The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials
(1945-1946) introduced the
novel
charge of crimes against humanity. For the first time, officials
were held legally accountable to the international community for
offenses against individual citizens, not states, and individuals
who in many cases were nationals, not foreigners. It was in the
United Nations, however, that human rights really emerged as a
subject of international relations.
Human rights have a prominent place in the UN Charter adopted
in
1945. And the new organization moved rapidly to elaborate
authoritative international human rights norms. On December 10,
1948, the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. This comprehensive list of rights codified the
emerging view that the way in which states treat their own
citizens is not only a legitimate international concern but
subject to international standards.
With the rise of the Cold War, however, human rights
increasingly
became just another weapon of ideological struggle. Just as the
United States was willing to accept the most vicious human rights
practices in "friendly" anti-Communist regimes, the Soviet Union
was ready to use force when necessary to assure "friendly"
totalitarian regimes in its sphere of influence.
Furthermore, few states desired more than the strong statement
of
norms provided by the Universal Declaration. Although no longer
willing to leave human rights entirely beyond international
purview, they refused to allow even multilateral monitoring of
national human rights practices, let alone international
implementation or enforcement. The UN Commission on Human
Rights,
for example, was not even permitted to read the thousands of
complaints received by the United Nations alleging human rights
violations.
The United Nations is not a world government standing above
states, but an intergovernmental organization. It can do nothing
that its members -- sovereign states -- do not authorize. During
the first two decades of the Cold War, neither bloc was
willing to allow the UN to do much at all in the field of human
rights.
By the mid-1960s, though, the Afro-Asian bloc had become the
largest group in the United Nations. These countries, which had
suffered under colonial rule, had a special interest in human
rights. They found a sympathetic hearing from the Soviet bloc
and
some countries in Europe and the Americas. The United Nations
thus once again began to attend to human rights.
Most significantly, the International Human Rights Covenants
were completed in December 1966. Along with the Universal
Declaration they provide an authoritative statement of
internationally recognized human rights.
The very comprehensiveness of the Covenants, however, demanded
that the United Nations shift its human rights work from
standard-setting to implementing these standards. This was an
area where the organization had made virtually no headway in its
first two decades.
In the absence of an international legislative body,
international law is in large measure contractual. Most
international legal obligations today arise from treaties, which
are, in effect, solemn contracts between states. Because states
are free to enter into treaties or not, as they see fit, the
obligations of international law are for the most part
voluntarily incurred. States are thus free to, among other
things, establish international obligations that cannot be
internationally enforced -- which is precisely what they did in
the case of human rights.
Consider the "implementation" machinery of the Covenants.
Parties
must submit periodic reports on compliance. The supervisory
committees may question state representatives about the reports
and draw attention to apparent shortcomings. But they are not
authorized to find violations of the treaty, demand changes in
state practice, or seek remedy for victims.
Although human rights norms were fully internationalized by
the
mid-1960s, implementation of those norms remained almost entirely
national. The emerging global human rights regime thus
reflected,
and even today continues to reflect, the strong persistence of a
sovereignty-respecting logic.
The Carter Revival: Small inroads began to be made
in the
late
1960s and 1970s. The UN Commission on Human Rights received
authority to discuss human rights violations in particular
countries. Special procedures addressed human rights violations
in Israeli-occupied territories, South Africa, and Chile. But
the
point of takeoff for human rights as an international issue came
in 1977, when Jimmy Carter took the office of president of the
United States.
In embracing human rights as a priority for American foreign
policy, Carter at least partly disentangled international human
rights from the East-West politics of the Cold War and the
North-South struggles over a new international economic order.
This gave new momentum and increased legitimacy to human rights
advocates throughout the world.
Within the United Nations, a revitalized Commission on Human
Rights, led by Canada, the Netherlands, and others, formulated
major treaties on women's rights (1979), on torture (1984), and
on the rights of the child (1989). Rapporteurs were appointed to
study human rights violations in a growing number of increasingly
diverse countries. The commission also developed innovative new
mechanisms to deal with particular kinds of violations, most
notably disappearances.
The mid-1970s also saw the introduction of
human rights into
the
mainstream of bilateral foreign policy. For example, the United
States and the Nordic countries began to consider the human
rights practices of recipient countries in their aid policies.
And the Helsinki Final Act of 1975
explicitly introduced human
rights into the mainstream of U.S.-Soviet relations.
By the mid-1980s, debate in most Western countries
focused less on whether human rights should be an active concern
of foreign policy -- still a matter of considerable controversy
in the late 1970s and early 1980s -- than on which rights should
be pursued and where.
