| La Embajada | Temas bilaterales | Prensa | Recursos electrónicos | Preguntas frecuentes | Sobre EE.UU. | Consular | Contáctenos |
|
| ||||
|
|
Actualizada: 29/IV/02
English version
Los esfuerzos para ayudar a Colombia muestran progreso, afirmó Speer. Pero advirtió que los militares colombianos carecen todavía de los "recursos, el personal, el transporte aéreo y la movilidad para restablecer un ambiente seguro y libre de peligros en todo el país". Speer advirtió que si a la amenaza terrorista que hay ahora en Colombia y otras partes de América Latina "no se la saca a luz y se la elimina, esa amenaza plantea una potencial amenaza seria" a la seguridad nacional de Estados Unidos y de sus vecinos. Speer citó un informe del Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos que dice que el 86% de todos los actos terroristas contra los intereses estadounidenses durante el 2000 en todo el mundo, ocurrieron en América Latina, predominantemente en Colombia. La bomba a las puertas de la embajada de Estados Unidos en Perú, que precedió a la visita del Presidente Bush a ese país en marzo, "indica que otros grupos terroristas locales plantean amenazas a Estados Unidos en otras partes del Hemisferio", le dijo Speer a la Subcomisión del Hemisferio Occidental, Cuerpos de Paz y Asuntos de Narcóticos, la cual es parte de la Comisión de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado. Declaró también que el tráfico de drogas persiste como una "amenaza corrosiva a la democracia, la estabilidad y la prosperidad de las naciones de la región", especialmente en la cordillera andina. Agregó que el tráfico de drogas genera violencia, promueve el crimen y corrompe las instituciones públicas. Sobre cómo luchar contra el tráfico de drogas en la región, Speer dijo que Estados Unidos apoya volver a establecer el Programa de Bloqueo del Puente Aéreo en Colombia y Perú, "como medio efectivo de interceptar la corriente de drogas, armas y contrabando". Anteriormente este programa demostró ser muy exitoso en desbaratar una red esencial de "acarreo" para los traficantes de drogas. Una vez que se hayan instalado las salvaguardas apropiadas, el programa debería reiniciarse.
Major General Gary Speer, U.S. Army
In these prepared remarks, "billion" equals "thousand million."
I have served as the Acting Commander in Chief of United States
Southern Command since October 1, 2001, when General Pace assumed the
position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the past
ten months, I have traveled to Colombia eight times. I have met key
leaders in Colombia and here in the United States, both military and
civilian. I appreciate their challenges and am convinced that the
Colombian military is led by experienced and principled officers. I
have seen first hand the commitment of the Colombian military's
leadership towards professionalizing their force, to include respect
for human rights and the rule of law.
I am grateful for the opportunity to provide an overview of the
problems facing Colombia and its neighbors, and what we have done to
date to address these threats and enhance security and stability,
which are the underpinnings of economic growth and legitimate
governance.
During the past 25 years, nations of our hemisphere have made
substantial progress toward achieving peace through democratically
elected governments, economic development, and the subordination of
the military to civilian authority. All countries, except for Cuba,
have democratically elected governments. Without a clear or imminent
external threat, Latin American and Caribbean nations essentially
appear to be at peace with their neighbors.
Underlying this perception of tranquility are the multiple
transnational threats of terrorism, drug and arms trafficking, illegal
migration, and organized crime, all of which threaten the security and
stability of the region. Some of our hemispheric neighbors are
suffering from the effects of political instability, faltering
economic growth, and institutional weakness. High unemployment,
endemic poverty, corruption, and crime combined with the effects of
terrorism, drug trafficking, and other illicit transnational
activities challenge and threaten the legitimacy of many of these
governments and consequently threaten U.S. hemispheric interests.
Governments are feeling the strain of weak economies, rampant
corruption, ineffective judicial systems, and growing discontent of
the people as democratic and economic reforms fall short of
expectations.
Transnational threats in the region are increasingly linked as they
share common infrastructure, transit patterns, corrupting means, and
illicit mechanisms. These threats transcend borders and seriously
affect the security interests of the United States.
Southern Command recognized a viable terrorist threat in Latin America
long before September 11. If not further exposed and removed, that
threat potentially poses a serious threat to both our national
security and that of our neighbors. We in Southern Command have
monitored terrorist activities for years with such incidents as the
bombing of the Israeli Embassy and Jewish-Argentine Cultural Center in
Argentina in 1992 and 1994 attributed to Hizballah.
