

global issues

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T A R G E T I N G




TERRORISM

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TERRORISM

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TERRORISM

No one is immune, whether you're riding a subway in Tokyo or a bus in Tel Aviv, whether you're window shopping in London or walking the streets in Moscow, whether you're doing your duty in Saudi Arabia or going to work in Oklahoma City.

Terrorism has become an equal opportunity destroyer, with no respect for borders.

Our personal, community, and national security depend upon our policies on terrorism at home and abroad.

We cannot advance the common good at home without also advancing the common good around the world. We cannot reduce the threats to our people without reducing threats to the world beyond our borders.

President Bill Clinton
August 5, 1996

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F O C U S

Terrorism Remains a Global Issue

By Ambassador Philip Wilcox, Jr.
State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism

Among the issues directly affecting people everywhere, terrorism remains a high priority item on the U.S. foreign policy agenda.

Today's world is still a dangerous place.

The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War did not bring forth the "End of History" or a new dawn of world peace and harmony. Instead, this change brought into sharper focus serious global problems and threats.

You've heard the list before: ethnic conflict, weapons proliferation, environmental degradation, untenable population growth, international crime, and terrorism.

All these global issues directly affect our well being and security. They therefore have high priority in the foreign policy agenda of the Clinton Administration.

Perhaps none of these issues has caused Americans more anxiety than terrorism.

Terrorism, which we define as politically motivated violence against non-combatants, is an ancient evil, and American interests have been targeted by terrorists abroad for years. But now, the threat seems to loom larger, perhaps because the threat of conventional war against the United States has declined, and because we've been struck by two major terrorist acts at home — the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings. Also the two bombings of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia and the pipe bomb at the Atlanta Olympics.

It is a paradox that although terrorism kills relatively few people, compared to other forms of violence, and although the statistical probability of any of us



being killed by terrorists is minuscule, we are preoccupied by terrorism, and governments pay extraordinary attention to combating it. Why?

First, terrorism provokes deep fear and insecurity — more than other forms of violence. Terrorists strike innocent civilians, often randomly, and without warning. We think we can protect ourselves against other forms of violence, but we feel defenseless against terrorists.

Terrorists know this, and they seek to use intimidation to impose their political or other agendas. Killing is only a means to that end. By creating fear and panic, terrorists try to extort concessions or to weaken and discredit governments by showing they are unable to protect their citizens.

Terrorism is also used as low-cost strategic warfare, sometimes by rogue states using surrogates, and sometimes by groups motivated by ideology, religion, or ethnicity to overthrow governments and change the course of history.

Terrorists also use violence in a less focused way to express protest and rage, to advance messianic and fanatic religious agendas, and for even more obscure pathological reasons.

One can argue that terrorism has failed historically as a strategic weapon. But that's no cause for comfort. There is no doubt that it has caused great damage to American interests and those of our friends around the world. For example, terrorism has prolonged the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the North Ireland conflict for decades. Real progress toward peace making in these struggles has come only when terrorism has been renounced and its practitioners marginalized.

Terrorism also has a high economic cost. The U.S. government alone spends about \$5,000 million a year to guard against terrorism, at home and abroad, and these costs will doubtless rise. Terrorism can also cripple entire economies. For example, in Egypt, by targeting a few tourists, terrorists almost shut down the vitally important tourist industry for many months.

Technology has also added to the terrorist threat. In 1605, the terrorist Guy Fawkes planted 29 barrels of explosives in a plot to blow up King James and the British Parliament. Today, a small explosive device in a purse could achieve the same effect. And bomb making recipes are readily available on the Internet.

Terrorists use computers, cellular phones, and encryption software to evade detection, and they have sophisticated means for forging passports and documents. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and his gang, convicted for a plot to blow up 12 U.S. airliners over the Pacific, used all these tools.

Even more dangerous is the specter that terrorists will turn to materials of mass destruction — chemical, biological, or nuclear — to multiply casualties far beyond traditional levels. The sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995 by Aum Shinrikyo, the apocalyptic Japanese sect, showed that the threat of chemical terrorism is now a reality.

And the willingness of some fanatic or crazed terrorists to commit suicide while carrying out attacks makes terrorists using weapons of mass destruction an even more sinister threat.

Finally, terrorism today is far more devastating than in the past because of the mass media. No story plays better, or longer, than a terrorist attack. Today's media, especially television, multiply the fear effect of terrorism by vividly conveying its horror. And this greatly increases our collective sense of vulnerability. The terrorists, of course, know this. And they seek to exploit media coverage to put us and our governments on the psychological defensive.

What about the current trend in terrorism? Who are today's terrorists? And what is the U.S. government doing to combat them and put them on the defensive, where they belong?

First, the trend. There is good news and bad. The actual number of international terrorist incidents

has declined in recent years, from a high of 665 in 1987 to an average between three and four hundred in recent years.

There are various reasons for this positive trend:

- ❑ The Soviet Union and almost all of the many revolutionary terrorist groups it supported are now history.
- ❑ After 50 years of war and terrorism, Arabs and Palestinians are struggling for peace. The PLO has renounced terrorism, and most Arab states have also condemned it unequivocally.
- ❑ Only a few rogue states continue to sponsor or support terrorism.
- ❑ There is a growing international consensus today that killing innocents for political reasons is absolutely unacceptable, whatever the motivation or cause.
- ❑ And there is a corresponding willingness by the majority of states to crack down on terrorists by all means available, especially by using the law to combat terrorism.

But there is also a negative side of the ledger.

- ❑ Notwithstanding the commitment of the Palestinian and Arab mainstream to peace in the Middle East, groups like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in 1995 carried out a vicious rear guard campaign of bombings in Israel in an effort to defeat the peace process.
- ❑ And an Israeli terrorist assassinated Prime Minister Rabin for the same purpose.
- ❑ Iran, notwithstanding U.S. efforts to contain it through sanctions, continues to use terrorism as a weapon of foreign policy to kill dissidents and disrupt the peace process.
- ❑ Libya, although U.N. sanctions have curtailed its terrorism abroad, still defies the U.N.'s mandate to deliver two suspects in the bombing of Pan Am 103 at Lockerbie to a British or U.S. court for trial.
- ❑ Exploitation of religion by terrorists may also be on the upsurge. In previous decades, most terrorist groups were secular, but more and more terrorists

today claim to act on behalf of religion, especially Islam. Some are part of organized groups such as Hamas, the Lebanese Hizballah, and the Egyptian Gamaat. Others are ad hoc Islamic elements, such as Ramzi Ahmed Yousef's gang, many of whom received training in Afghanistan.

❑ Exploitation of religion for political purposes, and violence, is an age-old phenomenon. It is important to remember that all religions have produced deviant and dangerous fringe groups, and Islam, like Christianity and Judaism, preaches peace and non-violence. Terrorists who claim to speak for Islam are abusing their faith, and they are increasingly condemned throughout the Islamic world.

❑ Domestic terrorism — terrorism that does not involve the citizens or territory of more than one state — has waxed and waned over time. Today it seems to be waxing, for example, in South Asia.

❑ Messianic cults, like the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo, who use terrorism to fulfill their visions of Armageddon, could also be a growing threat. They are all the more dangerous when they have access to money and technology.

The United States is doing a lot to combat terrorism.

❑ Our policy is to seek out relentlessly and punish terrorists wherever they may be, using the combined assets of U.S. law enforcement, diplomacy, and intelligence. Our ability to bring to justice the World Trade Center terrorists, the conspirators, including Sheik Abdul Rahman, who planned to blow up New York's Holland tunnel, the U.N. and federal buildings in New York, and the gang who plotted to blow up U.S. airliners over the Pacific, are major success stories.

We make no concessions to terrorists. We refuse to bow to demands for political concessions or ransom.

❑ We designate states who sponsor terrorism, impose economic sanctions, and ask our friends to do likewise. In a speech in Stuttgart, directed to our European allies, Secretary of State Christopher said "working together against state sponsors of

terrorism is an imperative, not an option....Our principled commitment to free trade simply does not oblige us to do business with aggressive tyrannies like Iran and Libya. We must join forces on effective multilateral measures to deny these rogue regimes the resources they crave."

❑ The United States stresses the rule of law in dealing with terrorists, and insists that terrorism is an unmitigated crime, whatever its motives or causes. By strengthening U.S. laws against terrorism, and aggressively promoting international treaties and conventions against terror, of which there are now 10, we have led a worldwide trend to use the law as our most effective tool against terrorists.

Also:

❑ We have superb military assets for use, when in rare cases the situation demands.

❑ Since terrorists operate in the dark, we are investing heavily in the collection and analysis of intelligence.

❑ The Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security has trained over 18,000 foreign government officials from over 80 countries in counterterrorism techniques and aviation security through our Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program.

❑ We have a strong program of research and development in counterterrorism technology, especially in explosives detection.

❑ And finally, cooperation with other states is indispensable to stop terrorists, as terrorism becomes increasingly transnational. For this reason, President Clinton has given high priority to counterterrorism in our diplomatic agenda. We consult with dozens of governments annually, and we promote multilateral action, such as the Sharm el-Sheik Peacemaking Summit and follow-up counterterrorism meetings in Washington, and the G-7 ministerial conference on terrorism in Paris.

We can be proud of the successes we've achieved, using these policies and tools. But we can't be complacent, since terrorism is a dynamic, moving target.

COMMENTARY

Postmodern Terrorism

By Walter Laqueur

The terrorist of the future will be less ideological, more likely to harbor ethnic grievances, harder to distinguish from other criminals, and a particular threat to technologically advanced societies.

NEW RULES FOR AN OLD GAME

As the 19th century ended, it seemed no one was safe from terrorist attack. In 1894 an Italian anarchist assassinated French President Sadi Carnot. In 1897 anarchists fatally stabbed Empress Elizabeth of Austria and killed Antonio Canovas, the Spanish prime minister. In 1900 Umberto I, the Italian king, fell in yet another anarchist attack; in 1901 an American anarchist killed William McKinley, president of the United States. Terrorism became the leading preoccupation of politicians, police chiefs, journalists, and writers from Dostoevsky to Henry James. If in the year 1900 the leaders of the main industrial powers had assembled, most of them would have insisted on giving terrorism top priority on their agenda, as President Clinton did at the Group of Seven meeting after the June bombing of the U.S. military compound in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

From this perspective the recent upsurge of terrorist activity is not particularly threatening. According to the State Department's annual report on the subject, fewer people died last year in incidents of international terrorism (165) than the year before (314). Such figures, however, are almost meaningless — because of the incidents they disregard and those they count. Current definitions of terrorism fail to capture the magnitude of the problem worldwide.

