D R A F T

SUBJECT: Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) Assessment for the XXXX Program, Milestone III

1. Reference memorandum, Commander, XXXXX, XXXXX-XXX, 10 January 19XX, subject: MANPRINT Assessment for the XXXX Program.

2. XXX Launcher concerns: The XXXX will be fired from the XXX launcher. This assessment will only address the issues created by adding the XXXX munition to the XXXXX. However, hazards exist for the XXX Launcher that if not addressed will affect the XXXX system effectiveness and could result in operator incapacitation or mission failure.

3. The assessments for each MANPRINT Domain are:

a. Manpower, Green.

b. Personnel, Green.

c. Training, Green.

d. Human Factors Engineering (HFE), Green.

e. System Safety (SS), Green.

f. Soldier Survivability, Green.

g. Health Hazards (HH) - Unknown. However, as this is a upgrade to an existing system there are no anticipated concerns sufficient to slow the program. Data does not exist measuring the impulse noise at normal personnel locations. Data is also required to assess crew exposure to rocket motor combustion products when the engine fan is on high and positive pressure cannot be maintained. Whole body vibration data does not exist. In all cases where data does not exist, The Surgeon General has requested that the data be collected so that a definitive assessment can be made. As these data are collected and analyzed, the end user should implement appropriate administrative controls to attenuate the problem, e.g., excessive steady state noise requires double hearing protection at all times.

4. Questions regarding the MANPRINT Assessment should be directed to XXXXXXXX, MANPRINT Division of the Personnel Technologies Directorate (PERTEC) at DSN 225-XXXX or commercial 703-695-XXXX.

FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL:

D R A F T

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

DAPE-MR 2                                                                                                                May 19XX

MEMORANDUM THRU THE ASARC SECRETARY

FOR THE ASARC MEMBERS

SUBJECT: Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) Assessment for the XXXX System

1. The program is rated Green. The XXXX has demonstrated through testing that it is a tremendous weapon, and far superior to the predecessor system, XXXXX, from a MANPRINT perspective. Health Hazard, Human Factors Engineering, and Soldier Survivability concerns are addressed below.

2. Health Hazards - Green. There persist two Health Hazard issues that are most practically mitigated by training and proper administrative control procedures:

a. The laser in the training device can cause eye damage so it needs to be well labeled, with trainers alerted to the need to carefully manage its use.

b. The blase fumes are noxious, so that exposure needs to be constrained by proper administrative control procedures.

3. Human Factors Engineering - Green. There is a continuing value in achieving a lighter load for future weapons designs, but I am satisfied that the modular configuration, controlled in the field by doctrine and training, make the system manageable by dismounted infantry.

4. Soldier Survivability - Green. Because of the weapon's range and lethality, training for target discrimination of friend or foe may need to be increased to reduce the risk of fratricide.

5. The POC is XXXXXXXXX, (703) 695-XXXX, DSN 225, FAX DSN 227-1283.

FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL:

                                                                                                          ROBERT F. HOLZ

                                                                                                          Acting Director for Personnel

D R A F T

DAPE-MR                                                                                                         10 September 19XX

MEMORANDUM THRU THE ASARC SECRETARY

FOR THE ASARC MEMBERS

SUBJECT: MANPRINT Assessment for the XXXXXXX

1. This MANPRINT Assessment is based on a review of the Domain Reports.

2. An overall system rating for the XXXXXXX could be set at RED, but we have registered AMBER to have the program continue. We see this program in a critical risk status because of the critical and major issues described below.

a. Manpower is rated AMBER. Although rated Amber, MANPRINT is verging on Red because the potential billpayers have not been identified for an estimated 39 maintenance MOS XXX spaces. Based on Title 10, U.S.C. Sec 2434, DoD regulation 5000-2R states, "no acquisition program shall be approved to proceed beyond program initiation unless sufficient resources including manpower are programmed... The Manpower Estimate for the program shall address manpower affordability in terms of end strength and civilian work years." With continuing pressures for reductions in force structure, billpayer issues are paramount; however, the clock continues to run and we may well run out of the lead time necessary for MPT actions.

b. Personnel is rated AMBER. Although rated Amber, personnel is also verging on Red because several critical program documents, such as the Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP) and the Qualitative and Quantitative Personnel Requirements Information (QQPRI), have not been approved. These documents are crucial to development of Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) and should be in place 39 months prior to the First Unit Equipped (FUE).

