American political culture.

The process began in the campaign of 1952 when Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Republican candidate, promised to go beyond the Truman administration’s policy of containment of the Soviet Union to “roll back” the gains made by Communists in Eastern Europe and Asia. Yet soon after he took office, Eisenhower ordered a major review of U.S. foreign policy which concluded that the focus of U.S. foreign policy should be the slow, patient containment of Soviet aggression. During his second term, Eisenhower set out on an even more moderate course, as he pursued detente with a new generation of Soviet leaders.

What Eisenhower considered to be prudent moves toward relaxation of superpower tension, prominent Democrats seeking their party’s presidential nomination in 1960 belittled as dangerous disregard of the nation’s defenses. One of them, John F. Kennedy, made rebuilding the nation’s military might and assertive competition with the Soviet Union the centerpiece of his foreign policy agenda in his successful bid for the presidency. In his first 21 months in office, Kennedy did confront Communist states and revolutionary movements, especially those in the developing world, more vigorously than Eisenhower had done in 1959 and 1960. But, after approaching the brink of war during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, Kennedy dramatically expanded Eisenhower’s earlier efforts at reducing the danger of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

When Republican Richard Nixon won the presidency in 1968 over Democrat Hubert Humphrey, Nixon promised to bring “peace with honor” to the terribly divisive war in Vietnam. Humphrey lost the election by barely one half of one percentage point, because, in the end, not enough Americans believed that he had distanced himself sufficiently from the highly unpopular

Vietnam war policy of President Lyndon B. Johnson. Yet when Nixon became President, he adopted a policy developed by the Johnson administration, Vietnamization — letting the South Vietnamese handle more of the fighting. Nixon and Henry Kissinger, his principal foreign affairs adviser and Secretary of State, gained wide public approval for advancing detente with the Soviet Union, opening frozen relations with the People's Republic of China, and starting down the road toward peace between Arabs and Israelis. All of these initiatives had roots in plans devised during the Johnson administration.

By 1976 the luster of Kissinger's foreign policy had dimmed. Democrat Jimmy Carter won the presidency that year in part with attacks on Kissinger's high-handed indifference to abuses of human rights abroad and his preoccupation with U.S.-Soviet relations. In 1977 and 1978 the Carter administration did pay more attention to relations between the developed and developing worlds, but in 1979 and 1980 the United States focused once again on the growing tensions between it and the Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan of December 1979 profoundly shocked Americans. In the last year of his presidency Carter had called for the largest defense buildup in 20 years. But Carter's rediscovery of a threat from the Soviet Union could not save him from defeat at the hands of Republican candidate Ronald Reagan who came to office in 1981 on the most militantly anti-Soviet platform of any candidate since 1952. In practice, however, Reagan confirmed the pattern of a President following the broad outline of his predecessor's foreign policies. The defense buildup of Reagan's first term fulfilled the plans of Carter's final defense requests. In his second term Reagan, who had once derided detente as promising "the peace of the grave," became the most enthusiastic proponent of reducing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.

When someone asked Reagan on his visit to Moscow in 1988 why he had dropped his harsh anti-Soviet rhetoric, he replied, "They've changed." Indeed they had. By the end of 1991 the Soviet

Union had crumbled internally and ceased to exist. The Cold War, which had provided the focal point of American foreign policy for four decades, ended two years earlier at the beginning of the presidency of Republican George Bush. In the post-Cold War era, Bush won high praise for his foreign policy skills, especially in assembling the multinational coalition that expelled Iraqi troops from Kuwait in 1991.

Foreign policy became a distinctly secondary issue during the election campaign of 1992. Yet the victor, Democrat Bill Clinton, while he focused most of his criticism of Bush on his poor stewardship of the nation's economy, also promised a different direction in foreign policy. Clinton assailed Bush's indifference to human rights abuses in China, his reluctance to intervene militarily in the war in Bosnia, and his apparent hostility to refugees fleeing repression in Haiti. In office, however, Clinton, like earlier presidents, differed far less sharply in foreign affairs from the predecessor he had ousted than his campaign rhetoric had indicated. Like Bush, Clinton tried to maintain cordial political and commercial relations with the PRC, despite China's human rights violations. Clinton quickly decided against entering the fight in Bosnia. His administration did, however, successfully broker a peace agreement among the warring Bosnian factions in 1995. On Haiti, as well, Clinton initially followed the Bush administration's policy he had condemned of returning refugees to their homeland. In 1994 the Clinton administration acted more forcefully to restore Democratic rule to Haiti.

In the midst of the 1996 election the Republican challenger Bob Dole has criticized Clinton's foreign policy approach for lacking coherence, excessive reliance on the United Nations and unwillingness to use military force appropriately. As a Senator, however, Dole supported Clinton's deployment of U.S. forces to Bosnia in late 1995. When the Clinton administration launched cruise missiles against Iraq in retaliation for that country's attack on Kurdish cities in September 1996, Dole supported the military strike.

However much presidential candidates in the post-World War II era may have accentuated the differences between their foreign policy positions and those of their opponents, both Democratic and Republican administrations during and after the Cold War have pursued remarkably similar foreign policies. During the Cold War they advocated containment of the Soviet Union and avoidance of world war, and after 1989 they kept the United States deeply involved in world affairs.

American voters also will elect a new Congress in 1996. The Republicans may keep their current majorities in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, or the Democrats may retake one or both chambers. But regardless of which party controls Congress, the experience of the post-Cold War era suggests continuation of bipartisanship in U.S. foreign policy. For 22 of the past 50 years a single party controlled the presidency and both houses of Congress at the same time; for 22 years one party held the presidency and the other had majorities in both houses of Congress; and for six years, the two parties divided control over Congress.

Congress and the President have often differed over foreign policy. Yet what is striking about the disagreements is that they are not as much between parties as they are over particular issues. For example, the Democratic Truman administration had the support of a Republican Congress in 1947 and 1948 in creating the Marshall Plan and promulgating the Truman Doctrine. The

Democratic Johnson administration, on the other hand, was assailed by Democratic members of Congress over the Vietnam war.

When Democrats controlled Congress in 1993 and 1994, the Clinton administration certainly enjoyed more support from lawmakers over foreign policy issues than it did during the Republican Congress of 1995 and 1996. But the last two years show that the experience of governing tempers the more extreme positions taken during the heat of an election campaign. When the Republicans organized Congress in 1995, they seemed poised to eliminate foreign affairs agencies, slash foreign assistance and hamstring the Clinton administration's trade and human rights policies. In 1996, however, Republican lawmakers looked for common ground with the Clinton administration on foreign policy.

Since the end of the Cold War a broad consensus has existed within the United States about the nation's foreign policy. Recent public opinion surveys indicate that, despite disagreements over style and details, most Americans believe it is vital for the United States to remain deeply engaged in the world. They believe it is necessary to have friends and allies in a still dangerous environment. They think that military force still is an important element in world affairs. They want the United States to promote democracy, human rights, free markets and free trade. The experience of the past 50 years suggests that either a second Clinton administration or a new Dole presidency will pursue these basic foreign policies. ●

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND TRADE: KEY THEMES FOR THE DEMOCRATS

An interview with Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski

While foreign policy is not playing a major role in the presidential campaign, says Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Middle East and NATO expansion are two issues that “could influence, but clearly not determine, the outcome of the election.” Although there are only marginal differences between Republicans and Democrats on foreign policy, he contends, Democrats are more inclined to emphasize trade, international cooperation and ecological concerns. Brzezinski was National Security Adviser to President Carter and formerly served on the faculties of Harvard and Columbia Universities. He is now Counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and also Professor of American Foreign Policy at the School of Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University in Washington. He was interviewed in September by Contributing Editor Wendy S. Ross.

QUESTION: In your view, how much of a role is foreign policy playing in the current presidential campaign?

BRZEZINSKI: I do not believe that foreign policy is playing a major role in the current presidential campaign. That campaign has focused predominantly on domestic issues. Moreover, at the present time, with the exception of the Iraqi problem, there are no major crises that are capturing public attention and galvanizing a genuine interest in foreign policy.

Q: Are there any foreign policy issues that could influence the outcome of the election?

BRZEZINSKI: There are some issues that could influence, but clearly not determine, the outcome of the election. Two in particular come to mind. The first of these pertains to the Middle East. That issue — because of the problem with Iraq, because of the relatively recent memory of the Persian Gulf War and because of the intense interest of many Americans in the future of Israel — could affect the voting patterns in some portions of the United States.

The second issue pertains to NATO expansion. That problem is of special concern, particularly to

those Americans who are of Central European origin.

The stances adopted by the respective candidates on these two issues could, to some extent, influence the voting patterns of some key religious and ethnic constituencies.

Q: Do you see basic philosophical differences between Republicans and Democrats on foreign policy issues?

BRZEZINSKI: The Democrats, in a vague sort of a way, are more inclined to emphasize multilateralism, international cooperation, ecological concerns and so forth. In brief, if one wished to be sarcastic, one could call it the “Do Gooders’ Agenda.” In contrast, Republicans are more interested in questions of power, military readiness, and national use of force. Again, to simplify, you could call it the “Schwarzenegger Agenda.”

I have to emphasize, however, that these are only marginal differences. And there is no fundamental philosophical collision between Republicans and Democrats today, in part because there are no major international crises which create significant dividing lines.

Q: What foreign policy issues are of key importance to the Democratic Party at this time?

BRZEZINSKI: In addition to the ones that I have mentioned, I would place trade high on the list because it affects working patterns in the United States, it has special significance to American labor, and it is related to the theme of prosperity. Trade is an area where the Clinton administration can show major accomplishments.

Q: What do you think is the most significant area of disagreement on foreign policy between the two presidential candidates?

BRZEZINSKI: I have to emphasize again that there are no fundamental disagreements, only marginal disagreements. The Republicans have been advocating, for example, a somewhat more robust response to the recent Iraqi challenge. The Republicans have gone on record as being in favor of a somewhat earlier date for NATO expansion than has been implied so far by the Democratic candidate.

There has been criticism by the Republicans of the Democratic handling of the China issue. The Republicans have been inclined to stress the human rights dimension. However, on that issue, the Republicans themselves are in disagreement because the business community, to the extent that it may lean somewhat toward the Republican candidate, is not interested in elevating the human rights issue into a major concern in the American-Chinese relationship.

Q: Some Republicans are saying that the recent U.S. air strikes in Iraq were conducted for political reasons during this election year. How do you answer such accusations?

BRZEZINSKI: I really don't think that is necessarily even an accusation. During an election year obviously the chief decision-makers who are guided by the national interest cannot entirely disregard the political consequences of foreign policy decisions. It so happens, actually, that on

Iraq, what the President did, the Republicans have generally supported, but then they have gone on to say that more ought to be done.

Q: Do you think politics played a significant role in recent weeks on foreign policy issues in the Congress — for example, the Senate decision to postpone action on the Chemical Weapons Convention?

BRZEZINSKI: The postponement of the Chemical Weapons Convention was a political decision, and the effort to get it approved was also a political decision. In that sense, both sides were playing the political game, and each was calculating that a negative outcome for the other side would be more damaging to the other side in terms of domestic politics. The reason for the postponement was that the Republicans did not want to go on record as opposing it, but at the same time, they were of the view that the Chemical Weapons Convention was not going to be very effective, and that it was simply one more treaty stating general wishes but without any teeth in it.

Q: And the view of the Clinton administration on the Chemical Weapons Convention?

BRZEZINSKI: The Clinton administration said it was nonetheless a step toward some international order — not foolproof, but a forward step, nonetheless, toward greater international cooperation on containing the proliferation of chemical weapons.

Those were the arguments that were being made on the merits of the issue. But behind it, on both sides, there was a political calculation. The Democrats hoped the Republicans would be embarrassed into appearing, somehow or other, to favor chemical weapons, and the Republicans hoped that the Democrats would look like wishful thinkers.

Q: Do you believe that both major political parties could do a better job in handling foreign policy issues during presidential campaigns?

