Remarks prepared for delivery by Dr. Elsa Murano, USDA Under Secretary for Food Safety at the Terrorist Threat Integration Center's Food Terrorism Summit, October 19, McLean, Virginia.

Introduction

Good morning. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to give you some insight on USDA's initiatives to secure the food supply from intentional contamination.

I also want to thank the Terrorist Threat Integration Center for bringing a wide variety of officials from various government agencies together over the next couple of days to discuss the security of one our most basic needs - food. It is very important to have these discussions for the sake of protecting the food supply for our families today and for future generations.

Let me first start off with a brief background of our responsibility at USDA. In my role as Under Secretary of Food Safety, I oversee the Food Safety and Inspection Service, or FSIS, which is responsible for protecting the safety of the meat, poultry and egg products supply. This is no small task. These products account for more than $120 billion in sales, or one-third of all U.S. consumer spending on food.

FSIS has a well functioning food safety infrastructure in place to protect the public from contamination. Our force of more than 7,600 inspection and veterinary personnel are in approximately 6,000 plants and import stations every day.

Complementing this sound infrastructure, FSIS has science-based policies in place that are driving down the prevalence of pathogens in meat and poultry, thus lowering the numbers of foodborne illnesses across the nation. Furthermore, the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) system, implemented in meat and poultry plants nationwide, is designed to prevent and control contamination of the food supply during processing. This is the case whether the contamination is naturally occurring or introduced intentionally. We are also continually evaluating, and updating when necessary, policies addressing specific food hazards to focus on those of greatest concern to public health.

To ensure the security of these important products is indeed a major challenge, but it is one which FSIS and its predecessor agencies have been equipped to handle for over a century. Over the past several years, we have strengthened our focus on both intentional and unintentional contamination by conducting risk and vulnerability assessments.

Specifically, on food security, vulnerability assessments have laid a solid foundation from which we have launched many important initiatives to safeguard our food supply from any intentional threats. Today, I'll give you some insight into the important role that vulnerability assessments have played in our food security efforts.

FSIS' Connection to Homeland Security

First, let me describe how we work within the broader Homeland Security framework. FSIS and USDA work closely with the White House and the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate our food security efforts.

Since the White House Homeland Security Council recognized the need for a more coordinated approach to food security matters, it assembled under its aegis the White House Interagency Food Working Group. The charge of this group, which includes FSIS, is to develop an interagency strategy to protect the food supply and minimize it as a target for terrorist activity.

Within FSIS, we established a full-time staff whose sole responsibility is food security - the Office of Food Security and Emergency Preparedness, or OFSEP as we normally call it. OFSEP works in concert with these other entities I just mentioned to ensure that activities are coordinated and resources are used efficiently.

I will come back to interagency cooperation a little later, but I first want to give you an idea where FSIS' OFSEP fits into the larger picture since I will be mentioning this office periodically throughout my discussion.

Vulnerability Assessments

FSIS/OFSEP has recently completed seven vulnerability assessments for selected domestic and imported food products. Even though our statutory authority lies over the slaughter and processing stages of the food system, we have gained a much broader perspective of the strengths and weaknesses in the whole farm-to-table continuum through these vulnerability assessments.

These assessments were conducted under the auspices of the White House - Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-9 - Defense of United States Agriculture and Food to be exact. They were completed using the DoD targeting method called CARVER + Shock, a method with which I'm sure many of you are familiar.

Putting the Vulnerability Assessments to Use

We have found these assessments are very powerful risk management tools that can be used to develop strategies and policies that reduce or eliminate the potential risk at vulnerable points along the farm-to-table continuum. It is difficult to manage a threat when we are unsure of its pervasiveness, so it was especially important to take a broad look when developing the assessments.