In addition, the Operator and Maintainer (O & M) decision, which is based on those documents, has not been developed. Therefore, job task analyses and the full spectrum of duties to operate and use the new technology have not been estimated well enough for essential MPT planning. It appears that soldier tasks will include a "Crew Chief/Local Area Network (LAN) Manager" function. This is a significant new and highly skilled function with many new tasks, and may result in training and task overload on the soldier.

c. Training is rated AMBER. The STRAP is missing several paragraphs and annexes. It does not address Army Reserve or National Guard training requirements. In addition, courses of action on the "who, what, when, and where" for training, to include the Automation Expert and the Battle Staff NCO, have not been made.

d. Human Factors Engineering is rated AMBER. The human-machine interface has potential risks that have yet to be analyzed and resolved. This is compounded due to the lack of operator and maintainer decisions.

e. System Safety (SS) is rated AMBER. This rating is based on the Safety Center's Systems Safety Assessment. "Emergency ventilation for Mission Module egress: The mission module construction and ventilation creates a hazard for the XXXXXXX crew during fire emergency egress. Several instances during testing had the XXXXXXX quickly filling up with smoke when an electronic device failed. The smoke quickly rose to the ceiling and engulfed the breathing zones of all the XXXXXXX crew... The hazard is the amount of CO, CO2 and toxic byproducts from electrical insulations. These byproducts could cause the XXXXXXX crew to be overcome, causing unconsciousness and significant lung damage. " (see paragraph f. below)

f. Health Hazards (HH) is rated AMBER. The Health Hazards Assessment Report (HHAR) supports the passage of XXXXXXX into LRIP. However, HH is rated AMBER due to the following previously unresolved HH: Chemical substances (fire extinguishing agents), acoustic energy (steady-state noise), and whole-body vibration.

      (1) The enclosure crew compartment is equipped with two 2.3 pound, hand-held, CO2 extinguishers in the carrier cab. A fire inside the confined space will quickly make it difficult for personnel to breathe. When the CO2 is released on the fire it denies the oxygen required for burning. Depending on the amount released and the length of exposure, personnel may become unconscious, experience other ill effects. Carbon dioxide (CO2) data collected in the XXXXXXX indicated the potential for very high CO2 concentrations at face level and deadly concentrations at the floor level. In all test scenarios, if soldiers breathe the atmosphere at the extinguisher discharged point or at the floor, unconsciousness or death could occur unless they are removed to a normal atmosphere or given oxygen quickly.

      (2) Acoustic energy, steady-state noise. The major sources of steady-state noise capable of propagating to the ear through the helmet are the drive train and the intercom/radio. The headset worn by crewmembers is the XXXXX helmet from the XXXX System. The XXXXX provides hearing protection with an attentive ear-cup and also employs Active Noise Reduction (ANR). The Aberdeen Test Center (ATC) also measured the noise levels inside the XXXXX headsets using miniature microphones; the objective was to determine at-ear-level for audio alarms. The measurements show almost no noise attenuation for the XXXXX headsets and severe overexposure of the of the crew wearing XXXXX headsets. Prolonged unprotected exposure to hazardous noise levels will cause loss of hearing and may reduce soldier survivability. All personnel exposed to hazardous noise must wear hearing protective devices. The test equipment and test procedures should be reviewed to determine the cause of the apparent failure to attain the expected noise attenuation in the XXXXX.

      (3) Whole-body vibration (WBV). Some of the XXXXXXX components that affect the transmission of the WBV to the crew include the steel road wheels, a "big-foot" track, torsion bar assemblies, and a seating subsystem which consists of the seat, a five-point restraining system, and a motion damping base. The XXXXXXX is likely to present a high level risk of injury to the driver during normal operations. This is based on the mobility requirement to travel cross-country terrain approximately 100 miles in 24-hour period. The highest risk of injury is associated with the driver position, and with vertical WBV direction.