BRZEZINSKI: It is easy to answer this question. The answer is obviously “yes.” The truth of the matter is that foreign policy issues have not been handled in a serious and responsible fashion in the course of this election and, unfortunately, in the course of most recent elections. I would hope that, for example, it could be — and in my view should be — possible to devote one full presidential debate to a discussion of foreign policy and nothing else. I would hope it would be possible to stage serious debates between the respective candidates’ associates that deal with foreign policy issues. Such events would help to enlighten the public regarding foreign policy matters and would crystallize, perhaps, some sharper definition of alternative approaches to foreign policy issues.

Q: How would you assess the American public’s knowledge of and interest in foreign affairs?

BRZEZINSKI: I have to say that, on the whole, it’s relatively low. The American public has very little knowledge of foreign history, abysmal knowledge of foreign geography, and a relatively low level of interest in foreign affairs. I believe this is the result of continental isolation, of some educational inadequacies, but also of the American mass media’s lack of serious focus on foreign policy.

I was struck by this in August when I was away from Washington and was listening to the CBS Radio morning news, which is called the CBS World News Roundup. There was literally nothing but a compendium of absolutely trivial stories, almost all of them exclusively involving domestic affairs; even though the 8 a.m. broadcast was called World News Roundup, it had literally no world news. The same was true again on the evening news. In the place I was located I could

only get the CBS TV evening news, which also pretends to be world news. But in fact there was no serious coverage of any major international issue.

American newspapers, even major national papers, increasingly place international news on the back pages. The fact of the matter is that America is much more preoccupied with itself. And those institutions, organizations, which could, and, in my view, should somewhat widen the perspectives of the American public, are failing abysmally in their job.

Q: What role did foreign policy play in the 1976 and 1980 presidential campaigns? Do you think the Iranian hostage crisis was in part responsible for Carter’s failure to be re-elected in 1980?

BRZEZINSKI: I think in 1976 foreign policy played a role on two levels. One, the Nixon-Ford detente policy was criticized by the Democrats as inadequately sensitive to human rights. And secondly, in the course of the presidential debate, President Ford made a statement about Eastern Europe which seemed to imply that, in his view, satellite Communist Poland was a fully independent state. That was quite naturally seized upon by the Democrats and exploited in a politically effective fashion.

In 1980, the Iranian hostage crisis certainly contributed to the defeat of the Democratic administration. The Democratic administration was perceived as incompetent, indecisive and weak and simply unable to deal with a protracted national humiliation. The Republicans certainly made these points and they were able to score significant political points thereby. ●

LEADERSHIP AND CONSISTENCY: KEY THEMES FOR THE REPUBLICANS

An interview with General Brent Scowcroft

The role of foreign policy in the current presidential campaign is minimal and is not expected to have a major impact on the way Americans vote unless unanticipated “dramatic events” take place on the world scene before election day, says General Brent Scowcroft. “Leadership and consistency” are key foreign policy themes for the Republican Party at this time, he says. Scowcroft was Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs during the administrations of Presidents Ford and Bush. He also served as Military Assistant to President Nixon. During his military career, Scowcroft held positions in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Headquarters of the U.S. Air Force, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He is founder and President of The Forum for International Policy, a non-partisan, non-profit organization providing independent perspectives on major foreign policy issues; he is also President of The Scowcroft Group, a consulting firm aiding corporations engaged in international expansion and investment. Scowcroft was interviewed in September by Managing Editor Dian McDonald.

QUESTION: How would you characterize the role of foreign policy in the current presidential campaign?

SCOWCROFT: I would say it is probably as minimal as any that I can remember. It is episodically raised, but it is not a major theme in the campaign.

Q: Do you think that there are any foreign policy issues that could have a potential impact on the outcome of the election at this point?

SCOWCROFT: I think not unless dramatic events take place that would have an impact. But barring that, I don't think so. Foreign policy will be an undertone to the campaign. And I think President Clinton will generally say he has been a good president in foreign policy, he has continued the tradition of American foreign policy, and he has been strong and not shied from the use of force when it was appropriate.

And Senator Dole is likely to say, “There's been no leadership. Our policy has been one change after another. There's been no consistency, no strategy. We need to have a consistent foreign policy, and

we need one backed by strength, and the President has let our military erode.”

It seems to me that will be an underlying theme, but that's not going to change many voters' minds. Now, should something dramatic happen, like something else in Iraq, like something with China and missile proliferation and so on, that could have an impact on the election. But that would be an unanticipated event.

Q: U.S. policy toward illegal immigrants has been described as the most contentious foreign policy issue for President Clinton and Senator Dole. Do you agree with that assessment?

SCOWCROFT: I think it's a very emotional issue. But that sounds too strong to me. In the first place, I would question whether that's really a foreign policy issue. That's a domestic policy issue. And it has great resonance in a few very key states, like California, Texas and Florida. But in most of the country, I think it's a more abstract issue, and therefore won't affect too many votes.

Q: Do you think it could be a big factor in how California votes?

SCOWCROFT: Yes, I think it could. But there, as you know, the split is not necessarily by party. But I think it is more likely to be a defining issue in California than any other place; and perhaps, second, in Florida.

Q: What foreign policy issues are of key importance to the Republican Party at this time?

SCOWCROFT: While there are some specific issues, such as Bosnia and Haiti, I think the general issues of leadership and consistency are the themes that the Republicans would emphasize.

Q: How do you view the role and character of security policy in the elections now that the Cold War is history?

SCOWCROFT: The elections during the Cold War were frequently the subject of debates about who was soft on Communism, who didn't keep our military strength up and so on and so forth. Those issues have gone away. And with the end of the Cold War, I think, by and large, the American people are not particularly interested in foreign policy at the moment. And, therefore, as the different campaign chairmen look at the issues which will excite the people, they are not likely to find one in foreign policy, because there isn't anything that excites people like the issue of the threat from an aggressive Soviet Union did.

Q: Do you see a basic philosophical difference between Republicans and Democrats on foreign policy issues?

SCOWCROFT: Yes, I think there are general differences between Republicans and Democrats. But you know it's a little harder to make that distinction because there are different kinds of Democrats and different kinds of Republicans. But to the extent one can make that distinction, I would say that the difference is two-fold. One is the degree to which military strength needs to play a role in foreign policy: How strong do we need to be militarily in comparison to our economy? And the other is really the degree to which issues of human rights and democracy come to be

operational elements of the foreign policy. There are elements of principle for both parties. But the Democrats tend to make them more operational in terms of what our foreign policy should be than the Republicans.

Let's take China, for example. The Democrats have tended to say, "The most important thing with respect to U.S.-Chinese relations is their human rights record, and we have to punish them until they get their human rights record straight."

Republicans tend to say, "China is a great power. We have a lot of interests with China — a lot of very important interests, among which is human rights. But it should not dominate the relationship."

Q: Do you think that the Republicans are now reluctant during this campaign to criticize President Clinton's foreign policy record?

SCOWCROFT: No, I don't think they are reluctant at all. Indeed, I think there's some tendency to do it, especially in terms of leadership. But foreign policy, as I said before, will not be a primary theme because it doesn't seem to resonate with the American voter.

Q: Could you briefly summarize President Bush's key foreign policy successes, and do you believe the American voter lost sight of those achievements during the 1992 presidential campaign?

SCOWCROFT: I think there were a couple of major achievements. The overwhelming one was the end of the Cold War. Now George Bush did not cause the end of the Cold War. Those were elements far beyond any particular individual. But the fact that a confrontation as deep and bitter as that which motivated the Cold War was able to end in so short a period of time, without a shot being fired, is, I think, little short of amazing. And I think the fact that it was managed in a way which ended it with a whimper — if you will — rather than with a nuclear boom, was a particular achievement of George Bush. Subsidiary to that was his ability to get the Soviet Union to accept not only the

reunification of Germany, but a reunification within NATO.

The other achievement which I think most people will remember George Bush for right now is the conflict in the Persian Gulf. And there, I think, he did a tremendous job, in the sense that he recognized aggression, he mobilized a coalition to deal with the aggression, to reverse the aggression; he mobilized the world community through the United Nations to condemn it and to approve the action to reverse it. And then having achieved his objectives, he ended it. And I think it is as pure a case of how to deal with unprovoked aggression as we have ever had.

And do I believe that the American voter somehow lost sight of those achievements in 1992?

I think a couple of things. The end of the Cold War — from the perspective of the American people — happened so effortlessly that it looked sort of inevitable and nobody paid much attention to how much effort it took to have it end the way it did. He got an enormous amount of credit for the Gulf War. Indeed, his popularity got up to about 90 percent. But I think that people's memory is short, that there was a domestic malaise, economically, and that then-Governor Clinton was successful in saying, "Our real problems are here at home, and we have a President who spends too much time on foreign policy."

Q: Do you believe that the Republicans and/or Democrats could do a better job of handling foreign policy issues during presidential campaigns? And, if so, what advice could you offer to improve the treatment of foreign policy in U.S. elections?

SCOWCROFT: That's a difficult question to answer. I think — to the extent that it is possible — foreign policy should be treated on its merits in a campaign. But that's a very difficult thing to

suggest. So far, the parties — when crises have arisen during a campaign — have closed ranks and acted in unison.

I think foreign policy should be debated as a campaign issue, but hopefully it should be debated on the merits of what it is we are trying to accomplish and how well we are doing it, rather than on personalities. But I don't have much hope that that will be the case.

Q: In view of your current involvement with The Forum for International Policy and The Scowcroft Group, could you comment further on the American public's knowledge of and interest in foreign affairs? How can this be changed and what would you recommend to heighten Americans' interest in international issues?

SCOWCROFT: I think that the current knowledge is relatively low, and lower than it was during most parts of the Cold War period. And I think that is because traditionally the American people have been rather insular, and foreign policy has been something so far away across two great oceans and not something of daily concern to their lives. I think this is a period when we are likely either to construct or lay the foundation for a world more compatible with our values, or let the world once again drift into a state of peril from which we may have to rescue it as has happened so often in this century.

There are a lot of people who can help in getting the message out and The Forum for International Policy is one which is trying to do that. But in the end, it's a particular responsibility of an American President, both to keep saying how important it is and why it's important — and to do the kinds of things that will advance our interests.

Again, in peace time, the American people sort of rely on the President to do what's right. And they give him a lot of leeway. So I think presidential leadership is really the key. ©

THE FOREIGN POLICY FACTOR IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS

By Stephen Hess

Describing instances in which foreign policy works its way into the “largely domestic terrain of U.S. presidential politics,” Hess says it can happen when a crisis imposes itself during an election period or when an “international issue becomes domesticated because it directly involves U.S. citizens, either as troops or as hostages.” While the electorate has “less knowledge of foreign relations than of domestic affairs,” he says, “it is clear that on the international issues that voters do care about, they care very deeply indeed.” Since 1972 Hess has been a Senior Fellow in Governmental Studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington. He was a speech writer for President Eisenhower, Deputy Assistant to President Nixon for Urban Affairs and consultant to President Carter for Executive Office reorganization. He is the author of 15 books including The Presidential Campaign, Organizing the Presidency, and Presidents and the Presidency.

On the first Sunday in September, as the President was ordering cruise missiles fired at Iraq, Robert Dole assailed Bill Clinton’s “weak leadership” in dealing with Saddam Hussein. The next day, after the missiles landed, the Republican presidential candidate concluded that attacking his Democratic opponent was a mistake and offered support “without hesitation or reservation” to the American military forces. The Reform Party’s Ross Perot refused to rally behind the President, however, saying, “War is not a place for politicians to create a positive image and get a bump in the polls.” Amazingly, once again foreign policy has become an issue in an American presidential contest.

Amazing because of the inward-direction of U.S. voters and the fact that most elections are determined by domestic considerations, notably by the state of the economy. When Clinton’s 1992 campaign manager, James Carville, warned staff meetings that “It’s the economy, stupid” — his colorful way of alerting campaign workers not to stray from their basic message — he was simply reiterating a truism of American politics.