The vulnerability assessments we conducted provided us the vital data on some inherent risks in our food safety system that otherwise would not have been as apparent to us if we had not conducted them. If we had made food security decisions without performing them, it would have been akin to aiming at a target in the dark without night-vision goggles. We would have had no idea if we had hit our mark. And when that mark is the security of the food on American tables, both at home and in restaurants, accuracy is essential.

Testing Under Different Threat Conditions
Therefore, what we gleaned from the vulnerability assessments helped us develop more effective intervention strategies, especially when it comes to surveillance and incident response plans. The assessments allowed us to rank food products and potential contaminating agents in order of highest concern. Using this ranking, during periods of heightened awareness our laboratories examine samples for threat agents posing the greatest risk as identified in our vulnerability assessments.

For instance, if there is a threat condition Orange or Red with no threat to the agricultural sector or food supply, our laboratories will continue to monitor samples for evidence of tampering that might be related to food safety.

If there is a condition Orange with a specific threat to the food supply or a particular product or process, then our laboratories will activate an emergency response plan, which is a set of specific procedures that lab personnel follow when a threat to the food supply has been identified. They will then test 50% of all food safety samples for possible food security risks.

If we have a condition Red with a specific threat to the food supply or a particular product or process, then our lab personnel will activate the emergency response plan and test up to 100% of all food safety samples for possible food security risks.

Furthermore, if FSIS identifies a food security threat through our routine testing of meat, poultry or egg products, we may activate the emergency response plan. This plan may be activated before the Department of Homeland Security declares a change in the threat level to ensure that adequate safety and security measures are in place to effectively respond to the identified threat.

Federal Emergency Response Network
To enhance surveillance and incident response further, FSIS has partnered with other food safety agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and our state counterparts to build an integrated laboratory system that would not only monitor the food supply and share data, but also assist in handling samples in the event of an emergency. This integrated system is known as the Food Emergency Response Network. It consists of federal and state governmental laboratories responsible for handling the increasing number of samples in the event of an emergency.

Currently over 60 laboratories, including public health and veterinary diagnostic laboratories, representing 27 states and five federal agencies, have agreed to participate in this network. Laboratory personnel in this system not only will help each other to handle a surge in sampling, but also share testing methods and training.

Expanding Surge Capacity
Speaking of surge capacity, FSIS has also expanded laboratory capability in other ways. Earlier this year, we opened a 2,000 square foot biosafety level 3 laboratory in Athens, Georgia, to analyze samples for bioterroristic agents and provide us support in the event of a bioterrorist attack on the food supply. We also signed an agreement with the Army facility at Aberdeen-Edgewood in Maryland under which Aberdeen will accept and analyze high risk samples for a variety of biological agents when necessary.

Inspection Activities
In another area, vulnerability assessments provided us with vital information to help guide our inspection activities, focusing on additional threats that we needed to consider within our inspection system. Using analyses from the assessments, OFSEP worked in conjunction with other program areas of FSIS to develop directives for our inspection and veterinary personnel. These provide detailed courses of action to take during heightened threat levels, such as orange and red.

Security Guidelines
As I mentioned before, the vulnerability assessments helped us realize the importance of countering vulnerabilities across the whole farm-to-table continuum. We all have a responsibility to make sure that each link in the food chain is strong. The entire system can only be as strong as the weakest link, and sharing information is vital for a comprehensive effort.

We developed three sets of guidelines for different segments of this continuum. The first publication, Food Security Guidelines for Food Processors, targets slaughter and processing plants. It helps establishments identify ways to strengthen their protection against intentional contamination.

The second one is titled Safety and Security Guidelines for the Transportation and Distribution of Meat, Poultry and Egg Products. This publication is designed to help facilities and shippers that process or transport meat, poultry and egg products identify potential vulnerabilities in their own operations and address them.

The third publication titled, Food Safety and Food Security: What Consumers Need to Know, outlines practical information for consumers about safe food handling practices, foodborne illness, product recalls, keeping foods safe during an emergency and reporting suspected instances of food tampering. All of these publications are available on FSIS' Web site at www.fsis.usda.gov.