Recommendations:

     (1) Chemical substances. Ensure the technical and training manuals warn personnel of the presence of high concentrations of CO2 near the floor of the enclosure, at the discharge point, and in the cab. The inclusion of this warning in the appropriate technical and training manuals should reduce to a negligible level the probability of personnel adversely affected by this hazard. In addition, conduct hands-on training in proper use of the portable fire extinguishers that are provided for use in the XXXXXXX. Explore the possibility of using a safer extinguisher material. After accidental or deliberate discharge, if able crewmembers' first priority is to exit the XXXXXXX to prevent overexposure to CO2 then ventilate the XXXXXXX prior to reentry. If unable to exit, ventilate to remove the extinguisher gas. Place warnings in all technical and training manuals regarding the high CO2 concentrations. Include following or similar information in the applicable technical manual: "Warning: DO NOT PANIC". Ensure soldiers are provided with an educational program to familiarize them with generic principles of fire extinguisher use and the hazards involved with incipient stage fire fighting.

     (2) Acoustic energy, steady-state noise. Wear hearing protection when in the vehicle or the XXXXXXX, moving at speeds above 8 km/hr. Hearing protection when within 40 feet, engine operating at idle at 1250 rpm or within 19 feet, idling at 750 rpm. Turn the XXXX volume down to the lowest level that is consistent with understanding the voice traffic. Investigate the apparent failure of the XXXXX to provide attenuation of the ambient noise during the ATC noise tests.

     (3) Whole-body vibration. Modify the vehicle seats, particularly the driver and jump seats, to eliminate WBV transmitted to the operators. Target the design modifications to WBV frequencies and magnitudes produced by the XXXXXXX when traveling over cross-country terrain. In the interim, limit travel to a maximum of 6 miles per move over cross-country, driver should switch positions with other crewmembers in order to reduce their injury risk. Until the driver's seat design is improved, avoid speeds between 15-25 mph when traveling over primary roads or restrict movement to a total of 60 miles.

g. Soldier Survivability (SSv) is rated AMBER. The memorandum describing the specific detailed concerns was transmitted 9 Sep XX directly to the Program Executive Office, XXXXXX and is the source for this rating.

3. MANPRINT point of contact is XXXXXXXX, DSN 221-XXXX, or commercial (703) 695-XXXX.

                                                                                                     ROBERT F. HOLZ

                                                                                                     Acting Director for Personnel

                                                                                                     Technologies

D R A F T

DAPE-MRA                                                                                                                  13 Jan 19XX

MEMORANDUM FOR OFFICE, DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND

COMPUTERS, ATTN: SAIS-PP

SUBJECT: Abbreviated Integrated Program Assessment (IPA)/MANPRINT Assessment for the XXXXX Program.

1.      Due to the very short suspense for the XXXXX IPA, several of the MANPRINT domain agencies were not able to successfully complete their domain assessments. Therefore, this assessment does not address all potential MANPRINT risks in the areas of System Safety, Health Hazards, Human Engineering, or Soldier Survivability.

a. Eight months ago during a combined IOTE/DT Test at Fort XXX, a significant noise problem was identified. When the XXXXX Terminal is operating in the shelter along with other equipment - including three fans, the noise level (88 dB(A)) exceeds the maximum acceptable level. High noise presents several hazards/performance risks. These include: 1) Hearing loss: For an 8-hour exposure, 85 dB(A) is the maximum noise level acceptable to prevent hearing loss. Since harmful noise effects are accumulative, exposures of longer duration would mandate lower dB(A) levels. 2) Degrade mission performance:

The maximum noise level for voice intelligibility is 75 dB(A). Noise that exceeds that level results in a decreased capability to correctly interpret voice transmitted over radios and telephones. 3) Degraded human/mission performance: Continued exposure to high noise levels can lead to operator fatigue, confusion, and increased errors. 4) Degraded mission performance: In the XXXXX configuration, noise levels that exceed the 65 dB(A) safety thresholds diminish the operator's capability to distinguish early warning audio cues/signals. As a possible resolution, the safety engineers have recommended that soldiers wear headsets to reduce the hazard. (Perhaps the new XXX headsets should be closely examined as a possible solution.) We have been unable to determine the current status of this issue as well as that of the recommended solution. Therefore, rather than delay the program from entering LRIP until resolution has been accomplished, recommend instead that the following language be included as exit criteria: "Satisfactory resolution to the safety/health hazard/intelligibility issue involving high noise levels must be identified, planned, and resourced prior to entering Full Rate Production."