Clinton did give several obligatory foreign policy speeches, generally focusing on the importance of world trade. But he was able to steer the debate away from overseas matters, which have been the

Republicans’ strong suit, first under Ronald Reagan, the party’s nominee in 1980 and 1984, who often appeared to be running for office against the Soviet Union, and then under George Bush, whose approval rating shot up to 90 percent after the Persian Gulf War.

There are various ways that foreign policy and national security issues work their way into the largely domestic terrain of American presidential politics.

Obviously the first way is when a crisis imposes itself during the election period, as in the case of Iraq’s military incursion into a Kurdish-protected area this year. The 1956 campaign between Dwight Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson was complicated by two international crises, the Hungarian uprising and the Israeli-French-British invasion of Egypt. All out-party candidates worry about such so-called “October surprises,” when the nation is reminded that the in-party candidate also may be the commander-in-chief and the nation tends to “rally ‘round the flag.”

Second: When an international issue becomes domesticated because it directly involves U.S. citizens, either as troops or as hostages. The most recent examples are the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the 1979 Iranian takeover of the

American Embassy, events that had a major impact on the election of Eisenhower (1952), Lyndon Johnson choosing not to run again (1968), the reelection of Richard Nixon (1972), and the defeat of Jimmy Carter (1980).

Third: An error on the part of a candidate, such as befell President Gerald Ford and Senator Barry Goldwater. Ford misspoke about Soviet domination of Eastern Europe when debating Carter in 1976; Goldwater, the Republican nominee in 1964, gave an uncalled for explanation about nuclear defoliation in Vietnam, which created an image of the candidate as a “nuclear bomber.”

Fourth: Candidates know that certain countries have special meaning to different groups of Americans. Dole’s proposal to move the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem by May 1999 appeals to Jewish-Americans, while Clinton’s intervention in the Ulster peace process is well received among Irish-Americans. U.S. relations with Castro’s Cuba have an impact in Florida, a state with a large number of electoral votes, just as immigration issues have special meaning in states that border Mexico.

Fifth: Candidates sometimes raise foreign policy matters because of their past experiences and interests. A number of presidential contenders have served on the Senate Foreign Relations or Armed Services Committees. George Bush was the U.S. Ambassador to China, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Dole — who urged delaying the Bosnia elections, claiming “these elections will be a fraud, but a fraud with the American stamp of approval” — has held long-standing and strong views on the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

Sixth: Candidates are committed to positions through their parties’ platforms. Comparatively there are real differences in these documents that help define why voters are attracted to the Republicans, Democrats, or one of the minor parties. In the 1996 platforms, for example, the

Republicans pledge to “reverse the decline in what our nation spends for defense” and the Democrats argue that the Republicans “desire to spend more money on defense than the Pentagon requests.” (The Reform Party’s platform does not deal with international relations.)

Any explanation of the important role that foreign policy has played in electoral politics must be tempered by serious reservations: The United States does not witness responsible debate on foreign policy during presidential campaigns; American voters are not knowledgeable about foreign policy issues; and the electorate’s interest in foreign policy does not go beyond a basic desire for peace.

Foreign policy as a matrix of campaign issues boils down to who is most apt to get or keep the country out of war. Highly technical matters such as international finance or even explosive situations that are unlikely to involve the American military are not the stuff on which electoral mandates are constructed. Candidates’ appeals are basic, even primitive. “I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars,” said Franklin Roosevelt in 1940.

Given, however, that the electorate has less interest in and less knowledge of foreign relations than of domestic affairs, it is clear that on the international issues that voters do care about, they care very deeply indeed. Foreign policy becomes a dominant campaign issue only when it has reached the raw nerve of the electorate. American involvement in Vietnam was one such issue and Perot would like to turn U.S. participation in NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) into another raw nerve issue.

It is Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s widely shared opinion that “elections are rarely our finest hour.” In a political campaign, issues are always oversimplified, overdramatized, and overcatastrophized. Perhaps in practice there should be no expectation that presidential

campaigns will be appropriate vehicles for objective, thorough, balanced reviews of public policy. Although this observation applies to both domestic and international issues, the latter are made even more inscrutable by their complexities, secrecy restrictions, and the limited knowledge of most voters. Thus it can be stated as a general law of campaigning: While all issues are handled badly, foreign policy issues are handled worst.

There are no changes in the geography or the geometry of American politics to suggest that foreign policy issues are more or less likely to be raised in future presidential races. Or that they will be handled more responsibly than in the

past. The irony is that the foreign policy promises the candidates make probably have little to do with the foreign policy crises that presidents actually confront. Judging from recent history, voters would be better served if candidates addressed such questions as: What would you do if a hostile power put offensive missiles in Cuba or if North Korea uses a nuclear weapon or if war breaks out again between Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia? Unfortunately contenders for the presidency do not answer hypothetical questions. But if they did, the results would be more interesting — and certainly more useful — than the foreign policy debates that now erupt in presidential campaigns. ©

WHAT THE POLLS SAY: ISSUES OF CONCERN TO AMERICAN VOTERS

*By Alvin Richman, Senior Research Specialist
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More than a dozen polls in recent months have asked U.S. voters about their main domestic and foreign policy concerns, including the issues that are most important to them in deciding which presidential candidate will receive their vote. Most of these polls found social issues, particularly education and crime, rank ahead of economic issues (budget deficit, taxes, jobs), while foreign policy/defense issues invariably place a distant third. Most Americans continue to favor generally active U.S. involvement abroad, but fewer than one in ten name a foreign affairs issue as one of their top national concerns.

The priority the public gives to various issues depends partly on how little hope or optimism it has about the seriousness of these issues in the future. Optimism about the U.S. educational system is the lowest it has been in two decades, and this issue receives high priority. In contrast, optimism about the U.S. “ability to get along with other countries” is at its high point, which helps explain why the public accords relatively low priority to the government’s handling of U.S. foreign relations.

PUBLIC’S CORE VALUES IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS — Americans’ views on U.S. foreign policy goals in the post-Cold War period have consistently fallen into four distinct attitude categories, which differ considerably in priority:

— U.S. “Domestic Issues” linked to foreign policy (e.g., protecting jobs of American workers, countering illegal drugs and illegal immigration) have the highest ratings. About 70 percent of respondents on average view these issues as “very important.”

— U.S. “Global Interests” (e.g., preventing nuclear proliferation, countering international terrorism, improving the environment) have the highest ratings among the three strictly foreign policy categories. About 60 percent of respondents on average rate these concerns “very important.”

— In contrast, all measures of “Global Altruism” (e.g., promoting democracy and human rights abroad, aiding developing nations) have experienced a decline in support since the end of the Cold War and this category contains the lowest ratings by far. About 30 percent of the public on average considers these issues “very important.”

— A “Military Security” category (e.g., defending our allies’ security, maintaining U.S. military power) ranks about midway between U.S. “Global Interests” and “Global Altruism,” with about 45 percent of respondents on average perceiving this category as “very important.”

In-depth analyses of several polls suggest that U.S. involvement in Bosnia is a “complex” policy issue for many Americans, reflecting values of Global Altruism as well as U.S. interest in European stability. Americans are closely divided about U.S. participation in the current Bosnia peacekeeping mission. In contrast, a large majority of the public (about 70 percent) supports the recent missile strikes in Iraq, which is widely perceived as a potential threat to U.S. vital interests.

Following are highlights of some of the recent surveys:

ISSUES RATED MOST IMPORTANT IN VOTING FOR THE PRESIDENT

Two types of poll questions used during the past few months generally agree that American voters are giving the highest priority to various social issues and relatively low priority to U.S. foreign affairs in electing their President:

1. “Open-end” (unstructured) questions permit respondents to mention any problems that spontaneously come to mind. The most recent of these polls — by Harris (September 5-8) — asked, “What two issues do you think will be of most importance to you in determining whom you will vote for” in the presidential election in November? All in all, 76 percent of the respondents mentioned various social issues (including health care and Medicare/Medicaid, welfare, abortion, education and crime/drugs) as a main criterion; 57 percent named economic issues (including taxes, the budget deficit and jobs), and 13 percent named various foreign policy/defense issues.

These results are similar overall to findings obtained from recent polls asking the often-used question: “What is the most important problem facing this country today?” A CBS/NY Times poll (August 16-18) found 46 percent of the public mentioned social problems, 30 percent named economic problems, and only 2 percent cited a foreign policy issue.

2. “Closed” questions ask respondents to rate individually a number of specific issues listed in the questionnaire, using a common set of response categories (e.g., “extremely important,” “very important,” “somewhat important,” “not important”). Several polls with “closed” questions concur that two social issues — education and crime — rate higher than any of the top three economic issues (budget deficit, taxes, jobs) as criteria to be considered when voting for President. The most recent of these polls (Gallup/USA Today, July 18-21) showed about two-fifths of the public believe education and crime are “extremely important” criteria, compared to about a third who view taxes and the federal budget deficit as

“extremely important.” About one-fifth of the public view “foreign affairs” as an “extremely important” factor in electing the President.

These results are similar to findings obtained from *Washington Post* polls in June and July asking respondents how worried they were (from “a great deal” to “not at all”) about 84 different issues. The top concerns — which some three-fifths of the public says it worries about “a great deal” — are that “the American educational system will get worse instead of better,” “crime will increase,” and “AIDS will become more widespread.” A second tier of issues — which 40-50 percent of the public says it worries about “a great deal” — involves concerns that Social Security and the Medicare trust fund “will run out of money,” “federal taxes will go up,” “more and more good American jobs will be moved overseas,” family incomes “won’t keep up with prices,” and “the federal budget deficit will grow.”

Regarding U.S. involvement in Bosnia, 36 percent of Americans say they worry “a great deal” that the situation in Bosnia will worsen and “our troops will be bogged down and casualties will increase.” A smaller number — 24 percent of the public — worries “a great deal” that “factions (in Bosnia) will go right back to killing each other” once U.S. troops are pulled out of Bosnia. Relatively few Americans express concern about the size of U.S. expenditures on defense: Only 20 percent say they worry “a great deal” because “the U.S. doesn’t spend enough on its armed forces,” and 13 percent report that they worry “a great deal” because “the U.S. spends too much on its armed forces.”

Candidate Best Able to Handle Various Issues:

About a dozen recent polls have asked which presidential candidate — Democratic nominee Bill Clinton or Republican nominee Bob Dole — would do a “better job” in dealing with various issues. These polls consistently have found the public rates Clinton clearly ahead of Dole in protecting the environment and handling certain social issues (education, health care, Medicare and “improving conditions for minority groups”). At the same time, the public rates Dole ahead of

Clinton in maintaining U.S. military strength and handling certain economic issues (controlling taxes and government spending). The public divides fairly evenly on whether Clinton or Dole is more capable of dealing with crime and drugs, the federal budget deficit and foreign policy issues.

Public's Outlook on Different Issues: The importance accorded various issues depends partly on how serious the problems are expected to become in the future. Issues about which public pessimism is high — or optimism is low — compared to previous years receive relatively high ratings from the public as criteria to be considered when voting for President. A Gallup poll in March found optimism at its lowest level since 1974 (when this series of questions was introduced) concerning the following issues: “the moral and ethical standards in our country” (24 percent of respondents were optimistic versus 53 percent pessimistic), “our system of education” (41 percent optimistic versus 39 percent pessimistic), and “our system of government and how well it works” (43 percent optimistic versus 28 percent pessimistic). On the other hand, optimism is at an historical high point in terms of “our ability to get along with other countries in the world” (61 percent optimistic versus 18 percent pessimistic) and the U.S. “economic outlook for the next year or two” (50 percent optimistic versus 18 percent pessimistic).

SUPPORT FOR U.S. INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

Several trend measures show a small decline over the past year or two in public support for an activist U.S. world role. However nearly 60 percent of Americans still favor a generally active U.S. role in world affairs, including close cooperation with the United Nations, while about 35-40 percent oppose active U.S. involvement abroad.

