The Peace Process with the AUC in Colombia

Presentation by Ambassador William B. Wood
The Woodrow Wilson International Center

Introduction

I am delighted to be here at the Woodrow Wilson International Center to discuss the vexed issue of the Colombian peace process with the AUC.

Support for peace should be the easiest of decisions. But in Colombia it is not. Indeed, in Colombia the idea of a peace process with the paramilitaries is in many ways more controversial than similar processes with such notable bad guys as the RUF in Sierra Leone, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, or even, in some ways, the Taliban in Afghanistan or the Baath Party and the Republican Guard in Iraq. Some in Europe and the United States have been prone to specify conditions for what is and is not an "acceptable" peace. And the Colombians, by attempting to establish a legal structure through what was once the "Alternative Sentencing Bill" and is now called the "Bill for Justice and Compensation" (in advance of any agreement) have gone through a similar domestic debate. In most circumstances, the process is reversed: the government strikes a deal and delivers a stark choice to the world: either support this peace or advocate continued conflict.

Right now the bill (which enjoys the general support of the U.S., the EU, and the UN) is awaiting adoption in the next session of Congress, which begins July 20. It was to have been adopted this session but fell victim to other urgent matters: reform of the penal code, passage of a tough new anti-terrorism law, and the first round of debate on a constitutional reform to allow re-election of the president. It also fell victim, I believe, to uncertainty about the future of the peace process itself, and the desire of the Colombian Congress to adopt a bill that would reinforce the chances for getting a good peace, without impeding the chances for an acceptable one.

Does this mean that the Government of Colombia should accept, and the U.S. support, peace at any price? Obviously not. In the case of Colombia, we should not consider support for any peace process unless it offers a good chance of ending conflict with the faction in question; reinforcing democracy, justice, and the rule of law; reducing narcotics trafficking; and providing the foundation for long-term peace, social equity, and development. I am convinced that those are the goals of the Government of Colombia.

But, after that, it gets murky. One interlocutor told me that he believed that durable peace with the paramilitaries required that 100 paramilitaries each go to jail for ten years. Or maybe a little less; he wasn't sure. I agree with him; I am not sure either. But I am sure of one thing: that we should defer to the democratic processes of the country that is waging the war. Colombia knows the cost of continued conflict and the benefits of future peace in a way that those of us outside the conflict cannot. And the strength of Colombian democracy gives the Colombian government the legitimacy to make the decision. That is the basis for the U.S. position that national reconciliation in Colombia is first and foremost up to the Colombians. And our desire to assist where we can be of assistance.

With that sort of metaphysical introduction, let's look at where we stand now.

Paramilitary Peace Process

In January, six months after the AUC had declared a cessation of hostilities, President Uribe was so dissatisfied with the continued, albeit reduced, level of violence against civilians and continued narco-trafficking by the AUC that he launched a major initiative to force them to the next stage of the process: verifiable concentration of forces. He reached a controversial agreement in January, ratified by the OAS on February 6, for the OAS to act as verifiers.

In early April, the talks looked as though they were breaking down. Carlos Castaño (historical leader of the AUC, drug trafficker and terrorist, fugitive from U.S. justice, and the loudest voice on the AUC side of the table for a negotiated peace) had disappeared. The leadership of the AUC increasingly was in the hands of long-term narco-traffickers without even the veneer of a historical political agenda. Peace Commissioner Restrepo had made a trip to Cordoba Department, where the talks were being held, to reverse his previous efforts to get an agreement that included all major AUC factions and instead to simply see if any of the factions were willing to sign on; he was not successful. The U.S. embassy was loudly criticizing the paramilitaries for their open descent into unambiguous narcoterrorism. "They have lost their disguise," was our cry (although it was never much of a disguise).

