For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
May 1, 2001
Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University
Fort Lesley J. Mcnair Washington, D.C.
2:40 P.M. EDT
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much,
Mr. Secretary. I appreciate you being here. I
also want to thank Secretary Powell for being here as well. My
National Security Advisor, Condi Rice is here, as well as the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Myers. I appreciate
Admiral Clark and General Ryan here, for being here as well. But most
of all, I want to thank you, Admiral Gaffney, and the students for NDU
for having me here today.
For almost 100 years, this campus has served
as one of our country's premier centers for learning and thinking about
America's national security. Some of America's finest
soldiers have studied here: Dwight Eisenhower and Colin
Powell. Some of America's finest statesmen have taught here;
George Kennan. Today, you're carrying on this
proud tradition forward, continuing to train tomorrow's generals,
admirals and other national security thinkers, and continuing to
provide the intellectual capital for our nation's strategic vision.
This afternoon, I want us to thank back some
30 years to a far different time in a far different
world. The United States and the Soviet Union were locked in
a hostile rivalry. The Soviet Union was our unquestioned
enemy; a highly-armed threat to freedom and democracy. Far
more than that wall in Berlin divided us.
Our highest ideal was -- and remains --
individual liberty. Theirs was the construction of a vast
communist empire. Their totalitarian regime held much of
Europe captive behind an iron curtain.
We didn't trust them, and for good
reason. Our deep differences were expressed in a dangerous
military confrontation that resulted in thousands of nuclear weapons
pointed at each other on hair-trigger alert. Security of
both the United States and the Soviet Union was based on a grim
premise: that neither side would fire nuclear weapons at each other,
because doing so would mean the end of both nations.
We even went so far as to codify this
relationship in a 1972 ABM Treaty, based on the doctrine that our very
survival would best be insured by leaving both sides completely open
and vulnerable to nuclear attack. The threat was real and
vivid. The Strategic Air Command had an airborne command
post called the Looking Glass, aloft 24 hours a day, ready in case the
President ordered our strategic forces to move toward their targets and
release their nuclear ordnance.
The Soviet Union had almost 1.5 million troops
deep in the heart of Europe, in Poland and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
East Germany. We used our nuclear weapons not just to
prevent the Soviet Union from using their nuclear weapons, but also to
contain their conventional military forces, to prevent them from
extending the Iron Curtain into parts of Europe and Asia that were
still free.
In that world, few other nations had nuclear
weapons and most of those who did were responsible allies, such as
Britain and France. We worried about the proliferation of
nuclear weapons to other countries, but it was mostly a distant threat,
not yet a reality.
Today, the sun comes up on a vastly different
world. The Wall is gone, and so is the Soviet
Union. Today's Russia is not yesterday's Soviet
Union. Its government is no longer Communist. Its
president is elected. Today's Russia is not our enemy, but a country
in transition with an opportunity to emerge as a great nation,
democratic, at peace with itself and its neighbors. The Iron
Curtain no longer exists. Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic are free nations, and they are now our allies in NATO,
together with a reunited Germany.
Yet, this is still a dangerous world, a less
certain, a less predictable one. More nations have nuclear
weapons and still more have nuclear aspirations. Many have
chemical and biological weapons. Some already have developed
the ballistic missile technology that would allow them to deliver
weapons of mass destruction at long distances and at incredible
speeds. And a number of these countries are spreading these
technologies around the world.
Most troubling of all, the list of these
countries includes some of the world's least-responsible
states. Unlike the Cold War, today's most urgent threat
stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles in the Soviet hands, but
from a small number of missiles in the hands of these states, states
for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life. They seek
weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors, and to keep
the United States and other responsible nations from helping allies and
friends in strategic parts of the world.
When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990,
the world joined forces to turn him back. But the
international community would have faced a very different situation had
Hussein been able to blackmail with nuclear weapons. Like
Saddam Hussein, some of today's tyrants are gripped by an implacable
hatred of the United States of America. They hate our
friends, they hate our values, they hate democracy and freedom and
individual liberty. Many care little for the lives of their
own people. In such a world, Cold War deterrence is no
longer enough.
To maintain peace, to protect our own citizens
and our own allies and friends, we must seek security based on more
than the grim premise that we can destroy those who seek to destroy
us. This is an important opportunity for the world to
re-think the unthinkable, and to find new ways to keep the peace.
Today's world requires a new policy, a broad
strategy of active nonproliferation, counterproliferation and
defenses. We must work together with other like-minded
nations to deny weapons of terror from those seeking to acquire
them. We must work with allies and friends who wish to join
with us to defend against the harm they can inflict. And
together we must deter anyone who would contemplate their use.