(1) **Active U.S. role in world affairs:** For the first time in the post-Cold War period, support for the U.S. taking an “active part in world affairs” has

dropped below the levels of support obtained in the 1980s and early 1990s. In two recent polls, 58 percent of respondents on average indicated support for an active U.S. role, compared to 64-65 percent in the earlier periods. At the same time, the number who want the United States to “stay out of world affairs” has risen since the 1980s and early 1990s, with 36 percent of respondents on average now favoring an isolationist stance compared to 29-30 percent in the earlier periods.

(2) **“Mind our own business” overseas:** A survey conducted in June by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland (PIPA) found 54 percent of the public disagreed (compared to 43 percent who agreed) with the statement that the U.S. should “mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along as best they can on their own.” This is down five points from the average percentage of respondents who rejected this isolationist position in three polls conducted in the 1980s.

(3) **Cooperate closely with the U.N.:** Sixty percent believe the U.S. should “cooperate fully with the United Nations” (versus 37 percent who disagree), according to a PIPA poll in June. This reflects a decline from the 77 percent peak level of support for U.S.-U.N. cooperation recorded in October 1991, but is close to the level of support obtained in the 1970s and 1980s, when 58 percent of the public on average favored strong U.S.-U.N. ties.

PUBLIC'S CORE FOREIGN POLICY VALUES

The four attitude categories into which Americans' foreign policy preferences consistently fall — “Global Altruism,” “Global Interests,” “Domestic Issues,” and “Military Security” — were identified by means of in-depth analyses of two major post-Cold War surveys conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (October 1994) and by the Times Mirror Center (September 1993). These four basic attitude groups differ considerably in priority accorded them by the public.

Global Altruism: All five Chicago Council measures of this category recorded 20-year low points in 1994, including three (promoting human rights, aiding developing countries and protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression) that were well below previous lows. With one exception — combating world hunger, which 56 percent of respondents termed a “very important” goal — this category had the lowest-rated measures among the 16 goal questions tested on the survey in terms of importance to the U.S.

U.S. Global Interests: This category contains one of the top foreign policy goals of the public, preventing nuclear proliferation — which 82 percent called “very important” — and several second tier goals: securing adequate energy supplies, called “very important” by 62 percent; improving the global environment, termed “very important” by 58 percent; and strengthening the U.N., a goal which 51 percent said was “very important.”

U.S. Domestic Issues: Most measures relating to this category — in contrast to Global Altruism measures — have risen above levels in the 1980s. Two issues in this category receive the top two ratings: Stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S. was a “very important” goal for 85 percent of the public. And protecting the jobs of American workers was termed “very important” by 83 percent — the highest level recorded on this goal in 20 years. At the same time, however, support for placing “tariffs and restrictions on imported goods” has declined to its lowest level in two decades, with 48 percent of respondents supporting this policy in the Chicago Council survey in October 1994. These results are consistent with other findings showing that Americans increasingly see U.S. economic security tied to expanding exports rather than to reducing imports.

Military Security: The Chicago Council trend questions relating to this category reveal a sharp contrast: Support for maintaining the present U.S. commitment to NATO and using U.S. troops to defend Western Europe against a Russian invasion

has declined about ten percentage points from the high levels attained in the 1980s (about 60 percent of the public in late 1994 versus 70 percent in 1986). But support for using U.S. troops to defend two countries outside of Europe has risen about ten or more percentage points since the 1980s. Thirty-nine percent in 1994 supported defending South Korea against a North Korean invasion, compared to 24 percent in 1986; and 42 percent supported defending Israel against an invasion by “Arab forces,” compared to 32 percent in 1986. These results suggest less an overall diminution in the public’s desire to protect military security interests in the post-Cold War era than a shift toward a more balanced, less Euro-centered set of security interests. These include regional threats in the Middle East and Asia and global security threats, such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

U.S. Involvement in Bosnia: Various polls taken this year show the American public is closely divided about U.S. troop participation in the current Bosnia peacekeeping mission (about 45 percent in favor versus 45 percent opposed). Support for the Bosnia mission is enhanced by the fact that it is viewed in part as serving U.S. Military Security interests (i.e., U.S. interest in a stable Europe) rather than being entirely an expression of Global Altruism. On the other hand, support for intervention in Bosnia is not as high as support for intervention in certain situations viewed predominantly as vital security interests of the U.S. For example, more than half of the public supports using U.S. combat troops to defend Western Europe or Saudi Arabia against external attack.

U.S. Military Strikes Against Iraq: Four polls taken shortly after the U.S. missile strikes against Iraq agree that about 70 percent of Americans approve — and only 20 percent disapprove — of “President Clinton’s decision to launch missile attacks” in Iraq. The Los Angeles Times poll (September 7-10) asked a separate question containing three response categories and found only nine percent of the public believed the missile strikes on Iraq were “too tough” an action. In

contrast, 30 percent said the strikes were “not tough enough,” while 46 percent said they were “about right” in response to Iraq’s military moves. Iraq is perceived as a threat to U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf, and it ranks among the U.S. public’s least favorite countries. A Gallup poll last March found 86 percent of the public have an

“unfavorable opinion” of Iraq, including 52 percent who have a “very unfavorable” opinion of that country, while only six percent view Iraq favorably. Americans have a more negative perception of Iraq than of any of the other 14 countries listed in the poll, including Iran, which 84 percent view unfavorably, and Cuba, which 81 percent perceive unfavorably. ●

THE ROLE OF FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS IN DOLE, CLINTON CAMPAIGNS

By Wendy S. Ross, Contributing Editor

The national campaign staffs of the Democratic and Republican presidential nominees are devoting considerable attention to how American voters react to foreign policy issues, even though recent public opinion polls indicate that domestic issues are now the U.S. electorate's primary concern.

The two political organizations have recruited international affairs experts, serving in both paid and volunteer roles, to advise them on how best to promote the foreign policy positions of their candidates.

Democratic presidential nominee Bill Clinton's campaign message on foreign affairs is principally guided by James P. Rubin, who, until recently, was senior adviser and chief press spokesperson for Ambassador Madeleine Albright, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Rubin is Director of Foreign Policy for the Clinton/Gore re-election campaign as well as its point person for dealing with the press on foreign policy issues.

Rubin, who earned a master's degree in international affairs at Columbia University, formerly served on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and advised Senator Joseph Biden on foreign policy. He now works at the Clinton/Gore campaign staff headquarters in Washington and stays in close touch with Samuel "Sandy" Berger and Nancy Soderberg, both Deputy Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs.

On the Republican side, presidential contender Bob Dole is relying on an experienced group of world affairs specialists, some of whom held key foreign policy and security affairs positions during the Reagan and Bush administrations. They include Jeane Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Permanent

Representative to the United Nations, and former Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld is chair of the Dole/Kemp '96 national campaign and Kirkpatrick, one of 12 national co-chairs to the campaign, is also a senior adviser on foreign policy.

How do the foreign policy advisers to the campaigns view their roles in the 1996 presidential election process and how do they define the key foreign policy priorities and contributions of the candidates? In recent interviews, representatives from both parties discussed these issues and offered some insight into the role of foreign policy in the current campaign.

Rubin emphasized that it is important for members of the campaign staff and the White House to "speak with the same voice" on foreign policy issues. He does not perceive major differences between President Clinton and Senator Dole on the key foreign policy issues that include U.S. global engagement and America's role as a world leader and sole remaining superpower.

"The differences lie in an overall approach to solving the complicated new threats in the world," he said. "President Clinton is trying to mix a practical approach by using creative diplomacy, economic sanctions and — where necessary — the use of force to confront the new threats of terrorism, rogue states and international drug cartels.

"One senses from Senator Dole's side a more rigid approach, a reflexive approach," Rubin said. "For example, he opposed the Chemical Weapons Convention using arguments — that were familiar during the Cold War days — of insufficient verification. But we see that treaty as an additional tool in the fight against terrorism."

But the critical debate that occurs in American politics, Rubin said, “is less between the candidates than between a candidate and the media. The media is the way in which hard questions are posed to candidates and difficult subjects are addressed and have to be explained” to the voting public.

Rubin portrays the biggest challenge in his new job as “trying to make foreign policy understandable to the American people.” They “don’t see tangible threats” to their security, now that the Cold War has ended, he said. It is very important to make them understand that “terrorism and drugs and international crime, the environment, are all international issues that do come home to America at some level or another.”

He said he gets help in these efforts from several Democratic members of Congress, who speak out publicly on the issues and write newspaper op-ed articles. They include Senators Joseph Lieberman, Joseph Biden and Christopher Dodd and Representatives Lee Hamilton and John Spratt.

Asked to highlight a typical workday, Rubin said: “In the final weeks of the campaign, the journalists and many of the major media organizations are preparing articles to compare and contrast President Clinton and Senator Dole on foreign affairs. So I work closely with them.

“I’m in a position to determine whether there is a need to do rapid response to Senator Dole’s positions. When he sank the chemical weapons treaty, that required some rapid response work.

“And finally, getting the material together for the debate preparation. That’s a typical day.” Rubin said he expects the moderators of the debates to include some foreign affairs questions for Dole and Clinton to answer.

When Rubin first came to the Clinton re-election campaign, he did not think foreign policy would emerge as an issue of intense interest to the American electorate. In fact, Rubin joked, he did not expect to be busy at all. But with the turn of events in Iraq, the situation changed dramatically, he said.

“The increasing criticism that we’re seeing from the Republicans over the President’s handling of Iraq...could portend an attempt by them to make foreign policy an issue,” Rubin said in a speech at the Woman’s National Democratic Club in Washington.

Praising the president’s leadership on foreign policy, Rubin said, “The public is rightly quite satisfied with the achievements President Clinton has made and the way in which he has balanced American interests in engaging the world, without taking on commitments that the American people are not prepared to support.”

In the early days of the Clinton presidency, Rubin recalled, the administration grappled with “some very serious” foreign policy problems carried over from preceding administrations, such as the situations in Bosnia and Haiti. In both of those cases Clinton made the decision to send U.S. forces to help those countries move toward democracy because he believed it was the right thing to do — even though Congress and the American people in general were wary of such engagement, Rubin said. These actions, he added, demonstrate that Clinton’s foreign policy decisions are not dictated by domestic political considerations.

“We feel quite proud of what President Clinton has accomplished and believe that, contrary to many past elections, foreign policy is a net plus for the Democrats for the first time in a long time. And that’s really a major achievement for us,” Rubin said.

However the Dole/Kemp campaign committee sees it differently, of course, and is implementing its own carefully devised strategy to tout Dole’s foreign policy contributions as a U.S. Senator and the world leadership role he would play if elected President.

Dole “wants to lay down a marker as to those areas in which he differs from the Clinton Administration” on foreign policy issues, explained Paula Dobriansky, who heads the foreign policy group at the Dole/Kemp election campaign.

“The speech Dole gave at the Republican Convention clearly reflects the foreign policy issues that he attaches significant importance to — terrorism, ballistic missile defense, concern about the United Nations and the issue of United States military troops being subsumed under any kind of U.N. command,” she said.

Dobriansky outlined the ways in which Dole differs from Clinton on foreign policy: “Dole is a very strong supporter of ballistic missile defense. The Clinton administration has opposed it. Secondly, Senator Dole was a long-time and very consistent supporter of lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims; the Clinton administration only agreed to [lift] it at the time of the Dayton accord — in fact, that was one of the conditions that Senator Dole had expressed in order to [support] the Dayton accord.”

She said another disagreement between Dole and Clinton concerns “Russia and the handling of Chechnya. Senator Dole came out very strongly against the Russian brutality in Chechnya and would not have extended a substantial IMF (International Monetary Fund) loan to Russia in the midst of these atrocities. He has stated that. And [he] would not compare Chechnya to the American Civil War,” as Clinton did, Dobriansky said.

Dole solicits advice on foreign policy not only from Kirkpatrick and Rumsfeld but also from his former colleagues in the Congress, including Republican Senator John McCain of Arizona, Dobriansky said. McCain, a former Navy pilot who was a prisoner of war in Vietnam, advises Dole on defense policy. Dobriansky also mentioned Kansan Robert Ellsworth, a former Republican member of the House of Representatives, as another of Dole’s advisers on foreign policy.