Terrorism has been defined as the substate application of violence or threatened violence intended to sow panic in a society, to weaken or even over-

throw the incumbents, and to bring about political change. It shades on occasion into guerrilla warfare (although unlike guerrillas, terrorists are unable or unwilling to take or hold territory) and even a substitute for war between states. In its long history terrorism has appeared in many guises; today society faces not one terrorism but many terrorisms.

Since 1900, terrorists' motivation, strategy, and weapons have changed to some extent. The anarchists and the left-wing terrorist groups that succeeded them, down through the Red Armies that operated in Germany, Italy, and Japan in the 1970s, have vanished; if anything, the initiative has passed to the extreme right. Most international and domestic terrorism these days, however, is neither left nor right, but ethnic-separatist in inspiration. Ethnic terrorists have more staying power than ideologically motivated ones, since they draw on a larger reservoir of public support.

The greatest change in recent decades is that terrorism is by no means militants' only strategy. The many-branched Muslim Brotherhood, the Palestinian Hamas, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Kurdish extremists in Turkey and Iraq, the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka, the Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA) movement in Spain, and many other groups that have sprung up in this century have had political as well as terrorist wings from the beginning. The political arm provides social services and education, runs businesses, and contests elections, while the "military wing" engages in ambushes and assassinations. Such division of labor has advantages: the political leadership can publicly disassociate itself when the terrorists commit a particularly outrageous act or something goes wrong. The claimed lack of control can be quite real because the armed wing tends to become independent; the men and women with the guns and bombs often lose

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sight of the movement's wider aims and may end up doing more harm than good.

Terrorist operations have also changed somewhat. Airline hijackings have become rare, since hijacked planes cannot stay in the air forever and few countries today are willing to let them land, thereby incurring the stigma of openly supporting terrorism. Terrorists, too, saw diminishing returns on hijackings. The trend now seems to be away from attacking specific targets like the other side's officials and toward more indiscriminate killing. Furthermore, the dividing line between urban terrorism and other tactics has become less distinct, while the line between politically motivated terrorism and the operation of national and international crime syndicates is often impossible for outsiders to discern in the former Soviet Union, Latin America, and other parts of the world. But there is one undamental difference between international crime and terrorism: mafias have no interest in overthrowing the government and decisively weakening society; in fact, they have a vested interest in a prosperous economy.

Misapprehensions, not only semantic, surround the various forms of political violence. A terrorist is not a guerrilla, strictly speaking. There are no longer any guerrillas engaging in Maoist-style liberation of territories that become the base of a counter-society and a regular army fighting the central government — except perhaps in remote places like Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka. The term "guerrilla" has had a long life partly because terrorists prefer the label for its more positive connotations. It also persists because governments and media in other countries do not wish to offend terrorists by calling them terrorists. The French and British press would not dream of referring to their countries' native terrorists by any other name but call terrorists in other nations militants, activists, national liberation fighters, or even "gun persons."

The belief has gained ground that terrorist missions by volunteers bent on committing suicide constitute a radical new departure, dangerous because they are impossible to prevent. But that is a myth, like the many others in which terrorism has always been shrouded. The bomber willing and indeed eager to blow himself up has appeared in all eras and cultural traditions, espousing politics ranging from the leftism of the Baader-Meinhof Gang in 1970s Germany to rightist extremism. When the

Japanese military wanted kamikaze pilots at the end of World War II, thousands of volunteers rushed to offer themselves. The young Arab bombers on Jerusalem buses looking to be rewarded by the virgins in Paradise are a link in an old chain.

State-sponsored terrorism has not disappeared. Terrorists can no longer count on the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies, but some Middle Eastern and North African countries still provide support. Tehran and Tripoli, however, are less eager to argue that they have a divine right to engage in terrorist operations outside their borders; the 1986 U.S. air strike against Libya and the various boycotts against Libya and Iran had an effect. No government today boasts about surrogate warfare it instigates and backs.

On the other hand, Sudan, without fanfare, has become for terrorists what the Barbary Coast was for pirates of another age: a safe haven. Politically isolated and presiding over a disastrous economy, the military government in Khartoum, backed by Muslim leaders, believes that no one wants to become involved in Sudan and thus it can get away with lending support to terrorists from many nations. Such confidence is justified so long as terrorism is only a nuisance. But if it becomes more than that, the rules of the game change, and both terrorists and their protectors come under great pressure.

OPPORTUNITIES IN TERRORISM

History shows that terrorism more often than not has little political impact, and that when it has an effect it is often the opposite of the one desired. Terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s is no exception. The 1991 assassination of Rajiv Gandhi as he campaigned to retake the prime ministership neither hastened nor inhibited the decline of India's Congress Party. Hamas' and Hezbollah's stepped-up terrorism in Israel undoubtedly influenced the outcome of Israeli elections in May, but while it achieved its immediate objective of setting back the peace process on which Palestine Authority President Yasir Arafat has gambled his future, is a hard-line Likud government really in these groups' interests? On the other side, Yigal Amir, the right-wing orthodox Jewish student who assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin last fall because he disapproved of the peace agreement with the Palestinians, might well have helped elect Rabin's dovish second-in-command,

Shimon Peres, to a full term had the Muslim terrorists not made Israeli security an issue again.

Terrorists caused disruption and destabilization in other parts of the world, such as Sri Lanka, where economic decline has accompanied the war between the government and the Tamil Tigers. But in Israel and in Spain, where Basque extremists have been staging attacks for decades, terrorism has had no effect on the economy.

Even in Algeria, where terrorism has exacted the highest toll in human lives, Muslim extremists have made little headway since 1992-93, when many predicted the demise of the unpopular military regime.

Some argue that terrorism must be effective because certain terrorist leaders have become president or prime minister of their country. In those cases, however, the terrorists had first forsworn violence and adjusted to the political process. Finally, the common wisdom holds that terrorism can spark a war or, at least, prevent peace. That is true, but only where there is much inflammable material: as in Sarajevo in 1914, so in the Middle East and elsewhere today. Nor can one ever say with certainty that the conflagration would not have occurred sooner or later in any case.

Nevertheless, terrorism's prospects, often overrated by the media, the public, and some politicians, are improving as its destructive potential increases. This has to do both with the rise of groups and individuals that practice or might take up terrorism and with the weapons available to them. The past few decades have witnessed the birth of dozens of aggressive movements espousing varieties of nationalism, religious fundamentalism, fascism, and apocalyptic millenarianism, from Hindu nationalists in India to neofascists in Europe and the developing world to the Branch Davidian cult of Waco, Texas. The earlier fascists believed in military aggression and engaged in a huge military buildup, but such a strategy has become too expensive even for superpowers. Now, mailorder catalogs tempt militants with readily available, far cheaper, unconventional as well as conventional weapons—the poor man's nuclear bomb, Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani called them.

In addition to nuclear arms, the weapons of mass destruction include biological agents and man-

made chemical compounds that attack the nervous system, skin, or blood. Governments have engaged in the production of chemical weapons for almost a century and in the production of nuclear and biological weapons for many decades, during which time proliferation has been continuous and access ever easier. The means of delivery—ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aerosols—have also become far more effective.

While in the past missiles were deployed only in wars between states, recently they have played a role in civil wars in Afghanistan and Yemen. Use by terrorist groups would be but one step further.

Until the 1970s most observers believed that stolen nuclear material constituted the greatest threat in the escalation of terrorist weapons, but many now think the danger could lie elsewhere. An

April 1996 Defense Department report says that "most terrorist groups do not have the financial and technical resources to acquire nuclear weapons but could gather materials to make radiological dispersion devices and some biological and chemical agents." Some groups have state sponsors that possess or can obtain weapons of the latter three types. Terrorist groups themselves have investigated the use of poisons since the 19th century. The Aum Shinrikyo cult staged a poison gas attack in March 1995 in the Tokyo subway; exposure to the nerve gas sarin killed ten people and injured 5,000. Other, more amateurish attempts in the United States and abroad to experiment with chemical substances and biological agents for use in terrorism have involved the toxin that causes botulism, the poisonous protein ricin (twice), sarin (twice), bubonic plague bacteria, typhoid bacteria, hydrogen cyanide, vx (another nerve gas), and possibly the Ebola virus.

TO USE OR NOT TO USE?

If terrorists have used chemical weapons only once and nuclear material never, to some extent the reasons are technical. The scientific literature is replete with the technical problems inherent in the production, manufacture, storage, and delivery of each of the three classes of unconventional weapons.

The manufacture of nuclear weapons is not that simple, nor is delivery to their target. Nuclear

The greatest change is that terrorism is not militants' only strategy.

material, of which a limited supply exists, is monitored by the U.N.-affiliated International Atomic Energy Agency. Only governments can legally procure it, so that even in this age of proliferation investigators could trace those abetting nuclear terrorists without great difficulty. Monitoring can overlook a more primitive nuclear weapon: nonfissile but radioactive nuclear material. Iranian agents in Turkey, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere are known to have tried to buy such material originating in the former Soviet Union.

Chemical agents are much easier to produce or obtain but not so easy to keep safely in stable condition, and their dispersal depends largely on climatic factors. The terrorists behind last year's attack in Tokyo chose a convenient target where crowds of people gather, but their sarin was apparently dilute. The biological agents are far and away the most dangerous: they could kill hundreds of thousands where chemicals might kill only thousands. They are relatively easy to procure, but storage and dispersal are even trickier than for nerve gases. The risk of contamination for the people handling them is high, and many of the most lethal bacteria and spores do not survive well outside the laboratory. Aum Shinrikyo reportedly released anthrax bacteria—among the most toxic agents known—on two occasions from a building in Tokyo without harming anyone.

Given the technical difficulties, terrorists are probably less likely to use nuclear devices than chemical weapons, and least likely to attempt to use biological weapons. But difficulties could be overcome, and the choice of unconventional weapons will in the end come down to the specialties of the terrorists and their access to deadly substances.