Recently, international terrorist groups have turned to some Latin
American countries as safe havens from which they sustain worldwide
operations. As an example, the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil,
and Paraguay serves as a base of support for Islamic Radical Groups,
such as Hizballah, HAMAS, and Al Gama'at al-Islamiyya. These
organizations generate revenue through illicit activities that include
drug and arms trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering, forged
travel documents, and even software and music piracy.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National
Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN) and the United Self Defense Group of
Colombia (AUC) are all on the State Department's list of Foreign
Terrorist Organizations. The FARC has been implicated in kidnappings
and attacks against United States citizens and interests, including
the murder of three U.S. citizens in 1999. According to the Department
of State's most recent "Patterns of Global Terrorism" report, 86
percent of all terrorist acts against U.S. interests throughout the
world in 2000 occurred in Latin America, predominately in Colombia.
The recent bombing outside the U.S Embassy in Peru preceding President
Bush's visit is indicative that other domestic terrorist groups pose
threats to the United States elsewhere in the hemisphere. These
include, but are not limited to, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)
and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) in Peru and the Jama'at
al Muslimeen (JAM) in Trinidad and Tobago.
Illegal drugs inflict an enormous toll on the people and economy of
the United States and our hemispheric neighbors, and appropriately,
have often been characterized as a weapon of mass destruction.
According to the latest Office of National Drug Control Policy
figures, Americans spend more than $64 billion on illegal drugs while
drug abuse killed more than 19,000 Americans and accounted for $160
billion in expenses and lost revenue. Most of the world's cocaine and
a significant portion of the heroin entering the United States are
produced in the Andean Region.
Drug trafficking persists as a corrosive threat to the democracy,
stability, and prosperity of nations within the region, especially in
the Andean Ridge, adversely affecting societies and economies as
scarce resources are diverted to rehabilitation, interdiction, and
crime prevention efforts. Drug trafficking generates violence, fosters
crime, and corrupts public institutions. Increasingly, terrorist
organizations support themselves through drug trafficking. This trend
is particularly troubling in Colombia where we find clear connections
between drug trafficking, guerrillas, and terrorist activities.
It is not only the drug producing countries that suffer. No country in
this hemisphere through which drugs transit escapes the violence and
corrupting influences of drug trafficking. Additionally, as
traffickers exchange drugs for arms and services in the transit
countries, transit nations are now becoming drug consumers as well.
Although Latin America and the Caribbean spend less than any other
region on legal arms purchases, illegal arms sales pose a significant
threat to the stability of the region. Of particular concern is the
rising trend in which Drug Trafficking Organizations exchange drugs
for arms, which are then provided to terrorist organizations such as
the FARC, ELN, and AUC in Colombia. Illegal arms originate from
throughout the world and transit through the porous borders of
Colombia's neighbors. Arms traffickers use a variety of land,
maritime, and air routes that often mirror drug and human trafficking
networks.
Latin America and the Caribbean are major avenues for worldwide
illegal migration. Although not a problem directly tied to Colombia,
illegal migration and human smuggling operations are linked to drugs
and arms trafficking, corruption, organized crime, and the possibility
for the movement of members of terrorist organizations.
According to the Census Bureau's latest figures, more than eight
million illegal immigrants reside in the United States; nearly two
million of them are from the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility. The
United States Immigration and Naturalization Service estimates more
than 300,000 illegal immigrants annually originate in, or transit
through, Central American countries destined for the United States.
Also, many Chinese illegal immigrants destined for the U.S. transit
through Suriname, Ecuador and other countries in the hemisphere. Human
trafficking is highly profitable, providing revenue of more than $1
billion annually to smuggling organizations within the region.
Moreover, human trafficking provides the potential means of entry into
the U.S. for criminals and terrorists.
No other region is suffering the destabilizing effects of
transnational threats more than the Andean Ridge countries. In
Colombia, the FARC, ELN, and AUC have created an environment of
instability in which the Government of Colombia does not control
portions of the country. In the areas where military and police are
not present and do not have control, there is lack of a safe and
secure environment, which undermines the ability to govern and permits
terrorism and crime to flourish.