Dobriansky said the campaign foreign policy group that she heads oversees some 200 volunteers who represent a wide range of backgrounds and include former high-level U.S. officials.

Dobriansky served in a variety of important foreign policy jobs in Republican administrations. She was Associate Director for Policy and Programs at the United States Information Agency, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs and Director of European and Soviet Affairs at the National Security Council. She received an undergraduate degree from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and earned master’s and doctoral degrees in Soviet political/military affairs at Harvard University.

On security affairs, the Dole campaign is also advised by a defense group, headed by Ambassador David Smith, former envoy to the Nuclear and Space talks in Geneva in the Bush administration. Smith coordinates a group of volunteers who assist the campaign in ways similar to the foreign policy group, Dobriansky said. They include former Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith, and former Counselor to the Secretary of State Bob Zoellick. In addition, Dole is advised by former National Security Adviser General Brent Scowcroft and former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell.

The foreign policy and defense groups work together as a team, Dobriansky said. “We backstop one another on a wide range of issues.”

A typical day for Dole’s foreign affairs advisers may involve drafting talking points for Dole to use on campaign trips, writing position papers, providing statements to media and other groups, and participating in meetings where foreign policy topics are discussed, Dobriansky said.

Rumsfeld, as the campaign chair, serves as the intermediary with Dole on the campaign trail and is in close daily contact with the Senator, even though he may not always be traveling with the candidate, she added. ©

PLATFORMS: HOW THE PARTIES DEFINE THEIR POLICY POSITIONS

By Ralph Dannheisser, Contributing Editor

The platforms adopted at U.S. political party conventions have had one consistent function: to outline what the party stands for in language that all its candidates in the upcoming election campaign can, hopefully, subscribe to.

This striving for inclusiveness is not a new phenomenon; indeed, Wendell Willkie, the Republican presidential candidate in 1940, referred to platform documents as “fusions of ambiguity.”

Despite this effort to bring in all viewpoints, the job of assembling the party platform has often in the past produced lively, and even angry, disputes on the convention floor. Thus, for example, Prohibition — the federal government’s ban on alcoholic beverages — proved a contentious issue for the 1932 Republican convention that nominated Herbert Hoover. Fights over civil rights planks actually caused angry convention walkouts for Democrats in the 1940s.

But such disarray was notable by its absence this year. Party platforms, along with the selection of the presidential and vice presidential candidates, were effectively resolved even before delegates assembled at a pair of conventions — the Republicans in San Diego, the Democrats in Chicago — that were artfully crafted to display minimum conflict and maximum party harmony. Both party platforms won floor approval without a hint of argument, dissent or fanfare.

A seemingly growing disconnect between the platform documents and the campaign was accelerated this year as, at least in one party, responsible officials voiced their disinterest in the document and denied even knowing what was in it.

The Republican Party’s presidential candidate himself, Bob Dole, said during the convention that

he did not feel bound by the platform’s provisions. “I probably agree with most everything in it, but I haven’t read it,” he confessed. The party chairman, Haley Barbour, acknowledged that he hadn’t read the document either. So did Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, considered one of the Republicans’ leading idea men.

Democrats were quick to jump on this phenomenon. Unlike the Republicans, said Senator Christopher Dodd, his party’s general chairman, his colleagues offered a platform that Democratic candidates could “run on with pride.” But while Democrats did not go so far as to disown their party’s policy document — predictably a call for continuity — neither did they make much effort to focus public or media attention on it.

And what is in this year’s platforms?

As is inevitably the case, the incumbent party — in this case the Democrats — “points with pride” to its accomplishments in office, while the challengers — now the Republicans — “view with alarm” what they portray as the sorry state things have come to since the voters turned them out of power.

In one important general respect, however, the Republican platform jibes with the Democrats’ version: Although both documents put their main emphasis on domestic issues, both see a vital role for continued U.S. engagement in the world.

Given the “new challenges and new threats to our vital interests” in the wake of the Cold War, the Republicans say, “our nation must resist the temptation to turn inward and neglect the exercise of American leadership and our proper role in the world.” The section on foreign affairs in their platform begins with a comparable quote from

candidate Dole: “It’s time to restore American leadership throughout the world. Our future security depends on American leadership that is respected, American leadership that is trusted, and when necessary, American leadership that is feared.”

The Democratic platform, for its part, declares, “President Clinton and Vice President Gore have seized the opportunities of the post-Cold War era. Over the past four years, their leadership has made America safer, more prosperous, and more engaged in solving the challenges of a new era.”

Here are other highlights of the two parties’ platforms:

THE REPUBLICANS

In the case of the Republicans, a platform bound into a handsomely printed 100-odd page booklet called “Restoring the American Dream” was developed by a 107-member committee headed by Congressman Henry Hyde of Illinois. With conflict on the touchy issue of abortion finessed in advance of the convention — pro-choice advocates were able to outline their views in a separate appendix to the document — the platform passed, quietly and without amendment, on the first evening of the convention. It got little notice from the commercial television networks during the nightly “prime time” hour that they devoted to convention coverage.

Of the overall platform, some 20 pages — assembled under the rubric, “Restoring American World Leadership” — deal with foreign affairs and related topics.

In line with the “view with alarm” approach generally adopted by the non-incumbent party, the Republican document insists that “the international situation — and our country’s security against the purveyors of evil — has worsened over the last three-and-a-half-years” while President Clinton has been in office.

It goes on to chronicle a long list of supposed Clinton administration failures: “Today, Russia’s

democratic future is more uncertain than at any time since the hammer and sickle was torn from the Kremlin towers. With impunity, Fidel Castro has shot American citizens out of the skies over international waters. North Korea has won unprecedented concessions regarding its nuclear capability from the Clinton Administration. Much of Africa has dissolved in tragedy — Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia. The Clinton administration objected to lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia while it facilitated the flow of Iranian weapons to that country. Bill Clinton made tough campaign pledges on China but subsequently failed in his attempt to bluff the Chinese government — diminishing American prestige while not addressing the serious issues of human rights, regional stability, and nuclear proliferation.”

Describing the Republicans as “the party of peace through strength,” the platform advocates putting “the interests of our country over those of other nations — and of the United Nations.”

The document assures that “Republicans will not subordinate United States sovereignty to any international authority.” It reiterates what has become a major foreign policy theme for the party: “We oppose the commitment of American troops to U.N. peacekeeping operations under foreign commanders and will never compel American servicemen to wear foreign uniforms or insignia.” Further, it calls for an end to “waste, mismanagement and fraud” at the United Nations, and rejects “any international taxation” by that organization or any grant of authority to an international court to try American citizens.

With respect to Europe, the platform calls for strengthening of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which it deems “the world’s strongest bulwark of freedom and international stability.” It specifically endorses Dole’s call for expansion of NATO to include Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary by 1998.

While voicing support for U.S. troops in Bosnia, it challenges “the ill-conceived and inconsistent

policies that led to their deployment.” The platform proposes a “timely withdrawal” of U.S. forces, linked to provision of weapons and training to the Bosnian Federation, as “the only realistic exit strategy.”

On defense issues, the platform charges that Clinton has left the United States defenseless against missile attack and calls for establishment of a national missile defense system for all 50 states by 2003. It describes the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, signed September 24 by President Clinton, as “inconsistent with American security interests” in limiting still-necessary testing. And, claiming seriously eroded military readiness, it proposes broad steps to “reverse the decline in what our nation spends for defense.”

The document promises a “proactive” policy against state-sponsored terrorism, declaring that “the governments of North Korea, Iran, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Cuba must know that America’s first line of defense is not our shoreline, but their own borders.”

In Africa, the Republicans propose continuing aid programs, but on a more limited “case-by-case” basis. In Asia, they call for emphasis on U.S. mutual security treaties with Japan and the Republic of Korea as “the foundation of our role in the region,” a tougher stance toward North Korea and Vietnam, “vigilance” with regard to China’s military potential and attitude on human rights, and a reaffirmed commitment to Taiwan’s security. In the Middle East, they emphasize the critical importance of Israel as “our most reliable and capable ally in this part of the world” and endorse recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s undivided capital. In the Western Hemisphere, they call for a new partnership to fight narcotics traffickers and protect democratic gains, and they reaffirm a policy of isolating the Castro regime in Cuba.

On foreign aid, the platform language suggests a turn toward spending on military aid to allies and away from “U.N. operations and social welfare spending in the Third World.”

THE DEMOCRATS

The Democrats list no fewer than 191 members on the committee that put together their own 47-page platform document; drafting the actual document was entrusted to a group of 16 headed by Governor Zell Miller of Georgia. Miller noted the platform-building exercise had started with a full day of public hearings in July.

The Democratic platform — which devotes just ten pages to foreign policy items under the heading, “Security, Freedom and Peace” — takes credit for what Democrats see as an unbroken string of foreign policy successes during the Clinton administration.

It points proudly to diplomacy that has eliminated “thousands of Russian nuclear weapons aimed at American cities,” the growth of democracy and free markets in the countries of the former Soviet Union, movement toward peace in the Middle East and in Northern Ireland, suspension of the North Korean nuclear program, and a revitalization of NATO that has incorporated peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and impending expansion to include new Central European members.

It claims successes in a restoration of democracy in Haiti, establishment of a national unity government in South Africa through elections strongly backed by the United States, and improvement of the international trading climate by means of initiatives such as the Summit of the Americas, the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation meetings and the trade promotion efforts of the late Commerce Secretary Ron Brown.

Asserting that the Republicans counsel policies of “retreat and indifference,” the platform advocates instead a continuation of policies “exerting American leadership across a range of military, diplomatic and humanitarian challenges around the world.”

The Democratic prescription on defense includes full funding of the Pentagon’s five-year spending plan, undertaking a second fundamental review of

the defense structure, increasing coordination among the service branches, and “ensuring that our troops can dominate the battlefield of the future.”

The platform calls for an aggressive effort against weapons of mass destruction — nuclear, chemical and biological — and their means of delivery, and specifically endorses swift action to approve and effectuate a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It also supports early ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which, following the convention, became stalled in the U.S. Senate after Dole signalled his opposition.

The Democrats express support for a “strong and balanced” national missile defense program, including nationwide deployment of a system to defend against long-range missiles by 2003. But the costlier Republican plan “would waste money, weaken America’s defenses and violate existing arms control agreements that make us more secure,” they argue.

Lauding the administration for mounting “the most aggressive effort in American history to combat terrorism, drug trafficking and international crime,” the platform document promises efforts to “seek increased cooperation from our allies and friends abroad in fighting these threats.”

It pledges to employ both “decisive strength and active diplomacy” in achieving peace and democracy around the world. The administration, it says, will pursue those ends “with diplomacy where possible, with force where necessary, and working with others where appropriate — our allies, willing partners, the U.N. and other security organizations — to share the risks and costs of our leadership.”

The platform proclaims broad support for “the aspirations of all those who seek to strengthen civil society and accountable governance.” Specifically, it backs the MacBride Principles of equal access to regional employment in Northern Ireland and supports the human rights of Jews and other

minorities in the countries of the former Soviet Union. It supports continued funding for the National Endowment for Democracy, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the Asia Pacific Network, Radio Marti “and other efforts to promote democracy and the free flow of ideas.”

Complaining that the Republicans in Congress have “savaged” vital spending on foreign policy efforts, the Democrats promise to “resist these irresponsible cuts that undermine our security and America’s ability to lead.”

In Europe, the Democrats list such objectives as increased assistance to Ukraine, continued peace efforts from Bosnia to Cyprus, and pursuit of a relationship with an evolving Russia in which “we seek cooperation where we can,” but also “frankly express disagreements where they exist, such as on Chechnya.”

In Asia, they applaud Clinton’s policy toward Japan and Korea, as well as administration efforts at “steady engagement to encourage a stable, secure, open and prosperous China — a China that respects human rights throughout its land and in Tibet, that joins international efforts against weapons proliferation, and that plays by the rules of free and fair trade.”

As for the Middle East, the Democrats mirror the Republicans in citing “America’s long-standing special relationship with Israel” and declare that “the United States should continue to help Israel maintain its qualitative edge.” At the same time, they propose to strengthen ties with “states and peoples in the Arab and Islamic world committed to nonaggression and willing to take risks for peace.”

