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Saudi Arabia: The Need For American Engagement
HON. ADAM B. SCHIFF
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Friday, June 25, 2004
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, the NBC Nightly News broadcast
a segment in which the Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah was
quoted as telling Saudi television that ``Zionists''
were behind May 1 attack on contractors at the Saudi
oil facility in Yanbu. That attack killed five westerners,
including two Americans.
The Crown Prince's remarks were echoed by Saudi Interior
Minister Prince Nayef, who said that, ``al Qaeda is
backed by Israel and Zionism.'' Prince Abdullah's comments
were scurrilous and inflammatory; unfortunately, they
are part of a persistent pattern by the Saudi government
of saying one thing to the United States and the west
and another thing altogether to its own citizens, 15
of whom participated in the September 11 attacks against
our Nation.
Indeed, the fact that three-quarters of the 9-11 terrorists
were Saudis and that their leader, Osama bin Laden,
was a member of a family that long enjoyed close ties
to the Saudi royal family, should have spurred the Saudi
government to immediate action. Instead, Saudi officials
engaged in a protracted effort to deny that any of their
citizens had been involved in the 9-11 attacks and instead
blamed Israel for terrorism.
Saudi double-talk has had the effect of undermining
the efforts that Kingdom has belatedly made in combating
terrorism. In the wake of the May 2003 bombing of the
housing compounds in Riyadh, the Saudi government began
to take steps to cut off sources of terrorism funding,
but much more needs to be done. A new report from the
Council on Foreign Relations notes that while Riyadh
has enacted new laws, regulations, and institutions
dealing with money laundering, charitable donations,
and financial operations, those new measures have not
been fully implemented and there have been no arrests
of prominent Saudis who have supported al Qaeda financially.
While we must work with the Saudis to ensure they are
continuing to move forward in their efforts in counterterrorism,
the war against Islamic terrorism requires the United
States to engage Saudi Arabia on a broad range of issues.
As the Council on Foreign Relations noted, our relationship
with Saudi Arabia over the past 7 decades was built
on a bargain in which the Kingdom would ensure stability
in the world's oil markets and would play a constructive
role in regional security. In exchange, the United States
would guarantee Saudi security and would not interfere
or raise questions about Saudi domestic issues.
The events of September 11 compel us to challenge the
Saudis to change the conditions in the Kingdom that
have made it a breeding ground for extremism. We must
do this for our own security, but also to help ensure
the stability of Saudi Arabia and of the entire Arab
world. A stable, moderate and reforming Saudi government
is in America's national interest, and we must push
for reform in Saudi Arabia without destabilizing the
country further and throwing it into chaos.
Saudi Arabia's problems did not arise overnight. They
are the product of decades of tension between the Saudi
royal family and the Wahhabi clerics, whose ultra-conservative
brand of Islam predominates in the Kingdom. When the
House of Saud came to power, it sought to bring electricity,
modern communications, and infrastructure to a traditional
nomadic desert society.
In November 1979, these contradictions exploded when
a group of Islamic militants invaded Mecca's Grand Mosque
and took hundreds of pilgrims hostage. Government forces
retook the Mosque and executed dozens of Islamic extremists.
Instead of working to root out extremism throughout
the country, the government sought accommodation with
the extremists and handed over control of many aspects
of Saudi life, including education, the Judiciary, and
cultural affairs to the clerics. As a Saudi businessman
tellingly told Newsweek's Fareed Zakaria recently, ``Having
killed the extremists, the regime implemented their
entire agenda.''
Thus, at the height of the Saudi oil boom of the 1970s
and 1980s, Saudi Arabia took a sharp conservative turn.
Even as thousands of young Saudis were being educated
in the west, the majority of their countrymen were being
fed a diet of religious and cultural bigotry. The rights
of women, already almost nonexistent, were even more
circumscribed.
By September 2001, the Saudi economy had faltered, its
cities were filled with large numbers of undereducated,
underemployed, and unmotivated young people who had
both tasted modernity and were steeped in an ideology
that preached hatred toward the west.
While the Saudis have begun to address the terrorist
financing issue, Riyadh has yet to begin the more difficult
task of recapturing the country from the extremists.
This battle will be long, it will be difficult, and
it will be bloody, but we must keep the pressure on
the government of Saudi Arabia to do this. Our security
and their future depends upon it.
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