Two and a half years ago, when I first visited our troops in Afghanistan, the war there was still in its combat phase.  Operation Anaconda, an effort to encircle Taliban forces and prevent their escape across the Pakistan border, had just concluded. 

Congressman Schiff meets with U.S. Troops in Afghanistan.

The morale of the troops in this early stage of the war on terrorism was very high.  They were deeply committed to the mission, and were having considerable success in routing the Taliban.  Still, it meant a lot to the troops to have our Congressional delegation come visit them, not only for the support it conveyed from the Congress, but just to see someone from home.  I resolved then that whenever we had our troops in harm's way, I would make every effort to visit them.

Flying into Baghram, our main base of operations in Afghanistan, our C-130 flew over the snow-capped mountains that characterize so much of the Afghan landscape.  Looking down from the cockpit window, it was apparent why it would be so difficult to find Bin Laden – the mammoth mountain ranges stretch on as far as the eye can see.  Even with the strong cooperation of Pakistan, something still open to question, capturing or killing Bin Laden will require solid intelligence, sound tactics and some luck.

The drive to Kabul from Baghram took about two hours.  Our armed convoy swerved left and right to avoid bomb craters in the road; the burned out hulks of armored vehicles could still be seen along the way (from a long progression of Afghan wars); teenage Afghans manned makeshift checkpoints with rifles; and brave civilians combed the land with metal detectors looking for land mines.  In this country where land mines are everywhere, rocks are painted red on one side and white on the other.  White means they have been searched for mines; red means tread at your own risk.  Tragically many Afghan shepherds and farmers have no other choice but to walk on the red side, with often catastrophic results.

While meeting with military commanders, intelligence officers, President Karzai and other Afghan leaders during that first visit, it was clear that the challenges would be great.  The Soviet failure in this rugged terrain demonstrated the tough military challenge; the country's lack of any meaningful experience in democracy, its backward civil institutions and subjugation of women made a political transformation highly problematic; and Afghanistan's already considerable opium production was on the rise.

Returning to Afghanistan last month, I could see that substantial progress had been made in every respect save one:  The country is at greater risk than ever of becoming a narco-state.

Militarily, the coalition success has been dramatic.  The Taliban control none of the large urban centers, and although they are still capable of isolated attacks against our troops and the Afghan population, they show no potential of mounting large-scale operations against the coalition.  We cannot let up the pressure in Afghanistan, and there is a real fragility to the peace among the warlords, but the Taliban have not demonstrated an ability to turn their harassing tactics into the broad insurgency we see in Iraq.

Our success in Afghanistan is due in part to the political progress and the leadership of Hamid Karzai.  In an unprecedented voter registration effort in advance of next month's elections, 10.5 million Afghans have registered to vote; 42 percent of whom are women.  In a nation which until recently banned women from any public role, this is an astounding achievement.  As Karzai told our delegation, in villages where people were threatened with being killed by the Taliban if they registered to vote, the entire village would go out and register.

There is still a risk that the Taliban will target voting places throughout parts of the country to disrupt the elections, and they have already killed some election workers.  The elections themselves will be somewhat primitive, with Afghans imprinted with indelible ink to prevent voter fraud.  Even if they do not meet Western standards, however, the elections themselves, any elections, will be a remarkable step given Afghan history.  And the conditions for the elections are far more promising than any we can imagine for Iraq next January, when security will still be a major impediment.

Congressman Schiff meets with Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

I have met President Karzai on several occasions, twice in Afghanistan and several times in Washington.  He is an incredibly bright, capable, and articulate man.  Facing his own election prospects in October, he discussed polls, campaign tactics (one of his opponents was sending his photo to local shops and businesses), and his election strategy of trying to keep his focus on the job and stay above the fray.  We all marveled at the universality of being a candidate, and told him that in America, we call his campaign “a Rose Garden strategy.”

President Karzai's “Rose Garden strategy” is dictated by necessity.  It simply isn't safe for him to travel about the country, and although the pejorative title some have given him – the mayor of Kabul – does not give him adequate credit, there is far more to be done to diminish the power of the country's many warlords.  If there is a vulnerability to our political strategy in Afghanistan, it is Karzai himself.  He is irreplaceable.

I asked the President what he considered the greatest threat to Afghanistan's future.  Was it the Taliban or the continuing problem with warlords?  His answer was the most surprising of our visit – neither.  The Taliban were sufficiently marginalized that Karzai saw no chance of their return.  The warlords he acknowledged were a problem, and one that he was increasingly willing to deal with – as we saw this week with the courageous decision to force Ishmail Khan, warlord of Herat, to step down from his governorship of that province.

Rather, Karzai thought the greatest threat to Afghanistan's future came from enemies around and outside Afghanistan, including those who did not want to see a democratic success in the region.  The threat to Afghanistan has always come from the invaders, making Afghans naturally wary of outsiders.  Because Afghans can see the progress we are making in reconstruction, they tolerate our presence.  Although Karzai was too diplomatic to name names, it was apparent that Afghanistan must concern itself with interference by Iran, disapproval by authoritarian Uzbekistan, and, most significantly, Pakistan's desire to control events there. 

Pakistan continues to view Afghanistan as a territory that gives it strategic depth in its conflict with India, and many Afghans worry that Pakistan wants to retain influence in the country after the Americans leave.  Indeed, our troops passed on to me the well-circulated if inaccurate Afghan concern that once Bin Laden is found the U.S. will pull out.  Some speculate that although Pakistan has worked to rout al Qaeda from its northwest tribal lands, it has been less energetic in defeating the Taliban forces because it wishes to retain influence in Afghanistan, and the Taliban is their lever.  This view was strenuously contested by the Pakistani Foreign Minister during our meeting with him in Islamabad.

The one area in which we have made no progress is in combating the opium trade.  Afghanistan is the largest supplier of heroin to Europe, and although military commanders acknowledged more than two years ago that opium production was on the rise (it had been disfavored by the Taliban), my impression was that they were not the least bit prepared to deal with the problem.  This may have reflected the view that the coalition had enough on its hands fighting the Taliban and did not want to fight or alienate the peasant farmers at the same time.

Now the problem is worse.  Another bumper crop of opium is on the way, and the risk that drug proceeds will be used to support the Taliban against us cannot be ignored.  Drug interdiction and eradication efforts alone will not be enough; we need to work with  Afghan farmers to find alternate crops.  Otherwise, the remarkable reforms being undertaken to transform the country into a place that will never again be a stateless home for terrorists are at risk of being lost in a narcotic fog.

The troops in Afghanistan feel very positive about the work they are doing and their morale remains high.  They are winning the war in Afghanistan and they know it.  They just want to make sure that America does not lose interest in a conflict which, after Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), they deprecatingly refer to as “the third front in a two front war.”  And they are right about that too.  We paid a terrible price for letting the state become a haven for al Qaeda, a mistake we dare not repeat.