The political arguments for shunning unconventional weapons are equally weighty. The risk of detection and subsequent severe retaliation or punishment is great, and while this may not deter terrorists it may put off their sponsors and suppliers. Terrorists eager to use weapons of mass destruction may alienate at least some supporters, not so much because the dissenters hate the enemy less or have greater moral qualms but because they think the use of such violence counterproductive. Unconventional weapon strikes could render whole regions uninhabitable for long periods. Use of

biological arms poses the additional risk of an uncontrollable epidemic. And while terrorism seems to be tending toward more indiscriminate killing and mayhem, terrorists may draw the line at weapons of superviolence likely to harm both foes and large numbers of relatives and friends — say, Kurds in Turkey, Tamils in Sri Lanka, or Arabs in Israel.

Furthermore, traditional terrorism rests on the heroic gesture, on the willingness to sacrifice one's own life as proof of one's idealism. Obviously there is not much heroism in spreading botulism or anthrax. Since most terrorist groups are as interested in publicity as in violence, and as publicity for a mass poisoning or

nuclear bombing would be far more unfavorable than for a focused conventional attack, only terrorists who do not care about publicity will even consider the applications of unconventional weapons.

Broadly speaking, terrorists will not engage in overkill if their traditional weapons — the submachine gun and the conventional bomb — are sufficient to continue the struggle and achieve their aims. But the decision to use terrorist violence is not always a rational one; if it were, there would be much less terrorism, since terrorist activity seldom achieves its aims. What if, after years of armed struggle and the loss of many of their militants terrorist groups see no progress? Despair could lead to giving up the armed struggle, or to suicide. But it might also lead to a last desperate attempt to defeat the hated enemy by arms not tried before. As one of Racine's heroes said of himself, their "only hope lies in their despair."

APOCALYPSE SOON

Terrorist groups traditionally contain strong quasi-religious, fanatical elements, for only total certainty of belief (or total moral relativism) provides justification for taking lives. That element was strong among the prerevolutionary Russian terrorists and the Romanian fascists of the Iron Guard in the 1930s, as it is among today's Tamil Tigers. Fanatical Muslims consider the killing of the enemies of God a religious commandment, and believe that the secularists at home as well as the State of Israel will be annihilated because it is Allah's will. Aum Shinrikyo doctrine held that murder could help both victim and murderer to salvation. Sectarian fanaticism

Terrorists can order the poor man's nuclear bomb from a catalog.

has surged during the past decade, and in general, the smaller the group, the more fanatical.

As humankind approaches the end of the second millennium of the Christian era, apocalyptic movements are on the rise. The belief in the impending end of the world is probably as old as history, but for reasons not entirely clear, sects and movements preaching the end of the world gain influence toward the end of a century, and all the more at the close of a millennium. Most of the preachers of doom do not advocate violence, and some even herald a renaissance, the birth of a new kind of man and woman. Others, however, believe that the sooner the reign of the Antichrist is established, the sooner this corrupt world will be destroyed and the new heaven and earth foreseen by St. John in the Book of Revelation, Nostradamus, and a host of other prophets will be realized.

Extremist millenarians would like to give history a push, helping create world-ending havoc replete with universal war, famine, pestilence, and other scourges.

Those who subscribe to such beliefs number in the hundreds of thousands and perhaps millions. They have their own subcultures, produce books and CDs by the thousands, and build temples and communities of whose existence most of their contemporaries are unaware. They have substantial financial means at their disposal. Although the more extreme apocalyptic groups are potentially terrorist, intelligence services have generally overlooked their activities; hence the shock over the subway attack in Tokyo and Rabin's assassination, to name but two recent events.

Apocalyptic elements crop up in contemporary intellectual fashions and extremist politics as well. For instance, extreme environmentalists, particularly the so-called restoration ecologists, believe that environmental disasters will destroy civilization as we know it — no loss, in their view — and regard the vast majority of human beings as expendable. From such beliefs and values it is not a large step to engaging in acts of terrorism to expedite the process. If the eradication of smallpox upset ecosystems, why not restore the balance by bringing back the virus? The motto of "Chaos International," one of many journals in this field, is a quotation from Hassan I. Sabbah, the master of the Assassins, a medieval sect whose members killed Crusaders and others in a "religious" ecstasy;

everything is permitted, the master says. The pre-modern world and post-modernism meet at this point.

FUTURE SHOCK

Scanning the contemporary scene, one encounters a bewildering multiplicity of terrorist and potentially terrorist groups and sects. The practitioners of terrorism as we have known it to this point were nationalists and anarchists, extremists of the left and the right. But the new age has brought new inspiration for the users of violence along with the old.

In the past, terrorism was almost always the province of groups of militants that had the backing of political forces like the Irish and Russian social revolutionary movements of 1900. In the future, terrorists will be individuals or like-minded people working in very small groups, on the pattern of the technology-hating Unabomber, who apparently worked alone sending out parcel bombs over two decades, or the perpetrators of the 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City. An individual may possess the technical competence to steal, buy, or manufacture the weapons he or she needs for a terrorist purpose; he or she may or may not require help from one or two others in delivering these weapons to the designated target. The ideologies such individuals and minigroups espouse are likely to be even more aberrant than those of larger groups. And terrorists working alone or in very small groups will be more difficult to detect unless they make a major mistake or are discovered by accident.

Thus at one end of the scale, the lone terrorist has appeared, and at the other, state-sponsored terrorism is quietly flourishing in these days when wars of aggression have become too expensive and too risky. As the century draws to a close, terrorism is becoming the substitute for the great wars of the 1800s and early 1900s.

Proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction does not mean that most terrorist groups are likely to use them in the foreseeable future, but some almost certainly will, in spite of all the reasons militating against it. Governments, however ruthless, ambitious, and ideologically extreme, will be reluctant to pass on unconventional weapons to terrorist groups over which they cannot have full control; the governments may be tempted to use such arms themselves in a first strike, but it is more probable that they would employ them in blackmail than in

actual warfare. Individuals and small groups, however, will not be bound by the constraints that hold back even the most reckless government.

Society has also become vulnerable to a new kind of terrorism, in which the destructive power of both the individual terrorist and terrorism as a tactic are infinitely greater. Earlier terrorists could kill kings or high officials, but others only too eager to inherit their mantle quickly stepped in. The advanced societies of today are more dependent every day on the electronic storage, retrieval, analysis, and transmission of information. Defense, the police, banking, trade, transportation, scientific work, and a large percentage of the government's and the private sector's transactions are on-line. That exposes enormous vital areas of national life to mischief or sabotage by any computer hacker, and concerted sabotage could render a country unable to function. Hence the growing speculation about infoterrorism and cyberwarfare.

An unnamed U.S. intelligence official has boasted that with \$1 billion and 20 capable hackers, he could shut down America. What he could achieve, a terrorist could too. There is little secrecy in the wired society, and protective measures have proved of limited value: teenage hackers have penetrated highly secret systems in every field. The possibilities for creating chaos are almost unlimited even now, and vulnerability will almost certainly increase. Terrorists' targets will change: Why assassinate a politician or indiscriminately kill people when an attack on electronic switching will produce far more dramatic and lasting results? The switch at the Culpeper, Virginia, headquarters of the Federal Reserve's electronic network, which handles all federal funds and transactions, would be an obvious place to hit. If the new terrorism directs its energies toward information warfare, its destructive power will be exponentially greater than any it wielded in the past—greater even than it would be with biological and chemical weapons.

Still, the vulnerability of states and societies will be of less interest to terrorists than to ordinary crimi-

nals and organized crime, disgruntled employees of big corporations, and, of course, spies and hostile governments. Electronic thieves, whether engaged in credit card fraud or industrial espionage, are part of the system, using it rather than destroying it; its destruction would cost them their livelihood. Politically motivated terrorist groups, above all separatists bent on establishing states of their own, have limited aims. The Kurdish Workers Party, the IRA, the Basque ETA, and the Tamil Tigers want to weaken their enemies and compel them to make far-reaching concessions, but they cannot realistically hope to destroy them. It is also possible, however, that terrorist groups on the verge of defeat or acting on apocalyptic visions may not hesitate to apply all destructive means at their disposal.

All that leads well beyond terrorism as we have known it. New definitions and new terms may have to be developed for new realities, and intelligence services and policymakers must learn to discern the significant differences among terrorists' motivations, approaches, and aims. The Bible says that when the Old Testament hero Samson brought down the temple, burying himself along with the Philistines in the ruins, "the dead which he slew at his death were more than he slew in his life." The Samsons of a society have been relatively few in all ages. But with the new technologies and the changed nature of the world in which they operate, a handful of angry Samsons and disciples of apocalypse would suffice to cause havoc. Chances are that of 100 attempts at terrorist super-violence, 99 would fail. But the single successful one could claim many more victims, do more material damage, and unleash far greater panic than anything the world has yet experienced.

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America : Not Immune to Attacks

The United States is not immune to terrorist attacks, although relatively few have occurred within its borders. The United States and its citizens remain a prime target of international terrorism.

Following are excerpts of a September 1996 report on "Terrorism — Background and Issues for Congress" prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress.

Historical Context

In recent years, terrorism has been primarily viewed as an international and foreign policy issue. Numerous acts of state-sponsored terrorists and of foreign-based groups have given support to this notion.

While United States policy is a prime target for international terrorism — in 1994, 24% of all terrorist incidents worldwide were committed against U.S. citizens or property — the vast majority of those acts take place on foreign soil. The U.S. public perception of terrorism as primarily an international issue, however, may be changing with the advent of the bombing of the Trade Center in New York and the federal building in Oklahoma City.

Although the United States has not been immune from terrorist acts historically, relatively few have occurred within its borders. For example, the FBI reports that between the years 1982 and 1992, a total of 165 terrorist acts occurred within the United States. These include bombing attacks, malicious destruction of property, acts of sabotage, hostile takeover, arson, kidnapping, assaults, alleged assassinations, assassinations, robbery, attempted robbery, and hijackings.

Acts of terrorism and political violence have occurred throughout the history of the United States. For example, the Ku Klux Klan's attacks against blacks had their origin in the era of

Reconstruction, and some Klan activities persist, even to the present time.

Prior to the Klan's emergence was the "nativist movement," which first manifested itself in the early 1850s and recurs from time to time. Based on distrust of aliens and immigrants, it was particularly antagonistic to the Irish who arrived in the United States around 1840.


