For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
June 9, 2004
G-8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation
At Evian, we recognized the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery systems, together with international
terrorism, as the pre-eminent threat to international peace and
security. This challenge requires a long-term strategy and
multi-faceted approaches.
Determined to prevent, contain, and roll back proliferation, today,
at Sea Island, we announce an action plan to reinforce the global
nonproliferation regime. We will work together with other concerned
states to realize this plan.
All states must fulfill their arms control, disarmament, and
nonproliferation commitments, which we reaffirm, and we strongly
support universal adherence to and compliance with these commitments
under the relevant multilateral treaties. We will help and encourage
states in effectively implementing their obligations under the
multilateral treaty regimes, in particular implementing domestically
their obligations under such treaties, building law enforcement
capacity, and establishing effective export controls. We call on all
states that have not already done so to subscribe to the Hague Code of
Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.
We strongly support UN Security Council Resolution 1540, calling on
all states to establish effective national export controls, to adopt
and enforce effective laws to criminalize proliferation, to take
cooperative action to prevent non-state actors from acquiring weapons
of mass destruction, and to end illicit trafficking in such weapons,
their means of delivery, and related materials. We call on all states
to implement this resolution promptly and fully, and we are prepared to
assist them in so doing, thereby helping to fight the nexus between
terrorism and proliferation, and black markets in these weapons and
related materials.
1. Nuclear Nonproliferation
The trafficking and indiscriminate spread of sensitive nuclear
materials, equipment, and technology that may be used for weapons
purposes are a threat to us all. Some states seek uranium enrichment
and plutonium reprocessing capabilities for weapons programs contrary
to their commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We reaffirm our commitment to the NPT and to
the declarations made at Kananaskis and Evian, and we will work to
prevent the illicit diversion of nuclear materials and technology. We
announce the following new actions to reduce the risk of nuclear
weapons proliferation and the acquisition of nuclear materials and
technology by terrorists, while allowing the world to enjoy safely the
benefits of peaceful nuclear technology.
- To allow the world to safely enjoy the benefits of peaceful
nuclear energy without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation,
we have agreed to work to establish new measures so that sensitive
nuclear items with proliferation potential will not be exported to
states that may seek to use them for weapons purposes, or allow them to
fall into terrorist hands. The export of such items should only occur
pursuant to criteria consistent with global nonproliferation norms and
to states rigorously committed to those norms. We shall work to amend
appropriately the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines, and to gain
the widest possible support for such measures in the future. We aim to
have appropriate measures in place by the next G-8 Summit. In aid of
this process, for the intervening year, we agree that it would be
prudent not to inaugurate new initiatives involving transfer of
enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to additional
states. We call on all states to adopt this strategy of prudence. We
will also develop new measures to ensure reliable access to nuclear
materials, equipment, and technology, including nuclear fuel and
related services, at market conditions, for all states, consistent with
maintaining nonproliferation commitments and standards.
- We seek universal adherence to IAEA comprehensive
safeguards and the Additional Protocol and urge all states to ratify
and implement these agreements promptly. We are actively engaged in
outreach efforts toward this goal, and ready to offer necessary
support.
- The Additional Protocol must become an essential new
standard in the field of nuclear supply arrangements. We will work to
strengthen NSG guidelines accordingly. We aim to achieve this by the
end of 2005.
- We support the suspension of nuclear fuel cycle cooperation
with states that violate their nuclear nonproliferation and safeguards
obligations, recognizing that the responsibility and authority for such
decisions rests with national governments or the Security Council.
- To enhance the IAEA's integrity and effectiveness, and
strengthen its ability to ensure that nations comply with their NPT
obligations and safeguards agreements, we will work together to
establish a new Special Committee of the IAEA Board of Governors. This
committee would be responsible for preparing a comprehensive plan for
strengthened safeguards and verification. We believe this committee
should be made up of member states in compliance with their NPT and
IAEA commitments.
- Likewise, we believe that countries under investigation for
non-technical violations of their nuclear nonproliferation and
safeguards obligations should elect not to participate in decisions by
the IAEA Board of Governors or the Special Committee regarding their
own cases.
2. Proliferation Security Initiative
We reiterate our strong commitment to and support for the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Statement of
Interdiction Principles, which is a global response to a global
problem. We will continue our efforts to build effective PSI
partnerships to interdict trafficking in weapons of mass destruction,
their delivery systems, and related materials. We also will prevent
those that facilitate proliferation from engaging in such trafficking
and work to broaden and strengthen domestic and international laws
supporting PSI. We welcome the increasing level of support worldwide
for PSI, which now includes all G-8 members. The Krakow meeting
commemorating PSI's first anniversary, attended by 62 countries,
evidences growing global support.
We will further cooperate to defeat proliferation networks and
coordinate, where appropriate, enforcement efforts, including by
stopping illicit financial flows and shutting down illicit plants,
laboratories, and brokers, in accordance with national legal
authorities and legislation and consistent with international law.
Several of us are already developing mechanisms to deny access to our
ports and airports for companies and impose visa bans on individuals
involved in illicit trade.
We encourage all states to strengthen and expand national and
international measures to respond to clandestine procurement
activities. Directly, and through the relevant international
mechanisms, we will work actively with states requiring assistance in
improving their national capabilities to meet international norms.