The violence in Colombia remains a significant threat to the region as
the combination and links among guerrillas, terrorists,
drug-traffickers, and illegal self-defense forces have severely
stressed the government's ability to exercise sovereignty and maintain
security. The FARC and other illegal groups cross into neighboring
countries at will. In addition, neighboring countries remain
transshipment points for arms and drugs entering and exiting Colombia.
Colombia is critically important to the United States. With over 40
million people, it is the second oldest democracy in the hemisphere,
and it is an important trading partner, notably for oil. More
importantly, it is the linchpin of the Andean Region; as such, it is
critical for the United States that Colombia re-establish a safe and
secure environment within its borders and survive as an effective
democracy. Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador are certainly at risk to
some degree based on what happens in Colombia.
The current political and security situation in Colombia is at a
critical juncture. Notwithstanding the Government of Colombia's
eleventh hour extension of the despeje, the FARC's "safe haven," on
January 20 of this year, the FARC initiated a countrywide terror
campaign with more than 120 attacks against the nation's
infrastructure and cities. These attacks ultimately prompted President
Pastrana to eliminate the despeje on February 20, and initiate
operations to occupy the area. From a military perspective, it was the
right move. The FARC used the despeje as a sanctuary to support their
drug trafficking operations, launch terrorist attacks, and recruit and
train their forces. Simply put, the FARC is a terrorist organization
that conducts violent terrorist attacks to undermine the security and
stability of Colombia, financed by its involvement in every aspect of
drug cultivation, production and transportation, as well as by
kidnapping and extortion.
The Colombian military immediately initiated operations to reoccupy
the despeje, focusing on occupying population centers with deliberate
operations to prevent civilian casualties. This strategy averted
significant displacement of the population. In response, the FARC
avoided confronting the military and has broken down into small
elements, retreated into the jungle and rural areas, and concentrated
its actions on terrorist attacks against the country's infrastructure.
While the March 10 congressional elections were executed relatively
problem-free, the weeks leading to the upcoming Presidential elections
on May 26 will be particularly critical as the Colombian Military
dedicates significant resources to ensure the security of the
electoral process.
We continue to execute the Department of Defense's counterdrug support
to Plan Colombia, Colombia's national security plan. Colombia is just
beginning the second year of this six-year plan. The initial phase of
operations focused in the Putumayo and Caqueta Departments of Southern
Colombia where approximately half of Colombia's coca cultivation takes
place. In implementing U.S. Support to Plan Colombia initiated by the
FY 2000 Emergency Supplemental, Southern Command has been responsible
for training and equipping a Counter Narcotics Brigade, riverine
units, fielding Blackhawk and Huey II helicopters, training pilots and
crews, infrastructure upgrades, and providing counterdrug intelligence
support. We are seeing positive results from our support. Although our
focus has been support to counterdrug operations, the increased
professionalism of the Colombian military, significant progress in
respect for human rights and the rule of law, and improved operational
planning and execution are all directly linked to our support.
The Counter Narcotics Brigade (CN Brigade) headquarters and its three
battalions are now fully trained and equipped. United States trainers
performed staff and light infantry training for almost 2,300 troops.
The brigade headquarters and the second battalion of the brigade
completed training and began operations in December 2000; we completed
training of the third battalion last May. We continue to provide
sustainment training to the CN Brigade.
The CN Brigade is the best-trained and equipped unit in the Colombian
Army. It has impressive results during drug interdiction operations by
destroying coca processing labs, providing security to eradication
operations, and seizing chemical precursors and coca leaf in Southern
Colombia. Since operations began in December 2000, over 890 drug labs
have been destroyed and 119 people detained for judicial processing.
The CN Brigade has also provided the ground security for the spraying
of 59,000 hectares of coca in the Putumayo and Caqueta regions.
Colombia's spraying effort in Putumayo last year would not have been
possible without the CN Brigade's aggressive ground support to spray
aircraft. There have been no allegations of human rights abuses
against the CN Brigade.
In addition, indications are that the Colombian military's concerted
interdiction efforts combined with aerial spraying are having an
effect on the narcotraffickers. Cocaine labs are being established
away from the Putumayo and Caqueta cultivation areas; in fact, large
scale, industrial size labs were discovered in the former despeje.
With the training and capabilities of the CN Brigade, no longer does
the FARC own the military initiative in Putumayo and Caqueta
Departments, but avoids head-on engagements against the Colombian
military. This increased security in the coca growing areas affords a
better environment for interdiction efforts by the CN Brigade and the
Colombian National Police.