More recently, domestic terrorism appeared to rise with the groundswell of opposition to political leaders and governing institutions of the 1960s. During that period, certain interest groups and movements, most espousing various far left ideologies, resorted to extreme tactics or terrorist actions to bring about the change or destruction of the "system" in their opposition to perceived social inequities within the United States and to U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia....

The bombing of the World Trade Center in New York on February 26, 1993, brought the domestic threat of international terrorism to the forefront, of U.S. public attention. A federal court found four men guilty of the bombing and sentenced them to life in prison. Several months later, police uncovered another plot by a related group of conspirators to bomb tunnels, bridges, and other critical sites in and around New York City.

On October 1, 1995, a federal court convicted nine men, including Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman, an extremist Muslim cleric from Egypt and spiritual leader of radical Muslim groups in this country, of conspiring to commit assassinations and bomb New York landmarks....

The Oklahoma City Bombing

On April 19, 1995, a bomb exploded, destroying the Alfred P. Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City and killing 168 people. An additional 500 people were injured in the blast, making it the worst terrorist incident ever to take place in the United States....



Within hours of the bombing, a suspect, Timothy James McVeigh, was arrested by police, initially in connection with a driving violation, and on May 10, 1995, Terry Lynn Nichols, a friend of McVeigh's who had been held as a material witness, was charged in connection with the crime. McVeigh and Nichols allegedly have ties to citizen paramilitary militias in Michigan and Arizona and, since the bombing, official and media attention has focused on these groups. On August 16, 1995, the two suspects were arraigned in federal court. They pled not guilty.

U.S. RESPONSE TO COMBAT TERRORISM

Domestic Legislation

Much U.S. policy against terrorism was shaped in reaction to the murders of Israeli athletes in the 1972 Munich Olympics. Much of the policy remains unchanged, but the thrust became increasingly aggressive as terrorist attacks against U.S. people abroad became more frequent and deadlier in the 1980s. Congress passed a series of laws to clearly identify terrorism as a crime, to set up procedures for apprehending and punishing perpetrators worldwide, and to require or permit sanctions on countries supporting terrorism.

No all-encompassing federal law explicitly pertains to domestic terrorism. For example, a terrorist act may be an actual or attempted bombing, armed robbery, arson, assassination, assault, rocket attack, hijacking, kidnapping, or a foreign embassy takeover. All of these activities are violations of federal or state laws and, depending on the motive, may be acts of terrorists. The FBI defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives." Between 1989 and the end of 1993 there were 23 recorded acts of terrorism in the United States.

In the current federal statutory structure, terrorism is addressed in a variety of ways. Extraterritorial acts of hostage-taking or terrorism aimed at U.S. nationals or actions intended to coerce the United States are federal offenses.

Under P.L. 104-132 (signed into law by President Clinton on April 24, 1996), certain acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries are

federal offenses, as are conspiracies within U.S. jurisdiction to kill, kidnap, maim or injure persons or property in a foreign country....

Current immigration law permits exclusion of aliens who have engaged in terrorist activity or aliens whom a consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reasonable grounds to believe are likely to engage in terrorist activity after entry.

International Efforts

Past administrations have employed a range of options to combat international terrorism, including the use of military force. Governments supporting international terrorism (as identified by the Department of State) are prohibited from receiving U.S. foreign assistance, and export credits to those governments are prohibited. In addition, export of munitions to such countries is foreclosed. Also noteworthy is the Department of State's anti-terrorism assistance program, which provides training and equipment to foreign countries to help them improve their anti-terrorism capabilities....

Most experts agree that the most effective way to fight terrorism is to gather as much intelligence as possible and to disrupt terrorist plans and organizations before they act and, also, to organize multinational cooperation against terrorists and countries that support them. The United Nations (U.N.) action against Libya is an example of the latter. Libya's refusal to meet a U.N. deadline to turn over individuals suspected of two aircraft bombings in 1988 and 1989 resulted in U.N.-mandated sanctions starting April 15, 1992.

The U.N. action against Libya was significant as the first worldwide coalition against a country accused of international terrorism. Several factors made the action possible: First, terrorism has touched many more countries in recent years, forcing governments to put aside parochial interests. (Citizens from over 30 countries died in Libyan-sponsored bombings.) Second, the end of the Cold War contributed to increased international cooperation against terrorism. And third, U.S. determination to punish terrorist countries — by military force in some instances — once their complicity was established was a major factor spurring other countries to join U.N.-sponsored action.

It took a long time for the international community to come together against a terrorist state. Most

governments have preferred to handle terrorism as a domestic problem without outside interference. Some governments were also wary of getting involved and possibly attracting additional terrorism in the form of reprisals. Others were reluctant to join in sanctions if their own trade interests might be damaged or they sympathized with the perpetrators cause. These impediments have not disappeared. And finally, there is the persistent problem of defining terrorism without abandoning long-held protection for persons fleeing persecution for political crimes.

One valuable law enforcement tool in combating international terrorism is extradition of terrorists. International extradition traditionally has been subject to limitations. These include the refusal to extradite for political or extraterritorial offenses and the refusal of some countries to extradite nationals. The U.S. has been encouraging the negotiation of agreements with fewer limitations, in part as a means of facilitating the transfer of wanted terrorists.

Because terrorism involves politically motivated violence, the Department of State has recently sought to curtail the availability of the political

offense exception to avoid extradition for certain types of violent acts. However, some argue that curtailing the political offense exception and other restrictions on extradition may be inappropriate when dealing with non-democratic governments.

Constitutional/Statutory Limitations

In responding to the risk of terrorist activity here and abroad, sensitivity to constitutional protections is necessary. For example, during investigations of allegations of possible terrorist activity, the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures in the Fourth Amendment, the protection of the freedoms of speech and association in the First Amendment, the protection of the right to bear arms in the Second Amendment, and due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments may be implicated. The constitutional framework sets the outside limits within which any official investigations must operate.

The CRS Issue Brief, "Terrorism: Background and Issues for Congress," was prepared by Ralph F. Perl, Coordinator of CRS's Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, along with Elizabeth Bazan and Larry Eig of the American Law Division, and Suzanne Cavanagh of the Government Division.

New Counterterrorism Law

The new U.S. counterterrorism law tightens restrictions on the export of defense materials, visas for aliens with terrorist ties, U.S. landing rights for foreign airlines, and fund raising and other material support for terrorist groups.


Following is a summary of the counterterrorism bill signed by President Clinton on April 24, 1996. The summary was prepared by the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. The full text of the bill can be found on the Internet at: <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c104:S.735.ENR>:

The bill (Public Law 104-132) contains a number of provisions affecting foreign assistance, or otherwise of interest to foreign governments.

For example, the bill:

- prohibits U.S. foreign assistance to governments that provide assistance or lethal military equipment to terrorist-list governments;
- prohibits sales or licenses for export of defense articles or defense services to countries the president determines are not fully cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism efforts;
- authorizes exclusion of aliens who are members or representatives of foreign terrorist groups designated as such by the secretary of state, and
- directs the Federal Aviation Administration to require foreign air carriers serving the United States to use the identical security measures utilized by U.S. carriers.

The bill also contains a number of provisions related to U.S. criminal codes. The bill is officially known as the "Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996."



The new law includes important provisions sought by the State Department, such as criminalizing fund raising or other forms of material support for foreign terrorist organizations and acts of terrorism outside the United States, implementing legislation for the plastic explosives convention, and expansion of U.S. extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in terrorism cases.

PROVISIONS AIMED AT TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS OR INDIVIDUALS

Fundraising

Section 302 authorizes the secretary of state, in consultation with the Attorney General and secretary of treasury, to designate foreign terrorist organizations. The designations are to be used for criminalizing the provision of funds and other material support for the designated foreign terrorist organizations by persons within the United States or subject to U.S. jurisdiction, and for visa exclusion purposes. The secretary of state, in consultation with the Attorney General, may designate an organization as a foreign terrorist organization if she finds:

- The organization is a foreign terrorist organization,
- the organization engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and
- the terrorist activity of the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States."

Section 302 defines "national security" to mean "the national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States."

Section 303 makes the provision of material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization a criminal offense, providing for up to 10 years in prison as well as fines, for “whoever, within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so.”

“Material support or resources” is defined broadly, by reference to the definitions used in Section 323 of the bill (see listing below).

Section 303 also authorizes the secretary of treasury to require financial institutions to retain possession of any funds over which the institution has control for a foreign terrorist organization or the organization’s agent. The term “agent” is not defined in the legislation or the legislative history of the act. Both sections 302 and 303 provide procedures for protecting classified information during any judicial review proceedings.

Section 301 of the bill contains a finding, in effect an expression of congressional views, that: “Foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such organization facilitates that conduct.”

Material Support for Specific Acts of Terrorism

Section 323 makes it illegal for anyone in the United States to provide material support for specific acts of terrorism, whether or not those acts are carried out by a designated terrorist organization.

Material support is defined to mean “currency or other financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials.” The predicate offenses for Section 323 are the U.S. laws implementing the major international terrorism conventions as well as other U.S. criminal laws.

Exclusion of Alien Terrorists

Section 411 amends the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to provide for exclusion — denial of visas — for aliens who are members as well as representatives of terrorist organizations

designated as such by the secretary under the INA (see paragraph describing Section 302.) The new legislation also amends the definition of representatives of terrorist organizations to include not only officers, officials or spokesmen but also: “any person who directs, counsels or induces an organization or its members to engage in terrorist activities.” This provision is directed at persons who may induce terrorist activities without actually being an officer of a terrorist group or engaging personally in acts of violence.

Alien Terrorist Removal

Section 401 establishes procedures for a special court to be established for deportation cases involving alien terrorists while protecting classified information. The provision requires the Executive Branch to provide the defendant with an unclassified summary of the classified information. The summary must be sufficient for the alien to prepare a defense. If the judge concludes the summary is not adequate and the government does not provide a satisfactory revised version within 15 days, the case will be terminated. However as part of the compromise between the Senate and House versions, the final bill lowered the government’s burden of proof to a “preponderance of evidence” standard rather than “clear and convincing.”

PROVISIONS DIRECTED AGAINST DESIGNATED STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM

Prohibitions against Financial Transactions with Terrorist States

Section 321 provides for fines and/or up to 10 years in prison for U.S. persons who engage in financial transactions with governments of countries on the terrorist list. Regulations issued by the Department of Treasury, in consultation with the Department of State, prohibited contributions by terrorist-list countries to persons or organizations in the United States. Ordinary commercial transactions are allowed unless already prohibited by other laws which affect Libya, Iran, Iraq, Cuba and North Korea.