3. The Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
Since its launch by G-8 Leaders two years ago at Kananaskis, the
Global Partnership has become a significant force worldwide to enhance
international safety and security. Global Partnership member states,
including the six new donors that joined at Evian, have in the past
year launched new cooperative projects in Russia and accelerated
progress on those already underway. While much has been accomplished,
significant challenges remain. We recommit ourselves to our Kananaskis
Statement, Principles, and Guidelines as the basis for Global
Partnership cooperation.
- We recommit ourselves to raising up to $20 billion for the
Global Partnership through 2012.
- Expanding the Partnership to include additional donor
countries is essential to raise the necessary resources and to ensure
the effort is truly global. Today we welcome the decisions of
Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, the Republic
of Korea, and New Zealand to join.
- We will continue to work with other former Soviet states to
discuss their participation in the Partnership. We reaffirm that
Partnership states will participate in projects according to their
national interests and resources.
- We reaffirm that we will address proliferation challenges
worldwide. We will, for example, pursue the retraining of Iraqi and
Libyan scientists involved in past WMD programs. We also support
projects to eliminate over time the use of highly-enriched uranium fuel
in research reactors worldwide, secure and remove fresh and spent HEU
fuel, control and secure radiation sources, strengthen export control
and border security, and reinforce biosecurity. We will use the Global
Partnership to coordinate our efforts in these areas.
4. Nonproliferation Challenges
- The DPRK's announced withdrawal from the NPT, which is
unprecedented; its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons, including
through both its plutonium reprocessing and its uranium enrichment
programs, in violation of its international obligations; and its
established history of missile proliferation are serious concerns to us
all. We strongly support the Six-Party Process, and strongly urge the
DPRK to dismantle all of its nuclear weapons-related programs in a
complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner, a fundamental step to
facilitate a comprehensive and peaceful solution.
- We remain united in our determination to see the
proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear program
resolved. Iran must be in full compliance with its NPT obligations and
safeguards agreement. To this end, we reaffirm our support for the
IAEA Board of Governors' three Iran resolutions. We note that since
Evian, Iran has signed the Additional Protocol and has committed itself
to cooperate with the Agency, and to suspend its enrichment and
reprocessing related activities. While we acknowledge the areas of
progress reported by the Director General, we are, however, deeply
concerned that Iran's suspension of enrichment-related activity is not
yet comprehensive. We deplore Iran's delays, deficiencies in
cooperation, and inadequate disclosures, as detailed in IAEA Director
General reports. We therefore urge Iran promptly and fully to comply
with its commitments and all IAEA Board requirements, including
ratification and full implementation of the Additional Protocol,
leading to resolution of all outstanding issues related to its nuclear
program.
- We welcome Libya's strategic decision to rid itself of its
weapons of mass destruction and longer-range missiles, to fully comply
with the NPT, the Additional Protocol, the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and to
commit not to possess missiles subject to the Missile Technology
Control Regime. We note Libya has cooperated in the removal of nuclear
equipment and materials and taken steps to eliminate chemical weapons.
We call on Libya to continue to cooperate fully with the IAEA and the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
5. Defending Against Bioterrorism
Bioterrorism poses unique, grave threats to the security of all
nations, and could endanger public health and disrupt economies. We
commit to concrete national and international steps to: expand or,
where necessary, initiate new biosurveillance capabilities to detect
bioterror attacks against humans, animals, and crops; improve our
prevention and response capabilities; increase protection of the global
food supply; and respond to, investigate, and mitigate the effects of
alleged uses of biological weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease.
In this context, we seek concrete realization of our commitments at the
fifth Review Conference of the BWC. The BWC is a critical foundation
against biological weapons' proliferation, including to terrorists.
Its prohibitions should be fully implemented, including enactment of
penal legislation. We strongly urge all non-parties to join the BWC
promptly.
6. Chemical Weapons Proliferation
We support full implementation of the CWC, including its
nonproliferation aspects. We strongly urge all non-parties to join the
CWC promptly, and will work with them to this end. We also urge CWC
States Parties to undertake national legislative and administrative
measures for its full implementation. We support the use of all
fact-finding, verification, and compliance measures, including, if
necessary, challenge inspections, as provided in the CWC.
7. Implementation of the Evian Initiative on Radioactive Source Security
At Evian we agreed to improve controls on radioactive sources to
prevent their use by terrorists, and we have made substantial progress
toward that goal. We are pleased that the IAEA approved a revised Code
of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources in
September 2003. We urge all states to implement the Code and recognize
it as a global standard.
We have agreed to export and import control guidance for high-risk
radioactive sources, which should only be supplied to authorized
end-users in states that can control them. States should ensure that
no sources are diverted for illicit use. We seek prompt IAEA approval
of this guidance to ensure that effective controls are operational by
the end of 2005 and applied in a harmonized and consistent manner. We
support the IAEA's program for assistance to ensure that all countries
can meet the new standards.
8. Nuclear Safety and Security
Since the horrific 1986 accident at Chornobyl, we have worked with
Ukraine to improve the safety and security of the site. We have
already made a large financial contribution to build a safe confinement
over the remnants of the Chornobyl reactor. We are grateful for the
participation and contributions made by 21 other states in this
effort. Today, we endorse international efforts to raise the remaining
funds necessary to complete the project. We urge Ukraine to support
and work closely with us to complete the confinement's construction by
2008 in a way that contributes to radiological safety, in particular in
Ukraine and neighboring regions.
An effective, efficient nuclear regulatory system is essential for
our safety and security. We affirm the importance for national
regulators to have sufficient authority, independence, and competence.
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