On April 27, President Uribe issued an ultimatum to the paramilitaries, which may have been a pivotal event. Its key elements were:

1. a first-ever accusation that the supposedly patriotic paramilitaries were targeting President Uribe for assassination, a true statement,

2. a statement that the peace process could not advance in the face of continued violations of the cessation of hostilities, drug trafficking, and other paramilitary violence,

3. a call for the paramilitaries to accept a concentration zone with clear rules, under OAS verification,

4. a threat that, otherwise, the government would continue to fight until they were annihilated, and

5. a confirmation that extradition was not a subject for negotiation.

   
   

Although the U.S. had no hand in drafting this statement, we strongly supported it, most directly during Under Secretary Grossman's visit in early May. Less than two weeks after that statement, AUC leadership advised the government that they were prepared to sign the draft peace agreement. Key elements of the agreement were:

• The ten most senior AUC leaders, with their bodyguards, about 400 persons in all, would concentrate in an area of 142 square miles (less than 12 miles by 12 miles) for six months, extendable upon agreement by the parties.

• Concentration of leaders was an explicit first step toward development of a timetable for concentration of all paramilitary forces.

• Once concentrated, paramilitary personnel would enter and leave the zone only with express permission of the government and only for activities related to the peace process. (There continues to be discussion about how many paramilitaries can be allowed out of the zone at any one time.)

• The paramilitaries inside the zone would not undertake illicit activities, recruit, pressure, or threaten the local population or visitors, train, or order or coordinate illegal actions. (This is crucial: concentrated paramilitary leaders will retain responsibility for the actions of their forces.)

• Arrest warrants would be suspended for paramilitaries within the zone, but national law would continue in full force there and the government could take law enforcement action in response to any infraction. (So the government can respond to any infraction by the leaders, or their cadre.)

• The OAS would verify compliance, including by receiving an inventory of all communications equipment, arms, and ammunition held by the paramilitaries in the zone. (The communications equipment is important because it is the basis for the continuing responsibility of the leaders for their cadre.)

• The military and police would establish a security perimeter around the zone. The 11th Army Brigade already has made its initial deployments. (The government had not been able to station troops in this area for more than a decade.)

On June 15, the government promulgated decrees 91 and 92, creating the zone of concentration and formally beginning the process of negotiation toward a final peace agreement with the paramilitaries. That same day, the paramilitaries and the government announced that concentration would take place on July 1. This is two weeks later than the original date for concentration and skepticism regarding paramilitary compliance remains high.

The U.S. welcomed the beginning of peace negotiations on June 16, emphasizing the contribution that a credible peace process could make toward ending the violence, the importance that the process in no way prejudice the extradition of Colombians indicted in the U.S., and the need to bring gross violators of human rights and major drug traffickers to trial. In Colombia, the Embassy has emphasized steadily in its public statements that the agreement is only as good as paramilitary compliance makes it. AUC leaders have requested the presence of the U.S. at the negotiating table. We have made clear that we would not even consider such a step.

ELN Peace Process

As the peace process with the paramilitaries was taking its most recent steps, on May 30 President Fox offered Mexican "facilitation" for a peace process with the ELN, one of the oldest, but now the weakest Colombian illegal armed group. Recent press accounts have noted that the ELN seemed to have only three options:

1. to lose on the battlefield,

2. to be absorbed by the FARC, which has a totally different approach and to which the ELN has lost both territory and stature, or

3. to negotiate with the government.

European repudiation of the ELN following the kidnapping last fall of European and Israeli eco-tourists may have influenced the ELN to move toward peace talks. The successful negotiations by the government that achieved their safe release, without damaging concessions, may have indicated that, unlike the FARC, the ELN could be dealt with and would comply with its commitments.

