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9	WASHINGTON, D.	.C.
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11	UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,	Case No. 2002 - CCP - 1
12	OFFICE OF APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING,	Case 110. 2002 - CC1 - 1
13	EMPLOYER AND LABOR SERVICES,	CALIFORNIA APPRENTICESHIP
14	Prosecuting Party,	COUNCIL'S MOTION TO
15	1 Tosceuting 1 arty,	COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES
16	v.	TO INTERROGATORIES
17	*•	TO INTERING GITT ORGES
18	CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL	
19	RELATIONS and CALIFORNIA APPRENTICESHIP	
20	COUNCIL,	
21		
22	Respondents.	
23		
24	Respondent California Apprenticeship Council mo	oves to compel prosecuting party
25	OATELS to provide further responses to interrogatories in	n the Council's first set of
26 27	interrogatories.	
-		
28	1.	ON TO COMPET TO THE TOTAL TO
	CALIFORNIA APPRENTICESHIP COUNCIL'S MOTI- RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES	ON TO COMPEL FURTHER

The text below sets forth each interrogatory in dispute, OATELS' response and surreply and a discussion of the pertinent issues.

INTERROGATORY NO. 2

State whether prior to August 4, 2003 OATELS informed the SECRETARY, directly or indirectly, of OATELS' intention to issue the DECISION.

OATELS' RESPONSE

We object to this interrogatory on the following grounds:

- (1) The interrogatory is irrelevant because OATELS' exercise of its authority to conduct concurrent registration is not at issue in this litigation, and the administrative law judge ("ALJ") has no jurisdiction over any challenge to OATELS' exercise of its registration authority.

 OATELS exercised concurrent authority to register apprentices in California for federal purposes to reduce the time to process a registration application from the one-and-a-half to three years California was taking to no more than a few months for federal registration. OATELS initiated derecognition proceedings, by contrast, to strip the California state apprenticeship council of its delegated federal registration authority because the State passed a restrictive apprenticeship law without prior OATELS approval. Derecognition would take away California's federal registration authority, whereas concurrent jurisdiction simply allows DOL to register apprentice programs for federal purposes alongside the State. Thus, the concurrent jurisdiction and derecognition decisions are based on unrelated grounds and provide different remedies to different problems. Accordingly, discussions about the concurrent jurisdiction have no bearing on the disputed derecognition decision here. Therefore, this interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence.
- (2) The interrogatory is also irrelevant because the Secretary is not the final agency decision-maker on the derecognition case, and therefore no communications with her <u>on any topic</u>, however related to derecognition, could have possibly been improper ex parte communications about this case.

2.

Secretary's Order 2-96 (May 3, 1996) delegated the Secretary's authority to decide derecognition appeals under the National Apprenticeship Act to DOL's Administrative Review Board ("ARB"). Id., § 4c(26), 61 Fed. Reg. 19,978, 19,978 (1996). Thus, the ARB, not the Secretary, will issue the final agency decision on any appeal of the ALJ's decision on the derecognition case, and any communications that OATELS or its attorneys had with the Secretary could not possibly have been ex parte contacts with the final agency decision-maker here. Accordingly, communications with the Secretary, on concurrent jurisdiction or any other subject, are completely irrelevant to this proceeding, and cannot taint the agency's prospective final decision on the derecognition case. Therefore, this interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

(3) The interrogatory is also objectionable because it attempts to probe DOL's deliberative processes for evidence of impropriety. Discovery of such internal deliberations and communications is not permitted absent a strong showing of agency bad faith or improper behavior. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420(1971); Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Lujan, 903 F.2d 922, 997-98 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Merely alleging wrongdoing without making the required showing first does not entitle CAC to request discovery to see whether DOL's conduct really was improper. See Apex Constr. Co. v. United States, 719 F. Supp. 1144, 1147 (D. Mass. 1989); Warren Bank v. Saxon, 263 F. Supp. 34, 39 (E.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd sub nom. Warren v. Camp, 396 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1968). CAC has made no such showing here, and we categorically deny that any improper ex parte communications, or any other misconduct, occurred.