The platform calls for further efforts to consolidate democracy, stability and open markets in the Western Hemisphere. And it declares that “continuing to help the people of Africa nurture their continent’s extraordinary potential is both the right thing to do and profoundly in America’s interest.” ●

DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE BILL CLINTON: FORGING A FOREIGN POLICY THAT ADVANCES U.S. VALUES

President Clinton wants “to build a bridge to the 21st century” that ensures that “our foreign policy still advances the values of our American community in the community of nations.”

Accepting the nomination of his party to run for re-election, Clinton told the Democratic National Convention in Chicago August 29 that real peace must be achieved in Northern Ireland, and Cuba “must finally join the community of democracies.” Following are excerpts of the address:

U.S. WORLD LEADERSHIP

My fellow Americans, I want to build a bridge to the 21st century that makes sure we are still the nation with the world's strongest defense; that our foreign policy still advances the values of our American community in the community of nations. Our bridge to the future must include bridges to other nations, because we remain the world's indispensable nation to advance prosperity, peace and freedom, and to keep our own children safe from the dangers of terror and weapons of mass destruction.

We have helped to bring democracy to Haiti and peace to Bosnia. Now the peace signed on the White House lawn between the Israelis and the Palestinians must embrace more of Israel's neighbors. The deep desire for peace that Hillary and I felt when we walked the streets of Belfast and Derry must become real for all the people of Northern Ireland. And Cuba must finally join the community of democracies.

Nothing in our lifetimes has been more heartening than when people of the former Soviet Union and Central Europe broke the grip of communism. We have aided their progress, and I am proud of it. And I will continue our strong partnership with a democratic Russia. And we will bring some of Central Europe's new democracies into NATO, so that they will never question their own freedom in the future.

Our American exports are at record levels. In the next four years, we have to break down even more barriers to them, reaching out to Latin America, to

Africa, to other countries in Asia, making sure that our workers and our products — the world's finest — have the benefit of free and fair trade.

In the last four years, we have frozen North Korea's nuclear weapons program. And I'm proud to say that tonight there is not a single Russian nuclear missile pointed at an American child. Now we must enforce and ratify without delay measures that further reduce nuclear arsenals, banish poison gas, and ban nuclear tests once and for all.

DEFENSE

We have made investments, new investments, in our most important defense asset — our magnificent men and women in uniform. By the year 2000, we also will have increased funding to modernize our weapons systems by 40 percent. These commitments will make sure that our military remains the best-trained, best-equipped fighting force in the entire world.

We are developing a sensible national missile defense, but we must not — not now, not by the year 2000 — squander \$60 billion on an unproved, ineffective Star Wars program that could be obsolete tomorrow.

TERRORISM

We are fighting terrorism on all fronts with a three-pronged strategy. First, we are working to rally a world coalition with zero tolerance for terrorism. Just this month I signed a law imposing harsh sanctions on foreign companies that invest in key sectors of the Iranian and Libyan

economies. As long as Iran trains, supports, and protects terrorists, as long as Libya refuses to give up the people who blew up Pan Am 103, they will pay a price from the United States.

Second, we must give law enforcement the tools they need to take the fight to terrorists. We need new laws to crack down on money laundering and to prosecute and punish those who commit violent acts against American citizens abroad; to add chemical markers or taggants to gunpowder used in bombs so we can track the bomb-makers; to extend the same power police now have against organized crime to save lives by tapping all the

phones that terrorists use. Terrorists are as big a threat to our future, perhaps bigger, than organized crime.

Third, we will improve airport and air travel security. I have asked the Vice President to establish a commission and report back to me on ways to do this. But now we will install the most sophisticated bomb-detection equipment in all our major airports. We will search every airplane flying to or from America from another nation — every flight, every cargo hold, every cabin, every time.

COUNTERING RISKS IN “AN AGE OF NEW THREATS”

In “an age of new threats,” says President Clinton, the challenge is twofold: to seize “opportunities for more people to enjoy peace and freedom,” and “to move strongly and swiftly against the dangers that change has produced.” In an address to the 51st U.N. General Assembly on September 24, Clinton called for an all-out campaign against terrorists and drug traffickers and also urged further efforts to combat the threats of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Following are excerpts of his remarks:

THE CHALLENGE AHEAD

Now we find ourselves at a turning point in history, when the blocks and barriers that long defined the world are giving way to an age of remarkable possibility; a time when more of our children and more nations will be able to live out their dreams than ever before.

But this is also an age of new threats: Threats from terrorists, from rogue states that support them; threats from ethnic, religious, racial and tribal hatreds; threats from international criminals and drug traffickers, all of whom will be more dangerous if they gain access to weapons of mass destruction.

The challenge before us plainly is twofold — to seize the opportunities for more people to enjoy peace and freedom, security and prosperity, and to move strongly and swiftly against the dangers that change has produced. This week in this place, we take a giant step forward. By overwhelming global consensus, we will make a solemn commitment to end all nuclear tests for all time.

Before entering this hall, I had the great honor to be the first leader to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I did so with some pride with this pen, for this pen is the very one that President Kennedy used to help bring the Limited Test Ban Treaty to life 33 years ago.

This Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will help to prevent the nuclear powers from developing more advanced and more dangerous weapons. It will limit the ability of other states to acquire such devices themselves. It points us toward a century in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be further reduced — and ultimately eliminated.

ARMS CONTROL GOALS BEYOND CTBT

The United States has six priority goals to further lift the threat of nuclear weapons destruction and the threat of weapons of mass destruction, and to limit their dangerous spread. First, we must protect our people from chemical attack and make it harder for rogue states and terrorists to brandish

poison gas by bringing the Chemical Weapons Convention into force as soon as possible.

Second, we must reduce the risk that an outlaw state or organization could build a nuclear device by negotiating a treaty to freeze the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. The Conference on Disarmament should take up this challenge immediately. The United States, Russia, France and the United Kingdom already have halted production of fissile materials for weapons. I urge other nations to end the unsafeguarded production of these materials pending completion of the treaty.

Third, we must continue to reduce our nuclear arsenals. When Russia ratifies START II, President Yeltsin and I are all ready to discuss the possibilities of further cuts, as well as limiting and monitoring nuclear warheads and materials. This will help make deep reductions irreversible.

Fourth, we must reinforce our efforts against the spread of nuclear weapons by strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. We should give the International Atomic Energy Agency a stronger role and sharper tools for conducting worldwide inspections. Our law enforcement and customs officials should cooperate more in the fight against nuclear smuggling. And I urge all nations that have not signed the NPT to do so without delay.

Fifth, we must better protect our people from those who would use disease as a weapon of war, by giving the Biological Weapons Convention the means to strengthen compliance, including on-site investigations when we believe such weapons may have been used, or when suspicious outbreaks of disease occur. We should aim to complete this task by 1998.

Finally, we must end the carnage caused by anti-personnel landmines, the hidden killers that murder and maim more than 25,000 people a year.

REGIONAL OBJECTIVES

In Bosnia, where the war is over, and just 10 days ago its people went to the polls in peace, we have

moved in the right direction. Now we must help Bosnia build a unified, democratic and peaceful future. In Haiti, where the dictators are gone, democracy is back and the exodus of refugees has ended, we have moved in the right direction. Now we must help the Haitian people seize the full benefits of freedom and forge a more prosperous future.

In the Middle East and in Northern Ireland, there is progress towards lasting peace, and we are moving in the right direction. Now we must support continued progress between Israel and Palestinians, and we must broaden the circle of peace to include more of Israel's neighbors. We must help to give the children of Belfast a chance to live out normal lives.

Here in the Americas, every nation but one has raised freedom's flag. In Central Europe, in Russia, Ukraine, the other New Independent States, the forces of reform have earned all our respect and will continue to have the support of the United States. Now we must begin to welcome Europe's new democracies into NATO, strengthen NATO's partnership with Russia, and build a secure and undivided Europe.

In Asia — South Korea, Japan, China and America, working together, persuaded North Korea to freeze its nuclear program under international monitoring. Now, in the wake of provocative actions by North Korea, we must pursue a permanent peace for all the Korean people.

Our planet is safer because of our common efforts to close Chernobyl, to address the challenges of climate change, to protect the world's forests and oceans. Now we must uphold our duty as custodians of our environment, so that our children will inherit an even healthier planet.

All of us must continue our historic efforts to build a better, more global trading system for the 21st century. We have made remarkable progress, but there is more to do in opening markets, in creating millions of new jobs for all our people.

In this time of challenge and change, the United Nations is more important than ever before, because our world is more interdependent than ever before.

Let me reassure all of you, the vast majority of Americans support the United Nations, not only because it reflects our own ideals, but because it reinforces our interests. We must continue to work to manifest the support that our people feel. ©

REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE BOB DOLE:

AMERICA WILL PURSUE TERRORISTS “TO THE ENDS OF THE EARTH”

Senator Dole pledges that he will put America “on a course that will end our vulnerability to missile attack and rebuild our armed forces.” Accepting the Republican Party’s presidential nomination in San Diego, California, August 15, Dole declared, “On my first day in office, I will also put terrorists on notice: If you harm one American, you harm all Americans. And America will pursue you to the ends of the earth.” Following are excerpts of Dole’s remarks:

TRADE

By any measure, the trade policy of the Clinton administration has been a disaster; trade deficits are skyrocketing, and middle-income families are paying the price. My administration will fully enforce our trade laws, negotiate effective trade agreements, and not let our national sovereignty be infringed by the World Trade Organization or any other international body.

IMMIGRATION

The right and obligation of a sovereign nation to control its own borders is beyond debate. We should not have here a single illegal immigrant. But the question of immigration is broader than that, and let me be specific. A family from Mexico who arrived this morning, legally, has as much right to the American dream as the direct descendants of the founding fathers.

NATIONAL SECURITY

In defending the nation from external threats, the requirements of survival cannot merely be finessed. There is no room for margin of error. On this subject, perhaps more than any other, a President must level with the people, and be prepared to take political risks. I would rather do what is called for in this regard and be unappreciated than fail to do so and win universal acclaim. It must be said: Because of misguided priorities, there have been massive cuts in funding for our national security. I believe President Clinton has failed to adequately provide for our future defense. For whatever reason his neglect, it is irresponsible.

I ask that you consider these crystal-clear differences. He believes it is acceptable to ask our military forces to do more with less. I do not. He defends giving a green light to a terrorist state, Iran, to expand its influence in Europe and relies on the United Nations to punish Libyan terrorists who murdered American citizens. I will not. He believes that defending our people and our territory from missile attack is unnecessary. I do not.

And on my first day in office, I will put America on a course that will end our vulnerability to missile attack and rebuild our armed forces. It is a course President Clinton has refused to take. On my first day in office, I will also put terrorists on notice: If you harm one American, you harm all Americans. And America will pursue you to the ends of the earth. In short, don’t mess with us unless you are prepared to suffer the consequences.

And furthermore, the lesson has always been clear. If we are prepared to defend — if we are prepared to fight many wars, and greater wars, and any wars that come — we will have to fight fewer wars, and lesser wars, and perhaps no wars at all. It has always been so, and will ever be so.

I am not the first to say that the long gray line has never failed us, and it never has. For those who might be sharply taken aback in thinking of Vietnam, think again, for in Vietnam the long gray line did not fail us, we failed it. The American soldier was not made for the casual and arrogant treatment he suffered there, where he was committed without clear purpose or resolve, bound by rules that prevented victory, and kept waiting in the valley of the shadow of death for ten

years while the nation debated the undebatable question of his honor. No. The American soldier was not made to be thrown into battle without clear purpose or resolve, not made to be abandoned in the field of battle, not made to give his life for indifference or lack of respect.

I will never commit the American soldier to an ordeal without the prospect of victory. And when I am President, our men and women in our armed forces will know the President is commander-in-chief — not Boutros Boutros-Ghali, or any other U.N. Secretary General.