President Uribe has called for "prudence" in developing an ELN process, not least to limit the ability of the paramilitaries and the ELN to play two separate processes against each other. Nevertheless, on June 2 the government made an extraordinary gesture: it released for one day convicted ELN leader Franciso Galán to meet with Vice President Santos and Peace Commissioner Restrepo, and to deliver its position in the national congress, at a meeting on anti-personnel mines. Although the ELN response, calling for a bilateral cessation of hostilities (the equivalent of renunciation of government authority) and immediate release of all so-called political prisoners was not acceptable, the process continues. On June 16, Mexico named experienced diplomat and former ambassador to Colombia Andres Valencia as facilitator; on June 18 he met with Peace Commissioner Restrepo for the first time and shortly thereafter with Mr. Galán in an extended get-acquainted session. On June 24, the ELN Central Council named Galán as their official negotiator, indicating continued interest in the process. I met with Ambassador Valencia last week. I assured him that the U.S. has long supported a process with the ELN, provided it met President Uribe's pre-condition for all such talks (declaration of a unilateral ceasefire) and was a serious process. We will have to see how it unfolds.

FARC Peace Process

In the interest of completeness, a few words about the peace process (or the lack of one) with the FARC. The FARC has made numerous overtures through the UN, the Church, and other intermediaries. With the UN, they were seeking simply an initial meeting, but the preparatory talks foundered over the nature of the event: the UN wanted a serious discussion on neutral ground; the FARC wanted a media event involving either concession by the government of secure territory inside Colombia for the talks, or recognition of FARC status in some form by a foreign host government. The talks broke down. More to the point, the FARC have never come close to accepting the unavoidable pre-condition of the government for a peace process: a unilateral declaration of a cessation of hostilities, to include an end to narco-trafficking.

I have held two final topics for last, because they are meant to apply not to any specific peace process, but to any process with any of Colombia's terrorist groups: the legal structure for peace under the draft Law of Justice and Compensation, and the organizational preparations made by the Colombian government to implement demobilization and reinsertion of armed groups.

Law of Justice and Compensation

The draft Law of Justice and Compensation has evolved substantially since it was first introduced last fall. In essence, it provides a legal structure in the event that an illegal armed group declares a unilateral cessation of hostilities, signs a final peace agreement, and provides the government with a list of its members to be considered for benefits under the law. If, at any stage, an individual ex-combatant fails to fulfill his obligations under the law, he immediately loses the benefits and becomes subject to full law enforcement action. The steps in the current draft are as follows:

• The ex-combatant promises to meet the requirements levied by a new "Tribunal for Truth, Justice, and Compensation" regarding assisting victims, paying compensation, and cooperating in further peace-making. In particular, he must assist the prosecutors and the Tribunal in examining his case, and disclose his economic assets.

• The Prosecutor General reviews the ex-combatant's record, condenses all charges into one case, and sends its recommendations for a normal sentence to the Tribunal. The Tribunal reaches a verdict and sets the sentence; at that point the individual has been formally convicted and sentenced according to the usual Colombian norms.

• Then the Tribunal sends the case to the president, with its recommendation that the ex-combatant be given or denied benefits; i.e., an alternative sentence. If the recommendation is denial, the individual receives the full sentence and the President (really the Ministry of Justice and Interior, which is responsible for the prison system) determines where he will serve it.

• If the recommendation is to grant benefits under the law, the president makes a final decision in favor or against benefits for the individual, and returns the case to the Tribunal. Again, if he decides against benefits, he determines where the sentence will be served.

• If the president decides in favor of benefits for this individual, the Tribunal sets the "alternative sentence," between five and 10 years of prison, and imposes obligations for compensation and peace-making actions. Again, the president determines where the sentence will be served.

• After serving his sentence and fulfilling all other obligations, the beneficiary is placed under supervised parole for ten years (or five years if he had received the minimum alternative sentence of five years).

• If, at the end of that period, the individual has fulfilled every obligation, he is a free man.

A couple of comments:

• First, this is a law meant for the leaders and most violent members of these organizations. Only those found personally responsible for major violent crimes or narco-trafficking would pass under it. Most members of IAGs would probably be found to be guilty only of so-called political crimes, which would be amnestied.