OATELS' SURREPLY

1. CAC's reply to the first objection misconceives OATELS' stated basis for the concurrent registration decision and OATELS' unrelated basis for requesting discovery into delays in CDIR's processing of registration applications. OATELS decided to exercise concurrent registration jurisdiction in California because the State's own regulations estimate that it takes one-and-a-half to three years to process a registration application, see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 212.2(j), a period that federal registration will reduce to no more than a few months. Unlike the derecognition decision, the concurrent registration decision has nothing to do with California's restrictive treatment of

apprenticeship programs, but is based on the unacceptably long time the State was taking to process registration applications.

By contrast, OATELS' discovery into CDIR's processing delays is designed to determine whether there is a pattern or practice of delay in processing unilateral, but not joint, program registration applications. Such disparate treatment, if it has occurred, would be directly related to the restrictive apprenticeship statute, section 3075(b) of the California Labor Code, on which the derecognition decision was based, but would not further support the concurrent registration decision, which was based on processing time. Conversely, if CDIR's processing delays have affected unilateral and joint programs equally, or have resulted simply from lack of staff or heavy work loads, the delays would be irrelevant to the derecognition decision but would still support the concurrent registration decision.

Thus, CAC's reply is based on the erroneous premise that OATELS' discovery in the derecognition proceeding concerns the facts that support the concurrent registration decision.

2. As a threshold matter, CAC's first reply to the second objection lacks merit because the reply erroneously assumes that the APA restrictions on ex parte contacts in administrative adjudications apply here. In fact, these APA restrictions apply only to administrative adjudications "required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing" See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a); see also § 554(d) (setting out restrictions on ex parte contacts). Since the hearing requirement here was established by regulation, see 29 C.F.R. § 29.13(c)(3), not by statute, the APA restrictions do not apply. Even if the APA restrictions did apply here, CAC's reply is still unwarranted because Secretary's Order 1-2002 delegated to the Administrative Review Board ("ARB") the Secretary's authority to issue final agency decisions on administrative appeals of ALJ decisions under the National Apprenticeship Act and its implementing regulations. See Secretary's Order 1-2002, § 4c(25), 67 Fed. Reg. 64,272, 64,272 (2002). Thus, under existing law, there is no possibility that the Secretary will make the final agency decision in this proceeding. CAC has not suggested any reason to think that the existing law will be changed in any way that would make this interrogatory relevant.

CAC's second reply to the second objection, that the Secretary is the ultimate decisionmaker here because she will decide whether to defend an appeal of the ARB's decision to federal court, confuses what would be the agency's final action here, the ARB's final order, with the agency's post-adjudicative litigation response to an appeal of that final order. Even assuming that the APA's restrictions on ex parte contacts with the final agency decision-maker apply here, those restrictions apply to contacts with the ARB, which will make the final agency decision here, and not to the Secretary, whose only role here is that of a potential party in a prospective CDIR and/or CAC appeal of the ARB's final order to federal court. If such an appeal is filed, DOL would no longer be acting as an administrative adjudicator but as a respondent, defending its final agency action in federal court. Any decision about this case that the Secretary makes at the judicial review stage would not be a "final agency action" within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 704, ¹/₂ but only a litigation decision made in the course of a CDIR and/or CAC appeal of the final agency action. Thus, the theoretical possibility that the Secretary might decide, after an appeal of a future ARB decision on this case, not to defend the ARB's decision in federal court does not make her the final agency decision-maker here, or make her subject to the APA ban on ex parte contacts with that decision-maker.

Even if the Secretary's decision whether to defend the ARB's final order on appeal could be construed as being, in some sense, the agency's final action, the APA doctrine of no ex parte contacts with the final agency decision-maker would still not apply to the Secretary in this proceeding. The ban would not apply here because no contacts between OATELS and/or OATELS' lawyers and the Secretary here could taint a later Secretarial decision whether to defend the ARB's final order since the Secretary has every right to consult her lawyers and the program agency concerned in making that litigation decision. Indeed, making such a decision without such consultations would be irresponsible, if not nonfeasant. Furthermore, such

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¹ See also Capital Network Sys. v. FCC, 3 F.3d 1526, 1530 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (agency action final if it represents a terminal, complete resolution of the case before the agency and determines rights or obligations, or has some legal consequence).