Automated Import Information System
Finally, our vulnerability assessment for imported products showed us ways to improve our Automated Import Information System even further and think of its potential utility beyond FSIS' jurisdiction. This system, focuses on a foreign country's inspection system as a whole, rather than on individual plants. It is a user-friendly automated system that uses statistics and chooses imports for reinspection based on the annual volume of shipments from the exporting country. In addition, it allows our inspectors at all ports-of-entry to share data.

From the assessment, we have enhanced this network to account for certain food security issues, and we're looking at integrating this database system with other agencies' systems, such as the Customs and Border Patrol, to enhance the flow of vital information to further strengthen our food safety system against intentional attacks.

Interaction With Our Partners

Earlier I mentioned interagency cooperation. Now, I would like to illustrate how the vulnerability assessments have paved new roads for expanded partnerships with other government agencies. The vulnerabilities identified in the various assessments guided us to take joint steps with other agencies in building food security awareness and plans for incident response.

For example, we are working with the FDA, USDA's Food and Nutrition Service and Agricultural Marketing Service to develop training in food security awareness. We want our employees and those of our sister agencies to address problems in the food supply not only as food safety issues, but also possibly as food security issues. If frontline employees can recognize potential threats or abnormalities early, then we can improve the efficiency of our response.

The assessments also showed us that there were significant gaps between the federal and state governments when it came to prevention and response to any act of intentional contamination. To close this breach we recently entered into a cooperative agreement with the FDA, the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Association of State Departments of Agriculture to develop the best practices by which federal assistance can be provided expeditiously and effectively. Following the development of these best practices, we hope to test them through exercises and modify them as necessary.

We also gained a greater appreciation for interacting more closely with the intelligence and law enforcement communities. One of our initial forays in working with these communities was the hiring of 20 Import Surveillance Liaisons to work with the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Patrol at ports of entry around the nation. Now we are building stronger relationships with other intelligence and enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Transportation Security Agency and the Coast Guard.

This kind of interaction only furthers the exchange and flow of intelligence information. The vulnerabilities we identify are only as good as the intelligence we're getting. This is why we very much want to strengthen our relationship with the intelligence community. In fact, we have detailed one of our employees from OFSEP to the Terrorist Threat Integration Center for two days a week. This effort is to provide our analytical expertise for the food and agriculture sector intelligence assessment. We also hope to understand better the kinds of intelligence on threats being gathered.

Finally, we can't forget our partners outside the United States. We are seeking to enter into bilateral agreements with several countries to share information to secure the food supply. Agreements are being developed with Canada, and similar discussions are beginning with Australia, Japan, Mexico and New Zealand. Our goal is to ensure that safe and secure food keeps moving between all of our trading partners and the United States.

Conclusion

As you see, we have made significant progress in enhancing food security. USDA/FSIS has had a strong and vibrant infrastructure in place for many decades that has helped us cope with intentional threats to the food supply. In the post 9/11 environment of detecting emerging threats and preparing for the unknown, vulnerability assessments play a key role in helping us implement the most effective countermeasures to prevent a terrorist attack on the meat, poultry and egg products supply.

These assessments are the critical base of our ability to deal with the challenges in this new environment, and we will continue to use them well into the future. By using vulnerability assessments, we are able to determine as accurately as possible not only our strengths and weaknesses, but also gain a much better understanding of the bigger picture - the whole farm-to-table continuum.

We have improved our surveillance capabilities and techniques; enhanced database systems; and forged new alliances with various federal and state agencies that focus on food production, inspection, surveillance, intelligence and enforcement. As the old adage goes, "knowledge is power," and the greater capability we have of sharing information, the better prepared we all are to make the right decisions affecting the security of our food supply.

I want to reiterate my pleasure for being here this morning. We are all in this together, and we still have a lot of work to do. I look forward to your feedback and working more closely with many of you in the days to come.