• Second, the payment of compensation under the law should not be confused with restoration of stolen or wrongfully acquired property. Compensation is in addition to restoration of illegally acquired property. So the former combatant faces both confiscation of illegal assets and compensation for illegal actions paid from possibly legal assets: two blows to the pocketbook.

• Third, no promises regarding extradition are made or implied in any part of the law.

• Finally, as I said earlier, the law is still in draft form and, now, not one but both terrorist organizations involved in peace talks will be reacting to it at the negotiating table. The government, and Peace Commissioner Restrepo in particular, have been very, very firm regarding jail time, compensation, and extradition, in spite of intense pressure from the paramilitaries. The ELN is likely to adhere to much the same line. The U.S., the Europeans, and the UN have all said that they can generally support the draft as it now stands. We will continue to support a tough line with terrorists.

Demobilization and Reinsertion

The government's plans for demobilization and reinsertion are also meant to apply to all groups entering a peace process. But there clearly will be operational differences if only because of the difference in size between the few thousand ELN members and the much larger AUC paramilitaries.

In general, the process is under the control of, first, the Peace Commissioner during the negotiations, second, the Ministry of Defense during the concentration and demobilization phase (which includes identification by the National Civil Registry and judicial interrogation by the Prosecutor General), and third the Ministry of Justice and Interior during the reinsertion phase, with the assistance of a number of other governmental and non-governmental social entities to help with health, education, and placement. The OAS has accompanied the Peace Commissioner at all recent negotiating sessions (not as a mediator but as an adviser to the government) and is responsible for verification of all operational phases.

The Medellín-based demobilization of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara, which you will hear about later, has reached the final stages of reinsertion and has many practical experiences to share. But the government's national effort has not yet passed the initial negotiation stage with any group. As I indicated, it was only on June 15 that the government formally ended the pre-negotiation phase with the paramilitary AUC group and began final negotiations.

The negotiation phase with the AUC paramilitaries has been difficult. Reports are that the disappearance of Carlos Castaño was related to his willingness, in contrast to the other AUC negotiators, to accept government demands, and that he was a source of internal dissension and insecurity among AUC leaders. Reports are also that Dr. Restrepo has taken a very tough line, through shouting matches and threats to leave the table; President Uribe's high popularity and the growing possibility of re-election give Restrepo a strong negotiating base.

Negotiations are taking place only within the limits of the April 27 declaration and the draft Law of Justice and Compensation, although the paramilitaries regularly attempt to sidestep both. As a result, the discussions have operationally related to two chief subjects: modalities for the concentration of the leaders, and the subsequent concentration and demobilization of their forces. Regarding the modalities, there already have been heated disputes regarding, for example, access by the paramilitaries to media and other outsiders. Regarding concentration of the rank-and-file, the first goal is to establish a calendar for concentration and demobilization. The government's goal (a hopeful one) is to concentrate up to 4,000 paramilitaries by year's end.

The concentration and demobilization phases are modeled after the government's experience with some 4,000 deserters from all the terrorist groups. Each former combatant would be identified, not least to enable a check of criminal records for past crimes (not an easy task, for instance, for paramilitaries carried off as child soldiers years ago). The Defense Ministry would debrief for intelligence about the organization and operation of the paramilitaries (the deserter program has been an important source of such information). The Prosecutor General would interview the former combatant for information relating to possible prosecution, application of the law of Justice and Compensation, and general legal issues. Following satisfactory interviews, the ex-combatant would sign a pledge to permanently separate himself from the organization and its activities, acknowledging that any failure to cooperate would leave him open for full action of law enforcement. That would constitute formal demobilization.