The 1970s was also the decade in which nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) concerned with human rights emerged as a
notable international political force, as symbolized by the award
of the Nobel Peace Prize to Amnesty International in 1977 for its
assistance to political prisoners. By 1980, there were some 200
NGOs in the United States that dealt with human rights in some
way, and about the same number in Britain.
These groups, in
addition to their advocacy for victims of human rights abuses,
have been important actors in changing bilateral and multilateral
international human rights policies. International campaigns
against torture by Amnesty International in the 1970s and 1980s
played an important role in the drafting of the UN's 1984
Convention Against Torture.
At the national level, the Dutch
section of Amnesty was involved in drafting its government's 1979
White Paper on human rights and development. And anti-apartheid
activists in the United States and several European countries had
a major impact on foreign policy toward South Africa in the
1980s.
The Post-Cold War Environment: Post-Cold War
developments
have
further strengthened multilateral, bilateral, and transnational
human rights actors and procedures. Existing multilateral
mechanisms are being used more vigorously and with greater
impartiality, and new initiatives, such as the creation of a UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights, promise intensified
international monitoring. In most countries, human rights have
become a more deeply entrenched and less controversial issue on
foreign policy agendas, and nongovernmental human rights
organizations and advocates have become an increasingly
significant part of the political landscape.
International human rights issues still provoke political
controversy. At the Vienna World Conference, for example, a
small group of countries argued,
ultimately unsuccessfully, against efforts of the international
community to press states to comply with the standards laid out
in the Universal Declaration and the Covenants. In bilateral
relations, raising human rights issues still is resented by many
states, as the strained relations between China and its major
trading partners in the years following the 1989 Tiananmen
massacre of Chinese citizens clearly illustrate. And most states
still refuse to press international human rights concerns
strongly enough to satisfy many human rights NGOs.
The record of national practice, although greatly
improved in
many countries over the past decade, also leaves much to be
desired. There are still regimes in power -- in Cuba, Iraq,
Burma, North Korea, and other countries -- that rest on
systematic violations of internationally recognized human rights.
And as is documented in the reports of groups as diverse as the
NGO Human Rights Watch and the U.S.
Department of State, most
countries of the world still have significant human rights
problems.
Nonetheless, there is a new willingness within the
international
community to act forcefully in at least some cases of systematic
human rights violations. During the Cold War, genocide in
Cambodia was met with pained expressions of regret, but little
more. In Rwanda in 1994, by contrast, the international
community
responded to genocide with military intervention. In El
Salvador,
UN human rights monitors played an important role in reaching a
political settlement and demilitarizing the country after a
decade-long civil war. In Somalia, when the country descended
into warlord politics, multilateral military forces intervened to
save literally hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians from
starvation. And in Cambodia, a massive United Nations operation
helped to remove occupying Vietnamese forces and install a freely
elected government.
To take just one more example, consider Bosnia. After three
and
a
half years of refusing to bow to force and the politics of ethnic
cleansing, the international community, led by the United States,
was able to broker a settlement of a bloody civil war that killed
close to a quarter million people and made refugees of some two
million others. Whether the peace will hold is unclear. But the
willingness of the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and several non-NATO countries in Central and
Eastern Europe to provide 50,000 troops to implement the Dayton
Peace Accords dramatically reflects the rise in importance of
human rights and humanitarian politics on national and
international agendas in the 1990s and beyond.
The United States and Human
Rights
The United States has played a special role in the political
development and spread of human rights ideas and practices. The
Declaration of Independence, by which the American colonies
severed their allegiance to the British Crown in 1776, proclaims
the self-evident truth that all men are created equal and endowed
with inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. No less important, it asserts the right of a people
to dissolve political bonds that have come to be oppressive. And
in the political system established under the U.S. Constitution
and its Bill of Rights, the world witnessed the first practical
experiment in a government committed to being judged by the
extent to which it respected and protected the rights of its
citizens. Rights, thus, are often seen by Americans as a
defining
feature of their national heritage.
Natural rights are those which appertain to man in right
of
his
existence. Of this kind are all the intellectual rights, or
rights of the mind, and also all those rights of acting as an
individual for his own comfort and happiness, which are not
injurious to the natural rights of others....
Thomas Paine, American political theorist and
writer
(1737-1809), from Rights of Man, 1792
There are, of course, darker sides to that heritage. Slavery
was
officially accepted for the better part of the first century of
the new republic -- the U.S. Constitution actually protected the
slave trade for some 50 years -- and legalized racial
discrimination was the norm for much of the second century.