Since December 2000, the United States has provided air mobility to
the first CN Brigade using 33 UH-1Ns with a combination of Colombian
and Department of State contracted pilots. The UH1N aircraft are based
in Tolemaida with the Colombian Army Aviation Battalion and are
forward deployed to Larandia for operations. Last year, the UH-1Ns
flew over 10,000 flight hours in direct support of Joint Task Force
South CN operations, moving over 26,700 soldiers and 261 tons of
cargo. The current operational focus remains providing air mobility
support for Joint Task Force South counterdrug missions in Colombia.
Our training and logistics programs are on track to provide greatly
enhanced air mobility capability to the Colombian Army. All fourteen
UH-60L Blackhawk helicopters procured under Plan Colombia for the
Colombian military were delivered by December 2001. The first 6 of the
25 Plan Colombia Huey II aircraft arrived in March 2002. Under the
current delivery schedule, we expect the remaining 19 Huey II
helicopters to be delivered by the end of September 2002.
Department of Defense training programs specifically designed to
fulfill the requirement for trained Colombian Army pilots, crew
chiefs, and maintenance personnel for the Blackhawk and Huey II
helicopters are currently underway and progressing well in Colombia
and in the United States. In addition to training pilots, crew chiefs
and maintenance personnel will also be trained.
This has been a real success story: Colombian Air Force Instructor
Pilots under the quality control of an U.S. Army Technical Assistance
Field Team are training Colombian Army pilots in the Blackhawk
transition and the Initial Entry Rotary Wing (IERW) courses. The night
vision training, advanced or readiness level progression training, and
the Huey II transition are being executed through a DOD contract in
Colombia. Crew chiefs are being trained in Spanish, both in the United
States and Colombia. The various special aviation and avionics
maintenance training is conducted in Army schools in the United
States. The Plan Colombia Blackhawk pilot and crew training will be
complete in July. The first IERW course is in progress and Huey II
transition will commence this month with a projected completion of
Colombian Army pilots and crews for the 25 Huey IIs by mid 2004. The
long pole in the aviation training is the CONUS specialized
maintenance training, which will last through 2003 due to the
extensive technical courses and the limited throughput possible. As
such, contractor logistics support will be required throughout this
entire period.
For much of Colombia, the rivers are the highways. Consequently, the
rivers are the only means of transportation and commercial
communication. As a result, an integral part of our support to
Colombia has been the training and equipping of the Colombian Riverine
forces. The goal of the Riverine Forces is to permit the Colombian
government to exercise sovereignty throughout the vast regions where
other governmental entities are otherwise absent. Colombia's plan is
to establish controls at critical river junctures along its borders
and throughout the heartland of the country. The plan includes
establishment of 58 riverine combat elements, with support structures,
at these critical river nodes. The operational objective of the
Riverine Forces is to establish control over the riverine
transportation network and interdict illicit trafficking of precursor
chemicals used in the production of cocaine.
To date five riverine battalions, composed of thirty riverine combat
elements, have been deployed and are operating throughout Colombia.
These riverine combat elements have successfully supported the
operations of the first CN brigade in destroying riverside labs and by
providing convoy security for building material used to construct the
Tres Esquinas airbase. Furthermore, these riverine units have
established the first continuous presence of the Colombian government
in areas previously abandoned to control of narco-terrorists
organizations. Continued support to complete the fielding of the
remaining riverine combat elements and establishment of a
self-sustaining training capability are high priorities in our
strategy for the future.
Extensive projects are underway in Larandia to support the CN Brigade
and associated helicopters. They include helicopter pads, a fueling
system, maintenance hangar and storage warehouse, operations building,
control tower, and an ammo storage facility with arm/disarm pads. The
first helicopter projects will be completed later this year, with the
overall construction complete in 2003. Other projects at Larandia
include additional barracks for both counter narcotics and aviation
brigade personnel, a counter narcotics brigade headquarters facility,
and a supply warehouse. These support projects will be complete later
this year also. At Tres Esquinas (a forward operating site in Southern
Colombia), construction was recently completed on the riverine
facilities, an A-37 ramp, and taxiway. The remaining projects at Tres
Esquinas (runway extension and Schweizer hanger) are in progress with
completions also scheduled for later this year. The riverine base at
El Encanto (forward base in Southern Colombia) and the riverine
maintenance facility at Nueva Antioquia are complete. However, the
airfield runway improvements at Marandua remain unfunded; this
airfield will be critical to supporting operations in Eastern
Colombia. The military base and improvement projects, which we have
funded and overseen, have effectively enabled the Colombian military
to expand its influence over the coca growing areas of Putumayo and
Caqueta.
