NSF Award Abstract - #0112906| NSF Award Abstract - #0112906 |
AWSFL008-DS3 |
| NSF Org | SES |
| Latest Amendment Date | July 1, 2003 |
| Award Number | 0112906 |
| Award Instrument | Continuing grant |
| Program Manager |
Nancy A. Lutz SES DIVN OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SCIENCES SBE DIRECT FOR SOCIAL, BEHAV & ECONOMIC SCIE |
| Start Date | July 15, 2001 |
| Expires | June 30, 2006 (Estimated) |
| Expected Total Amount | $313872 (Estimated) |
| Investigator |
Lawrence M. Ausubel ausubel@econ.umd.edu (Principal Investigator current) Peter C. Cramton (Co-Principal Investigator current) |
| Sponsor |
U of MD College Park 3112 Lee Building College Park, MD 207425141 301/405-6269 |
| NSF Program | 1320 ECONOMICS |
| Field Application | |
| Program Reference Code | 0000,OTHR, |
In recent years, auction theory has been asked to provide guidance to policymakers in several important areas, including spectrum auctions, electricity auctions, and Treasury auctions. Unfortunately, the received theory had largely focused on auctions of a single object, and so had little to rigorously say about the most empirically relevant auction problems. Recent research by economists has begun to expand the boundaries of auction theory and analysis so as to encompass multiple-item auctions. In prior work, we have analyzed the theoretical properties of existing multiple-item auction formats, proposed new efficient auction formats for multiple items, proposed new applications for multiple-item auctions, and empirically evaluated recent applications of auctions for spectrum and electricity. This project builds upon this recent work, by examining the following topics: * Development of the properties of a new, efficient ascending auction for heterogeneous commodities. * Understanding the theoretical underpinnings for efficient ascending auctions. * Analysis of auctions for heterogeneous commodities in environments with interdependent values. * Study of auction theory with agency problems. * Use of the reserve price in mitigating the exercise of market power. * New applications for multiple-item auction designs. * Empirical analysis of the European 3G spectrum auctions. The project includes a balance between further theoretical developments of multiple-item auctions, and practical applications and empirical testing of the ideas of auction theory.