This is not an issue of politics, but far graver than that. Like the bond of trust between parent and child, it is the lifeblood of the nation. It commands not only sacrifice but a grace in leadership embodying both daring and caution at the same time. And this we owe not only to ourselves. Our allies demand consistency and resolve, which they deserve from us as we deserve the same from them. But even if they falter, we cannot, for history has made us the leader, and we are obliged by history to keep the highest standard.

And in this regard may I remind you of the nation's debt to Presidents Nixon, Ford, Reagan and Bush. President Nixon engaged China and the Soviet Union with diplomatic genius. President Ford, who gave me my start in 1976, stood fast in a time of great difficulty, and with the greatest of dignity.

Were it not for President Reagan, the Soviet Union would still be standing today. He brought the Cold War to an end, not, as some demanded, through compromise and surrender — but by winning it.

President Bush, with a mastery that words fail to convey, guided the Gulf War coalition and its military forces to victory. A war that might have lasted years and taken the lives of tens of thousands of Americans passed so swiftly and went so smoothly that history has yet to catch its breath and give him the credit he is due. History is like that. Whenever we forget its singular presence it gives us a lesson in grace and awe.

TIME TO REASSERT U.S. ROLE AS ALLY TO PEOPLES OF ASIA

The U.S. military presence and alliances in Asia are indispensable to U.S. security and must be maintained, says Senator Dole. He also believes the United States should reassert its role as a security guarantor and an ally to the peoples of Asia. Here is an excerpt of his remarks on U.S.-Asia ties delivered to the Center for Strategic and International Studies Statesmen Forum on May 9:

American interests in peace, security, freedom and prosperity in Asia are greater now than they have ever been. The modernization taking place throughout the region can trace its roots back to the United States of America. It was America that produced the technology revolution beginning with the telephone, the automobile, and the television. It was America that produced the political revolution by guaranteeing individual rights, universal suffrage, freedom of the press and accountability of our leaders. And it is the American people who inspired the rest of the world to believe in the future. In Asia, as much as anywhere in the world, that belief has taken hold.

As much as we are valued for our political successes, our economic achievement, and for the power of our values, our influence in Asia also relies on Asia's respect for our unsurpassed military strength. If we are to extend that influence into the next century for the sake of our own interests and the peaceful progress of Asia, we must firmly oppose calls for our military retreat from Asia whether those calls originate in the capitals of our adversaries or right here in America. Our military presence and alliances in Asia are indispensable to our own security, and they must be maintained.

So now it falls to the United States to point the way forward, as the natural leader among the Pacific nations, to a future that will preserve our common interests. No more can we afford an inattentive, incoherent, vacillating and reactive posture from the leader of the Free World. Serious national interests call for serious national policy. A Dole presidency will bring about two abrupt changes from the performance of the Clinton Administration: first, an Asia policy worthy of the name; and second, a coherent, well-managed effort to advance American power and purpose in the Pacific.

Influence is the coin of the realm in foreign policy. The United States will face challenges, problems, and perhaps even national security crises in Asia over the next four years. The only question is how high a price we will have to pay to resolve these problems. We must begin now to reassert our role as a security guarantor, an ally, a trading partner, and a good neighbor to the peoples of Asia — in short, to live up to our unique role as a leader.

SETTING AN AGENDA FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT

Outlining one of his foreign policy aims for the presidency, Senator Dole says he “will urge NATO to begin accession talks with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, and to set the goal of welcoming new NATO members at a summit in Prague in 1998.” Here are excerpts of Dole’s June 25 remarks to the Philadelphia World Affairs Council:

[NATO enlargement] will secure the gains of democracy in Central Europe. It will stabilize the security of Europe in which Russia also has a stake. It will ensure that security concerns in Eastern Europe are addressed through NATO. It will demonstrate to post-Soviet Russia that the freedom that Eastern and Central Europe gained in 1989 is permanent. And it will be an unmistakable safeguard against a reversal of democratic trends in Russia.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic should be offered full NATO membership today. Many other nations from Slovenia to the Baltics rightly aspire to this goal. And Ukraine, despite the great pressure of its geography, remains a willing, dedicated and welcome participant in cooperative activities with NATO. As I said, NATO enlargement is a process that should begin with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic — but it should not end there.

When I am elected President, I will urge NATO to begin accession talks with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, and to set the goal of welcoming new NATO members at a summit in

Prague in 1998 — the 60th anniversary of the betrayal of Munich, the 50th anniversary of the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia, and the 30th anniversary of the Soviet invasion. There could be no more appropriate year or appropriate place to declare that Central Europe has become a permanent part of the Atlantic community.

I will actively promote cooperation efforts in NATO to develop and deploy Europe-wide missile defenses to protect against missile attack by rogue states poised on NATO’s southern flank.

I will support the integration of Central and Eastern European militaries into the NATO defense structure, using the Defense Export Loan Guarantee program — ignored by President Clinton.

As President, I will not grant Russia a veto over NATO enlargement, but I will offer Russia serious dialogue on long-term relations with NATO. NATO is a defensive organization by its very nature, and its interests collide with Russia only where Russia intrudes upon sovereign nations. A non-expansionist Russia is not threatened by any enlargement of NATO. ©

REFORM PARTY PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE ROSS PEROT: IN PURSUIT OF “INTELLIGENT, FREE INTERNATIONAL TRADE”

The time has come to be frank about America's trade position, says Perot, who points out that the U.S. “merchandise trade deficit last year was \$174 billion,” the largest of any nation ever.

In remarks to the Reform Party Convention in Long Beach, California, August 11, Perot said he is a proponent of “intelligent, free international trade” but rejects “stupid, one-sided trade deals” that take away millions of jobs from Americans. Here are excerpts of his address:

Let me say very clearly I am for intelligent, free international trade, but I am not for stupid, one-sided trade deals that cost our country millions of jobs.

You cannot wreck this country by shipping the jobs overseas. Most people do not understand trade deficits, but if a country buys more from foreign countries than it sells to foreign countries, it has a trade deficit. Trade deficits are bad. Trade surpluses are good. When you hear me say trade deficit, that's bad.

[The] United States merchandise trade deficit last year was \$174 billion, the largest of any nation in the history of man. This means we bought \$174 billion more from foreign nations than we sold to those countries. Now do you understand why the 18 largest banks in the world are in Europe and Asia? They got to have big banks over there to take care of all our money they're making, right?

In plain Texas talk, they got our money, we have what used to be their products. Their products are getting less valuable every day, they're investing our money and getting richer every day. Who is winning and who is losing? You know. I know why we do this, I know we shouldn't do it, and I know we've got to bring it to a stop.

This is 174 billion bucks that should have stayed here in the good old U.S.A. and supported American jobs and companies.

In the last ten years the combined total of all our trade deficits has exceeded a trillion dollars. Our U.S. merchandise trade deficit with China is

forecasted to be \$50 billion this year. Think about it. Every other industrialized nation in the world has a trade surplus with China. Isn't that interesting? These other countries know how to negotiate fair trade agreements. We don't.

Our 1995 trade deficit with Japan was \$59.3 [billion]. Now we go to NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), which was sold to us as a job-creating dynamo for the good old U.S.A. And I was ridiculed for saying it was going to be a giant sucking sound. Do you remember that?

Somebody said one time I would rather be right than president, but I think we're at a point in time that we need to be someone who is right and is president.

Our 1995 trade deficit with Canada, \$18.1 billion. Bad. Our 1995 trade deficit with Mexico, \$15 billion. Unbelievable.

The thing they don't tell you is Mexico's biggest export [to] the United States is \$120 billion a year of illegal drugs, flooding across the border, poisoning our children. This number is not included in the Mexican trade deficit. This is a company bigger than Exxon and almost as big as Ford Motor Company, \$120 billion a year. This is chemical warfare directed against our children. It must be stopped and we are all dedicated to bringing a stop to it.

Now, right after World War II, [what] if I had come to you here in California and said Pittsburgh will no longer be the steel capital of the world in 1996? Detroit will no longer be the automobile

capital of the world in 1996. We will lose our dominance in electronics. We will have lost our dominance in all consumer products; for example, two-thirds of the world's shoes are made in China. Making shoes is honest work. Making clothes is honest work. These are the jobs that could revitalize our inner cities. You say, oh, we're getting such cheap products back. Wrong, the retail price is the same or higher. The profits are big.

The top 18 banks in the world, as I said before, [are] in Europe and Asia. Now, you wouldn't have believed that if I told you that at the end of World War II. You would have ignored me, but these are the facts. We can't ignore the facts now.

FIRST COMMIT THE NATION — THEN COMMIT THE TROOPS

As the world's last superpower, the United States has the responsibility to be "a positive and constructive force throughout the world," says Perot. "This is a duty we must accept on one condition: That our troops are never committed until the American people are committed." Following is Perot's position statement on defense:

Defending our nation is our highest priority and must never be compromised. The end of the Cold War required the United States to change the focus of our armed forces. Our military still requires the latest and finest weapons, and we must be combat ready at all times.

We are the world's last superpower. With this distinction comes the duty to be a positive and constructive force throughout the world. This is a duty we must accept on one condition: That our troops are never committed until the American people are committed. First commit the nation — then commit the troops. We must avoid another Vietnam at all costs.

Missions such as Bosnia have many hazards. The President's role is to explain to the American people what is at stake and clearly define our objectives. The President must fully commit the American people any time our troops are engaged in combat.

Because of treaties signed after World War II, nations such as Japan and Germany cannot have a strong military. As a result, the United States provides their defense. Now that these two nations are economic superpowers, we should reevaluate

this. They should pay the full cost for their defense. They should also have to put the lives of their people at risk in case of war. All the money in the world will not compensate for the loss of our soldiers.

In 1993 (latest figures available) the United States spent \$298 billion on defense while Germany spent \$36 billion and Japan spent \$42 billion. We should collect a total of at least \$100 billion each year from the nations we protect. Half of this money could be used to help balance our budget, and the other half could go towards military research that would keep us at the leading edge of military technology.

The biggest threat to our nation today comes from terrorism. Our military must focus its intelligence resources on stopping terrorist threats not only within our borders, but around the world. If terrorists do strike, our military must be prepared to punish these cowards with severe force. We must send a clear message that the United States will never back down from a threat.

The words "Don't Tread on Me" should have real meaning.

WINNING THE WAR AGAINST ILLEGAL DRUGS

“Determined leadership” is needed to win the war against illegal drugs, says Perot, and the anti-drug effort “can’t be limited to our shores, because production occurs around the world.”

Following are excerpts of his policy statement on drug control:

America’s War on Drugs is not over. Drug use is on the rise in our nation, and our leaders, starting with the President, must do everything in their power to stop the chemical warfare that is being waged against our children.

After a few years of decline, drug use is once again on the rise. These are just a few examples:

— Since 1992, the number of high-school seniors who use drugs at least once a month has increased 52 percent.

— In 1992, 2.4 million children between the ages of 12 and 17 used drugs. In 1994, that number skyrocketed to 3.8 million children.

— Hard-core use of cocaine is rising. In 1982, a gram of cocaine cost \$286. In 1995, the same amount cost less than \$100. Drugs are like any other business; when supply is up, prices are down.

Our leaders should not be debating whether we need to focus on drug interdiction, drug education or drug prosecution. We need to focus on each and every aspect because this must be treated like any other war — an all-out offensive is needed.

The reason drug use is up is because we have become lax in fighting each battle of the drug war. For example, Coast Guard planes flew more than

23,000 hours of drug interdiction flights in 1991. By 1994, this number dropped to 6,300 hours. As a result, cocaine seizures, which had been as much as 35.4 tons in 1993, declined to only 10.8 tons in 1995. What should we do? The first step is to increase spending on addiction and education programs. We must help the people who are using drugs, and we need to make sure our children and every other American know that drugs kill.

The next step is to punish those who try to sell drugs. Strict sentences without parole should be mandatory for drug dealers. Particularly, anyone caught selling drugs to a child should serve a long, mandatory jail term.

