TAB G – European Commission Report: "The Opinion of the Group of Experts Established According to Article 31 of the Euratom Treaty; Depleted Uranium" ^[84]

Summary. The European Commission reported on the possible radiological health effects of depleted uranium. The report was based on the work of a group of independent scientific experts that was established according to Article 31 of the Euratom Treaty. The group’s authority, according to the text of the Euratom Treaty, is to advise on the dangers arising only from ionizing radiation. Thus, the Commission asked the group to note the chemical toxicity of uranium, but specifically address only the radiological health consequences of exposure to depleted uranium.

This report is a good layman’s guide to the entire DU radiological issue. Written in non-technical language, it covers the properties, uses, pathways of exposure, and dose estimates for DU. When considering the potential radiological health effects of DU, the group of experts draws heavily on the experiences of the uranium and atomic weapons industries.

• Taking into account the pathways and realistic scenarios^[85] of human exposure, radiological exposure to depleted uranium could not cause a detectable effect on human health (e.g., cancer).
• Leukemia’s latency period is shorter than that for solid cancers, but uranium accumulates very little in blood forming organs such as bone marrow. Therefore, the calculated risk of leukemia is far below the risk of solid cancers.
• DU exposure scenarios via the food chain included deposition of depleted uranium on vegetation, ingestion of contaminated water or soil, and consumption of contaminated foodstuffs. Resulting doses through such means would be extremely low.
• On the basis of available knowledge of chemical toxicity, one would expect to observe uranium renal toxicity before any other damage (including cancer). The possibility of a combined effect of exposure to toxic or carcinogenic chemicals and to radiation can not be excluded, but there is no evidence to support this hypothesis.
• Without knowing the specific exposure situation, monitoring guidance cannot be provided for individuals who have been in contact with DU. In general, it would be more appropriate to monitor the environment (e.g., drinking water supplies) than it would to monitor individuals.
• The experts also felt that they were not in a position to provide guidance on the need for clean-up measures. Any intervention should take into account the specific situation. General protective measures should be considered on the basis of a common-sense approach to prevent easily avoidable exposures. Where appropriate, specific protection against exposure to depleted uranium should be proposed (e.g., warning signs to prevent the public from picking up DU metal pieces).
• The experts saw no need to exempt DU from any provision of the basic safety standards for the protection of workers and the public from the dangers of ionising radiation; neither did they see a need to introduce stricter safety standards for specific uses of DU.

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