Finally, entry into the reinsertion program and preparation for reinsertion. This phase is supposed to last for no more than a year for each "reinsertado," except in the case of child soldiers. In all cases, it is expected that the national Institute for Family Welfare, the Ministries of Health and Education, the national Training Institute, and a number of others would work to prepare the ex-combatant for return to normal life in body and mind. In cases where ex-combatants want to return to farms or other places they formally worked, they normally would be allowed to go. In other cases, they would be prepared for some sort of regular work. They would receive a stipend during this period, in exchange for cooperation and work that did not interfere with the other tasks of this phase.

Estimates have placed the cost of the whole demobilization process at about $8,500 per head, or more than $42 million for 5,000 "reinsertados." The government is still defining the specific elements of the program, so the precise numbers are not yet available. They may even be affected by the negotiations themselves, so we may not be able to know the costs in complete detail for a while longer. Although the cash-strapped government will pay the lion's share of the cost of concentration and demobilization, they need help on the more "humanitarian" reinsertion side: they are requesting that the international community contribute up to $5,700 per "reinsertado." We are studying the policy, budgetary, and legal implications of U.S. assistance. One thing is clear: the cost of reinsertion for each ex-combatant would be substantially lower than the costs of his continued illegal activity plus the cost of confronting and defeating him militarily. Not to mention the continued suffering by the population and the armed forces that would entail. A good peace is also a good deal.

The OAS verification mission has also faced financial difficulties. The U.S. provided several hundred thousand dollars to help OAS mission head Sergio Caramagna launch his office. The government just provided $1 million for further preparation and development. But long-term funding is unclear. Until that is pinned down, Caramagna, who is working almost alone, says he is unable to write contracts with the experts he needs to do the actual work. In addition, Caramagna says that he has critical needs for vehicles and communication gear: in all such operations, mobility and communications compensate for not having sufficient personnel to be in all places at all times. Sweden appears to have offered to send an expert to work in Caramagna's office, who will also come with some equipment. The U.S. recently reached a decision that continued assistance to the OAS effort is legally possible for us if there are no changes in the program. But, since the program is still in development, there will be changes; so we are working to broaden that decision.

Bottom Line

Thank you for your attention to what has been a very long and probably too-detailed presentation. In closing, I would like to leave you with some concluding thoughts:

• This is hard. Finding a balance between peace and justice necessarily implies that neither goal will be served perfectly, so judgment is a key factor. The draft Law of Justice and Compensation has been toughened substantially since its introduction precisely because voices inside and outside Colombia didn't think the first draft got it exactly right. That debate will continue inside and outside Colombia.

• This is uncertain. The paramilitaries are composed of many different kinds of people: Child soldiers who never had a chance to know better. Campesinos who may have been caught up in a struggle they did not understand or may have felt that their safety and the safety of their families required that they ally with one armed side or another. Thugs and psychopaths looking for a way to realize their desire to prey on society. Leaders who range from those who once may have had an ideology but slipped into narco-trafficking and abuse over the years, to the hardest-core, most cynical, most cruel drug lords on the face of the earth, hoping to use the so-called political aspects of the movement to disguise and shield their real activities. And leaders-to-be waiting for their time when they can order the depredations, and reap the profits. By the way, the other illegal armed groups share this horribly mixed profile. In no plausible scenario will all of these persons participate in good faith in any meaningful peace process. But to be able to pull 1,000 or 5,000 or, optimistically, 10,000 fighters off the battlefield, in the country with the largest, and longest-lived terrorist movement in the world, is a goal worth working for.

• Finally, this is a necessary part of our policy, both as a part of our partnership with the Uribe Administration and as part of our unrelenting war on terrorism and narco-trafficking. Just as we support alternative development to undermine the economic and social structure that has contributed to the growth of narco-terrorism, we must also support a "pull" strategy to complement our forceful "push" strategy to destroy the political and military structure of the illegal armed groups. And we have to get it right.

Thank you again for your attention. And thanks again to the Woodrow Wilson International Center for hosting this important discussion, so directly relevant to the well-being of our citizens, as they live their daily lives in U.S. cities, suburbs, and towns.

Washington, DC
June 28, 2004