Additionally, we continue to improve our infrastructure at the Forward
Operating Location (FOL) in Manta, Ecuador. Last year, operations at
the FOL ceased for six months while we made runway improvements. The
current construction for living quarters and maintenance facilities
will be completed in June 2002. The infrastructure upgrades for the
FOL at Curacao are in progress, but Aruba remains unfunded. The FOLs
are critical to our source zone counterdrug operations and provides
coverage in the transit zone Pacific where we have seen the greatest
increase in drug smuggling activity.
The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is assisting the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in
providing employment for the alternative development program in
Colombia. Due to the long process for crop substitution to develop
into major income producing industries, USAID determined that a
large-scale jobs-via-infrastructure program is needed to provide
short-term income to individuals shifting from coca production as well
as eliminating the competitive disadvantages resulting from the lack
of infrastructure where crop substitution will take place. The USACE
is currently analyzing and evaluating infrastructure works in Putumayo
and Caqueta. One project already approved for development includes the
repair and widening of a road connecting the Putumayo and Caqueta
river systems. This project will reduce the time required to move
products through Putumayo and Caqueta while providing employment to
those individuals shifting from coca production. Additionally, it will
enhance the mutual support of Colombian military units operating along
the rivers.
We have witnessed a steady improvement in the professionalism and
respect for human rights and the rule of law by the Colombian
military, accompanied by increased effectiveness in counterdrug
operations. The increase in professionalism starts with the continued
professional military education, the confidence gained by technical
proficiency, and resources available for operations.
Our legal assistance projects in Colombia, which include developing a
Judge Advocate General (JAG) school as well as legal and human rights
reform, continue on track. We have worked closely with the Colombian
military to establish and build a Military Penal Justice Corps that
has made significant strides in a short period of time. The initial
JAG school courses began in February 2002 for 60 judge advocates and
clerks in temporary facilities. The Department of State recently
approved funding for construction of a permanent JAG facility, and we
expect completion in July 2003.
In the area of human rights, United States Southern Command has
supported Colombian efforts to extend human rights training throughout
its ranks. Additionally, we sponsor opportunities for the continued
exchange of information on human rights issues, such as: a recent
Human Rights Seminar with 60 Colombian media and international
representatives, bimonthly human rights roundtables involving
representatives from various sectors of Colombian society,
incorporating human rights in every training initiative, and advanced
education programs. This summer, twenty students from the Armed
Forces, National Police, Ministry of Defense, and Commanding General's
office will receive specialty degrees in International Humanitarian
Law.
I am convinced the military leadership in Colombia is firmly committed
to human rights and is taking action on any new reports of wrongdoing
that come to their attention, to include any reports of collusion with
illegal self defense forces. They have suspended officers and
noncommissioned officers for acts of wrongdoing and have stepped up
their operations against illegal defense forces.
Colombian military combat operations increased against illegal
self-defense groups in 2001. With increased operations against these
groups, the Colombian military captured or killed approximately 700
illegal defense force individuals in 2001, compared to 239 in 2000.
During this period there has been positive institutional response with
prosecutions of military members with credible allegations of ties to
illegal self-defense forces rising and improved cooperation with
civilian legal authorities.
In fact, in a short period of time, the Colombian military has emerged
as one of the most respected and trusted organizations in Colombian
society. Fewer than three percent of complaints of human rights abuses
last year were attributed to the Colombian Security Forces, down from
a high of 60 percent just a few years ago. There have been zero
allegations of human rights abuses against the U.S. trained counter
narcotics drug brigade.
This is a success story that often gets overlooked. Colombia should
publicize what the military is doing and take credit for the
accomplishments they have attained. This progress reflects a strong
and principled leadership and the genuine desire of the Colombian
military to honor and promote democratic principles in their country.
The Department of State's Andean Counterdrug Initiative is designed to
sustain and expand programs funded by the FY 2000 emergency
supplemental. It addresses potential production, processing, and
distribution spillover due to successful Plan Colombia execution.