b. Certain critical MANPRINT-related program documents are either outdated or incomplete. These include the BOIP, QQPRI, and the STRAP. These documents direct vital efforts involving planning, resourcing and documenting actions for manpower, personnel, and training. Therefore, to ensure that XXXXX can be supported with properly trained soldiers at system fielding, we strongly recommend the following exit criteria be established: "Require an approved BOIP, QQPRI, and STRAP (to include update, if necessary) before proceeding to Full Rate Production."

c. Since test results from the Limited Users Test are not yet available and hence, could not be addressed in this assessment, recommend that the following exit criteria be established: "Require all MANPRINT issues being tested receive either a satisfactory performance rating, or that recommended fixes be funded and tested before proceeding to Full Rate Production."

d. Another area of concern involves the lack of institutional training for the maintenance personnel (MOS XXX - which converts to MOS XXX in 2QFYXX). Since this training will be accomplished by an exportable training package, there is concern regarding the adequacy of the training. Since the competence of the maintainers will have a direct bearing on the turn-around time of the LRUs in the XXXXX, poorly trained soldiers would adversely impact the unit mission performance. Therefore, to ensure sufficient competency of the training package, recommend the following exit criteria be established: "Require the exportable training package be thoroughly tested for adequacy and that it receive a satisfactory performance rating."

e. One last concern involves a deficiency in equipment planning for the National Guard. As noted in the Manpower Estimate Report, although there are requirements for XXXXX in two National Guard units, there are no XXXXX radios available for those units. This could result in a serious operational and training problem for the Army.

3.     Ordinarily, lacking four of the seven MANPRINT domain assessments would automatically mandate a RED program rating from this office. However, considering this is a limited production decision, we believe that by (1) using sufficient MANPRINT exit criteria at the end of the LRIP phase, (2) requiring IOTE test results prior to the Milestone III ASARC, and (3) requiring all seven domain MANPRINT domain assessments for the Milestone III ASARC Review, we can ensure there will be adequate safeguards in place to reduce potential MANPRINT performance risk.

4.      Telephonic inquiries regarding this action may be addressed to XXXXXXXX, at DSN 225-XXXX, or COM (703) 695-XXXX.

FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL:

D R A F T

SUBJECT: Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) Assessment for the XXXXXX

1.    Program is rated AMBER. There are no known issues that will prevent XXXXXX from proceeding to Phase III Production and Deployment. However, there are several issues that will require intensive management by the materiel and combat developers before fielding to ensure XXXXXX total system performance is optimized. The issues and specific domain ratings for each domain are addressed below:

a. Manpower - GREEN. There are no known issues.

b. Personnel - AMBER. There are two major personnel issues: late processing/approval of the Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP)/Qualitative and Quantitative Personnel Requirements Information (QQPRI) and late initiation of the process to create a transitional Additional Skill Identifier (ASI). The PM has obtained a deferment to the requirement for an approved BOIP/QQPRI 39 months prior to First Unit Equipped (FUE), and the U. S. Army XXXXXX School has made final MOS decisions and initiated a formal request to PERSCOM to create ASI XX, but these actions will not alleviate the need to intensively coordinate, manage and work both processes over the next year. BOIPs will be approved in September XX and ASI approval will take 8 months to one year. Both timeframes coincide with Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 4QFYXX. Any delay in either process will have a negative impact on XXXXXX fielding. DAPE-MR will continue to work with the PM to support this action.

c. Training - GREEN. Although rated as Green, we yet have a concern regarding reading grade level (RGL) and completeness of XXXXXX training documentation.