Then we must empower the drug czar with broad powers. We need to get the Coast Guard, military, border patrol, Drug Enforcement Agency, Customs, FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), local and state law enforcement agencies, and foreign governments all coordinated to fight the drug war together to make the war as efficient and successful as possible. The war on drugs can’t be limited to our shores, because production occurs around the world. We need the equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine for drugs, that says we will fight drug production and smuggling anywhere in the Western Hemisphere. We must fight and win the war on drugs, but we need determined leadership to get it done. ●

ELSEWHERE ON THE DIPLOMATIC SCENE

HISTORIC U.N. SIGNING CEREMONY FOR COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

The United States, in a ceremony held September 24 at the United Nations, joined the four other nuclear weapons states — Britain, France, Russia and China — in signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that most nations hope will put an end to all nuclear testing on the earth and in the atmosphere for all time.

President Clinton, who was the first signer of the treaty, later told the U.N. General Assembly that the CTBT represents “a giant step forward” in preventing the nuclear powers “from developing more advanced and more dangerous weapons. It will limit the ability of other states to acquire such devices themselves. It points us toward a century in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be even further reduced — and ultimately eliminated.”

The president stressed that the signatures of the world’s five declared nuclear powers, “along with those of the vast majority of its nations, will immediately create an international norm against nuclear testing, even before the treaty formally enters into force.” Sixty-five nations signed the treaty September 24, and U.N. officials expect a total of 80 signatories by October 9.

Although the CTBT will not enter into force until ratified by the 44 countries named in the treaty as sites for nuclear research reactors, many experts and government officials believe every nation that signs it will be obliged to abide by the treaty’s provisions immediately and that the CTBT will create an international norm against testing even before it actually becomes international law.

India, which blocked the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament from sending the treaty to the General Assembly earlier this year, has vowed never to sign the accord, thus preventing it from becoming international law. India is one of the 44 nations that must ratify the treaty before it can go into effect.

India has criticized the pact because it does not include a specific timetable for complete nuclear disarmament. It also is opposed to being one of 44 nations listed as having to ratify the CTBT. “India will never sign this unequal treaty — not now, not ever,” Indian Ambassador Arundhatpi Ghose said in September. “This treaty will never come into force.”

Pakistan, which along with India and Israel is considered an undeclared nuclear power, voted to approve the treaty but said that it would not sign the CTBT until India does so.

Nevertheless, most CTBT supporters are optimistic that international pressure will keep India from further nuclear testing and that eventually — despite India’s position — a way will be found to allow the treaty to enter into force, and to establish the extensive monitoring and verification system provided for under the accord.

Following an effort initiated by Australia to bring the CTBT text to the United Nations for a vote, the General Assembly September 10 adopted the treaty text and asked that it be opened for signature. The vote was 158 to 3 with 5 abstentions; all 158 countries are expected to sign the treaty eventually. India, Bhutan and Libya voted against approving the CTBT; Lebanon, Syria, Mauritius, Tanzania and Cuba abstained. ◎

ACTION ON CAPITOL HILL

(As of September 27)

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

BILL NUMBER: Treaty Document 103-21

DESCRIPTION: CWC would ban the development, production, use or stockpiling of chemical weapons for battlefield use. The treaty would establish a wide-ranging system of international inspections that would be applied to acknowledged chemical weapons sites and to a large number of factories that process, or could readily be adapted to process, substances that could be used to make chemical weapons.

HOUSE ACTION: Not required on ratification of treaties.

SENATE ACTION: Senate leaders agreed September 12 to postpone action on a resolution approving ratification of the treaty after Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole announced September 11 that he opposed the treaty and Democrats expressed a concern they did not have the necessary votes for passage. On April 25 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had endorsed the resolution approving ratification of the treaty by a vote of 13 to 5.

STATUS/OUTLOOK: The treaty will most likely carry over to the next Congress.

FY 1997 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION CONFERENCE REPORT

BILL NUMBER: H.R. 3230 (H. Rept. 104-724)

DESCRIPTION: The conference agreement authorizes \$265,600 million for the Defense Department's fiscal year 1997 programs, \$11,200 million more than President Clinton requested and \$1,300 million more than was authorized in fiscal year 1996. More than half of the increased spending over Clinton's budget request would go toward buying weapons and other hardware. The measure includes programs sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar to destroy thousands of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union and to prevent dangerous materials from these weapons from being diverted to unauthorized entities.

HOUSE ACTION: Approved conference report August 1 by a vote of 285 to 132.

SENATE ACTION: Approved conference report September 10 by a vote of 73 to 26.

STATUS/OUTLOOK: Signed into law (P.L. 104-201) by President Clinton September 23.

RESOLUTION SUPPORTING U.S. TROOPS IN IRAQ

BILL NUMBER: S. Res. 288

DESCRIPTION: Commends the U.S. armed forces for their successful attack against Iraqi air defense installations, in retaliation for Saddam Hussein's military action against civilians in northern Iraq.

HOUSE ACTION: No similar resolution introduced.

SENATE ACTION: Voted 96 to 1 September 5 to approve resolution.

STATUS/OUTLOOK: No further action expected.

U.N. COMMAND OF U.S. TROOPS

BILL NUMBER: H.R. 3308 (H. Rept. 104-642, Part I — U.N. commanders)

DESCRIPTION: Prohibits spending Department of Defense funds on U.S. armed forces under United Nations control, unless Congress specifically approves the expenditure or the President certifies beforehand that it is in the national interest. The bill would not affect North Atlantic Treaty Organization missions.

HOUSE ACTION: Voted 299 to 109 September 5 to approve bill.

SENATE ACTION: No similar bill introduced, and no similar measure is expected to be considered.

STATUS/OUTLOOK: Administration opposes it. In a letter to House Democrats, Defense Secretary Perry called the bill "a significant intrusion upon the constitutional prerogatives of the commander in chief."

IRAN/LIBYA OIL SANCTIONS

BILL NUMBER: H.R. 3107 — PL 104-172

DESCRIPTION: Penalizes foreign countries that aid the oil industries of Iran or Libya. Is intended to punish both countries for their sponsorship of global terrorism and for their efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The law requires the President to impose two of six possible sanctions on foreign companies that invest at least \$40 million in a single year in the oil industries of Iran or Libya. Foreign entities that sell petroleum-related goods and technology to Libya face the same penalties.

HOUSE ACTION: Approved its version of the legislation June 19 by a unanimous 415 to 0 vote.

SENATE ACTION: Approved House version of legislation unanimously July 16, but added an amendment restoring sanctions against companies investing in Libya's petroleum industry.

HOUSE ACTION: Passed amended version July 23.

STATUS: President Clinton signed the bill into law August 5. ●

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE 1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: KEY INTERNET SITES

Please note that USIS assumes no responsibility for the content and availability of the resources listed below which reside solely with the providers.

All Things Political
<http://dolphin.gulf.net/Political.html>

AllPolitics Presidential Candidates and Issues: Foreign Affairs
<http://allpolitics.com/issues/topics/foreign.shtml>

Atlantic Monthly Election Connection: U.S. Foreign Policy
<http://www.theAtlantic.com/atlantic/election/connection/foreign/foreign.htm>

Campaign Central
<http://www.clark.net/ccentral/>

Campaign '96 Analysis
<http://www.usia.gov/elections/analysis.htm>

The Campaigns Page
<http://www.gspa.washington.edu/campaigns.html>

Clinton/Gore '96
<http://www.cg96.org/>

Countdown '96 Home Page
<http://www.comeback.com/countdown/>

The Democratic National Committee — The Democratic Party Online
<http://www.democrats.org/>

Dole/Kemp '96: Online Campaign
<http://www.dole96.com/main/>

Election Nexus — Issues: Defense and International Affairs
<http://dodo.crown.net/~mpg/election/issues.htm#-5>

Electionline — Campaign '96: A Critical Election
<http://www.electionline.com/HTEL/races/page1.cgi>

The Jefferson Project — Campaign '96
<http://www.voxpop.org/jefferson/>

Kennedy School Online Political Information Network
<http://ksgwww.harvard.edu/~ksgpress/opinhome.htm>

1996 Presidential and Congressional Elections
<http://www.usis-canada.usia.gov/election.htm>

Official Reform Party Website
<http://www.reformparty.org>

PoliticsNow — Issues — Foreign Policy
<http://www.politicsnow.com/issues/fpolicy/>

Republican National Committee — Republican Main Street!
<http://www.rnc.org/>

Road to the White House
<http://www.ipt.com/vote/>

Ross Perot for President — Official WWW Site
<http://www.perot.org/>

Showdown '96: Foreign Policy and Defense
http://www.iguide.com/pol_govt/showdown/issues/foreig.htm

The Top 10 Political Web Sites
<http://top10.imgis.com/>

U.S. Presidential Candidates on the Web
<http://www.usyd.edu.au/su/acas/elections.html>

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ARTICLE ALERT: OTHER POLITICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES

Carpenter, Ted and Perlmutter Amos. STRATEGY CREEP IN THE BALKANS: UP TO OUR KNEES AND ADVANCING. (The National Interest, no. 44, Summer 1996, pp. 53-59)

The authors suggest that the Clinton administration will have a hard time making a case for a "U.S.-orchestrated" policy designed to contain Serbian power in the Balkan region. "America's significant strategic and economic interests center around the major powers of Western Europe and, increasingly, East Asia," they say, with "little need to become deeply committed to a geopolitical backwater like the Balkans." If stability in that region is to be a new mission for NATO or "merely a solo U.S. venture," they contend, the U.S. president must do what then-U.S. President "Harry Truman did for the original containment doctrine: seek public support and congressional approval."

Jonas, Susanne. DANGEROUS LIAISONS: THE U.S. IN GUATEMALA (Foreign Policy, no. 103, Summer 1996, pp. 144-160)

Jonas points out that although it has received "far less international attention than the 12-year conflict in neighboring El Salvador, Guatemala's civil war is the longest and deadliest in Central America." She contends that the Guatemalan army has committed numerous human rights abuses and has jeopardized the peace process in Guatemala. The United States, "by virtue of its long relationship with the Guatemalan army — despite the restructuring of that relationship and the 'relative autonomy' of the Guatemalan army since the late 1970s — ...remains the only international player with the leverage to pressure for demilitarization," she writes.

Kaiser, Karl. REFORMING NATO (Foreign Policy, no. 103, Summer 1996, pp. 128-143)

The author notes that, from the first, NATO has been a multipurpose organization. Beyond containing the threat of war in Europe, he says, it has fundamentally changed the relationships and perceptions of its members and can continue to provide a very useful framework for collective security in Europe.

Krulak, Charles. PROTECTING THE ASIAN PROMISE (Strategic Review, vol. 24, no. 3, Summer 1996, pp. 7-11)

The U.S. has a vital interest in maintaining stability in the Asia-Pacific region, says Marine Corps Commandant Krulak, noting that the promise of Asia lies in its potential contribution to world prosperity. The U.S. challenge in Asia is to ensure that this prosperity is not threatened by conflict, and the key to meeting this challenge is to remain engaged in the region, he contends.

Logan, Carolyn J. U.S. PUBLIC OPINION AND THE INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF MILITARY-HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS (The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, vol. 20, no. 2, Summer/Fall 1996, pp. 155-180)

An analysis of American public opinion during various phases of the intervention in Somalia suggests that while public opinion generally favors humanitarian intervention, there are definite limits to this support. The author also discusses how the President and the media influence public opinion on foreign policy matters.

Sperry, Roger. DIPLOMATIC DISORDER (Government Executive, vol. 28, no. 7, July 1996, pp. 16-22)

Efforts to merge America's foreign affairs agencies are "forcing them to look for ways to work together like never before," both in Washington and overseas, according to the author. Better coordination, he says, could be achieved by improved use of information technology, tying funding to specific objectives, and joint procurement of administrative services at overseas missions. However, "most people interviewed for this article were open to at least some restructuring," Sperry notes, "and many believed it was all but inevitable."

The annotations above are part of a more comprehensive Article Alert offered on the home page of the U.S. Information Service: <http://www.usia.gov/admin/001/wwwhapub.html>