Prohibition on Assistance to Countries That Aid Terrorist States

Section 325 requires the president to withhold assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act to any

government that provides assistance to the government of a country that the secretary of state has designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. The section permits the president to waive the prohibition upon a presidential determination that furnishing the assistance is "important to the national interests" of the United States and provides explanatory information to Congress, as specified in the statute.

Assistance is defined, in Section 329 of this act, as "assistance to or for the benefit of any country that is provided by grant, concessional sale, guaranty, insurance or by any other means on terms more favorable than generally available in the applicable market, whether in the form of a loan, lease, credit, debt relief, or otherwise including subsidies for exports to such country and favorable tariff treatment of articles that are the growth, product, or manufacture of such country." The section specifically excludes provision of disaster-type relief from the type of assistance to a terrorist state that could trigger a U.S. cutoff.

Prohibition on Assistance to Countries that Provide Lethal Military Equipment to Terrorist States

Section 326 requires the president to withhold foreign assistance to any government that provides lethal military equipment to a terrorist-list government. A national interest waiver similar to the one in Section 325 is also provided. This provision is similar to a provision that has been incorporated annually in the foreign operations appropriations bills for the past several years.

Opposition to Assistance by International Financial Institutions to Terrorist States

Section 327 requires the U.S. executive director of each international financial institution to use the "voice and vote" of the United States to oppose any loan to terrorist-list countries. The institutions include the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the African Development Bank, the African Development Fund," and any similar institution established after the date of enactment of this section." A similar provision has been incorporated annually in the foreign operations appropriations bills for the past several years.

Civil Lawsuits Against Terrorist List States

Section 221 amends the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to permit U.S. nationals to bring civil actions against countries the secretary of state has designated as terrorist-list states under the Foreign Assistance Act if the lawsuit arises from aircraft sabotage, torture, extrajudicial killing, or hostage taking. This is a compromise from the House measure which also would have permitted civil suits by U.S. nationals against states not on the terrorism list. The law allows the Attorney General to take steps to protect information in the hands of the U.S. government from public disclosure in civil actions if such disclosures could interfere with a criminal investigation or prosecution or a national security operation.

Findings

The House-Senate conferees adopted the congressional findings section contained in the bill passed by the Senate in June, 1995. Although the findings are non-binding, they are quoted because the expression of congressional views regarding Libya and strong actions against terrorist facilities may be of interest to some foreign governments. The findings state that:

- because the United Nations has been an inadequate forum for the discussion of cooperative, multilateral responses to the threat of international terrorism, the president should undertake immediate efforts to develop effective multilateral responses to international terrorism as a complement to national counter-terrorist efforts;
- the president shall use all necessary means, including covert action and military force, to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy international infrastructure used by international terrorists, including overseas terrorist training facilities and safe havens;
- Congress deplores decisions to ease, evade, or end international sanctions on state sponsors of terrorism, including the decision by the United Nations Sanctions Committee to allow airline flights to and from Libya despite Libya's noncompliance with United Nations resolutions;
- the president should continue to undertake efforts to increase the international isolation of state sponsors of international terrorism, including efforts to strengthen international sanctions, and should

oppose any future initiatives to ease sanctions on Libya or other state sponsors of terrorism.

PROVISIONS AFFECTING NON-TERRORIST LIST COUNTRIES

Arms Export Control Amendment

Section 330 prohibits sales or licenses for export of defense articles or services to countries that the president determines “are not cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts.” Under section 330, such determinations made by May 15 of each year would apply to a country for a one year period beginning the following October 1. The president is authorized to make national interest waivers with respect to specific transactions.

Foreign Air Travel Safety

Section 322 requires the Federal Aviation Administration to impose on foreign air carriers serving U.S. airports the identical security measures that are required of American carriers serving the same airport. The FAA is considering how to implement this provision.

Antiterrorism Training

Section 328 strengthens the State Department’s Antiterrorism Training Assistance (ATA) program by lifting the restrictions in current law allowing only for certain specified courses to be taught overseas. The provision also lifts the 30-day limitation on ATA personnel working overseas under the ATA program, thus potentially allowing for ATA instructors to be attached to foreign training academies.

PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES AND OTHER WEAPONS

Plastic Explosives

Section 601 provides the implementing legislation for the 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection. The convention was negotiated in the aftermath of the bombings of Pan American flight 103 in 1988 and UTA flight 722 in 1989. It requires each manufacturing state to place specified chemical agents in plastic explosives to facilitate detection by explosive detection equipment or trained dogs. Enactment enables the United States to deposit its instrument of ratification.

Conventional Explosives Study

Section 732 requires the secretary of the treasury, who oversees the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, to conduct a study in conjunction with other agencies of the feasibility of placing taggants (identification tags) in conventional explosives for the purposes of detection and post-blast investigation, and the feasibility of rendering fertilizers inert.

Nuclear

Section 502 strengthens the existing prohibitions against possession of nuclear materials by expanding the definition to include nuclear byproduct material. This is defined as “any material containing any radioactive isotope created through an irradiation process in the operation of a nuclear reactor or accelerator.”

Biological

Section 511 expands existing prohibitions against possession of certain biological agents by broadening the definition of infectious substances to include biological products that may be engineered as a result of biotechnology, or any naturally occurring or bioengineered component of any such microorganism, virus, infectious substance or biological product.” The secretary of health and human services is required to establish and maintain a list of each biological agent that has the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety.

Chemical

Section 521 makes it unlawful to use or attempt to use a chemical weapon against United States nationals or property overseas as well as within the United States. Chemical weapons are defined as “any weapon that is designed or intended to cause widespread death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or precursors of toxic or poisonous chemicals.”

ADDITIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CHANGES WITH INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Transcending National Boundaries

Section 702 criminalizes acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries. The offenses

include acts that take place within the United States and at least some aspect of the terrorist act that took place outside the United States, such as a foreign terrorist group plotting overseas to kill persons on American soil. The offenses include killings, kidnappings, maimings, or assaults with a dangerous weapon, attacks on property in the United States, or attacks against U.S. government employees or property. Section 702 states that the Attorney General has primary investigative responsibility over "federal crimes of terrorism," which are defined as: (1) offenses "calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct" and (2) additionally cited offenses already in U.S. law, such as destruction of aircraft and attacks on foreign officials, official guests, and internationally protected persons.

Conspiracy to Harm Persons or Property Overseas

Section 704 criminalizes conspiracies to kill, murder, or maim persons outside the United States so long as at least one of the conspirators involved in

a terrorist operation overseas commits an act in furtherance of the conspiracy in the United States. The statute includes attacks on property overseas, either owned by a government with which the United States is at peace or any building used for religious, education, or cultural purposes, any railroad, canal, bridge, airfield or other public conveyance or structure.

Extension of Criminal Jurisdiction Overseas

Section 721 amends the Aircraft Piracy statute to provide extraterritorial jurisdiction if a U.S. national was on the affected aircraft or would have been aboard; if the perpetrator is a U.S. national; or the offender is found in the United States after committing the crime. The law also provides additional U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction over aircraft destruction and violence at international airports. It also provides federal criminal jurisdiction over the murder or kidnapping of, or threats against persons with diplomatic immunity if the victim is a U.S. government employee; if the offender is a U.S. national; or if the offender is later found in the United States.

U.S. Rewards Program Saves Lives

By Edmund F. Scherr

While the U.S. program of rewards is aimed at preventing terrorism against Americans, the United States shares information with other nations. The program provided valuable information on planned terrorist attacks during the Gulf War and in the search for World Trade Center suspects.


America's Counter-Terrorism Rewards Program has saved lives by helping uncover terrorist plots and bringing terrorists to justice. The program, established by Congress in 1984, offers substantial rewards — up to \$2 million — for information preventing acts of international terrorism against U.S. citizens or property, or which leads to the arrest or conviction of those responsible for such acts. The reward is up to \$4 million in cases of U.S. civil aviation targeted by terrorists.

Brad Smith, director of the program under the State Department's Diplomatic Security Service, said in an interview with USIA that over \$5 million has been paid out to cooperating individuals.

The U.S. government protects in strict confidence the identity of those providing information and, in some cases, those individuals and their immediate families may be relocated to the United States or elsewhere for their safety.

"While the rewards program is aimed at terrorism directed against Americans," Smith emphasized, "the United States shares information with other nations whose citizens are at risk. Every government and every citizen has a stake in bringing terrorists to justice and in preventing acts of terrorism."

In 1990, Smith noted, the State Department forged a "partnership" with the Air Transport Association of America and the Air Line Pilots Association, International — with each organization pledging up to \$1 million to supplement rewards paid by the U.S. government for information that prevents a terrorist act against U.S. civil aviation, or that leads to



the arrest and conviction of any person who has committed such an act.

He said that efforts are underway to expand government partnership with the private sector, so up to \$4 million per case can also be offered for information in areas outside civil aviation.

Smith said the program produced valuable information in connection with Operation Desert Storm, the international effort against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the location of suspects in the terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York.

At the start of the Gulf War, Smith recounted, an informant in an East Asian country came forward with "alarming information" about a series of terrorist attacks planned by the Iraqi intelligence service. "The attacks were beyond the planning stage and about to be carried out," Smith stressed.

According to the informant, one of the attacks, a planned terrorist bombing of airline ticket counters at a major airport, was scheduled to be carried out within 48 hours.

Smith said the "cooperating individual provided information which was essential in thwarting the planned terror attacks; and the terrorists were stopped in their tracks by U.S. and host nation authorities."

The informant, and his/her immediate family, were relocated under the rewards program to a place of safety in the United States. "He/she was given a very substantial reward for coming forward and saving lives," Smith said.

On February 26, 1993, the specter of international terrorism struck Americans when a large explosive device, concealed in a truck, was detonated in the garage of the 110-story World Trade Center. "One of the terrorists responsible, when apprehended, admitted the attackers sought to collapse one or both of the twin towers, killing tens of

thousands of innocent people," Smith said. Six persons were killed and some 1,000 injured.