Since the beginning of 2001, we have been working with the Department
of State to help develop, prioritize, and validate requirements for
partner nation militaries. In each case, although still counterdrug
focused, we are seeking to sustain the military contacts focused on
professionalization of the armed forces and the specific challenges
and security needs within available resources.
Approximately $100 million of the Andean Counterdrug Initiative will
be allocated to support the Colombian military. This funding will be
used to sustain the capabilities initiated under the FY 2000
supplemental appropriation, particularly in the areas of training and
aviation support for the first CN Brigade, riverine programs, and the
Colombia military legal reform program.
Based on the success of the first CN Brigade, the U.S. government is
supporting Colombia's request to train and equip a second CN Brigade
in FY 2003 for employment elsewhere within the country. The existing
CN Brigade has been successful in forcing the drug traffickers to move
their operations outside of the Putumayo and Caqueta departments. A
second CD Brigade will enable the Colombians to attack the other main
coca growing areas to the east of the Andean Ridge or elsewhere in the
country.
Using the first CN Brigade as a baseline, we will profit from our
experience in training and equipping the second CN Brigade. The second
CN Brigade will be made up of approximately 1,700 troops. If approved,
using U.S. Special Operations Forces, we could train one battalion per
quarter, commencing with the second CN Brigade Staff. This training
will continue to emphasize professionalism and human rights
requirements. The equipment will include weapons, ammunition, and
communications equipment. Additionally, the Department of State's FY
2003 request includes funding to continue sustainment training of the
existing CN Brigade.
In addition to counterdrug assistance, the Administration has proposed
to Congress $98 million, for FY 2003, to help Colombia to enhance the
training and equipping of units to protect the Caño Limon-Covenas oil
pipeline, one of the most vulnerable elements of their economic
infrastructure. The FARC and ELN are active in carrying out attacks
against Colombia's energy infrastructure. Attacks on the Caño
Limon-Covenas pipeline cost the Government of Colombia more than $40
million per month in revenues when the pipeline is not operational.
During the past year, the pipeline was offline for more than 266 days.
In addition, the amount of oil spilled during these attacks is eleven
times greater than the Exxon Valdez spill, creating significant
environmental damage.
The Administration has included $6 million in the FY 2002 Supplemental
to begin the training. The first unit to be trained for this program
will be the recently human rights vetted, Arauca-based Colombian Army
18th Brigade. Subsequent units to be trained for infrastructure
security include the 5th Mobile Brigade, designated Colombian National
Police units, and Colombian Marines. The Colombian units will also be
equipped with weapons and ammunition, vehicles, night vision devices,
and communications equipment, as well as a helicopter tactical lift
capability for a company-sized quick reaction force.
If approved, this training will assist the Colombians to exert
effective sovereignty in the Arauca Department, where these attacks
primarily occur. Through a comprehensive strategy of reconnaissance
and surveillance, offensive and quick reaction operations, the
Colombian military will be better able to mitigate the debilitating
economic and financial effects of constant attacks on critical
infrastructure.
Despite extensive eradication in the source zone and successful
interdiction in the transit zone, cocaine supply continues to exceed
demand. Although Colombia and other partner nations are willing to
work with us to counter the production and trafficking of illegal
drugs, effective and sustainable counterdrug operations are beyond the
capabilities of their thinly stretched security forces.
United States counterdrug assistance to security forces helps Colombia
and other nations in the region develop more effective counterdrug
capabilities; however, drug trafficking organizations have shown
considerable flexibility in adjusting their operations in reaction to
counterdrug efforts.
With Colombia's narcoterrorists increasingly supporting themselves
through drug trafficking, it is increasingly difficult for the
security forces to sustain a secure environment that allows democratic
institutions to fully function, permits political, economic, and
social reforms to take hold, and reduces the destabilizing spillover
into neighboring countries.
In addition to combating the FARC and its current terror campaign, the
Colombian Military must contend on a daily basis with the conventional
and terrorist attacks by the ELN and AUC, as well as the drug
trafficking organizations. This requires not only the continuous
conduct of military and counterdrug operations, but the protection of
population centers, critical infrastructure to include electrical
towers and power grids, communication towers and facilities, the oil
pipelines, dams, roads and bridges. Also, the Colombian military must
devote significant resources and manpower to secure the Presidential
election process.