DISCUSSION

consultations, like any similar communications that might have occurred during this proceeding, would very likely be protected by the deliberative process and/or attorney-client privileges.

In any case, even if the APA ban on ex parte contacts did apply to the Secretary in this proceeding (on the theory that the Secretary would later decide whether to defend the ARB's final order on appeal), such contacts could not prejudice CAC because the Secretary cannot appeal DOL's final agency actions. Thus, the only ARB decision here that the Secretary could decide not to defend would be a decision in OATELS' favor, and such a Secretarial action would benefit, not harm, CAC.

3. CAC's reply to the third objection mistakenly assumes that the objection characterizes the Secretary's deliberations when, in fact, the objection neither admits nor denies that any such deliberations occurred, but characterizes only what the interrogatory seeks. CAC's reply is also based on the erroneous premise that any deliberations the Secretary might have made about the concurrent jurisdiction decision are relevant to this derecognition proceeding. As explained in surreply 1 above, however, this premise conflates the basis of the concurrent jurisdiction decision (that CDIR has taken an unacceptably long time to process registration applications) with the unrelated question that OATELS has sought to answer through discovery (whether CDIR has delayed processing unilateral, but not joint, program applications). In any event, CAC's reply also ignores the fact that CAC has not made the strong showing of agency misconduct that is the prerequisite for any discovery that seeks an agency's internal communications or other evidence of its deliberative processes. CAC has only speculated about the possibility of improper ex parte contacts with the Secretary, and discovery into the above matters is not permitted on speculation.

1. The first objection assumes the absence of any connection between this proceeding and OATELS' decision to register apprentices in California for federal purposes. However, the stated rational for the registration decision is the alleged delays in CAC/DIR's registration of apprentices. These alleged delays have been the subject of extensive discovery by OATELS. It therefore appears

that the Secretary has prejudged one of the issues in this proceeding. CAC is entitled to know whether the Secretary was influenced by improper ex parte communications.

OATELS cannot argue that the registration decision is unrelated to this proceeding if OATELS' discovery in this proceeding is directed to the facts that justify the registration decision.

2. The second objection assumes that the Secretary is not the final decision maker on this proceeding because the Secretary has delegated her authority to decide derecognition appeals to the Administrative Review Board ("ARB"). However, as Judge Vittone indicated in the November telephone status conference, it is not certain that the delegation covers this proceeding, and it also is not certain that the revocation is non-revocable. If there is any possibility that the Secretary has or will assume decision making authority over this proceeding, OATELS' Response has no validity.

Furthermore, even if the Secretary has made an irrevocable delegation, the Secretary retains ultimate decision-making authority because it is the Secretary, and not ARB, who will decide whether to defend the decision if there is an appeal to the courts.

3. The third objection claims that the interrogatory seeks discovery into "DOL's deliberative processes". Since the Secretary of Labor is the head of the Department of Labor, the response is an admission that the Secretary already has deliberated about the issues raised in this proceeding. The APA prohibits the Secretary from deliberations about this proceeding based on ex parte communications. CAC therefore is entitled to know whether such improper ex parte communications exist.

It is surprising that OATELS would claim that the Secretary has no involvement in this proceeding and then make the additional claim that the discovery is improper because it seeks to disclose the Secretary's deliberations about this proceeding.

Lastly, OATELS claims that the registration decision was based solely on California's alleged delays in processing applications for new programs. However, CAC is not required to accept this claim on faith and instead is entitled to test its veracity through discovery.