Indigenous populations were forced to surrender their homes,
their lands, and often their lives, as America expanded westward.
American international human rights policies and practices reveal
a similar ambivalence. For example, Central America and
the Caribbean were viewed as "our backyard," in which American
troops were sent to overthrow governments the United States
judged unacceptable. And during the Cold War, brutal military
dictatorships were called free and democratic, and were given
American financial and military support, so long as they
supported U.S. economic and geopolitical interests.
But the United States also has a long record of positive
international action on behalf of human rights, as, for example,
during the French Revolution and when the countries of Central
and South America threw off Spanish colonial rule in the 19th
century. Furthermore, throughout the 20th century, the United
States has acted internationally to strengthen this reputation.
After World War I, American President Woodrow Wilson championed
national self-determination and protection of minorities by the
international community. After World War II, the United States
devoted considerable effort and money to sustaining and
rebuilding democracy in Europe and to establishing it in Japan.
The United States was a leader in decolonization, granting
independence to the Philippines in 1946.
Even during the Cold
War, when the United States supported repressive dictatorships in
the name of anti-communism, there was a core of truth to the
American claim to be the one superpower committed to the
realization of human rights. And with the end of the Cold War,
the United States has emerged as a leader in multilateral human
rights and humanitarian initiatives in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia,
and other countries.
This leadership role has its problematic elements.
Traditionally,
the United States has been reticent to open itself to the sort of
human rights scrutiny it applies to others. It was only in 1992
that the United States ratified the United Nations' International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, more than 25 years after
the measure received General Assembly approval. In addition,
across the
mainstream of the American political spectrum, there has been an
unusual reluctance to accept the equal status of civil and
political and economic, social, and cultural rights, a central
normative principle of the UN's Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the Covenants. The United States is not a party to
the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
and most Americans do not regard social problems involving
education,
health care, and employment as human rights issues.
American leadership has also been challenged. At home, the
isolationist tradition is deeply rooted. Today, many Americans
are reluctant to spend money or risk American lives to support
human rights abroad. Abroad, American self-righteousness and a
preference for unilateral action have often provoked resentment
even among those who have shared the values underlying American
policies.
Nonetheless, the United States today, as two centuries ago, is
a
world leader in the ongoing struggle for human rights. And the
struggle continues, globally, to realize the revolutionary idea
that all people, simply because they are human, are entitled to
the basic protections, goods, services, and opportunities of
internationally recognized human rights.
International Monitoring and
Implementation
Mechanisms
The transformation of the international relations of human
rights
has been particularly striking at the normative level. For
example, by mid-1998 the International Human Rights Covenants
have been ratified by 137 and 140 states, more than three-fourths
of the countries of the world. Although international bodies
still play a secondary role
in implementing these norms, states are increasingly accountable
to the international community for their human rights practices.
...there are occasional crimes committed on so vast a
scale
and
of such peculiar horror as to make us doubt whether it is not our
manifest duty to endeavor at least to show our disapproval of the
deed and our sympathy with those who have suffered by it. The
cases must be extreme in which such a course is justifiable.
Theodore Roosevelt, 26th president of the United States
(1858-1919), from On Human Rights in Foreign Policy,
1904
The UN's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
established a supervisory committee of independent experts -- the
Human Rights Committee -- the principal function of which is to
review the periodic reports submitted by states. Similar
committees have been created by international human rights
treaties on racial discrimination, women's rights, torture, and
the rights of the child.
Although questions from the committee during review of the
reports are often well informed and probing, the representative
of the reporting state need not answer any question, let alone
provide a satisfactory answer. Many reports contain little more
than extracts from laws and the constitution, or obviously
evasive claims of compliance. And whatever the quality of the
report, once it has been reviewed, the monitoring process
typically ends until the next report is due.
Reporting schemes obviously cannot force recalcitrant states
to
alter their practices. They can, however, provide additional
incentives for states seeking to improve or safeguard their human
rights record. Preparing a report requires a national review of
law and practice, which may uncover areas where improvement may
be needed or possible. It also provides a concrete periodic
reminder to officials of their international legal obligations.
Human rights reports, because they originate from the
reporting
government, may provide the least adversarial of all
international monitoring mechanisms. Reporting systems also have
the virtue of allowing human rights issues to be addressed before
problems become severe. But government control of the mechanism
makes this type of monitoring most subject to evasion and abuse.