Preliminary analysis of Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOTE) results indicate that a substantial amount of work will be needed to revise training material RGL to meet TRADOC requirements. In addition, results point to a deficiency of emphasis in training documentation on troubleshooting procedures and commonly encountered problems. IOTE results indicate the need for training enhancements in some areas, especially power supply. Losses of power that occurred during IOTE that caused the system to crash indicate the need for increased hands-on XXXX training, checklists of power switch procedures, and training enhancements to drill soldiers on correct procedures for switching power between the generator and the track. Other training enhancements are needed in the areas of guidance alerts and meanings of alerts and warnings. SMEs report that XXX software fixes may eliminate the need for some of these training enhancements, but the software solutions must be verified during Technical Testing (TT) next year. DAPE-MR recommends that the system documentation be updated to reflect these training issues at risk and document their closure in the future.

d. Safety - AMBER. Nine high risk hazards in the XXXXXX software are scheduled to be fixed in the next release of software, XXX. The required software fixes have been identified by the XXXXXX contractor and are scheduled for technical testing (TT) and verification in March XX. The Operational Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) will provide test oversight. XXX will be fielded in Jan XX if the TT is successful and the version proceeds through CECOM materiel release. The XXXXXX System Safety Working Group (SSWG), the Army Safety Center, and Director, MANPRINT, expect these hazards to be fully mitigated with the software fixes. TECOM's materiel release is dependent upon tested and proven correction of the high risk hazards.

e. Human Factors Engineering - AMBER.

(1)      Heat stress in the XXXXX is identified as a significant risk in terms of mission failure, degradation of mission performance, potential for causing life threatening heat stroke, loss of consciousness, coma and death. The XXXXX workspace temperature is often elevated to dangerous and debilitating levels (100 to 125 degrees F). The air exchange from inside the XXXXX to the outside ambient air is small. Therefore, humidity climbs rapidly to life threatening levels (inside the XXXXX) due to soldier sweat and other moisture that may have entered. Potential solutions are to mechanically cool the workspace air, or limit (XXXXX) vehicle use to cool areas. Although AMC has accepted the risk to safety and health by operating the XXXXX under hot climatic conditions (provided users are informed of the potential for heat stress injuries and exercise administrative controls to mitigate the hazard), human performance degradation and Manpower, Personnel and Training (MPT) issues E-mail (i.e., when administrative controls are used to relieve an operator to avoid heat stress, some other trained operator must be provided).

(2)     Two major issues identified during Initial Operational Testing and Evaluation (IOTE), were clock synchronization and frequent (system) rebooting. SMEs state that both will be corrected by software changes to XXX. Clock synchronization problems, if not corrected, could cause mission failure. ATEC analysis described frequent rebooting as a major indicator of the need for more specified troubleshooting training, especially for common problems. The report also noted that operators need more training on the meaning of alerts and warnings. The software revision should make the need for increased training less likely.

f. Health Hazards - AMBER. There are no health hazards directly associated with XXXXXX, apart from heat stress, but there are health hazards associated with different configurations of vehicles housing the XXXXXX and associated equipment. These are exposure to chemical substances (i.e., diesel exhaust), acoustic energy and temperature extremes. Recommendations are to prohibit operation of the XXXXX diesel engine when the XXXX is occupied. Diesel generator engine exhaust can be controlled by positioning generators downwind and as far away from personnel as possible. New noise data is needed on the XXXXX. Crew are required to wear the XX helmet with chin strap fastened at all times when the vehicle is operating, but from 30 to 59% of these helmets checked in the field are totally unserviceable for protection of hearing. Pending new noise data, double hearing protection must be worn for missions involving more than 30 minutes of stationary or 13 minutes of vehicle movement in a 24 hour period. Personnel noise exposure time must be limited to 12 hours per 24 hours with double hearing protection when operating in the stationary mode. Heat stress in the XXXXX is discussed under HFE. Rigid Wall Shelters (RWS) mounted on the XXXXX should be equipped with an Environmental Control Unit (ECU) capable of meeting heating requirements of MIL-STD-1472D. The XXXX should be equipped with a heater capable of meeting requirements of MIL-STD-1472D. DAPE-MR strongly recommends that these health hazards be considered during future XXXX and generator variant upgrades/new developments.

g. Survivability - AMBER. The Soldier Survivability (SSv) Domain Report found no critical problems for XXXXXX. A major problem is the unknown ability of the system to detect malicious codes. SLAD reports that the impact of the results of malicious codes on system performance is also unknown. SLAD concludes that there are no adverse effects that would delay the fielding of XXXXXX.

3. Direct telephonic inquiries regarding this assessment to XXXXXXXX, DSN 225-XXXX, or COMM 703-695-XXXX.

                                                                                                          ROBERT F. HOLZ

                                                                                                          Acting Director for Personnel

                                                                                                          Technologies