1	INTERROGATORY NO. 3
2	If your response to the previous interrogatory is anything other than an unqualified
3	negative, explain the response.
4	
5	OATELS' RESPONSE
6	Same as the objections to Interrogatory No. 2.
7	OATELS' SURREPLY
8	Same as the surreply to Interrogatory No. 2.
9	
10	DISCUSSION
11	See discussion of response to Interrogatory No. 2.
12	
13	INTERROGATORY NO. 4
14	IDENTIFY each COMMUNICATION from OATELS to the SECRETARY
15	RELATING TO apprenticeship in California that was made subsequent to May 11, 2002.
16	
17	OATELS' RESPONSE
18	In addition to all of our objections to Interrogatory No. 2, which we incorporate by reference,
19	we also object to the request for all communications on California apprenticeship <u>after May 11, 2002</u>
20	as irrelevant. Since the derecognition decision was issued on May 10, 2002, no post-decisional
21	communication could have had any possible influence on that decision or any conceivable bearing on
22	this case. Accordingly, this interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
23	admissible evidence, and CAC has made no showing of any need to require DOL to search for and
24	identify responsive communications.
25	OATELS' SURREPLY
26	Same as the surreply to Interrogatory No. 2.
27	CAC's reply to OATELS' additional objection is without merit because the Secretary lacks
28	8.
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RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES

- 1	
1	authority to judge the issues here. Further, as discussed in our objection (3) to Interrogatory No. 2, an
2	agency's internal communications are not discoverable merely because the requester thinks that they
3	may have violated the APA, but only if the requester makes a strong showing that the alleged
4	misconduct actually occurred. CAC has not made the required showing here.
5	
6	DISCUSSION
7	See discussion of response to Interrogatory No. 2.
8	OATELS' additional objection ignores the possibility that ex parte communications after May
9	10, 2002 will lead the Secretary to prejudge the issues in this proceeding. Such communications are
10	discoverable because they are prohibited by the APA.
11	
12	INTERROGATORY NO. 5
13	IDENTIFY each DOCUMENT RELATING TO a COMMUNICATION identified in
14	your response to the previous interrogatory.
15	
16	OATELS' DISCUSSION
17	Same as the objections to Interrogatory No. 4.
18	OATELS' SURREPLY
19	Same as the surreply to Interrogatory No. 4.
20	
21	DISCUSSION
22	See discussion of response to Interrogatory No. 4.
23	
24	<u>INTERROGATORY NO. 6</u>
25	IDENTIFY each COMMUNICATION from OATELS' ATTORNEYS to the
26	SECRETARY RELATING TO apprenticeship in California that was made subsequent to May
27	11, 2002.
28	9.
	CALIFORNIA APPRENTICESHIP COUNCIL'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES

1	OATELS' RESPONSE
2	Same as the objections to Interrogatory No. 4.
3	
4	OATELS' SURREPLY
5	Same as the surreply to Interrogatory No. 4.
6	Same as the surreply to interrogatory 140. 4.
7	DISCUSSION
8	See discussion of response to Interrogatory No. 4.
9	INTERPROCATION VICTORY IN
10	INTERROGATORY No. 7
11	IDENTIFY each DOCUMENT RELATING TO a COMMUNICATION identified in
12	your response to the previous interrogatory.
13	
14	OATELS' RESPONSE
15	Same as the objections to Interrogatory No. 4.
16	OATELS' SURREPLY
17	Same as the surreply to Interrogatory No. 4.
18	
19	<u>DISCUSSION</u>
20	See discussion of response to Interrogatory No. 4.
21	
22	<u>INTERROGATORY NO. 8</u>
23	IDENTIFY each COMMUNICATION from the SECRETARY to OATELS
24	RELATING TO apprenticeship in California that was made subsequent to May 11, 2002.
25	
26	OATELS' RESPONSE
27	Same as the objections to Interrogatory No. 4.
28	10
	10. CALIFORNIA APPRENTICESHIP COUNCIL'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
	RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES

1	OATELS' SURREPLY
2	Same as the surreply to Interrogatory No. 4.
3	
4	DISCUSSION
5	See discussion of response to Interrogatory No. 4.
6	
7	INTERROGATORY NO. 9
8	IDENTIFY each DOCUMENT RELATING TO a COMMUNICATION identified in
9	your response to the previous interrogatory.
10	
11	OATELS' RESPONSE
12	Same as the objections to Interrogatory No. 4.
13	
14	OATELS' SURREPLY
15	Same as the surreply to Interrogatory No. 4.
16	
17	DISCUSSION
18	See discussion of response to Interrogatory No. 4.
19	
20	INTERROGATORY NO. 10
21	IDENTIFY each COMMUNICATION from the SECRETARY to OATELS'
22	ATTORNEYS RELATING TO apprenticeship in California that was made subsequent to
23	May 11, 2002.
24	
25	OATELS' RESPONSE
26	Same as the objections to Interrogatory No. 4.
27	
28	11.
	CALIFORNIA APPRENTICESHIP COUNCIL'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
	RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES

1	
1	OATELS' SURREPLY
2	Same as the surreply to Interrogatory No. 4.
3	
4	DISCUSSION
5	See discussion of response to Interrogatory No. 4.
6	
7	INTERROGATORY No. 11
8	IDENTIFY each DOCUMENT RELATING TO a COMMUNICATION identified in
9	your response to the previous interrogatory.
10	
11	OATELS' RESPONSE
12	Same as the objections to Interrogatory No. 4.
13	
14	OATELS' SURREPLY
15	Same as the surreply to Interrogatory No. 4.
16	
17	DISCUSSION
18	See discussion of response to Interrogatory No. 4.
19	
20	INTERROGATORY No. 12
21	Describe any involvement of the SECRETARY in the deliberations which resulted in
22	the issuance of the DECISION.
23	
24	OATELS' RESPONSE
25	Same as the objections to Interrogatory No. 2.
26	
27	
28	12.
	CALIFORNIA APPRENTICESHIP COUNCIL'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES

1	OATELS' SURREPLY
2	Same as the surreply to Interrogatory No. 24.
3	
4	DISCUSSION
5	See discussion of response to Interrogatory No. 2.
6	
7	INTERROGATORY NO. 13
8	IDENTIFY each DOCUMENT that constitutes or discusses each fact stated in your
9	response to the previous interrogatory.
10	
11	OATELS' RESPONSE
12	Same as the objections to Interrogatory No. 2.
13	
14	OATELS' SURREPLY
15	Same as the surreply to Interrogatory No. 2.
16	
17	DISCUSSION
18	See discussion of response to Interrogatory No. 2.
19	
20	INTERROGATORY NO. 16
21	IDENTIFY each "reason", as you have defined that word in your response to the
22	previous interrogatory, that you contend warrants the derecognition of the Council and/or DIR
23	pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 29.
24	
25	OATELS' RESPONSE
26	Not applicable.
27	
28	13.
	CALIFORNIA APPRENTICESHIP COUNCIL'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES

1	OATELS' SURREPLY
2	The two reasons in question are stated in Administrator's Swoope's April 8, 2003 letter to Mr
3	Kay. See id. at 1, para. 2.
4	
5	DISCUSSION
6	See discussion of response to Interrogatory No. 15.
7	
8	INTERROGATORY NO. 17
9	IDENTIFY each apprenticeship training program that you contend submitted an
10	application for approval to train apprentices that was denied by the COUNCIL pursuant to
11	California Labor Code section 3075.
12	
13	OATELS' RESPONSE
14	We have asked CDIR and CAC this very question in discovery and have requested the
15	material that would enable us to answer this interrogatory, but we cannot do so until we have
16	received, and have had a chance to review, all of the requested material.
17	
18	OATELS' SURREPLY
19	OATELS does not know now whether any applications have been denied on the basis of
20	section 3075, did not know the answer to this question before discovery in this proceeding, and will
21	not know the answer until the thousands of pages of program files recently received from CDIR have
22	been completely reviewed. Since one of the goals of our discovery is to learn the answer to this
23	question, we cannot be required to answer it until our discovery is complete.
24	
25	DISCUSSION
26	The interrogatory asks whether OATELS has any knowledge as of the date of its responses of
27	program applications that were denied pursuant to Labor Code section 3075. If OATELS does not
28	1./