Although we have seen great progress through the military portion of
the first year of Plan Colombia, the Colombian military still lacks
all of the essential resources to create a safe and secure environment
in Colombia. As mentioned previously, fundamental security and
stability are necessary for the Government of Colombia to remain a
viable, legitimate government and for other supporting programs to
succeed.
U.S. support to the Colombian military is currently restricted to
support for counterdrug operations. We are further limited by
restrictions on sharing non-counterdrug information with the
Colombians. The Colombians are also limited in their use of U.S.
provided counterdrug-funded equipment, such as the Plan Colombia
helicopters.
If enacted, the Administration's FY 2002 supplemental request to
expand our authorities in Colombia will provide some relief by lifting
these restriction for United States funded equipment, assets, and
programs for Colombia. Even, without any additional funding or
resources, this authority would allow us to look at the FARC, (AUC and
ELN) not only as drug traffickers, but also as a narco-terrorist
organization and to gather and share information on their activities
across the board. Additionally, from an interdiction standpoint, again
with the assets already provided, instead of attempting to interdict
only drugs leaving Colombia, we would be able to look for the arms
entering the country, which are fueling the FARC, ELN, and AUC. For
Colombia, the expanded authority, if approved, would allow them to use
the helicopters we provide and the CN Brigade for missions other than
counterdrug.
We support reinstating the Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia and
Peru as an effective means to interdict the flow of drugs, arms and
contraband. In the past, this program was very successful in breaking
down a critical network of conveyance for the drug traffickers.
Furthermore, we know that arms traffickers smuggle weapons to the FARC
by air. By incorporating the recommendations of the Beers and Busby
reports, we can safely resume U.S. support to the air bridge denial
operations and reinforce our commitment to partner nations.
As we look to the future, we need to ensure that our efforts are
focused on fighting terrorism throughout this hemisphere and on
preserving and stabilizing Colombia's democracy. The problem in
Colombia is not just about drugs.
One of the cornerstones of our security cooperation strategy is to
provide the opportunity for professional military education in the
United States for students from Latin America and the Caribbean. Our
professional military education institutions dedicated to the region
provide those opportunities and serve as vital tools in achieving
United States strategic objectives in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Our professional military education program has been a significant
factor in shaping the current leadership in Colombia. All of the
members of the current high command in the Colombian military have
received training and instruction at United States institutions. With
over 2000 Colombian military students graduating from United States
schools within the past three years, the Colombian military's
receptivity to professionalizing the force and significant progress in
respecting human rights and the rule of law is a by product of
professional military education opportunities with us.
The National Defense University's Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies (CHDS) at Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C., supports the
development of civilian specialists from Latin American and the
Caribbean in defense and military matters by providing programs in
defense policy planning, resource management, and political and
civil-military relations. CHDS significantly enhances the concept of
military subordination to civilian authority by training a core of
civilian defense specialists who serve in the region's defense
ministries and legislatures.
As an element of the Inter-American Defense Board and Organization of
American States, the Inter-American Defense College (IADC) provides
senior service level professional military education for senior
officers, including officers from the United States.
The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) at
Ft. Benning, Georgia, offers instruction that promotes democratic
values, respect for human rights, and regional cooperation. WHINSEC
provides an opportunity for regional military and police leaders to
receive, in Spanish or English, the same instruction we provide our
own Armed Forces. The capstone course at WHINSEC is the yearlong
resident Command and Staff Course, which includes approximately 40 per
cent United States officers from all services. Concepts and values
taught at WHINSEC are continually reaffirmed, as our hemisphere's
militaries are increasingly supportive of democratic values and the
subordination of the military to civilian control.
The Inter-American Air Force Academy (IAAFA) at Lackland AFB, Texas,
and Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School
(NAVSCIATTS) at Stennis, Mississippi provide specialized technical and
tactical training on aircraft maintenance and small boat operations to
the region's militaries. This training enhances the interoperability
and increases the life cycle of U.S. equipment used by countries in
the region.
For some of these courses and other military schooling, the
International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program are
critical. We appreciate the continued support of this valuable
program. However, in order to reach the future military leaders for
Guatemala, we need to remove the prohibitions on junior and field
grade officer's attendance of the same professional military training
as their U.S. counterparts such as command and staff college and
advanced courses.
These and other United States schools produce graduates who make
positive contributions to their countries through distinguished
military and public service. In many cases, the interpersonal
relationships forged during a common educational experience serve as
valuable tools for security cooperation while promoting regional
stability.