The Human Rights Committee may also consider "communications"
(complaints) from individuals in the states party to the (First)
Optional Protocol to the Covenant. Although the findings of the
Human Rights Committee are not enforceable, several states have
acted on them. For example, Canada revised legislation
concerning
the rights of Indians living off their tribal lands, Mauritius
altered legislation concerning women's rights, and the
Netherlands changed discriminatory social security legislation.
The expert committees on racial discrimination and torture have
similar powers.
An even stronger individual complaint mechanism exists within
the
Council of Europe. The decisions of the European Commission on
Human Rights, although not technically binding, are usually
accepted by states. And the European Court of Human Rights has
made legally binding decisions in almost 200 cases dealing with a
variety of issues, including such sensitive questions as public
emergencies. This is the one instance, globally, where there has
been a significant transfer of authority for implementing human
rights from states to a supranational political community.
Unfortunately, regional schemes in the Americas and Africa have
had less success working with individual communications, and Asia
and the Arab world do not have regional human rights commissions.
The attraction of individual cases is that their concreteness
and
specificity make it hard for states to evade responsibility. In
order to avoid embarrassing publicity, a state may release
political prisoners or may compensate individual victims --
although the three global treaty-based petition systems have
handled well under 1,000 cases combined. Procedures focused on
individual victims, however, fail to address broader patterns and
deeper structural forces.
Therefore, it is of special interest that the Committee
Against
Torture is also authorized to investigate
communications concerning situations where torture is
systematically practiced. But precisely because such procedures
allow more systematic challenges to governments, they are not
widely implemented. No other independent committee of experts
has
this authority, and the comparable "1503 procedure" in the UN
Commission on Human Rights dealt with less than half a dozen
cases during its first two decades of operation.
Here as elsewhere, one can see an inverse relationship between
the strength and scope of international monitoring procedures and
the willingness of states to use and participate in them. And
because sovereign states have the right to choose not to
participate in most international human rights implementation
systems, the tradeoff between strength and coverage is a serious
and persistent problem.
Another set of multilateral human rights monitoring mechanisms
focuses on investigative reporting and advocacy. The pioneer in
this area was the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Its
reports on Chile in the 1970s and 1980s were an important element
in the international campaign against the Pinochet government,
and its 1978 report on Nicaragua appears to have contributed
significantly to the demise of the Somoza government.
Over the past two decades, the UN Commission on Human Rights has
devoted considerable and growing effort to country studies,
including such politically prominent countries as Guatemala,
Iran, and Burma. Typically, the commission works through a
special rapporteur -- a semi-independent expert and investigator.
The special rapporteur, in addition to reporting formally to the
commission, typically attempts to maintain a continuing dialogue
with the government in question in order to establish a sustained
presence and channel for influence.
The UN Commission on Human Rights has also developed an
innovative series of "thematic" efforts to consider particular
types of human rights violations, beginning with the Working
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances established in
1980. In its first decade, this working group handled over
19,000
cases. In 1985, Peter Kooijmans, the outgoing chair of the
commission, was appointed special rapporteur on torture.
Kooijmans held this position until 1993, when he became Foreign
Minister of the Netherlands -- a sign of the dramatic rise in the
priority of human rights in the foreign policy of at least some
states. Additional rapporteurs or working groups have been
created to deal with summary or arbitrary executions, arbitrary
detentions, religious intolerance, human rights violations by
mercenaries, and racism.
The newest international human rights monitor is the
semi-independent UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,
established in 1994 on the recommendation of the Vienna World
Conference. Although it is still too early to assess the impact
of this initiative, the appointment in 1997 of Mary Robinson, the
former President of Ireland, has brought a substantial increase
in the profile and vigor of the office.
Nongovernmental Organizations and
States: Their Contrasting
Roles
As noted earlier, the transnational activities of human rights
nongovernmental organizations outside their own countries and the
bilateral policies of states are often at least as important to
the international politics of human rights as the activities of
formal multilateral institutions discussed above. In addition to
the international campaigns waged by Amnesty International, such
U.S. NGOs as Americas Watch, the American Civil Liberties Union,
and several other organizations were important players in the
struggles over Central American policy in the 1980s. And in both
North America and Europe, NGOs played a major role in national
debates over sanctions against South Africa during the 1980s.
Because of their private status, NGOs can operate free of the
political control of states. And because they do not have
broader
foreign policy concerns that may conflict with their human rights
objectives, they often are better able to press human rights
concerns.