Two of the suspected terrorists, Abdul Rahman Yasin and Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, fled the United States following the bombing. Following the indictments of Yasin and Yousef, the United States launched a "massive international manhunt" for the two fugitives. Wanted posters — offering up to \$2 million in rewards for information leading to their capture — were distributed in a variety of languages. Multi-language leaflets were also sent throughout the world. Even matchbooks containing photos of the fugitives were distributed, and announcements were placed on the Internet.

On February 8, 1995, Smith said, Pakistani police along with U.S. diplomatic security agents — acting on information gained through the rewards program — located and arrested Ramzi Ahmed Yousef in Pakistan. He was extradited to the United States for trial. Smith said that Yasin is believed to be hiding in Iraq.

Pointing at the potential danger from nuclear material in the hands of terrorists, Smith noted that Congress has expanded the definition of international terrorism by authorizing rewards for information regarding "any act substantially contributing to the acquisition of unsafeguarded special nuclear material...or any nuclear explosive device...by an individual, group, or non-nuclear-weapon state."

The official stressed that "we will pursue aggressively our responsibilities to deny terrorists the opportunity to acquire or use weapons of mass destruction."

The following are some of the terrorist cases in which the United States is seeking information:

❑ The June 25, 1996, terrorist attack against the multi-national peacekeeping force in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which left 19 dead and hundreds injured. The State Department is offering a reward of up to \$2 million for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of those responsible for the AL-Khobar Towers bombing. In addition, the government of Saudi Arabia is offering a reward of \$3 million.

❑ Dr. Donald Hutchings, an American medical professional, was abducted July 4, 1995, by unknown persons in the hill country of Kashmir.

❑ Wanted in the terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center, Abdul Rahman Yasin is believed to be hiding in Iraq.

❑ Mir Aimal Kansi allegedly murdered two persons and injured three others firing an AK-47 assault rifle into cars waiting at a stop light near the headquarters of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Kansi is believed to be hiding in Pakistan, Afghanistan, or Iran.

❑ On December 21, 1988, terrorists destroyed Pan American Flight 103 over Scotland using a bomb hidden in baggage. All 259 passengers, representing citizens from 30 countries, were killed. Another 11 persons were killed on the ground by the wreckage. Lamem Khalifa Fhimah and Abdel Basset Ali Al-Megrahi, both Libyan nationals and intelligence officers, are believed responsible and are currently hiding in Libya.

❑ In April 1986, one of the youngest victims of terrorism, 9-month-old Demetra Stylian Klug, was killed in the terrorist bombing of TWA Flight 840 in Greek airspace. Those believed to be responsible may be hiding in Lebanon, Libya, or Iran.

❑ Terrorists hijacked TWA Flight 847 in Greece on June 13, 1985, and beat American Robert Stethem to death. Those believed to be responsible are thought to be hiding in Lebanon, Libya, or Iran.

❑ During the 1980s, kidnapped American citizens — as many as nine at one time — were held hostage in Lebanon. Three were murdered during their captivity. Those believed to be responsible are thought to be hiding in Lebanon, Libya, or Iran.

Outside the United States, people with information should contact local authorities or the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate. Information may also be provided by telephone, by mail, or by electronic mail.

The mail address is: HEROES, P.O. Box 96781, Washington, D.C. 20090-6781 USA.

Telephone: 1-800-HEROES-1 (within the United States only). E-mail: heroes@heroes.net

More information on the rewards program can be found on the Internet's World Wide Web at:

<http://www.heroes.net>

Edmund F. Scherr writes on terrorism and other global issues for the United States Information Agency.

U.S. Program Helps Governments Fight Terrorism

By Jim Fuller

Over the past dozen years the participants in a small but effective U.S. foreign assistance program have been working to strengthen security forces in countries around the world.


A relatively small U.S. program to train and equip countries to fight international terrorism has been invaluable in strengthening U.S. relationships with other governments and in protecting the lives of diplomats overseas.

The U.S. Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Program provides this assistance to friendly governments that face a significant threat from terrorism. Since its inception in 1983, the program has provided training to over 19,000 individuals from more than 80 countries. The training ranges from bomb detection and deactivation to hostage negotiations, dignitary protection, crime scene investigation, and airport security.

Though small, the ATA Program is growing. "The budget has gone up for the last three years," said ATA Director Burley Fuselier in an interview. "It started at roughly \$2 million per year 14 years ago. Congress has been a very strong proponent of the program and we have seen our resources climb even in this resource-deficient era." The projected budget for fiscal year 1998 is \$19 million.

In addition to the ATA Program, other federal agencies including Defense, Justice, Transportation, Treasury, and the Central Intelligence Agency also provide counterterrorism training assistance.

Fuselier said such programs are needed because international terrorism can strike anywhere. Many terrorist groups have demonstrated an ability to extend their reach to distant parts of the world. In early 1995, for example, Islamic terrorists, including participants in the New York World Trade Center bombing in 1994,



conspired in Manila to blow up U.S. passenger airliners in Asia.

"While terrorism by national governments has declined, the number of small independent terrorist cells is increasing," Fuselier said. "They may not be as large or as well-financed as the national entities of the past, but they're as dangerous and deadly. So the training is very important to ensure that there is a joint effort worldwide to defeat them."

Fuselier said that while the main purpose of the ATA Program is to provide assistance to the international community in dealing with terrorism, the program also helps protect American lives and property overseas by improving the effectiveness of a nation's security forces.

In fact, Fuselier said, one of the major benefits of the program is the way it strengthens working relationships and coordination with other countries. Such ties are invaluable when specific terrorist threats or incidents require close cooperation between U.S. and foreign officials.

"The level of support rendered to our diplomatic missions abroad subsequent to the training has demonstrated the substantial benefits of the program," Fuselier said. "In Latin America, for example, we've had numerous threats that were perceived to be directed against our missions, and just on a simple telephone call, we would receive an enormous amount of support that would never have been available before."

Decisions on the selection of countries to receive ATA training are made by the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. Assistance is considered a priority for friendly countries that face existing or potential terrorist threats, but cannot meet those threats with their own resources. Also given high priority are countries with a substantial U.S. presence, and those

that provide the last point of departure for airline flights to the United States.

For example, Peru, Turkey, Argentina, and Chile received extensive ATA training during FY 1995 because of the recurring and persistent terrorist activity in those countries. Also, countries that have played an important role in the Middle East peace process, such as Egypt, Jordan, and Israel, have experienced significant terrorist activity and thus continue to be among the principal recipients of ATA training.

Russia and Ukraine received substantial training in airport security management as part of their transition to more democratic security and law enforcement organizations.

The State Department also reviews the human rights record of a country before agreeing to provide assistance through the ATA Program. And assistance may be suspended if a country's record of human rights practices has fallen below acceptable standards.

Once a country is selected, a small department-led team of experts visits the country to assess the country's ability to control its international borders, protect its infrastructure, and protect its national leadership and the diplomatic corps. The department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security then prepares plans for training courses based on the assessment.

According to Fuselier, training focuses on enhancing the antiterrorism skills of a country's police, law enforcement, and security officials. All participants must come from the public safety sector. The training of military personnel is prohibited.

"However, if a military officer is seconded to a civilian police organization for an extended period of time, which is often the case in the Eastern European states or Latin America, he or she is allowed to receive the training," Fuselier said.

Most training takes place at various U.S. locations and is provided by federal, state, and local authorities, and by private contractors. However, in a effort to reach more people and reduce costs, more and more of the training is being conducted overseas. According to Fuselier, nearly every type of training course — including airport

and maritime security, crisis management, document screening, hostage negotiation, crime scene investigation, and dignitary protection — can now be conducted in-country.

"We will also send specialists from the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to a country for two-to-three weeks to consult on a particular problem," Fuselier said. "We will even send professors to their police academies to help them design certain course materials."

Recently, police academy directors from 17 Latin American countries arrived at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Georgia to learn how to develop a network of law enforcement and anti-terrorism training for the Latin American community.

Fuselier said that every training course must also be consistent with the values of democracy and human rights.

"In every training course we review international accords on human rights and how they apply to the use of force in dealing with terrorism," he said. "Human rights concerns can come into play during the interview of a suspected terrorist or if it is necessary to eliminate civilian privileges during times of crisis."

The ATA Program can also allocate up to 30 percent of its annual budget to provide training-related equipment and commodities to participating countries. The program spent over \$1 million in FY 1995 to provide countries with items such as bomb X-ray machines, metal detectors, dogs for explosive detection, kits for crime scene investigations, and portable telephones for hostage negotiations.

Fuselier concludes that the main objective of the ATA Program is to make countries self-sufficient in their ability to counter international terrorism.

"The goal of any foreign assistance program is to go out of existence," he said. "We are supposed to bring assistance to the problem, make the recipient self-sufficient, and then move on."

Jim Fuller writes on science, technology, and other global issues for the United States Information Agency.

State-sponsored Terrorism

Following are excerpts of the section on state-sponsored terrorism from "Patterns of Global Terrorism — 1995," a report issued by the State Department in April, 1996.


The United States and its allies continue to focus on raising the costs for governments that support, tolerate, and engage in international terrorism. It is widely recognized that state support for terrorist groups enhances their capabilities and makes law enforcement efforts to counter terrorism more difficult.

To pressure states to stop such support, U.S. law imposes trade and other restrictions on countries determined by the secretary of state to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism by supporting, training, supplying, or providing safe haven to known terrorists.

The United States currently lists Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria as state supporters of terrorism. The list is sent annually to Congress, although countries can be added or removed at any time circumstances warrant.

Cuba no longer is able to actively support armed struggle in Latin America or other parts of the world because of severe ongoing economic problems. While there was no direct evidence of its sponsorship of terrorist acts in 1995, the Cuban government continued to provide safe haven for several international terrorists. Cuba has not renounced political support for groups that engage in international terrorism.

Iran continued in 1995 to be the world's most active supporter of international terrorism. Although Tehran tried to project a moderate image in the West, it continued to assassinate dissidents abroad and maintained its support and financing of groups that pose a threat to U.S. citizens. Iranian authorities reaffirmed the validity of the death sentence imposed on British author Salman Rushdie, although some Iranian officials claimed



that the government of Iran would not implement the fatwa.

No specific acts of terrorism attributed to the Iranian-backed Lebanese Hizballah in 1995 were on the scale of the July 1994 bombing of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires, which is believed to have been perpetrated by Hizballah. Hizballah continued attempts to undermine the Middle East peace process and oppose Western interests throughout the Middle East.