Security Assistance is an important element of the U.S. national
security strategy that fosters and supports cooperative security
arrangements. The International Military Education and Training (IMET)
Program has been essential to the effort of professional military
education and professionalization of the militaries of the region. We
appreciate the continued congressional support of this valuable
program.
Although military expenditures in the region are the lowest in the
world, Latin American and Caribbean militaries do have legitimate
defense sustainment and modernization requirements. We need the
assistance of partner nations in both regional cooperation and in
protecting their own borders against terrorism and other transnational
threats. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is a critically important
source of equipment and training for resource strapped countries.
Against these requirements, Latin America and the Caribbean were
allocated in 2002 less than one-tenth of one percent of the annual
worldwide FMF program, which although an increase over previous years,
was just $8.7 million. This allocation does not take into account the
need to sustain aircraft and other equipment previously provided to
our regional partners, nor does it provide for modernization or new
initiatives. In light of the security cooperation requirements that
exist, the United States has not provided substantive security
assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean over the past decade,
and this is a region of vital significance to the United States in
terms of demographics, trade, natural resources, and proximity.
There may be a perception that the FY 2000 Plan Colombia Emergency
Supplemental and the FY 2002 Andean Counterdrug Initiative fully
satisfies the requirements for Colombia and neighbor militaries. While
these programs are essential, especially for Colombia, they are not
concentrated on military assistance, and the assistance provided is
counterdrug-related.
Limited FMF resources constrain our ability to influence the direction
and scope of regional military modernization and enlist the full
cooperation of partner nations. Likewise, the capabilities of the
militaries within the region could be increased to assume a more
active role in security cooperation against transnational threats,
disaster response, and peacekeeping.
Our global war on terrorism continues to reinforce the critical role
that a comprehensive ISR posture plays in any operational environment,
whether home-based or abroad. Secretary Rumsfeld noted in the 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review that: "We cannot and will not know
precisely where and when America's interests will be threatened ..."
His observation is particularly applicable to the Southern Command
area of responsibility, where threats take many forms and are often
ambiguous. These threats present a range of intelligence challenges -
from tracking terrorist groups and drug trafficking organizations in
Colombia to monitoring international criminal and terrorist activities
throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.
The restrictions placed on the use of certain collection assets
exacerbate the constraints inherent to the limited availability of
intelligence resources in our area of responsibility. Today, most
intelligence assets allocated to Southern Command are funded from
counterdrug appropriations. Therefore, the employment of these scarce
assets is further restricted to supporting only counterdrug operations
or force protection of those involved with counterdrug activities.
Also, our access agreements on the Forward Operating Locations of
Manta, Ecuador, Aruba and Curacao, and Comalapa, El Salvador restrict
operations from the FOLs to counterdrug only.
Our ability to assist operations in Colombia is also limited by
restrictions on sharing data. We are prohibited from providing
intelligence that may be construed as counterinsurgency related. For
the operator, it is very difficult to distinguish between the FARC as
a drug trafficking organization and the FARC as a terrorist
organization and the FARC as a insurgent organization. In my opinion,
we have tried to impose artificial boundaries where one no longer
exists.
In summary, the United States Southern Command remains committed to
providing the assistance needed by Colombia and other partner nations
in the region within Congressional authority. We continue to execute
operations and activities to enhance the region's militaries, advance
democracy, promote regional security, support hemispheric cooperation,
foster economic opportunities, promote peace, sustain freedom, and
encourage prosperity. Additionally, we will continue to prioritize
these activities in areas that offer the greatest leverage for
protecting and advancing United States regional and global interests.
While Southern Command's priority since September 11 has been on the
planning and coordination necessary to execute the global war on
terrorism, everything we are doing in Colombia and in the region
supports that end. Our efforts in Colombia are not only to fight drugs
but also to save democracy in that country and promote security and
stability in the Andean Region.
We are seeing progress in our efforts. Although in the past few years
the Colombian military has emerged as a much more capable and
professional force, they still lack the resources, manpower, airlift
and mobility, to re-establish a safe and secure environment throughout
the country.
Your continued support will help to ensure the stability of Colombia
and safeguard U.S. national security interests throughout Latin
America and the Caribbean against the transnational threats that
concern us all. Thank you for providing me this opportunity to discuss
these issues with you today. I will be happy to respond to any
questions you may have at this time. |
|
|