We need new concepts of deterrence that rely
on both offensive and defensive forces. Deterrence can no
longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear
retaliation. Defenses can strengthen deterrence by reducing
the incentive for proliferation.
We need a new framework that allows us to
build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today's
world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the
30 year old ABM Treaty. This treaty does not recognize the
present, or point us to the future. It enshrines the past.
No treaty that prevents us from addressing today's threats, that
prohibits us from pursuing promising technology to defend ourselves,
our friends and our allies is in our interests or in the interests of
world peace.
This new framework must encourage still
further cuts in nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons still have
a vital role to play in our security and that of our
allies. We can, and will, change the size, the composition,
the character of our nuclear forces in a way that reflects the reality
that the Cold War is over.
I am committed to achieving a credible
deterrent with the lowest-possible number of nuclear weapons consistent
with our national security needs, including our obligations to our
allies. My goal is to move quickly to reduce nuclear
forces. The United States will lead by example to achieve
our interests and the interests for peace in the world.
Several months ago, I asked Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld to examine all available technologies and basing modes
for effective missile defenses that could protect the United States,
our deployed forces, our friends and our allies. The
Secretary has explored a number of complementary and innovative
approaches.
The Secretary has identified near-term options
that could allow us to deploy an initial capability against limited
threats. In some cases, we can draw on already established
technologies that might involve land-based and sea-based capabilities
to intercept missiles in mid-course or after they re-enter the
atmosphere. We also recognize the substantial advantages of
intercepting missiles early in their flight, especially in the boost
phase.
The preliminary work has produced some
promising options for advanced sensors and interceptors that may
provide this capability. If based at sea or on aircraft,
such approaches could provide limited, but effective, defenses.
We have more work to do to determine the final
form the defenses might take. We will explore all these
options further. We recognize the technological difficulties
we face and we look forward to the challenge. Our nation will assign
the best people to this critical task.
We will evaluate what works and what does
not. We know that some approaches will not
work. We also know that we will be able to build on our
successes. When ready, and working with Congress, we will
deploy missile defenses to strengthen global security and stability.
I've made it clear from the very beginning
that I would consult closely on the important subject with our friends
and allies who are also threatened by missiles and weapons of mass
destruction.
Today, I'm announcing the dispatch of
high-level representatives to Allied capitals in Europe, Asia,
Australia and Canada to discuss our common responsibility to create a
new framework for security and stability that reflects the world of
today. They will begin leaving next week.
The delegations will be headed by three men on
this stage: Rich Armitage, Paul Wolfowitz, and Steve Hadley;
Deputies of the State Department, the Defense Department and the
National Security staff. Their trips will be part of an
ongoing process of consultation, involving many people and many levels
of government, including my Cabinet Secretaries.
These will be real
consultations. We are not presenting our friends and allies
with unilateral decisions already made. We look forward to
hearing their views, the views of our friends, and to take them into
account.
We will seek their input on all the issues
surrounding the new strategic environment. We'll also need
to reach out to other interested states, including China and
Russia. Russia and the United States should work together to
develop a new foundation for world peace and security in the 21st
century. We should leave behind the constraints of an ABM
Treaty that perpetuates a relationship based on distrust and mutual
vulnerability. This Treaty ignores the fundamental breakthroughs in
technology during the last 30 years. It prohibits us from
exploring all options for defending against the threats that face us,
our allies and other countries.
That's why we should work together to replace
this Treaty with a new framework that reflects a clear and clean break
from the past, and especially from the adversarial legacy of the Cold
War. This new cooperative relationship should look to the
future, not to the past. It should be reassuring, rather
than threatening. It should be premised on openness, mutual
confidence and real opportunities for cooperation, including the area
of missile defense. It should allow us to share information
so that each nation can improve its early warning capability, and its
capability to defend its people and territory. And perhaps
one day, we can even cooperate in a joint defense.
I want to complete the work of changing our
relationship from one based on a nuclear balance of terror, to one
based on common responsibilities and common interests. We
may have areas of difference with Russia, but we are not and must not
be strategic adversaries. Russia and America both face new
threats to security. Together, we can address today's
threats and pursue today's opportunities. We can explore
technologies that have the potential to make us all safer.
This is a time for vision; a time for a new
way of thinking; a time for bold leadership. The Looking
Glass no longer stands its 24-hour-day vigil. We must all
look at the world in a new, realistic way, to preserve peace for
generations to come.
God bless. (Applause.)
END 2:56
P.M. EDT
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