CALIFORNIA APPRENTICESHIP COUNCIL'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER

RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES

1	have any current knowledge of any such program, it must say so. CAC is entitled to know whether
2	OATELS had any actual knowledge of such programs prior to discovery in this proceeding.
3	OATELS may reserve the right to supplement its responses when it has completed its review of the
4	discovery it has received from DIR.
5	
6	INTERROGATORY NO. 18
7	IDENTIFY each apprenticeship training program that you contend submitted an
8	application for approval to train apprentices that was denied by DIR pursuant to California
9	Labor Code section 3075.
10	
11	OATELS' RESPONSE
12	Same as response to Interrogatory No. 17.
13	OATELS' SURREPLY
14	Same as the surreply to Interrogatory No. 17.
15	
16	DISCUSSION
17	See DISCUSSION of response to Interrogatory No. 17.
18	
19	INTERROGATORY NO. 19
20	IDENTIFY each apprenticeship training program that you contend submitted an
21	application for approval to train apprentices that was denied by the COUNCIL on grounds
22	that violate 29 C.F.R. part 29.
23	
24	OATELS' RESPONSE
25	Same as response to Interrogatory No. 17.
26	
27	
28	15.
	CALIFORNIA APPRENTICESHIP COUNCIL'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES
	ALDI OTIBLE TO INTERMOUNTONIES

1	DISCUSSION
2	The interrogatory asks whether OATELS has any knowledge as of the date of its responses of
3	programs applications that were denied on grounds that violate 29 C.F.R. If OATELS does not have
4	any current knowledge of any such program, it must say so. CAC is entitled to know whether
5	OATELS had any actual knowledge of such programs prior to discovery in this proceeding.
6	OATELS may reserve the right to supplement its responses when it has completed its review of the
7	discovery it has received from DIR.
8	
9	OATLELS' SURREPLY
10	OATELS does not know now whether any applications have been denied on grounds that
11	violate 29 C.F.R., part 29, did not know the answer to this question before discovery in this
12	proceeding, and will not know the answer until the thousands of pages of program files recently
13	received from CDIR have been completely reviewed. Since one of the goals of our discovery is to
14	learn the answer to this question, we cannot be required to answer it until our discovery is complete.
15	INTERROGATORY NO. 20
16	IDENTIFY each apprenticeship training program that you contend submitted an
17	application for approval to train apprentices that was denied by DIR on grounds that violate 29
18	C.F.R. part 29.
19	
20	OATELS' RESPONSE
21	Same as response to Interrogatory No. 17.
22	
23	<u>DISCUSSION</u>
24	See DISCUSSION of response to Interrogatory No.19
25	OATELS' SURREPLY
26	Same as the surreply to Interrogatory No. 19.

16.

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CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, OATELS should be ordered to provide further respnses to the Council's interrogatories. DATED: January 16, 2004 **BILL LOCKYER** Attorney General Deputy Attorney General Attorneys for respondent California Apprenticeship Council 17. CALIFORNIA APPRENTICESHIP COUNCIL'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER

RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES

DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY E-MAIL

Case Name: UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OFFICE OF

APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING, EMPLOYER AND LABOR SERVICES v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND

CALIFORNIA APPRENTICESHIP COUNCIL

United States Department of Labor, Washington, D.C., Case No.: 2002-CCP-1

I declare:

I am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a member of the California State Bar at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age and older and not a party to this matter. I am familiar with the business practice at the Office of the Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placed in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business. My e-mail address is emily.aquino@doj.ca.gov.

On January 20, 2004, I served the attached

California Apprenticeship Council's Motion to Compel Further Responses to Interrogatories

by e-mailing a true copy. In addition, I placed a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the internal mail system of the Office of the Attorney General addressed as follows:

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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on January 20, 2004, at San Francisco, California.

Emily Aquino	Att Elguna
Declarant	Signature /

40014350.wpd