Human rights NGOs may also have a special advantage as
national
advocates of improved human rights practices. Because they are
narrowly focused and generally nonpartisan, they sometimes can
raise human rights issues within a country that no other actor
can. Particularly where independent political activity is
repressed and civil society is weak, as in the Soviet bloc or the
Southern Cone of South America during the late 1970s and early
1980s, human rights NGOs may be the only national voice not
completely silenced. Likewise today, in countries where
democratization and political liberalization remain incomplete,
partisan political activity often is far more dangerous than less
directly partisan human rights activity. And both national and
international human rights NGOs have a special role when
political space begins to open, or threatens to close back down,
because they act with a single-minded focus on human rights.
However, NGOs must rely on the power of publicity and
persuasion.
They lack the resources of even weak states. States remain free
to be unpersuaded. And many states have used their powers of
coercion against the members of human rights NGOs, turning them
into new victims.
Sovereign states have almost the opposite strengths and
weaknesses of NGOs. States in their foreign policies must
accommodate a wide range of interests. Foreign policy can never
be reduced to or identical to human rights policy. Furthermore,
foreign policy is by its nature directed toward the realization
of the national interest, which rarely places human rights above
material and political interests. But when states do choose to
pursue human rights objectives, they typically possess resources,
channels of influence, and even publicity capabilities that are
unavailable to NGOs.
The national role of states also needs to be emphasized.
States,
in addition to being the principal violators of human rights, are
the principal mechanism for their protection and implementation
in the contemporary world. The ultimate goal of human rights
advocacy is to alter national law and practice. The contribution
of international actors is therefore almost always secondary to
the national political struggles by which citizens force their
own government to respect their rights. International action can
help to quicken the pace, provide support for national human
rights advocates, and add further incentives for regimes to
respect the rights of their citizens. It is at the level of the
nation-state, however, that human rights must ultimately be
vindicated.
Finally, in thinking about international human rights
pressures
on states, the role of actors who are only episodically involved,
or may not even have an explicit human rights mandate, should not
be overlooked. For example, the 1993 Vienna World Conference on
Human Rights, a one-time, ad hoc gathering, helped refocus
international attention on human rights in the post-Cold War
world. The war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda are ad hoc bodies that may help to shape the direction of
international human rights activities. The 1995 United Nations
Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing attempted to
introduce women's issues more explicitly into the mainstream of
international human rights discussions. The World Bank, in its
recent emphasis on "good governance," has begun to touch on
important human rights issues. And both the Council of Europe
and
the European Union have stressed the importance of
rights-protective policies to inclusion in "Europe."
A System of International
Accountability
Although sovereign states retain a primary responsibility for
implementing internationally recognized human rights in their
territories, they no longer enjoy the protections of discrete
diplomatic silence. Quite the contrary, persistent human rights
violators increasingly must act in the light of embarrassing
international publicity mobilized by public and private groups.
Global, regional, national, and transnational actors have created
a web of pressures that make it almost impossible today for
states to avoid a public accounting of their human rights
practices.
The authority of government...is still an impure one: to
be
strictly just, it must have the sanction and consent of the
governed. It can have no pure right over my person and property
but what I concede to it. The progress from an absolute to a
limited monarchy, from a limited monarchy to a democracy, is
progress toward a true respect for the individual.
Henry David Thoreau, American essayist (1817-1862),
from Civil Disobedience, 1846
Admittedly, most of the current mechanisms of accountability
rely
principally on the power of public exposure and scrutiny. But
the
value of publicizing violations and trying to shame states into
better compliance should not be underestimated. Even vicious
governments may care about their international reputation. For
example, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, no less vile a
government than the Argentine military regime devoted
considerable diplomatic effort to thwart the investigations of
the UN Commission on Human Rights. Furthermore, publicity often
helps at least a few of the more prominent victims of repression.
The most important impact of all this -- largely verbal --
international human rights activity, however, probably lies less
in its immediate achievements on behalf of victims than in the
fact that national and international norms and expectations are
being altered. The idea of human rights has a moral force and
mobilizing power in the contemporary world that seems hard to
resist. And as more and more citizens throughout the world come
to think of themselves as endowed with inalienable rights against
their government, the demand for human rights continues to cause
dictators to flee and their governments to crumble.
The sword often proves mightier than the word, at least in the
short run. But the task of human rights advocates, wherever they
may be, is the ancient and noble one of speaking the truth of
justice to power. And one of the most heartening lessons of
recent international history is that, far more often than
so-called realists would
ever allow, that truth can triumph.
__________
Jack Donnelly is the Andrew W. Mellon professor at the
Graduate
School of International Studies, University of Denver. Dr.
Donnelly is the author of Universal Human Rights in Theory
and
Practice, International Human Rights, and numerous articles
on a
variety of human rights issues.