Iran also supports other radical organizations that commit terrorism in opposition to the peace process, including HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (PFLP-GC). It also provides safe haven to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a terrorist group fighting for an independent Kurdish state that carried out numerous terrorist acts in 1995 against Turkish interests.

During 1995 several acts of political violence in northern Iraq matched Baghdad's pattern of using terrorism against the local population and regime defectors. These included a bombing attack on the Iraqi National Congress and the poisoning of a number of regime defectors. Iraq continues to provide a safe haven for various terrorist groups.

Libya continued for another year its defiance of the demands of U.N. Security Council Resolutions adopted in response to its involvement in the bombings of Pan Am flight 103 (1988) and UTA flight 772 (1989). These resolutions demand that Libya turn over for trial the two intelligence agents indicted for the PA 103 bombing, cooperate with U.S., U.K., and French authorities in investigating the Pan Am and UTA bombings, pay compensation to victims, and cease all support for terrorism. Instead, Libya continued to foster disingenuous "compromises" aimed at diluting or evading the resolutions.

It also continued hosting terrorist groups like the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO). Further, an inves-

tigation into the murder of PU leader Fathi Shaqaqi in Malta in October 1995 revealed that he had long been a Libyan client. Tripoli also continued to harass and intimidate the Libyan exile community; it is believed to be responsible for the abduction of U.S. resident Mansur Kikhia in December 1993 and was blamed by Libyan exiles for the murder of a Libyan oppositionist in London in November 1995. The Libyan charge in London was expelled in 1995 for threatening and surveilling Libyan exiles in the United Kingdom.

North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK) is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since 1987. Since 1993 the DPRK has made several efforts to reiterate a stated position of opposition to all forms of international terrorism.

The DPRK government since 1970 has provided safe haven to several members of the Japanese Communist League—Red Army Faction, who participated in an aircraft hijacking in 1970.

Sudan came into sharper focus in 1995 as a center of international terrorist activities. By year's end it was at odds with many of its neighbors. Uganda and Eritrea had severed diplomatic relations with Khartoum because of its support of armed opposition groups in those countries.

Ethiopia and Egypt accused Sudan of complicity in one of the year's highest profile terrorist crimes — the unsuccessful attempt to assassinate

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa on 26 June, attributed to the Egyptian al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group or IG). Surviving assailants captured by Ethiopian police incriminated the Sudanese government, which is dominated by the National Islamic Front (NIF), in planning the crime and training the assailants. Three conspirators are believed to be in Sudan. When Khartoum refused to cooperate in apprehending them, the Organization for African Unity (OAU) called for Sudan to hand over the suspects.


In addition, Sudan continues to harbor Usama Bin Ladin, a major financier of terrorism, and members of some of the world's most violent groups like the IG, ANO, Lebanese Hizballah, and HAMAS. Khartoum is a major transit point and base for a number of terrorist groups.

There is no evidence that Syrian officials have been directly involved in planning or executing terrorist attacks since 1986. Nevertheless, Syria continues to provide safe haven and support — inside Syria and in areas of Lebanon under Syrian control — for terrorist groups such as Ahmad Jibril's PFLP-GC, HAMAS, Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Japanese Red Army, and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

Syria has permitted Iranian resupply of Hizballah via Damascus but continues to restrain the international activities of some of these groups.

Some of the Most Notorious Groups

The following is background information on 13 major groups excerpted from a State Department report, "1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism - 1996," released April 1996 describing some 40 organizations.



ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION (ANO)

— also known as Fatah Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Black September, and Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims.

Description

International terrorist organization led by Sabri al-Banna. Split from PLO in 1974. Made up of various functional committees, including political, military, and financial.

Activities

Has carried out terrorist attacks in 20 countries, killing or injuring almost 900 persons. Targets include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, moderate Palestinians, the PLO, and various Arab countries. Major attacks included the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985, the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul in September 1986, the Pan Am Flight 73 hijacking in Karachi in September 1986, and the City of Poros day-excursion ship attack in July 1988 in Greece. Suspected of assassinating PLO deputy chief Abu Iyad and PLO security chief Abu Hul in Tunis in January 1991. ANO assassinated a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon in January 1994, and it has been linked to the killing of the PLO representative there. There have been no attacks against Western targets since the late 1980s.

Strength

Several hundred militia in Lebanon, and overseas support structure.

Location/Area of Operation

Currently headquartered in Libya with a presence in Lebanon in the Al Biqa' (Bekaa Valley) and also

several Palestinian refugee camps in coastal areas of Lebanon. Also has a presence in Sudan. Has demonstrated ability to operate over wide area, including the Middle East, Asia, and Europe.

External Aid

Has received considerable support, including safe haven, training, logistic assistance, and financial aid from Iraq and Syria (until 1987); continues to receive aid from Libya, in addition to close support for selected operations.

BASQUE FATHERLAND AND LIBERTY (ETA)

Description

Founded in 1959 with the aim of creating an independent homeland in Spain's Basque region. Has muted commitment to Marxism.

Activities

Chiefly bombings and assassinations of Spanish Government officials, especially security forces. In response to French operations against the group, ETA also has targeted French interests. Finances its activities through kidnappings, robberies, and extortion. In 1995, Spanish and French authorities foiled an ETA plot to kill King Juan Carlos in Majorca.

Strength

Unknown; may have hundreds of members, plus supporters.

Location/Area of Operation

Operates primarily in the Basque autonomous regions of northern Spain and southwestern France, but also has bombed Spanish and French interests elsewhere.

External Aid

Has received training at various times in Libya, Lebanon, and Nicaragua. Also appears to have close ties to the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)

HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)

Description

HAMAS was formed in late 1987 as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Various elements of HAMAS have used political and violent means, including terrorism, to pursue the goal of establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in place of Israel. HAMAS is loosely structured, with some elements working openly through mosques and social service institutions to recruit members, raise money, organize activities, and distribute propaganda. Militant elements of HAMAS, operating clandestinely, have advocated and used violence to advance their goals. HAMAS's strength is concentrated in the Gaza Strip and a few areas of the West Bank. It also has engaged in peaceful political activity, such as running candidates in West Bank Chamber of Commerce elections.

Activities

HAMAS activists, especially those in the Izz el-Din al-Qassam Forces, have conducted many attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets, suspected Palestinian collaborators, and Fatah rivals.

Strength

Unknown number of hardcore members; tens of thousands of supporters and sympathizers.

Location/Area of Operation

Primarily the occupied territories, Israel, and Jordan.

External Aid

Receives funding from Palestinian expatriates, Iran, and private benefactors in Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states. Some fundraising and propaganda activity take place in Western Europe and North America.

HIZBALLAH (Party of God)

— also known as Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, and Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine.

Description

Radical Shia group formed in Lebanon; dedicated to the creation of an Iranian-style Islamic republic in Lebanon and removal of all non-Islamic influences from the area. Strongly anti-West and anti-Israel.

Closely allied with, and often directed by Iran, but may have conducted rogue operations that were not approved by Tehran.

Activities

Known or suspected to have been involved in numerous anti-U.S. terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck bombing of the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983 and the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut in September 1984. Elements of the group were responsible for the kidnapping and detention of U.S. and other Western hostages in Lebanon. The group also attacked the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992.

Strength

Several thousand members.

Location/Area of Operation

Operates in the Al Biqa' (Bekaa Valley), the southern suburbs of Beirut, and southern Lebanon. Has established cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and elsewhere.

External Aid

Receives substantial amounts of financial, training, weapons, explosives, political, diplomatic, and organizational aid from Iran.

KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (PKK)

Description

Marxist-Leninist insurgent group composed of Turkish Kurds established in 1974. In recent years has moved beyond rural-based insurgent activities to include urban terrorism. Seeks to set up an independent Marxist state in southeastern Turkey, where there is a predominantly Kurdish population.

Activities

Primary targets are Turkish government forces and civilians in eastern Turkey, but becoming increasingly active in Western Europe against Turkish targets. Conducted attacks on Turkish diplomatic and commercial facilities in dozens of West European cities in 1993 and again in spring 1995. In an attempt to damage Turkey's tourist industry, the PKK has bombed tourist sites and hotels and kidnapped foreign tourists.

Strength

Approximately 10,000 to 15,000 full-time guerrillas, 5,000 to 6,000 of whom are in Turkey;

60,000 to 75,000 part-time guerrillas; and hundreds of thousands of sympathizers in Turkey and Europe.

Location/Area of Operation

Operates in Turkey and Western Europe.

External Aid

Receives safe haven and modest aid from Syria, Iraq, and Iran.

THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM (LTTE).

Other known front organizations: World Tamil Association (WTA), World Tamil Movement (WTM), the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT), the Ellalan Force.

Description

Founded in 1976, the LTTE is the most powerful Tamil group in Sri Lanka and uses overt and illegal methods to raise funds, acquire weapons, and publicize its cause of establishing an independent Tamil state. The LTTE began its armed conflict with the Sri Lankan government in 1983 and relies on a guerrilla strategy that includes the use of terrorist tactics.

Activities

The Tigers have integrated a battlefield insurgent strategy with a terrorist program that targets not only key personnel in the countryside but also senior Sri Lankan political and military leaders in Colombo. Political assassinations and bombings have become commonplace. The LTTE has refrained from targeting Western tourists out of fear that foreign governments would crack down on Tamil expatriates involved in fundraising activities abroad.

Strength

Approximately 10,000 armed combatants in Sri Lanka; about 3,000 to 6,000 form a trained cadre of fighters. The LTTE also has a significant overseas support structure for fundraising, weapons procurement, and propaganda activities.

Location/Area of Operation

The Tigers control most of the northern and eastern coastal areas of Sri Lanka but have conducted operations throughout the island. Headquartered in the Jaffna Peninsula, LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran has established an extensive network of checkpoints and informants to keep track of any outsiders who enter the group's area of control.

The LTTE prefers to attack vulnerable government facilities, then withdraw before reinforcements arrive.

External Aid

The LTTE's overt organizations support Tamil separatism by lobbying foreign governments and the United Nations. The LTTE also uses its international contacts to procure weapons, communications, and bomb-making equipment. The LTTE exploits large Tamil communities in North America, Europe, and Asia to obtain funds and supplies for its fighters in Sri Lanka. Information obtained since the mid-1980s indicates that some Tamil communities in Europe are also involved in narcotics smuggling. Tamils historically have served as drug couriers moving narcotics into Europe.

PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT (PLF)

Description

Terrorist group that broke away from the PFLP-GC in mid-1970s. Later split again into pro-PLO, pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan factions. Pro-PLO faction led by Muhammad Abbas (Abu Abbas), who became member of PLO Executive Committee in 1984 but left it in 1991.

Activities

The Abu Abbas-led faction has carried out attacks against Israel. Abbas's group was also responsible for the attack in 1985 on the cruise ship Achille Lauro and the murder of U.S. citizen Leon Klinghoffer. A warrant for Abu Abbas's arrest is outstanding in Italy.

Strength

At least 50.

Location/Area of Operation

PLO faction based in Tunisia until Achille Lauro attack. Now based in Iraq.

External Aid

Receives logistic and military support mainly from PLO, but also from Libya and Iraq.

THE PARTY OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (Khmer Rouge)

Description

The Khmer Rouge is a Communist insurgency that is trying to destabilize the Cambodian government.

Under Pol Pot's leadership, the Khmer Rouge conducted a campaign of genocide in which more than one million people were killed during its four years in power in the late 1970s.

Activities

The Khmer Rouge now is engaged in a low-level insurgency against the Cambodian government. Although its victims are mainly Cambodian villagers, the Khmer Rouge has occasionally kidnapped and killed foreigners traveling in remote rural areas.

Strength

Approximately 8,000 guerrillas.

Location/Area of Operation

The Khmer Rouge operates in outlying provinces in Cambodia, particularly in pockets along the Thailand border.

External Aid

The Khmer Rouge is not currently receiving external assistance.

POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP)

Description

Marxist-Leninist group founded in 1967 by George Habash as a member of the PLO. Advocates a Pan-Arab revolution. Opposes the Declaration of Principles signed in 1993 and has suspended participation in the PLO.

Activities

Committed numerous international terrorist attacks during the 1970s. Since the death in 1978 of Wadi Haddad, its terrorist planner, PFLP has carried out numerous attacks against Israeli or moderate Arab targets.

Strength

800 members.

Location/Area of Operation

Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and the occupied territories.

External Aid

Receives most of its financial and military assistance from Syria and Libya.

POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE—GENERAL COMMAND (PFLP-GC)

Description

Split from the PFLP in 1968, claiming that it wanted to focus more on fighting and less on politics. Violently opposed to Arafat's PLO. Led by Ahmad Jabril, a former captain in the Syrian Army. Closely allied with, supported by, and probably directed by Syria.

Activities

Has carried out numerous cross-border terrorist attacks into Israel using unusual means, such as hot-air balloons and motorized hang gliders.

Strength

Several hundred members.

Location/Area of Operation

Headquartered in Damascus, with bases in Lebanon and cells in Europe.

External Aid

Receives logistic and military support from Syria, its chief sponsor; financial support from Libya; safe haven in Syria. Receives support also from Iran.

PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA)

— also known as The Provos.

Description

A radical terrorist group formed in 1969 as the clandestine armed wing of Sinn Fein, a legal political movement dedicated to removing British forces from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland. Has a Marxist orientation. Organized into small, tightly knit cells under the leadership of the Army Council.

Activities

Bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, extortion, and robberies. Targets senior British government officials, British military and police in Northern Ireland, and Northern Irish Loyalist paramilitary groups. PIRA's operations on mainland Britain have included bombing campaigns against train and subway stations and shopping areas. Observed cease-fire through all of 1995.

Strength

Several hundred members, plus several thousand sympathizers.

Location/Area of Operation

Northern Ireland, Irish Republic, Great Britain, and Western Europe.

External Aid

Has received aid from a variety of groups and countries and considerable training and arms from Libya and, at one time, the PLO. Also is suspected of receiving funds and arms from sympathizers in the United States. Similarities in operations suggest links to the ETA.

SENDERO LUMINOSO (Shining Path, SL)**Description**

Larger of Peru's two insurgencies, SL is among the world's most ruthless guerrilla organizations. Formed in the late 1960s by then university professor Abimael Guzman. Stated goal is to destroy existing Peruvian institutions and replace them with peasant revolutionary regime. Also wants to rid Peru of foreign influences. Guzman's capture in September 1992 was a major blow, as have been the arrests of other SL leaders in 1995, defections, and President Fujimori's amnesty program for repentant terrorists.

Activities

Engages in particularly brutal forms of terrorism, including the indiscriminate use of bombs. Almost every institution in Peru has been a target of SL violence. Has bombed diplomatic missions of several countries in Peru. Carries out bombing campaigns and selective assassinations. Involved in cocaine trade.

Strength

Approximately 1,500 to 2,500 armed militants; larger number of supporters, mostly in rural areas.

Location/Area of Operation

Originally rural based, but has increasingly focused its terrorist attacks in the capital.

External Aid

None.

TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRTA)**Description**

Traditional Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement formed in 1983. Currently struggling to remain viable. Has suffered from defections and government counterterrorist successes in addition to infighting and loss of leftist support. Objective remains to rid Peru of imperialism and establish Marxist regime.

Activities

Bombings, kidnappings, ambushes, assassinations. Previously responsible for large number of anti-US attacks. Most members have been jailed.

Strength

Unknown; greatly diminished in recent years.


Location/Area of Operation

Peru; provided assistance in Bolivia to Bolivian ELN.

External Aid

None.

Major Multilateral Terrorism Conventions




There are nine major multilateral conventions related to states' responsibilities for combating terrorism. The United States is a party to all of these.

The conventions are:

- Convention on the marking of plastic explosives for the purpose of identification. The convention can be found on the World Wide Web of the Internet at:
http://www.iasl.mcgill.ca/air_law/plastic.html
- Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation, with related protocol (3/88). It applies to terrorist attacks on ships and on fixed offshore platforms.
- Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation (2/88). This extends and supplements the Montreal Convention on air safety.
http://www.iasl.mcgill.ca/air_law/mtlpt88.html
- International convention against the taking of hostages (12/79).
- Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material (10/79). The convention combats unlawful taking and use of nuclear material.
<http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/glance/legal/in f274r1.html>
- Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons (12/73). This agreement protects senior government officials and diplomats.
- Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation (Montreal Convention)(9/71). It applies to acts of aviation sabotage such as bombings aboard aircraft in flight.
http://www.iasl.mcgill.ca/air_law/mtl1971.html
- Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft (Hague Convention) (12/70). This applies to hijackings.
http://www.iasl.mcgill.ca/air_law/hague70.html
- Convention on offenses and certain other acts committed on board aircraft (Tokyo Convention) (9/63). It applies to acts affecting in-flight safety.
http://www.iasl.mcgill.ca/air_law/tok1963.html

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
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Economist, vol. 338, no. 7955, March 2, 1996, pp. 23-25

ARTICLE ALERT



Abstracts of a few recent articles on terrorism.

Aberlin, Mary Beth.

TRACE ELEMENTS: TAGGANTS CAN HELP FINGER TERRORISTS AND COUNTERFEITERS
The Sciences, vol. 36, no. 6, November/December 1996, pp. 8-10

The author discusses how physical identification markers taggants can help solve terrorist attacks and other crimes. Taggants can mark human antibodies, fuels, explosives, cosmetics, perfumes, and pharmaceutical products.

Alali, A. Odasuo and Kenoye K. Eke.

TERRORISM, THE NEWS MEDIA, AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ORDER
Current World Leaders, vol. 39, no. 4, August 1996, pp. 67+

The role the mass media play in terrorist incidents is examined. At another level, the article analyses the impact of terrorism and media coverage of such acts of violence on political democratic order. Drs. Alali and Eke recommend that research efforts should be aimed at developing criteria to assess media coverage of terrorism, particularly in the area of ethical issues.

This article can be accessed via the Internet at:
<http://www.iasb.org/cwl/terror6.html>

Jain, Vinod K.

THWARTING TERRORISM WITH TECHNOLOGY
The World & I, vol. 11, no. 11, November 1996, pp. 149-155

The author describes technologies under development or in use to detect concealed bombs and explosives that are not revealed by the X-ray scanners and metal detectors currently in use at airports and other locations. A system that combines high-resolution X-ray imaging with computed tomography (CAT scanning) is being tested at several U.S. airports and is in regular operation at airports in several other countries. Other technologies include resonance analysis of low-intensity radio waves, vapor- or trace-detection systems, and pulsed fast-neutron analysis. All the systems involve trade-offs in speed, sensitivity, selectivity, and costs.

Kamp, Karl-Heinz.

AN OVERRATED NIGHTMARE
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 52, no. 4, July/August 1996, pp. 30-34

The sub-headline, "There are a lot of dangers out there, but terrorists wielding nuclear bombs isn't one of them," sums up the tenor of this article, which points out the difficulties terrorists would have in obtaining nuclear devices and using them effectively as nuclear weapons. The article mentions the extent of controls all nuclear states exert on their arsenals and nuclear materials. Though the author maintains it is naive to assume that terrorists could easily build nuclear weapons, he does not dismiss this as impossible. He concludes that nuclear materials should be protected stringently, and that prevention of nuclear terrorism should not be ignored.

Laqueur, Walter.

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Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 5, September/October 1996, pp. 24-36

The author describes the evolution of terrorism from the ideological to the expression of ethnic grievances. The current and future terrorist is armed with new weapons and experimenting with others. State-sponsored terrorism is replacing warfare, and lone individuals with grudges are more apt to turn to terrorism. He asserts that terrorism is becoming more destructive and putting the most advanced societies at greatest risk.

Nacos, Brigitte Lebens.

AFTER THE COLD WAR:

TERRORISM LOOMS LARGER AS A WEAPON OF DISSENT AND WARFARE

Current World Leaders, vol. 39, no. 4, August 1996, 12 pp.


This study examines the reasons why international terrorism has remained a major problem in the post-Cold War era. Dr. Nacos describes developments such as the eruption of ethnic nationalism in the former Soviet Union, the increased militancy of religious fundamentalists, the easy availability of weapons of mass destruction, and the global information highway, noting that these factors increase the likelihood of further terrorism and the need for more effective preventive measures.

Note that this article can be accessed via the Internet at: <http://www.iasb.org/cwl/terror2.html>

A more comprehensive Article Alert is offered on the international home page of the U. S. Information Agency:

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